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The  Struggle  over  and  Impact  of 
Media  Portrayals  of  Northern  Ireland 
This  thesis  examines  the  process  of  mass  communication  from  media 
strategies  to  audience  belief  in  relation  to  the  conflict  in  Ireland.  It  documents 
the  media  strategies  used  by  the  various  actors  and  participants  in  the  conflict, 
from  the  Northern  Ireland  Office,  Royal  Ulster  Constabulary,  Foreign  Office  and 
Army  to  Sinn  Rin  and  the  Irish  Republican  Army,  via  the  Ulster  Defence 
Association,  other  political  parties,  Civil  liberties  and  human  rights 
organisations  and  many  others.  It  reveals  the  the  continuing  disinformation 
efforts  of  the  British  government,  examines  how  source  organisations  interact 
with  journalists,  how  journalists  and  their  editors  operate  and  looks  at  the 
outcome  of  their  endeavours  by  analysing  international  coverage  of  the 
Northern  Ireland  conflict.  Finally,  the  research  examines  the  reception  of 
media  information  amongst  people  living  in  Northern  Ireland  and  Britain.  Key 
questions  here  included  the  extent  to  which  'violence'  acted  as  a  key  organising 
category  in  British  perceptions  of  the  conflict  and  the  effectiveness  of 
propaganda  in  structuring  public  (mis)understandings. Contents 
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Basil  Fawlty  (to  Polly)  Listen...  Don't  mention  the  war...  I  mentioned  it 
once,  but  I  think  I  got  away  with  it  all  right  ... 
(He  returns  to  his  guests.  )  So 
It's  all  forgotten  now  and  let's  hear  no  more  about  it.  So...  that's  two  egg 
mayonnaise,  a  prawn  Goebbels,  a  Herman  Goering  and  four  Colditz 
salads...  no,  wait  a  moment,  I  got  a  bit  confused  there,  sorry...  (from 
Fawlty  Towers,  BBC  Television,  in  Sadler  and  Hallyar  1985) 
This  thesis  emerges  from  wide-ranging  empirical  research  conducted  between 
1988  and  1993.  It  is  an  attempt  to  examine  the  process  of  mass 
communication  from  the  genesis  of  media  strategies,  through  the  production  of 
news  and  other  factual  accounts  of  the  Northern  Ireland  conflict,  to  the  content 
of  press  and  television  reporting.  It  also  goes  further  and  attempts  to  examine 
the  impact  of  the  media  on  public  opinion  and  belief. 
The  research  for  this  thesis  draws  on  over  200  interviews  with  both  sources 
and  journalists.  Amongst  the  former  were  serving  and  former  Information 
Officers  and  administrative  civil  servants  in  the  Northern  Ireland  Office,  Royal 
Ulster  Constabulary,  Ministry,  of  Defence,  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office, 
Central  Office  of  Information,  Northern  Ireland  Tourist  Board,  Industrial 
Development  Board  and  Fair  Employment  Agency,  together  with  Press  officers 
or  representatives  of  The  Democratic  Unionist  Party,  The  Ulster  Unionist  Party, 
the  Social,  Democratic  and  Labour  Party,  Sinn  Fein  and  a  range  of  civil 
liberties  and  human  rights  organisations  such  as  Amnesty  International, 
Liberty,  Committee  on  the  Administration  of  Justice,  the  Standing  Advisory 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  etc.  Amongst  the  journalists,  were 
representatives  of  all  British  national  papers,  all  Belfast  and  Dublin  based 
papers,  both  BBC*TV  and  ITN  reporters,  together  with  numerous  current  affairs 
and  radio  journalists  and  senior  broadcasting  management  in  both  London  and 
Belfast.  I  also  interviewed  a  selection  of  foreign  correspondents  and  a  range 
of  US  journalists. 
There  are  very  few  recent  studies  which  analyse  media  coverage  together  with 
its  interpretation  by  audiences  (although  see  Corner  et  al  1990;  Morley  1980; 
Philo  1990;  Schlesinger  et  al  1992).  By  contrast  there  has  been  a  huge 
explosion  of  research  on  the  television  audience  which  tends  to  downplay  or 
ignore  media  messages  and  concentrate  simply  on  audience  interpretation. 
Much  of  this  has  been  concerned  with  demonstrating  audience  'activity.  Texts 
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are  seen  as  having  no  fixed  meanings  and  audiences  may  (to  some  extent  at 
least)  pick  and  choose  the  meanings  they  take  from  a  given  message. 
However'the  most  important  thing  for  audience  research  to  focus  on'  (Corner 
1991:  275)  is  the  relationship  between  media  content  and  public  belief.  If  we 
want  to  understand  media  content,  it  is  also  crucial  to  examine  the  production 
of  media  messages  and  the  strategies  used  by  sources  to  influence  the  media. 
Framing  all  these  processes  are,  of  course,  the  prevailing  economic  relations  of 
media  production.  Yet  surprisingly  there  are  veVther  studies  which  have 
taken  in  such  a  broad  sweep  from  source  strategies  to  audience  belief.  The 
arguments  about  the  influence  of  the  media  on  public  belief  presented  here  are 
the  result  of  extensive  empirical  research  with  groups  of  people  living  in  Britain 
and  Northern  Ireland,  together  with  serving  British  soldiers. 
Our  Irish  history 
The  guiding  light  of  British  policy  over  the  last  seventy  five  years  has  been  to 
try  and  push  Ireland  to  the  margins  of  British  politics.  This  was  managed  quite 
successfully  until  1968  when  the  North  exploded  onto  television  screens 
around  the  world.  Since  then,  British  policy  has  been  directed  to  containing  the 
'troubles'  and  attempting  to  reduce  the  killing  to  what  one  government  Minister 
called'an  acceptable  level  of  violence'  (Sunday  Times  Insight  Team  1972: 
309).  It  borders  on  the  heretical  even  to  describe  what  is  happening  in 
Northern  Ireland  as  a  'war'.  Yet,  in  one  of  the  many  confusions  surrounding 
British  policy,  public  relations  strategy  has  consistently  emphasised  the 
criminality  and  'evil'  of  the  IRA,  thus  raising  the  news  value  of  a  conflict  which 
they  have  otherwise  tried  so  hard  to  forget. 
In  this'war'over  3,000  people  have  died  out  of  a  population  of  1.5  million  in  a 
part  of  Ireland  about  the  same  size  as  Wales.  The  conflict  costs  in  excess  of 
E2  billion  a  year  and  has  dragged  on  for  over  a  quarter  of  a  century.  Millions  of 
words  have  been  spoken  and  written  about  the  conflict.  Yet  Northern  Ireland 
has  been  very  low  on  the  political  agenda.  Northern  Ireland  Ministers  are 
exiled  to  a  British  Siberia  and  very  few  return  to  job  promotion.  Political  parties 
do  not  prioritise  Northern  Ireland  -  indeed  they  have  tended  to  agree  on  many 
aspects  of  policy.  At  General  Elections  the  issue  has  not  intruded  into  the 
hysteria  of  canvassing.  So  low  is  the  profile  of  Northern  Ireland  that  during  the 
1992  election,  the  last  cabinet  or  shadow  cabinet  ministers  to  appear  on  TV 
news  were  either  those  that  their  parties  were  embarrassed  about  -  Gerald Introduction 
Kaufman  or  John  Gummer  -  or  their  Northern  Ireland  spokespersons  -  Peter 
Brooke  and  Kevin  McNamara  (Billig  et  al  1993). 
But  debate,  argument  and  negotiation  about  the  war  in  Ireland  is  crucial  if  the 
conflict  is  to  be  brought  to  an  end.  This  means  that  the  thesis  is  written  in 
opposition  to  those  who  would  prefer  debate  to  be  stifled  or  permitted  only  so 
long  as  it  contributes  to  governmental  objectives.  Thus  Paul  Wilkinson,  the 
'doyen'  (Gearty  1991:  14)  of  British  terrorism  studies,  has  suggested  that 
debate  about  the  meaning  and  use  of  the  term  'terrorism'  may  simply  be  a 
device  to  obstruct  'anti-terrorist'  policies: 
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The  problems  of  establishing  a  degree  of  common  understanding  of  the 
concept  of  terrorism  have  been  vastly  exaggerated.  Indeed,  I  suspect 
that  some  have  tried  to  deny  that  any  common  usage  exists  as  a  device 
for  obstructing  co-operation  in  policies  to  combat  terrorism  (Wilkinson 
1990:  27). 
For  such  writers  the  only  worthwhile  argument  concerns  how  to  increase  the 
effectiveness  of  'anti-terrorist'  policies.  Should  we  choose  to  question  the 
assumptions  in  such  an  approach,  the  ideological  policing  of  the 
counterinsurgents  will  label  us  as  fellow  travellers  of  the  'terrorists'.  But  in  truth 
there  is  no  universal  agreement  on  the  causes  of  the  Northern  Ireland  conflict 
and  the  term'terrorism'  is  not  unambiguous  in  it's  meaning  and  use. 
Definitions  of  terrorism 
For  Western  governments,  'terrorism'  is  an  illegitimate  form  of  violence  which  is 
a  dangerous  threat  to  liberal  democracies.  There  is  another  'alternative'  view 
which  emphasises  the  rhetorical  and  ideological  functions  of  the  term  terrorism. 
In  this  view  Western  governments  and  counterinsurgency  writers  label  only 
their  enemies  as  terrorists  and  ignore  their  own  'terrorist'  actions  and  those  of 
their  allies  or  friends. 
Almost  all  writers  are  agreed  that  'terrorism'  is  the  'systematic'  use  of  'murder' 
or  other  physical  violence  for  political  ends.  In  particular,  there  is  substantial 
agreement  thatterrorist'  violence  is  either  'indiscriminate'  or  mostly  targets 
civilians  or  both  (e.  g.  Gearty  1991;  Thackrah  1987;  Wilkinson  1978;  1990; 
Wright  1991).  Were  we  to  use  the  killing  of  civilians  as  a  criterion  and  apply  it 
literally  to  the  Northern  Ireland  conflict,  we  would  be  unable  to  label  the  IRA Introduction  11 
unequivocally  as  'terrorist'  since  a  minority  (37.4%)  of  victims  of  the  IRA 
between  1969  and  June  1989  were  civilians.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Army  and 
the  police  in  Northern  Ireland  would  be  categorised  as  'terrorists'  since  a 
majority  of  the  people  they  have  killed  were  civilians  (54.4%)  (Irish  Information 
Partnership  1990).  Of  course,  the'security  forces'would  claim  that  they  do  not 
kill  civilians  deliberately,  but  then  so  would  the  IRA.  Indeed  the  IRA  routinely 
apologises  when  it  does  kill  civilians'by  mistake'. 
The  degree  of  discrimination  in  targets  is  not,  however,  a  reliable  guide  to  the 
organisations  described  as  'terrorist'  in  the  writings  of  'counterinsurgency, 
theorists.  Writers  such  as  Wilkinson  do  not  apply  their  definitions  with  any 
rigour.  The  IRA  are  referred  to  as'terrorist'  not  according  to  their  targets,  but 
whatever  they  do.  Counterinsurgency  theorists  have  already  made  up-their 
minds  about  the  groups  they  think  of  as'terrorist'.  They  then  manage  to  define 
'terrorism'  so  that  it  fits  with  their  own  preconceptions.  For  example,  Paul 
Wilkinson  writes  that: 
Terrorism  can  be  briefly  defined  as  coercive  intimidation  or  more  fully  as 
the  systematic  use  of  murder,  injury,  and  destruction  or  threat  of  same  to 
create  a  climate  of  terror,  to  publicise  a  cause,  and  to  coerce  a  wider 
target  into  submitting  to  its  aims  (Wilkinson  1990:  27). 
in  principle  this  could  fit  any  form  of  political  violence,  including  state  violence. 
So  could  the  definition  written  into  British  Law  in  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism 
Act: 
'Terrorism'  means  the  use  of  violence  for  political  ends  and  includes  any 
use  of  violence  for  the  purpose  of  putting  the  public  or  any  section  of  the 
public  in  fear  (cited  in  Walker  1992:  7). 
But  in  practice  it  is  only  the  violence  of  non-state  groups,  or  non-western 
states,  to  which  these  definitions  refer.  Even  writers  from  a  civil  liberties 
perspective  such  as  Conor  Gearty  are  vulnerable  to  polemical  uses  of  the  term. 
Gearty's  concern  is  to  narrow  the  definition  to  make  it  less  partisan,  as  well  as 
to  tease  out  the  subtleties  of  meaning  in  writing  on'terrorism'.  This  leads  him 
to  set  out  a  definition  of  'pure'  or'core'  terrorism  which  he  regards  as  sufficient 
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Acts  of  violence  which  we  consider  unambiguously  terrorist  have  certain 
characteristics  in  common.  They  uniformly  involve  the  deliberate 
infliction  or...  the  threatened  infliction  of  severe  physical  violence;  killing 
and  maiming  are  the  trademark  of  the  true  terrorists.  Such  acts  are  not 
in  themselves  rare  in  contemporary  society.  Despotic  government  may 
do  the  same,  but,  unlike  the  practitioner  of  subversive  terror,  they  have 
the  authority  of  the  state  to  enforce  and  legitimate  their  actions  (Gearty 
1991:  8) 
Unfortunately  even  this  is  not  immune  from  polemical  implications.  When  his 
definition  does  not  work,  Gearty  manipulates  it  to  distinguish  groups  of  which 
he  apparently  approves  (the  African  National  Congress  are  referred  to  as  a 
'genuine'  liberation  movement  (1991:  98)),  from  those  of  which  he  disapproves. 
This  is  especially  clear  in  the  case  of  Northern  Ireland  where,  in  order  to  call 
the  IRA  'terrorists',  he  redefines'pure'  terrorism  from  the'deliberate  infliction' 
(1991:  8)  of  indiscriminate  violence,  to  violence  which  is  'for  al  I  practical 
purposes  indiscriminate  in  its  effect'  (1991:  126)  .  It  should  also  be  noted  that 
his  definition  explicitly  leaves  state  violence  out,  making  it  a  good  deal  more 
partisan  than  that  given  by  either  Wilkinson  or  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act. 
The  problem  which  this  points  up  is,  though,  common'to  counterinsurgency 
theory  as  well.  Despotic  governments  are  excluded  because'they  have  the 
authority  of  the  state  to  legitimate  their  actions'.  But  the  legitimacy  of  even 
'democratic'  states  such  as  the,  'United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern 
Ireland'  (to  give  it  its  full  title)  is  not  definitively  established.  The  legitimacy  of 
British  rule  of  the  'six  counties'  of  Northern  Ireland  is  precisely  the  point  of 
contention  between  the  IRA  and  the  British  government.  It  is  hardly  neutral  to 
accept  the  claim  of  one  side  to  be  the  legitimate  rulers  and  define  'terrorism'  so 
that  it  fits  only  the  actions  of  the  other  side. 
The  most  fundamental  problem  with  trying  to  define  'terrorism'  is  that  it  is 
contested.  Noam  Chomsky  illustrates  this  by  citing  St  Augustine: 
St.  Augustine  tells  the  story  of  a  pirate  captured  by  Alexander  the  Great. 
'How  dare  you  molest  the  sea7asked  Alexander.  'How  dare  you  molest 
the  whole  world?  '  the  pirate  replied.  'Because  I  do  it  with  a  little  ship 
only,  I  am  called  a  thief,  you,  doing  it  with  a  great  navy,  are  called  an 
emperor'  (Chomsky  1991:  9). 
Were  a  non-partisan  definition  possible,  then  it  would  either  be  ignored  by Introduction  13 
those  who  have  the  power  to  define  it  in  world  politics,  or  a  new  term  of  abuse 
would  be  found.  But  as  things  stand  'terrorism'  is  pejorative  and  is  only  used  to 
describe  violence  of  which  the  user  disapproves.  In  contemporary  debate  the 
usage  of  the  term  can  mainly  be  explained'in  terms  of  Western  interests  and 
policy,  not  by  the  actions  and  plans  of  the  "terrorists"'  (Herman  and  O'Sullivan 
1991:  39).  If'terrorism'  consists  of  either  'strategic'  or  'indiscriminate'  attacks  in 
which  the  victims  are  civilian,  then  why  are  the  bombings  of  Dresden, 
Hiroshima,  Vietnam  and  the  Greenpeace  ship  'Rainbow  Warrior'  by  the  French 
Secret  Service,  not  defined  as  'terrorist'?  And  why  was  the  carpet  bombing  of 
civilians  in  Iraq  during  the  Gulf  War  not  terrorism?  Why  are  the  killings  on 
Bloody  Sunday  in  Derry  1972  when  13  civilians  were  shot  dead  by  the 
Paratroop  Regiment,  or  the  killing  of  civilians,  John  Downes  by  plastic  bullet  in 
1984,  taxi  driver,  Ken  Stronge  in  1988  and  the  more  than  300  other  civilians 
killed  by  the  British  Army  and  RUC  not  described  as'terrorism'?  Because,  as 
George  argues,  the  term  ...  terrorism"  has  been  virtually  appropriated  to  signify 
atrocities  targeting  the  West'  (George  1991  b:  1  ). 
The  labelling  of  one  organisation  or  action  as  'terrorist'  is  intimately  related  to 
questions  of  power  and  influence.  The  attempt  to  label  an  opponent  as 
'terrorist'  is  not  a  question  of  more  and  more  exactly  delineating  the  ýactions 
which  qualify  as  terrorist  from  those  which  don't.  Defining  opponents  as 
'terrorists'  represents  an  active  pursuit  of  legitimacy.  Such  legitimation 
strategies  are  central  to  the  operation  of  all  governments,  whether  they  are 
dictatorships  or  liberal-democracies. 
The  Legitimacy  of  the  State 
The  fundamental  dispute  in  Northern  Ireland  is  around  the  legitimacy  of  the 
state.  In  the  official  view  armed  opposition  to  the  state  is  illegitimate  since 
conditions  of  democracy  prevail.  Yet  the  definition  of  the  political  entity  itself  is 
what  is  contested.  The  Official  British  view  acknowledges  that  the  civil  rights 
protests  in  the  late  1960s  against  the  systematic  discrimination, 
gerrymandering  and  repression  of  the  Unionist  government  had  some 
justification.  But  it  sees  the  introduction  of  Direct  Rule  in  1972  as  having 
fundamentally  reformed  the  Northern  Ireland  state.  From  that  point  on,  the 
causes  of  the  conflict  had  been  removed  and  any  manifestations  of  unrest 
could  only  be  explained  as  initiating  from  'extremists'.  The  IRA  are  held  to  be  a 
criminal  conspiracy  similar  to  organised  crime  networks  such  as  the  Mafia  (thus 
the  use  of  the  term  'godfathers'  in  some  official  propaganda).  It  is  also introduction  14 
presented  to  some  audiences  as  part  of  an  international  network  of  'terrorists' 
with  connections  to  Marxist  revolutionaries  in  Europe,  anti-Western  feeling  in 
the  middle  east,  particularly  Libya,  and  was  until  its  demise  linked  to  the  global 
ambitions  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  role  of  the  British  Army  and  RUC  in  all  this  is  seen  as  being  to  counter  the 
'terrorist  threat'  and  keep  the  peace  between  the  warring  factions.  The 
governmental  apparatus  exists  solely  to  oversee  a  return  of  'normality'.  Thus 
we  have  seen  media  coverage  of  a  large  number  of  attempts  by  the  British  to 
'facilitate'a  negotiated  settlement  between  the  two  communities.  When  these 
fail,  the  responsibility  rests,  in  the  official  version,  solely  with  the  deep  and 
irreconcilable  historical  antagonisms  which  bind  the  unionist  and  nationalist 
communities  in  conflict. 
But  there  are  other  views  of  the  conflict.  The  most  widely  held  of  these 
stresses  that  Britain  is  not'above'  the  conflict  but  is  actually  an  intimate  part  of 
it.  The  conflict  in  Ireland  is  seen  as  rooted  in  the  creation  of  the  statelet  of 
Northern  Ireland  in  1921.  The  creation  of  the  Northern  Ireland  state  is  itself 
seen  as  a  breach  of  democracy  in  that  the  last  elections  in  Ireland 
overwhelmingly  returned  a  Sinn  Fein  government  and  the  parliament  in  the 
north  was  created  purely  on  the  basis  of  a  sectarian  head  count  to  ensure  a 
Protestant  majority  in  perpetuity.  In  this  view,  the  idea  that  there  is  democracy 
in  a  state  which  is  gerrymandered  is  fundamentally  flawed.  -  The  maintenance 
of  the  border  is  seen  as  being  guaranteed  by  both  the  presence  of  British 
troops  and  the  funding  of  the  current  administrative  set  up  by  the  British 
government.  The  cost  of  this  British  Subvention  to  Northern  Ireland  in  1988/89 
was  E1.9  billion  (Gaffikin  and  Morrissey  1990:  49).  Versions  of  this  view  are 
shared  by  many  politicians  in  the  South  of  Ireland,  the  Social,  Democratic  and 
Labour  Party  (SDLP)  in  the  North  as  well  as  among  some  politicians  in  Britain. 
It  is  also  current  in  some  parts  of  the  media.  The  Daily  Mirror,  for  example, 
routinely  put  this  view  between  1978  and  1991.  In  an  editorial,  signed  by 
former  Mirror  proprietor  Robert  Maxwell,  following  the  collapse  in  the  summer 
of  1991  of  the  latest  round  of  talks  sponsored  by  the  N  10,  the  Mirror  again 
repeated  its  view  that  the  conflict  continues  because  it  is  funded  and 
underwritten  by  Britain: 
Once  again,  a  well-meaning  attempt  by  the  British  government  to  solve 
the  unsolvable  in  Ulster  has  ended  in  failure.  It  will  always  be  so.  The 
Northern  Ireland  Secretary,  Peter  Brooke,  as  so  many  decent  men introduction  15 
before  him,  tried  to  win  from  the  leaders  of  the  Protestant  majority  and 
the  Catholic  minority  an  agreement  on  some  measure  of  power  sharing. 
He  was  doomed  to  failure,  as  were  all  the  other  Government  Ministers 
who  have  tried  before  him.  The  Protestant  Unionist  leadership  will  never 
concede  an  inch  to  the  Catholic  republicans  as  long  as  they  believe  they 
have  a  Big  Brother  in  Britain  to  protect  and  finance  them.  The 
nationalists  will  remain  obstinate  while  they  believe  the  Dublin 
Government  is  always'in  their  corner.  (Daily  Mirror  5  July  1991) 
Arguments  like  these  recognise  that  there  is  no  military  solution  to  a  conflict 
which  is  essentially  political.  Contrary  to  the  logic  of  much  public  official 
thinking  some  senior  figures  in  the  British  establishment  also  accept  that  this  is 
the  case.  General  Sir  James  Glover,  the  former  Commander  in  Chief,  UK  Land 
Forces,  who  had  previously  served  as  an  intelligence  officer  in  Northern 
Ireland,  I  has  put  this  view: 
In  no  way  can,  or  will,  the  Provisional  IRA  ever  be  defeated  militarily... 
The  long  war  will  last  as  long  as  the  Provisional  IRA  have  the  stamina, 
the  political  motivation  -I  used  to  call  it  the  sinews  of  war  -  but,  the 
wherewithal  to  sustain  their  campaign  and  so  long  as  there  is  a  divided 
island  of  Ireland.  (BBC1  Panorama  29  February  1988).  ' 
At  the  time  of  the  revelation  of  British  contacts  with  Sinn  176in  in  November 
1993  'a  key  British  source'  made  a  striking  departure  from  the  public  official 
position.  The  source  told  the  Observer  that  the  IRA 
was  imbued  with  an  ideology  and  a  theology.  He  then  added...  that  its 
ideology  included  an'ethical  dimension'  -  that  members  would  not 
continue  killing  for  the  sake  of  it...  The  Provisionals  did  not  kill  'for  no 
purpose',  and  that  if  that  purpose  was  removed,  there  was  no  reason 
why  they  should  not  stop  killing  (Observer  28  November  1993). 
Clearly,  there  is  a  recognition  in  some  official  circles  that  the  problem  in  Ireland 
is  political,  yet  publicly  the  government  adheres  to  it's  depiction  of  a  conflict 
caused  byterrorism'. 
Some  Unionists  in  Northern  Ireland  also  question  the  idea  that  Britain  is  neutral 
in  the  conflict.  Many  are  distrustful  of  the  motivations  of  British  policy  and  often 
suspect  their  interests  are  being  ignored  or  that  they  will  be  'sold  out,  to  the Introduction  16 
South.  This  was  one  of  the  main  loyalist  objections  to  the  Anglo-Irish 
Agreement  of  1985.  As  a  result  of  such  uneasy  feelings,  some  unionists  now 
advocate  either  an  independent  Northern  Ireland  or  closer  integration  with 
Britain  in  order  to  lessen  the  chances  of  being  'cut  loose'. 
Perhaps  the  most  perplexing  question  is  why  have  the  British  remained  in 
Northern  Ireland  for  so  long?  The  truth  is  that  the  British  state  remains  in 
Ireland  mainly  for  the  simple  reason  that  it  is  easier  to  stay  than  to  go.  In 
addition  there  has  been  some  benefit  to  the  Army  in  that  Northern  Ireland 
provides  training  in  combat  and  allows  them  to  defend  some  measure  of 
resource  allocation.  There  is  no'objective  necessity'for  British  forces  to 
remain  in  Ireland.  Indeed,  it  has  been  argued  that  there  has  been  very  little 
strategic  reason  for  around  thirty  years,  well  before  the  demise  of  the  Soviet 
Union  (Bew  and  Patterson  1985).  But  this  is  only  to  say  that  the  monolithic 
inertia  of  the  British  state  is  moved  in  new  directions  only  when  the  interests  of 
the  state  are  seen  to  over-ride  the  difficulties  of  a  change  in  policy  or  when 
opposition  is  unstoppable.  The  opposition  to  British  policy  has  never  been 
strong  enough  to  force  withdrawal  since  British  forces  left  the  twenty  six 
counties  over  fifty  years  ago.  Added  to  this  is  the  historical  legacy  of  the 
Conservative  Party's  links  with  the  Unionists  and  the  occasional  usefulness  to 
tottering  governments  (Labour  or  Conservative)  of  the  Unionist  block  vote.  It 
seems  likely,  in  these  circumstances,  that  the  impetus  for  a  British  withdrawal 
will  only  become  great  enough  when  the  cost  (or  potential  cost)  to  the  British 
exchequer  becomes  great  enough  to  worry  an  insecure  government. 
Chapter  by  chapter 
The  first  chapter  examines  the  limits  imposed  on  media  coverage  by  the 
economic  context  of  media  production  and  by  government  intimidation,  the  use 
of  the  law  and  direct  censorship.  It  traces  the  mounting  pressures  on  the  public 
space  for  dissent  and  assesses  the  relationship  between  broadcasting  and  the 
state.  It  reveals,  for  the  first  time,  the  government  threat,  in  the  1950s,  to  vet  all 
programmes  on  nuclear  weapons  and  the  BBC's  subsequent  agreement  not  to 
make  programmes  which  discussed  the  effects  of  radiation.  Also  for  the  first 
time,  it  tells  the  story  of  the  senior  BBC  official  who  was  sacked  in  1988 
because  of  his  criticisms  of  senior  management  decisions  on  the  coverage  of 
the  killings  in  Gibraltar.  Chapter  Two,  examines  the  public  relations  strategies 
of  official  and  unofficial  sources  in  Northern  Ireland.  It  starts  of  by  looking  at 
contending  definitions  of  'propaganda',  then  it  describes  changing  propaganda Introduction  17 
strategies  between  the  early  1960s  and  1993.  Finally  it  assesses  the  veracity 
of  official  public  relations  and  their  relationship  to  British  policy  in  Ireland.  It 
argues  that  official  disinformation  did  not  stop  in  the  mid  1970s  with  the 
disbanding  of  the  black  propaganda  unit  'Information  policy'  at  Army  H  Q.  Both 
the  RUC  and  the  Army  continue  to  give  false  information  to  journalists  in  order 
to  protect  security  forces  personnel  from  the  due  process  of  law  and,  more 
importantly,  legitimise  otherwise  unlawful  killings  by  the  state.  Chapter  Three 
includes  a  detailed  examination  of  the  resources  available  for  PR  activities  and 
the  uses  to  which  they  are  put.  Even  though  official  sources  have  a  huge 
inbuilt  advantage  in  terms  of  resources,  they  do  not  always  succeed  in 
managing  the  media  exactly  as  they  would  wish.  However,  they  have  been 
remarkably  successful  in  some  areas  in  shaping  media  agendas.  This  chapter 
reveals  the  covert  propaganda  role  of  the  little  known  London  Radio  Service. 
Operated  by  the  British  government,  the  Service  places  news  stories  in  radio 
news  bulletins  around  the  world,  including  in  the  United  States,  in 
contravention  of  US  criminal  law.  Chapter  Four  surveys  international  coverage 
of  the  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  and  then  presents  a  detailed  comparison 
between  US  and  British  press  and  television  coverage.  It  argues  that  the  US 
media  is  significantly  more  open  and  diverse  than  British  media  coverage, 
showing  that  British  media  coverage  could  be  different.  It  also  examines  the 
substantial  variations  between  different  types  of  actuality  coverage.  Chapter 
Five  presents  the  results  ofýmy  own  audience  research.  It  focuses  on  public 
responses  to  media  coverage  of  the  Gibraltar  killings.  Unless  they  have  an 
alternative  source  of  information,  people  in  Britain  are  inclined  to  believe  the 
distorted  picture  of  life  in  Northern  Ireland  presented  by  television  and 
newspaper  reports.  In  particular,  a  large  proportion  of  my  sample  believed 
official  misinformation  about  the  killings  to  be  true.  The  Gibraltar  killings  are  a 
striking  illustration  of  the  way  in  which  official  misinformation  can  have  a 
powerful  effect  on  public  belief.  Chapter  Six  reviews  the  major  debates  about 
the  effects  of  media  coverage  of  the  conflict,  examining  counter-insurgency 
theory,  'active'  audience  research  and  other  approaches.  It  concludes  by 
assessing  the  role  of  the  media  in  the  struggle  for  definition,  arguing  that  media 
information  can  have  a  powerful  impact  on  public  opinion  and  on  the  ability  of 
the  state  to  carry  on  regardless. 
The  Propaganda  War 
Competing  definitions  of  the  legitimacy  of  political  and  military  action  in 
Northern  Ireland  are  actively  pursued.  The  constant  definitional  struggle  over Introduction  18 
language  is  central  to  the  conflict.  The  importance  of  the  mass  media  is  that 
they  provide  an  arena  in  which  such  battles  are  fought.  Alongside,  but 
intimately  connected  with  the  bombings  and  shootings,  the  torture  and  the 
beatings,  runs  another  conflict.  It  is  waged  from  the  offices  of  the'Secretary  of 
State  for  Northern  Ireland  at  Stormont  Castle  to  the  Republican  Press  Centre 
on  the  Falls  Road;  from  the  offices  of  the  Ifish  Times  in  Dublin,  the  London 
Times  to  the  New  York  Times  in  the  USA;  From  living  rooms  in  Protestant  East 
Belfast  and  Catholic  West  Belfast  to  the  English  home  counties;  And  from  the 
offices  of  the  British  government  in  Whitehall  to  diplomatic  missions  around  the 
world. 
This  is  the  propaganda  war.  It  attracts  much  less  attention  than  its  shooting 
counterpart,  but  is  arguably  the  more  crucial  part  of  the  conflict  -  the  battle  for 
hearts  and  minds.  This  book  examines  the  struggle  for  legitimacy  as  it  is 
waged  in  the  pages  of  the  press  and  on  television  screens  across  the  world. 
Footnotes 
I  Glover  was  the  author  of  the  1978  secret  intelligence  report  Northem  Ireland  Tefforist  Trends 
which  was  leaked  to  the  press.  In  it  he  concluded  that  'The  Provisionals  campaign  of  violence 
is likely  to  continue  while  the  British  remain  in  Northern  Ireland...  We  see  little  prospect  of 
political  development  of  a  kind  which  would  seriously  undermine  the  Provisionals'  position... 
PIRA  will  probably  continue  to  recruit  the  men  it  needs.  They  will  still  be  able  to  attract  enough 
people  with  leadership  talent,  good  education  and  manual  skills  to  continue  to  enhance  their  all 
round  professionalism.  The  movement  will  retain  popular  support  sufficient  to  maintain  secure 
bases  in  the  traditional  Republican  areas'  (Reproduced  in  Faligot,  1983:  241). Chapter  One 
Policing  the  Media: 
Secrecy,  intimidation  and  Censorship 
On  paper,  the  Government  of  the  day  has  the  power  to  veto  any  BBC 
broadcast.  The  BBC  -  and  this  is  the  important  point  -  has  the  right  to 
broadcast  that  this  veto  has  been  exercised.  In  the  whole  history  of  the 
BBC  no  Government  -  not  even  in  war  time  -  has  made  use  of  this  power 
in  connection  with  any  particular  programme  or  item  and  it  is  now  pretty 
well  politically  unthinkable  that  it  ever  could  be  made  use  of. 
Sir  Hugh  Greene,  The  Third  Floor  Front,  1969,  p.  69 
The  power  to  require  the  BBC  to  refrain  from  broadcasting  particular 
material  is  the  famous  'unused'  veto.  This  arouses  immense  suspicion 
in  the  minds  of  those  visitors  to  Britain,  who  are  not  accustomed  to  the 
force  of  convention  in  British  society.  The  fact  that  the  power  exists 
leads  them  to  suspect  that  it  must  be  used,  or  that  its  use  must,  at  times, 
be  threatened  in  order  to  secure  desired  objectives.  This  is  simply  not 
the  case. 
Sir  Charles  Curran,  A  Seamless  Robe,  1979,  p.  64 
In  fact,  the  threat  of  the  veto  to  secure  desired  objectives  has  been  threatened 
by  governments  on  several  occasions.  However,  the  use  of  the  veto  is  not  the 
only  indicator  of  the  degree  to  which  broadcasting  is  independent  of  the  state. 
In  Britain,  there  is  an  identifiable  'tradition'  to  the  pattern  of  relationships 
between  broadcasters  and  the  state.  The  veto  has  rarely  been  used  both 
because  it  has  not  been  necessary  to  use  it  and  because  successive 
governments  have  recognised  the  immense  value  of  an  apparently 
independent  broadcasting  system.  Broadcasting  in  Britain  is  centrally 
legitimated  by  its  claim  to  be  independent  of  the  state.  Maintaining  the 
appearance  of  independence  is  crucial  to  the  broadcasters  and  it  is  this  which 
can  allow  the  government  to  exert  pressure  for  informal  and  'voluntary' 
agreements  with  the  media.  The  history  of  the  relationship  is  one  of 
government  pressure  and  'voluntary  self  restraint'  or'responsibility,  by  the 
broadcasters.  This  has  been  tempered  by  the  occasional  willingness  of  E3BC 
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and  Independent  Television  management  to  display  their'independence'  by 
refusing  to  accede  to  government  'requests'  or  threats. 
This  chapter  explores  the'policing'  of  the  media  by  examining  four  main  limits 
on  media  coverage.  These  are,  firstly,  the  economic  context  of  media 
production,  secondly,  indirect  censorship  via  pressure,  intimidation,  and  the 
use  of  the  law,  thirdly,  direct  censorship  imposed  under  the  Broadcasting  Ban 
in  1988,  and  fourthly,  the  limits  imposed  by  the  broadcasters  on  themselves  - 
that  is  self  censorship. 
A  key  argument  is  that  none  of  these  limits,  including  the  law,  is hard  and  fast, 
rather  the  way  in  which  the  powerful  use  the  techniques  at  hand  (indeed  the 
techniques  which  are  available)  and  the  way  in  which  the  broadcasters  react 
are  related  to  an  ongoing  process  of  contest  and  to  changing  political  and 
economic  circumstances. 
'Responsibility'  Vs  'Independence' 
An  early  example  of  the  'responsible'  approach  was  the  General  Strike,  during 
which  there  was  pressure  for  the  government  to  take  over  the  BBC.  In  the  ý 
event  they  decided  not  to.  But  as  Lord  Reith,  the  first  Director-General  of  the 
BBC,  recorded  in  his  diary'The  Cabinet  decision  is  really  a  negative  one.  They 
want  to  be  able  to  say  that  they  did  not  commandeer  us,  but  they  know  that 
they  can  trust  us  not  to  be  really  impartial'  (Stuart  1975:  96). 
In  the  1939-45  War,  the  BBC  saw  itself  as  having  a  central  role  in  fighting  the 
enemy.  It  was  subject  to  strict  control  of  all  news  bulletins  by  the  Ministry  of 
Information,  although  it  was  not  simply  the  mouthpiece  of  the  government. 
During  the  Suez  crisis  in  1956  the  BBC  came  under  very  heavy  government 
pressure.  Prime  Minister  Eden  regarded  Suez  as  a  war  situation  and  expected 
internal  criticisms  of  the  government  to  be  suppressed.  When  the  BBC  gave 
the  opposition  the  right  to  reply  to  ministerial  broadcasts  and  refused  to  excise 
critical  comments  from  its  overseas  bulletins  the  government  made  threats  of 
financial  cuts  and  planted  a  Foreign  Office  Liaison  Officer  in  Bush  House  to  vet 
the  external  services.  '  The  BBC  was  able  to  resist  government  pressure  partly 
because  Suez  was  not  a  national  emergency,  but,  also  because  there  was  a 
deep  division  in  the  press  and  in  politics,  stretching  to  the  cabinet  itself.  2 Policing  the  Media  21 
The  credibility  of  British  broadcasting  was  a  key  reason  for  the  reluctance  of 
the  government  to  take  over  the  BBC.  This  thinking  was  shared  by  the 
broadcasters.  In  the  aftermath  of  Suez.  Postmaster  General  Charles  Hill 
argued  this  point  with  the  Cabinet: 
In  my  view,  the  gain  to  Britain  from  the  BBC's  high  reputation  is 
immense,  far  outweighing  any  confusion  which  may  occur  through  failure 
to  understand  its  relationship  to  government.  The  independence  which 
the  corporation  has  should  always  be  kept  inviolate.  Once  this  issue 
was  decided  little  more  was  heard  of  the  agitation  to  destroy  or  to  reduce 
the  BBC's  independence  (Hill  1964:  188). 
In  1958,  the  crisis  in  Cyprus  and  the  possibility  of  Archbishop  Makarios  being 
interviewed  on  a  visit  to  London,  prompted  the  Foreign  Secretary,  Selwyn 
Lloyd,  to  write  to  the  BBC  expressing  his  concern.  Charles  Hill,  who  by  then 
was  the  Chancellor  of  the  Duchy  of  Lancaster,  went  to  visit  Harman  Grisewood, 
Chief  Assistant  to  the  Director  General,  for  what  he  called  'one  of  our  informal 
chats.  '  (Irish  Times  2/3  January  1989)  Grisewood  resisted,  the  attempt  to  keep 
Makarios  off  the  air,  but  nevertheless  Hill:  'was  left  with  the  impression  that...  if 
they  did  put  Makarios  on,  they  would  make  it  the  occasion  for  severe  hostile 
questioning  of  the  gentleman'(PREM  11/2226,16  June  1958). 
In  August  1956,  over  two  months  before  the  Suez  crisis  came  to  a'head,  the 
BBC  had  already  come  under  pressure  from  Eden  who  objected  to  an  Egyptian 
Major  being  interviewed.  The  BBC  rejected  his  complaints.,  -  Eden's  Press 
Adviser,  William  Clark,  then  wrote  to  the  Prime  Minister  advising  on  the  powers 
that  could  be  used  against  the  BBC.  Clark  noted  that  every  dispute  with  the 
BBC  has'been  settled  by  persuasion  so  far.  '  (Guardian  2  January  1987) 
Charles  Hill  also  advised  Eden  that'while  the  powers  of  formal  intervention 
remain  so  limited,  it  is  only  byinformal  contact  and  discussion  that  programme 
content  can  be  influenced'  (HO  256/360,20  August  1956). 
During  the  Falklands  episode  the  broadcasters  again  found  it  difficult  to  admit 
critical  or  oppositional  views  to  news  programmes  and  they  were  attacked  for 
being  'traitorous'  when  they  did.  In  Suez,  the  BBC  had  managed  to  resist 
government  pressure,  but  during  the  Falklands  it  is  clear  that  much  news  was 
shaped  to  support  government  policy  (Glasgow  University  Media  Group  1985). 
During  the  Gulf  Conflict  of  1991  the  broadcasters  obsession  with'surgical Policing  the  Media  22 
strikes'  and  'precision  killing',  meant  that  civilian  casualties  were  ignored  and 
there  was  little  criticism  which,  questioned  the  rationale  for  the  war  (Kellner 
1992;  Mowlana  et  al  1992;  Philo  and  McLaughlin  1992;  Pilger  1992). 
Threatening  the  Veto 
Contrary  to  the  official  view,  the  threat  of  the  veto  arose  as  early  as  1935  in  the 
case  of  The  Citizen  and  His  Government,  a  series  of  talks  which  was  to  have 
included  contributions  from  Oswald  Moseley  of  the  Fascists  and  Harry  Pollitt  of 
the  Communist  Party  as  well  as  representatives  from  the  other  parties.  The 
Foreign  Office  wanted  to  stop  the  programmes  because  of  the  embarrassment 
it  would  cause.  After  some  argument  the  BBC  agreed  to  cancel  the 
programmes  only'if  they  were  authorised  to  state  that  "they  had  been  given  to 
understand  that  the  broadcasting  of  these  talks  would  be  an  embarrassment  to 
the  Government"  or  something  similar'  Foreign  Secretary  Anthony  Eden  tried 
to  get  the  BBC  to  say  instead  that  the  government  felt  that  the  talks  'were  not  in 
the  national  interest.  '  In  the  event,  after  further  pressure  from  the  government, 
the  BBC  cancelled  the  talks  without  mentioning  the,  government  intervention. 
The  force  of  the  government  pressure  was  underlined  by  the  Cabinet's,  decision 
to  authorise  the  Postmaster'General  'if  necessary,  to  make  quite  clear  that  the 
Government  would  not  permit  these  broadcasts'(Briggs  1979:  198-201;  Scannell 
and  Cardiff  1991:  72-78). 
For  government  ministers  and  information  managers,  the  quiet  chat  is  a  less 
overt  and  more  effective  way  of  managing  coverage.  In  the  post  war  period 
'informal  consultation'  seems  to  have  produced  some  remarkably  effective 
results.  So  effective,  that  they  don't  even  feature  in  the  history  books.  It  is 
notable  that  Briggs'  many  volumes  on  the  history  of  the  BBC  (Briggs  1965; 
1970;  1979;  Cockerell  1989)  contain  no  mention  of  an  informal  arrangement 
between  the  BBC  and  the  government  on  one  of  the  most  controversial  issues 
of  the  time  -  Nuclear  Weapons. 
The  BBC  and  the  The  Bomb 
The  introduction  of  nuclear  weapons  in  Britain  and  the  build  up  of  the  British 
'independent  deterrent'  have  been  shrouded  in  secrecy  from,  the  very 
beginning.  'The  War  Cabinet  never  discussed  the  atomic  bomb  in  the  period 
leading  up  to  1945;  the  (Labour)  Deputy  Prime  Minister  was  told  nothing  about Policing  the  Media  23 
it;  and  the  Labour  Cabinet  as  a  whole,  after  the  1945  election,  never  discussed 
Britain's  own  bomb.  From  then  until  now  every  effort  has  been  made  to 
discountenance  public  debate  on  the  subject'  (Downing  1986:  167).  3 
By  late  1954  BBC  producer  Nesta  Pain  was  researching  a  possible  programme 
on  nuclear  weapons.  Her  preliminary  explorations  with  scientists  and  others 
came  to  the  attention  of  the  government,  prompting  a  pre-emptive  letter  from 
the  Postmaster-General  to  the  Chair  of  the  BBC,  Sir  Alexander  Cadogan.  Earl 
De  La  Wares  letter  was  a'crude  attempt  to  vet  all  programmes  on  nuclear 
weapons  by  threatening  the  veto: 
The  wide  dissemination  in  a  broadcast  programme  of  information  about 
thermo-nuclear  weapons  might  well  raise  important  issues  of  public 
policy.  Indeed  this  is  a  subject  on  which  the  public  interest  might  in 
certain  circumstances  require  the  issue  of  guidance  or  directions  to  the 
Corporation  in  pursuance  of  Section  15(4)  of  the  Corporations  Licence. 
I  am  therefore  writing  to  ask  you  to  let  me  see  in  advance  the  script  of 
any  programme,  whether  for  broadcasting  or  for  television,  which 
contains  information  about  atomic  or  thermo-nuclear  weapons  (18 
December  1954,  BBC  WAC  R34/997). 
Since  Cadogan  was  out  of  the  country  at  the  time,  the  Director  General,  Ian 
Jacob,  raised  the  letter  at  the  Board  of  Management  meeting  on  December  20 
where  it  was  felt  that'it  was  not  in  accordance  with  precedent  to  submit  scripts 
to  the  PMG'  and  that'it  would  be  more  appropriate  if  the  government  would 
give  the  BBC  general  guidance  in  the  matter'4.  Around  the  same  time  Sir  Ben 
Barnett  of  the  Post  Office  had  phoned  the  Director  General  to  threaten  the  use 
of  Clause  15(4)  against  a  planned  programme  called'the  Spirit  in  Jeopardy'. 
Cadogan  raised  both  these  issues  in  a  stinging  four  page  reply  to  the  PMG  in 
January  1955.  He  queried  'whether  the  government  is  interested  from  the  point 
of  view  of  security  or  from  the  point  of  view  of  wider  questions  such  as  the 
effect  on  public  morale'.  The  letter  from  the  PMG  together  with  the  phonecall 
from  Ben  Barnett  'seem  to  indicate'  wrote  Cadogan  'that  the  Government 
desires  to  exercise  a  measure  of  control  over  BBC  output  which  would  be 
unprecedented  in  peacetime'.  He  rejected  the  threat  in  the  PMG's  letter  and 
more  or  less  challenged  him  to  introduce  a  notice  or  back  down: Policing  the  Media  24 
Experience  over  a  good  many  years  seems  to  show...  that  the 
corporation  cannot  agree  to  accept  and  follow  Government  guidance 
over  particular  fields  of  output  except  where  security  is  concerned.  To 
do  so  would  be  to  abdicate  from  responsibilities  given  to  the  Governors 
by  the  Charter.  (Cadogan  to  De  La  Warr  24  January  1955,  BBC  WAC 
R34/997) 
Cadogan  concluded  by  asking  for'enlightenment  on  the  thinking  that  has 
inspired  these  communications...  with  sufficient  precision  to  enable  the 
Governors  to  decide  what  their  attitude  should  be'.  However,  at  the  board  of 
management  meeting  later  that  day  the  Director  General  ruled  that  until  they 
got  more  information  from  the  government  that'no  programmes  should  be 
broadcast  about  atomic  weapons'  (Minute  49,  Board  of  Management  meeting 
24  January  1955). 
Enlightenment  came  in  the  form  of  an  informal  meeting  at  the  Ministry  of 
Defence  between  Cadogan  and  Jacob  of  the  BBC  and  The  PMG,  Minister  of 
Defence  and  two  officials.  By  all  accounts  the  mood  was  much  calmer  than  it 
had  been  in  the  earlier  exchange  of  letters.  According  to,  the  BBC  account  of 
the  meeting  the  Minister  of  Defence  explained  that  government  anxiety  had 
been  sparked  by  the'mistaken  impression  that  the  BBC  was  proposing  to  do  a 
programme  about  Thermo-nuclear  weapons  and  their  effects  before  the 
publication  of  the  Government's  white  paper  on  Defence  Policy.  '  According  to 
this  account,  the  government's  concern  here  was  not  one  of  national  security, 
but  rather  a  simple  desire  to  manipulate  public  opinion: 
The  government  had  been  giving  anxious  consideration  to  the  extent  of 
the  information  that  should  be  made  public  about  the  hydrogen  bomb 
and  its  effects,  and  to  the  way  in  which  this  information  should  be 
presented.  On  the  one  hand  they  did  not  desire  to  keep  the  public  in 
entire  ignorance;  on  the  other  hand  they  did  not  want  to  stimulate  the 
feeling  so  easily  accepted  by  the  British  people  because  it  agreed  with 
their  natural  laziness  in  these  matters,  that  because  of  the  terrible  nature 
of  the  hydrogen  bomb  there  was  no  need  for  them  to  take  part  in  home 
defence  measures  (Ian  Jacob,  'Note  of  meeting  held  at  the  Ministry  of 
Defence'  15th  February  1955). 
Having  tried  to  assure  the  BBC  that  the  target  of  the  governments  action  was Policing  the  Media  25 
the  lazy  British  people  rather  than  the  independence  of  the  BBC,  the  Minister  of 
Defence  went  on  to  suggest  that  the  PMG's  rather  intemperate  letter  and 
Cadogan's  reply  be  quietly  forgotten  about  and  that  they  start  afresh: 
The  Minister  of  Defence  felt  that  these  two  communications  should  now 
be  put  away  in  the  files  and  that  the  matter  should  be  handled  on  a  more 
informal  basis.  He  assumed  that  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  close 
touch  being  maintained  between  the  Ministry  of  Defence  and  the 
Corporation  on  this  matter,  and  this  would  enable  both  parties  to 
exchange  information  and  views  without  hampering  documents  (Ian 
Jacob,  'Note  of  meeting  held  at  the  Ministry  of  Defence'  15th  February 
1955). 
The  BBC  response  was  one  of  relief  and  they  quickly  agreed  that  quiet  chats 
were  a  better  way  of  proceeding: 
The  Chairman  entirely  agreed  with  the  Minister's  proposal  and  confirmed 
that  the  Corporation  had  no  desire  to  embarrass  the  Government  in  this 
very  delicate  matter  (Ian  Jacob,  'Note  of  meeting  held  at  the  Ministry  of 
Defence'  15th  February  1955). 
Ian  Jacob  then  explained  that  discussions  of  the  White  paper  on  Defence 
would  simply  take  their  agenda  from  the  government's  concerns  set  out  in  the 
paper  itself., 
I  explained  to  the  Minister  that  we  should  be  under  the  necessity  of 
having  programmes  expounding  and  discussing  the  White  paper  on 
Defence  but  that  naturally  these  would  be  founded  on  the  information 
contained  in  that  paper.  I  did  not  foresee  any  immediate  desire  on  the 
part  of  the  corporation  to  mount  programmes  about  the  effects  of  the 
hydrogen  bomb.  There  did  not  seem  to  be  any  immediate  point  in  doing 
so  (Ian  Jacob,  'Note  of  meeting  held  at  the  Ministry  of  Defence'  15th 
February  1955). 
A  public  interest  in  such  programmes  was  perhaps  not  considered  reason 
enough. 
Following  this  the  DG  prepared  a  paper  on  nuclear  weapons  and  broadcasting Policing  the  Media  26 
which  was  discussed  inside  the  Corporation  on  March  4th.  In  it  he  emphasised 
that  certain  types  of  discussion  of  nuclear  weapons  which  furthered  the 
'national  interest'  should  be  made'with  no  hesitation': 
To  further  the  national  interest  in  this  case  will  be  to  give  full  exposition 
to  the  facts  given  in  the  White  Paper,  and  to  the  theories  expounded  in  it 
by  the  Government.  But  there  are  many  conclusions  founded  on  these 
facts  and  theories  which  call  for  full  discussion.  For  example,  should 
Britain  make  hydrogen  bombs?  Could  there  be  a  greater  partition  of  the 
defence  effort  between  us  and  our  allies?  What  role  should  the  TA 
play?  and  so  on.  ('Thermo-Nuclear  Weapons  and  Broadcasting',  A  note 
by  the  Director  General  28  February  1955) 
On  the  other  hand  there  were  other  topics  which  were  a  'more  difficult  problem', 
such  as  'the  symptoms  induced  by  the  "fall-out",  the  degree  of  radioactivity  in 
the  atmosphere  which  may  prove  harmful,  and  so  on.  '  Such  topics  had  to 
satisfy  much  stricter  criterion,  including  'is  there  a  worth-while  object  to  be 
achieved  by  the  programme,  which  would  outweigh  the  horrific  impact'.  As  we 
have  seen  Jacob  had  already  told  the  Minister  of  Defence  that  there  seemed  to 
be'no  immediate  point'  in  such  programmes. 
In  a  draft  letter  to  the  Prime  Minister,  Winston  Churchill,  following  the  meeting 
with  Jacob  and  Cadogan,  the  PMG  was  flushed  with  success: 
We  finally  agreed  that  the  Corporation  should  keep  in  close  touch  with 
the  Ministry  of  Defence  on  all  matters  relating  to  the  presentation  of  the 
hydrogen  bomb  to  the  public.  We  all  thought  that  this  was  a  more 
satisfactory  and  practical  solution  than  that  the  Government  should  try  to 
lay  down  precise  rules  in  writing.  I  hope  you  agree  that  this  arrangement 
should  give  us  the  results  we  want. 
Churchill  was  also  pleased  and  congratulated  Jacob  for'standing  up'  for  self 
censorship: 
I  realise  how  great  your  difficulties  are.  The  responsibility  for  the  use  of 
the  vast  machinery  of  radio  and  TV  is  at  once  formidable,  novel  and 
perpetual.  In  this  case  I  think  there  would  have  been  no  trouble  if  the 
topic  had  been  part  of  a  rather  high-grade  programme  like  the  Third Policing  the  Media  27 
programme.  What  vexed  me  was  the  millions  of  humble  homes  affected. 
I  am  very  glad  you  are  standing  up  against  the  idea  of  anticipating  the 
Parliamentary  debate  on  the  H  bomb  (Churchill  to  Jacob  20  February 
1955). 
Thus  is  the  intemperate  language  of  vetting  and  censorship  translated  into  co- 
operation,  consultation  and  responsibility. 
This  informal  arrangement  seems  to  have  worked  for  some  years  and  was 
regarded  as  something  of  a  success  in  Whitehall.  Some  eighteen  months  later 
the  PMG  advised  the  government  that  informal  consultation  was  the  best  way 
to  control  the  BBC.  In  his  support  he  cited  the  nuclear  weapons  agreement  as 
a'major  question'on  which'informal  consultation  has  had  some  success'  (HO 
256/360,  Hill  to  the  Prime  Minister  20  August  1956).  However  it  seems  that  the 
agreement  was  not  still  operating  in  1965  when  Peter  Watkins  celebrated  film, 
The  War  Game  was  banned  by  the  BBC  following  government  pressure  (See 
Tracey  1982;  Briggs  1979:  121-123). 
What  is  the  veto  for? 
The  power  vested  in  the  government  was  originally  interpreted  as  being  for  use 
only  in  time  of  national  emergency.  The  problem  for  the  broadcasters  has  been 
that  the  agreement  on  this  interpretation  has  always  been  informal  and 
interpretation  by  the  government  and  by  the  civil  service  has  been  uneven, 
depending  partly  on  whether  it  suits  them. 
In  1932  the  government  succeeded  in  getting  the  BBC  to  cancel  an  interview 
with  a  German  former  U-boat  commander  by  threatening,  though  without  using, 
the  power  of  veto.  Writing  to  complain  the  Chairman  of  the  BBC  said  that  they 
had  been  assured  by  the  Post  Master  General  in  1927  that  the  veto  would  only 
be  exercised'in  time  of,  national  emergency'.  The  Postmaster  General, 
however  denied  all  knowledge  of  this  informal  arrangement  stating  'there  was 
no  such  limitation  in  the  licence'  (Briggs  1979:  193-194). 
During  the  Suez  crisis,  the  Prime  Minister  sought  the  advice  of  the  Post  Office 
on  what  powers  were  available  to  influence  the  BBC.  The  civil  service  advice 
was  that'these  wide  powers  had  never  been  used  for  the  purpose  of 
suppressing  individual  programme  items.  They  were  really  designed  to  suit Policing  the  Media  28 
conditions  of  national  emergency'.  5  Following  the  attempt  to  keep  Archbishop 
Makarios  ofthe  air,  during  the  Cyprus  crisis,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Duchy  of 
Lancaster,  Charles  Hill  wrote  to  the  Prime  Minister  that'there  is  no  power  to 
prevent  such  an  appearance  either  on  the  BBC,  or  ITA'.  6 
It  is  curious  that  Hill  should  give  this  advice  since  only  three  years  previously, 
as  Postmaster  General,  he  had  issued  two  directives  to  the  broadcasters 
prohibiting  certain  'matters'  from  being  broadcaSt.  7  One  interesting  possibility 
is  that  the  government  interpretation  of  the  PMG's  power  to  limit'matters  of  any 
particular  class'  did  not  include  banning  individuals  from  being  interviewed. 
This  would,  of  course,  be  in  contrast  to  the  Home  Office  interpretation  in 
Douglas  Hurd's  directive  of  October  1988,  banning  direct  appearances  by  11 
named  Irish  organisations.  However,  it  does  seem  more  likely  that  the  decision 
to  threaten  the  use  of  the  power  or  to  pretend  that  the  power  is  not  available  is 
related  more  to  government  information  strategies.  The  acknowledgement  that 
the  power  exists  places  responsibility  for  censorship  squarely  in  the  hands  of 
the  government,  whereas  if  it  is  believed  that  the  government  has  no  power  in 
this  area  then  the  responsibility  rests  rather  more  heavily  on  the  shoulders  of 
the  broadcasters.  In  fact,  the  law  tends  to  be  used  in  ways  which  suit  the 
powerful,  which  will,  of  course,  vary  over  time.  In  the  spring  of  1988,  for 
example,  the  Daily  Telegraph  reported  that'Powers  to  ban  press  and  television 
contact  with  terror  organisations  like  the  IRA  have  been  discussed  by  senior 
ministers  but  there  are  no  plans  at  present  for  legislation  to  introduce  such  a 
wide-ranging  curb  on  press  freedom'  (28  March  1988).  Yet  following  the  BBC's 
Spotlight  programme  on  the  Gibraltar  killings,  Whitehall  sources  told  the 
Independent  that'the  reserve  power  could  only  be  used  as  "an  ultimate 
weapon"'.  8 
The  next  section  describes  the  organisational,  legal  and  economic  context 
within  which  the  media  operate.  Taken  together  these  factors  further  limit  the 
space  available  for  critical  or  alternative  perspectives  on  the  conflict  in 
Northern  Ireland.  There  is  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  period  from  1979 
onwards,  partly  because  previous  developments  are  recounted  elsewhere 
(Curtis  1984a;  Curtis  1986;  Schlesinger  et  al  1983,  Schlesinger  1987)  and 
partly  because  the'pressures  have  so  intensified  (Garnham  1986;  Elliot  1982; 
Thornton  1989;  Hillyard  and  Percy-Smith  1988;  Ewing  and  Gearty  1990). 
The  economic  context Policing  the  Media  29 
The  ownership  and  control  of  media  institutions  provides  the  context  within 
which  journalists  work.  In  Britain  the  press  is  very  largely  in  the  hands  of  a 
small  number  of  media  corporations.  The  newspaper  industry  is  first  and 
foremost  a  business  enterprise.  The  politics  of  the  press  are  dictated  by  a 
collection  of  diverse  judgements,  foremost  among  which  is  the  need  to  maintain 
or  increase  readership.  This  does  not  mean  that  all  of  the  press  is  on  the  right 
of  politics.  There  is  an  extent  to  which  newspapers  target  themselves  at 
particular  audiences  because  of  their  assessment  of  the  market  for  non 
conservative  coverage.  Such  judgements  are  also  influenced  by  the  state  of 
the  market,  competition  with  other  titles,  and  by  political  circumstances,  which 
will  in  turn  affect  the  size  of  the  market.  These  factors  also  inform  the 
judgement  of  media  barons  such  as  Rupert  Murdoch  and  Lord  Rothermere. 
The  extent  to  which  they  intervene  in  the  running  of  a  particular  newspaper  or 
the  kind  of  intervention  will  not  simply  be  related  to  their  personal  political 
alliances  and  commitments,  but  also  to  wider  economic  factors. 
However,  it  is  clear  that  political  intervention  does  occur.  For  example,  in  1988, 
the  Daily  Telegraph,  under  editor  Max  Hastings,  had  pursued  a  more  liberal  line 
on  Northern  Ireland,  for  example  in  coverage  of  the  Gibraltar  killings  (see 
Chapter  Four).  In  1989,  however,  proprietor  Conrad  Black  exerted  more  direct 
control  over  the  Daily  Telegraph  and  Sunday  Telegraph,  complaining  publicly 
about  Hastings'  'flirtation  with  incorrect  thinking  about  Ulster  and  about  South 
Africa'  (cited  in  Curran  and  Seaton  1991:  90) 
In  fact  newspapers  do  not  have  strictly  bounded  ideologies  which  are  insulated 
from  the  market  or  from  political  circumstances.  The  content  of  British 
newspapers  cannot  be  explained  simply  by  the  personal  prejudices  or 
occupational  ideologies  of  the  journalists,  editor  or  even  proprietor. 
Segmentation 
In  Britain  there  has  been  an  increased  segmentation  of  newspaper  audiences 
by  region.  The  content  of  news  reports  in  those  regions  will  vary  according  to 
the  audience  being  targeted  by  the  particular  edition.  The  Sunday  Times,  for 
example,  has  a  separate  Northern  Ireland  section.  This  segmentation  is 
related  to  competition  with  the  strong  national  and  regional  press  in  Scotland 
and  Northern  Ireland  respectively.  The  constant  hunt  for  more  readers  can Policing  the  Media  30 
mean  that  papers  place  different  stories  on  different,  pages  to  appeal  to 
different  types  of  reader  or  on  occasion  different  stories  in  the  same  place  in 
different  editions.  Following  the  killing  of  three  would  be  robbers  in  West 
Belfast  by  undercover  soldiers,  the  editorials  in  the  London  and  Dublin  editions 
of  the  Daily  Starwere  as  follows: 
IT'S  IRA  WHO  SHOOT  TO  KILL 
(London) 
WE  WANT  THE  FACTS 
(Dublin) 
_  Undercover  troops  shot  dead  three  No  one  is  above  the  law.  And  that 
men  robbing  a  betting-shop  in  West  includes  the  security  forces  in  the 
Belfast.  The  robbers  were  North.  Last  Saturday  in  Belfast  they 
brandishing  replica  guns  shot  dead  three  raiders  outside  a 
indistinguishable  from  the  real  thing.  betting  shop  in  what  can  only  be 
Whining  do-gooders  -joined  by  Sinn  described  as  strange  circumstances. 
Fein,  the  political  wing  of  the  IRA  -  Taoiseach  Charles  Haughey  rightly 
immediately  jumped  on  the  left-wing  said  that  his  Government  had  'serious 
bandwagon,  and  demanded  to  know  disquiet  and  misgivings'  about  the 
whether  our  security  forces  are  incident.  But  yesterday  in  the  House 
operating  a  shoot  to  kill  policy.  The  of  Commons  Ulster  supremo,  Peter 
three  villains  -  all  with  records  as  long  Brooke,  refused  demands  from  MPs 
as  your  arm  -  were  dressed  in  IRA  to  hold  an  independent  inquiry.  Not 
'uniform'  of  black  balaclavas  and  good  enough,  Mr  Brooke.  Surely  you 
black  woollen  gloves.  The  Army  must  cannot  dismiss  so  lightly  reports  of 
not  waste  time  on  a  ridiculous  inquiry  eye-witnesses  who  said  that  even 
into  these  absurd  allegations.  after  the  raiders  had  stopped,  further 
Anyone  who  tries  to  commit  a  robbery  shots  were  fired  into  their  bodies. 
in  Northern  Ireland  carrying  weapons  The  Government  here  must  not  let  the 
-  or  lifelike  replicas  -  can  hardly  matter  rest.  They  must  insist  that  all 
expect  to  be  welcomed  with  tea  and  the  facts  are  brought  fully  into  the 
scones.  And  do  people  have  to  be  open.  Nothing  else  will  satisfy  decent 
reminded:  it  is  the  IRA  who  people.  (reprinted  in  UK  Press 
STARTED  the  shoot-to-kill  policy.  Gazette  29  January  1990) 
Cross  Promotion 
The  direct  influence  of  economics  on  news  coverage  is  of  course  not  the  only 
way  in  which  the  ownership  and  control  of  the  media  impacts  on  the  content  of Policing  the  Media  31 
the  news.  In  an  age  of  ever  increasing  concentration  of  ownership  and  the 
formation  of  multimedia  conglomerates,  symbolised  in  Britain  by  Rupert 
Murdoch,  have  opened  up  many  opportunities  for  cross  promotion  as  well  as 
the  possibility  of  attacking  the  opposition  in  one  sphere  (say  broadcasting)  with 
media  in  another  sphere  (the  press).  The  most  cited  example  of  this  in  Britain 
is  the  cross  promotion  of  Sky/B  Sky  B  satellite  television  by  Murdoch  owned 
newspapers.  The  practice  is  so  well  known  that  in  the  late  1980s  the  satirical 
magazine  Private  Eye  introduced  a  feature  titled  'Eye-sky'  which  offered 
readers'the  usual  ElO'for'Sky-plugs  masquerading  as  news  items  in  Murdoch 
papers'.  The  major  attacks  on  public  service  broadcasting  in  relation  to  the 
coverage  of  Northern  Ireland  are  also  to  be  found  from  the  mid  eighties  in  the 
Murdoch  press.  It  was  the  Sunday  Times  which  started  the  ball  rolling  in  the 
Real  Lives  affair  and  it  was  the  Sun  and  Sunday  Times  which  were  consistently 
to  the  fore  in  the  attacks  on  'Death  on  the  Rock'  and  the  attempt  to  shore  up  the 
official  version  of  the  Gibraltar  shootings  (Bolton  1990;  Miller  1991).  In  the 
latter  case  there  was  a  strong  economic  interest  in  destabilising  public  service 
broadcasting  as  Sky  television  is  engaged  in  a  protracted  battle  with  terrestrial 
television  over  the  viewing  audience.  The  Conservative  government's  auction 
of  television  franchises  which  has  further  destabilised  Public  Service 
programming  was  encouraged  by  the  onslaught  on'Death  on  the  Rock'. 
Teievision 
Television  is  more  heavily  regulated  than  the  press  and  is  bound  by  law  to 
standards  of  'impartiality'  and  'objectivity.  This  does  not,  however,  mean  that 
broadcasting  is  immune  to  the  pressure  of  the  market.  The  fact  that  - 
independent  television  is  funded  by  advertising  revenue  means  that  it  is 
audiences  themselves  rather  than  television  programmes  which  'are  the 
primary  commodity.  The  economics  of  commercial  broadcasting  revolves 
around  the  exchange  of  audiences  for  advertising  revenue'.  So  the  need  to 
secure  large  audiences  promotes  the  production  of  familiar  programming  and 
limits  the  production  of  innovative  or  risky  programmes.  'Hence',  as  Golding 
and  Murdock  argue'the  audience's  position  as  a  commodity  serves  to  reduce 
the  overall  diversity  of  programming  and  ensure  that  it  confirms  established 
mores  and  assumption  far  more  often  than  it  challenges  them'  (1991:  20).  The 
auctioning  of  televisions  franchises  in  1992  resulted  in  a  dilution  of  a  public 
service  commitment  amongst  television  companies  and,  because  of  the  high 
cost  of  some  franchises,  has  led  to  a  concern  with  maximising  audiences  and Policing  the  Media  32 
keeping  programme  budgets  down.  One  indication  of  this  is  the  debate  about 
the  historically  guaranteed  peak  slots  for  both  current  affairs  and  news 
programmes.  The  opening  up  of  the  BBC  to  commercial  forces  will  also 
inevitably  have  the  effect  of  minimising  critical  programming,  either  by  the  hunt 
for  audience  figures  or  by  the  retreat  of  the  BBC  to  minority  broadcasting 
status.  Arguments  about  whether  television  should  attract  high  audiences  or 
whether  it  should  inform  are  once  more  on  the  agenda,  accompanied  by  a 
move,  away  from  conceptions  of  broadcasting  as  a  'right  to  information',  to 
notions  of  the  right  to  be  entertained  and  reassured. 
The  ownership  and  control  of  media  organisations  together  with  the  legal 
regulation  of  broadcasting  provide  the  context  within  which  the  media  report  the 
world.  Of  course,  this  context  is  affected  and  indeed  managed  by  the  state. 
The  level  of  the  licence  fee  for  the  BBC  and  the  regulatory  apparatus  of 
independent  television  are  set  by  the  government.  State  control  over  the 
legislative  context  of  broadcasting  allows  government  to  exert  leverage  in 
relation  to  the  content  of  broadcasting.  Such  leverage  has  in  fact  been  a 
routine  part  of  the  relationship  between  broadcasting  and  governments  of  all 
complexions  since  the  founding  of  the  BBC.  For  example,  Tom  McNally, 
advisor  to  Labour  Prime  Minister  James  Callaghan  has  revealed: 
In  1978,  the  Government  had  been  going  throughýa  rough  patch  and  had 
been  getting  some  pretty  rough  treatment  from  television...  particularly 
from  BBC  Newsnight,  and  at  the  Labour  Party  conference  in  Brighton 
that  year,  I  came  face  to  face  with  Brian  Wenham,  then  head  of  BBC2, 
and  I  eyeballed  Brian  in  the  way  of  Mohammed  Ali  and  looked  [at]  him 
squarely  and  said...  'Hell  will  freeze  over  before  you  get  a  licence  fee 
increase  unless  we  get  a  better  deal  out  of  you'  (World  in  Action  1988). 
Such  pressure  forms  the  backdrop  to  routine  political  relationships  between 
broadcasters  and  the  government.  However,  when  the  government  has  had 
more  specific  objectives  in  mind  a  range  of  other  tactics  for  pressurising  the 
broadcasters  come  into  play. 
Intimidation  and  pressure 
Rex  Cathcart,  the  historian  of  the  BBC  in  Northern  Ireland  notes  that'Until  1951 
the  BBC  (in  Northern  Ireland)  sought  to  portray  a  society  without  division:  the Polidng  the  Media  33 
very  mention  of  'partition'  was  precluded.  '  (1988:  7).  It  wasn't  until  the  Civil 
Rights  Association  took  to  the  streets  in  1968  that  Northern  Ireland  began  to 
feature  extensively  on  British  network  TV  screens.  The  pattern  of  relationships 
between  the  broadcasters  and  the  state  were  set  in  1971.  Although  the  press 
has  periodically  been  involved  in  conflicts  with  the  government  it  has  been  the 
broadcasters  and  particularly  the  BBC  which  has  born  the  brunt  of  government 
intimidation.  This  is  partly  because  of  the  perceived  national  role  of  the  BBC, 
but  also  because  the  government  has  more  cards  in  its  hand  when  dealing  with 
a  publicly  regulated  system  than  it  does  with  the  press.  Television  is  also 
perceived  by  government  to  be  more  important  because  of  its  immediacy  and 
the  large  audiences  it  attracts. 
Following'the  entry  of  the  Provisional  and  Official  Irish  Republican  Army's  into 
armed  conflict  with  the  British  Army  in  1971  -and  the  introduction  of  Internment 
in  August  of  that  year,  the  BBC  came  under  mounting  criticism.  The  Minister 
for  Posts  and  Telegraphs,  Christopher  Chataway  let  it  be  known,  in  a  speech  in 
November,  that  broadcasters  were  no  longer  required  to  strike  an  even 
balance  between  the  IRA  and  the  Unionist  government  nor  between  the  Army 
and  the  'terrorists'.  9  Lord  Hill,  the  Chair  of  the  BBC,  then  wrote  to  the  Home 
Secretary,  later  that  month,  agreeing  that'as  between  the  British  Army  and  the 
gunmen  the  BBC  is  not  and  cannot  be  impartial' 
. 
10  The  ITA's  Lord  Aylestohe 
put  it  even  more  directly,  'As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  Britain  is  at  war  with  the 
IRA  in  Ulster  and  the  IRA  will  get  no  more  coverage  than  the  Nazis  would  have 
done  in  the  last  war'  (cited  in  Curtis  1984a:  10).  This  definition  of  the  role  of  the 
broadcaster  fitted  well  with  the  view  of  the  state.  Since  1971,  this  has 
remained  the  view  of  the  broadcasting  establishment,  although  editorial  policy 
has  been  repeatedly  tightened  in  the  intervening  years,  as  we  shall  see. 
Within  the  BBC,  however,  it  was  the  events  of  the  following  month,  December 
1971,  which  were  to  pass  into  the  institutional  memory  as  the  key  example  of 
the  ability  to  resist  government  pressure.  The  Question  of  Ulster,  a  two  and  a 
half  hour  current  affairs  programme  came  under  direct  and  public  pressure  from 
the  Home  Secretary  Reginald  Maudling,  and  sections  of  the  press,  even  though 
no  IRA  members  were  to  be  interviewed.  The  fact  that  the  BBC  resisted  such 
open  pressure  is  still  vividly  remembered  in  the  Corporation.  "  At  the  time  Sir 
Charles  Curran  said  The  Question  of  Ulster  was  'the  central  example  in  my  time 
of  the  BBC's  insistence  on  editorial  independence'  (cited  in  Schlesinger 
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However,  at  that  time  it  would  have  been  very  difficult  for  the  BBC  to  back 
down,  since  the  price  would  have  been  a  considerable  injury  to  perceptions  of 
their  independence  from  the  state.  As  we  saw  in  the  course  of  the  row  over 
nuclear  weapons,  informal  arrangements  and  'responsibility'  are  much  favoured 
over  open  intimidation.  By  the  1980s  the  political  climate  had  changed  and 
more  overt  intimidation  was  both  increasingly  likely  and  increasingly 
successful. 
Legislation 
From  the  early  1970s  we  can  see  an  increasingly  tight  system  of  internal  and 
external  control  on  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland.  Perhaps  the  most  dramatic 
indication  of  that  is  the  large  body  of  legislation  which  has  been  enacted. 
While  some  laws,  such  as  the  Special  Powers  Act,  which  had  very  sweeping 
provisions,  have  been  abolished  or,  at  least  temporarily,  fallen  into  disuse  (0 
Maol6in  1989:  19),  many  more  have  been  introduced.  According  to  6  Maol6in 
(1989:  18)  between  1970  and  1986  some  70  pieces  of  'emergency'  legislation 
were  applied  in  all  or  part  of  Ireland  although  not  all  of  these  restrict  media 
practice.  In  addition  there  are  a  number  of  laws  which  apply  in  Britain  and  were 
not  solely  enacted  to  deal  with  the  Irish  conflict.  Some  of  these  predate  the 
current  conflict,  whilst  others  represent  the  drift  to  the  strong  state  since  the 
late  1  970s,  particularly  under  successive  Conservative  governments. 
From  fighting  terrorism  to  policing  the  media 
Some  legislation  which  was  never  intended  for  use  against  the  media  has 
subsequently  turned  in  a  useful  few  laps  in  the  cause  of  government  secrecy  or 
censorship.  The  most  important  provisions  which  affect  journalists  covering 
Northern  Ireland  are  the  Official  Secrets  Act  (and  the  associated  'D'  Notice 
committee),  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  and  the  Emergency  Provisions  Act. 
The  Official  Secrets  Act  1911  (revised  in  1920,1939  and  1989)  is  supposed  to 
function  to  protect  national  security.  especially  against  espionage  and  spying. 
it  can  also  be  used  against  media  organisations.  The  main  provision  affecting 
the  media  has  been  section  2.  It  prevents  unauthorised  communication  or 
receipt  of  official  information.  The  government  brought  in  an  amended  act  in Policing  the  Media  35 
1989  claiming  that  it  would  liberalise  the  provisions  of  the  previous  law.  It  has, 
however,  been  described  as  'even  more  repressive'  (0  Maolciin  1989:  80)  and 
as-  imposing  'tighter  controls  than  ever  before  in  peacetime'  (Ponting  1990:  79). 
The  revised  Act  makes  it  an  offence  for  any  member  or  former  member  of  the 
security  or  intelligence  services  (or  anyone  associated  with  security  or 
intelligence  activities)  to  disclose  any  information  about  those  activities. 
Journalists  who  publish  such  information  having  grounds  to  believe  it  has  been 
disclosed  without  permission  may  also  be  prosecuted  as  accessories.  - 
It  is  also  an  offence  to  disclose  other  kinds  of  government  information  where 
damage  is  caused,  or  likely  to  be  caused,  by  unauthorised  disclosure.  - 
Information  conveyed  to  other  governments  and  then  leaked  overseas  is  also 
protected  under  the  Act  (McBride  1990:  138-139).  Section  5  makes  it  an 
offence  to  publish  information  known  to  be  protected  by  the  Act  and  having 
cause  to  believe  that  publication  would  be  damaging  to  the  national  interest. 
There  is  no  provision  for  a  public  interest  defence  or  protection  for  exposing 
wrongdoing  or  illegality  by  the  government  or  security  services.  There  is, 
however,  a  'no  damage'  defence  which  would  allow  journalists  to  report  the 
words  of  a  former  member  of  the  security  services  or  other  information  so  long 
as  it  did  not  harm  national  security. 
The'D'-notice,  or  Defence,  Press  and  Broadcasting,  Committee,  is  closely 
associated  with  monitoring  potential  breaches  of  'national  security'.  It  issues 
notices  on  subjects  on  which  it  is  deemed  too  sensitive  to  report.  However,  the 
notices  have  no  legal  force  and  the  committee,  on  which  representatives  of  the 
media  sit,  operates  on  the  basis  of  a  'voluntary'  agreement.  Themajornotices 
in  relation  to  Northern  Ireland  cover  the  activities  of  the  intelligence  services, 
the  photographing  of  government  installations  and  discussion  of  telephone 
tapping  and  surveillance  operations.  Under  the  1989  Official  Secrets  Act  prior 
clearance  by  the  D-notice  Committee  is  no  defence  against  prosecution. 
Nonetheless  the  committee  remains  in  operation  and  is  evidently  seen  as 
worthwhile  by  some  sections  of  the  MoD  (See  Campbell  1980;  Palmer  1984; 
Robertson  and  Nicol  1992:  435-437).  12 
The  Emergency  Provisions  (Northern  Ireland)  Act  1978  prohibits  the  collection 
of  information  which  is  likely  to  be  of  use  to  terrorists  and  although  its  'overt 
purpose  is  to  punish  espionage'  the  Act  is  broad  enough  to  'cover  normal Policing  the  Media  36 
journalistic  activities'  (Robertson  and  Nicol  1992:  443-444).  The  Act  also 
prohibits  soliciting  or  inviting  support  for  an  illegal  organisation  such  as  the  IRA 
or  the  UDA  (6  Maoldin  1989) 
The  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  started  life,  as  did  the  Official  Secrets  Act,  with 
a  hurried  passage  through  Parliament.  Introduced  by  Home  Secretary,  Roy 
Jenkins  as'draconian'in  the  aftermath  of  the  1974  Birmingham  pub  bombings, 
the  Act  was  not  tested  until  five  years  later.  In  the  meantime,  it  was  amended 
in  1976  to  make  it  an  offence  under  Section  11  not  to  pass  information  to  the 
police  about  any  future  act  of  terrorism  or  about  people  involved  in  terrorism 
without  'reasonable  excuse'.  It  was  further  amended  in  1984  to  apply  to  non 
Irish  'terrorism',  an  extension  of  'emergency'  powers  to  the  wider  polity  which 
were  until  then  premised  on  the  conflict  in  Ireland. 
Also  in  1984,  the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  extended  police  powers  to 
seize  material,  powers  only  previously  available  in  relation  to  Northern  Ireland. 
Following  the  seizure  of  film  from  the  BBC  and  ITN  in  March  1988,  the 
government  was  reported  to  be  considering  introducing  the  powers  under 
PACE  to  Northern  Ireland  (Financial  Times  24  March  1988).  In  1990  the  circle 
was  completed  with  the  implementation  of  the  PACE  (NI)  1989  Order.  This 
represents  the  reimportation  to  Northern  Ireland  of  exceptional  powers  first, 
introduced  because  of  the  conflict  and  now'normallsed'  in  British  legislation. 
PACE  grants  police  officers,  who  are  lawfully  on  any  premises,  powers  to  seize 
anything  found  there  if  they  have  reasonable  grounds'for  believing  that  it  has 
been  obtained  as  a  result  of  an  offence,  or  that  it  is  evidence  in  relation  to  any 
offence,  and  that  seizure  is  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  it  being  concealed, 
lost,  damaged,  altered  or  destroyed'  (Dickson  1990:  20-21). 
Similar  powers  were  written  into  the  PTA  in  1989.  The  objective  of  this 
additional  provision  was  said  to  be  uncovering  funding  for  paramilitary 
organisations.  Clause  17,  Schedule  7  allows  the  police  access  to  privileged 
documents  such  as  medical  records,  so  long  as  the  police  say  that  the 
documents  are  need  in  connection  with  a  'terrorist  investigation'  (See  Bunyan 
1977:  291;  0  Maol6in  1989;  Curtis  1984a;  Dickson  1990)13. 
Practice  and  Precedent:  The  law  and  selective  communication 
It  is  often  assumed  that  the  law  is  simply  an  impermeable  and  unchanging  limit Policing  the  Media  37 
on  journalism  and  public  debate.  In  fact,  the  law  tends  to  be  interpreted  and 
used  according  to  the  prevailing  political  climate  (Downing  1986).  The  policing 
of  the  media  by  censorship,  secrecy,  court  orders  and  police  pressure  does  not 
just  work  to  exclude  certain  representations  or  information,  it  helps  to  allow  the 
powerful  to  communicate  as  and  when  they  want  (Kuhn  1988).  As  David  Leigh 
has  memorably  put  it:  'The  obverse  side  of  the  secrecy  coin  is  always 
propaganda'  (Leigh  1980) 
Historically  legislation  has  been  introduced  under  the  rubric  of  national  security 
which  has  included  provisions  for  policing  the  media.  On  occasion  the 
legislation  is  ostensibly  not  intended  to  apply  to  the  media,  but  once  in  place  it 
is  quickly  put  to  use  in  the  service  of  the  media  police.  The  Official  secrets  Act 
of  1911  was  rushed  through  parliament  on  the  understanding  that  it  applied 
only  to  those  covered  in  the  previous  Act.  But  applying  the  Act  to  the  press 
was  a  covert  preoccupation  of  the  government  and  in  their  view  fell  within  the 
terms  of  the  new  Act.  On  the  basis  of  advice  from  the  DPP  one  civil  servant 
argued  that: 
In  certain  circumstances  the  Act  could  be  used  against  a  newspaper. 
We  have  a  note  on  our  official  papers  to  the  effect  that  the  speedy 
passage  of  the  Act  was  due  to  a  general  understanding  that  the  new 
measure  was  not  directed  against  any  new  class,  but  against  that  which 
the  former  Act  was  aimed,  viz.  the  spy  class,  and  that  to  use  it  against  a 
newspaper  merely  for  publishing  news  useful  to  an  enemy  would  amount 
to  a  breach  of  faith  with  Parliament.  But  there  is  no  record  to  this  effect 
in  the  official  version  of  the  debates  (cited  in  Palmer  1984:  235). 
The  way  the  law  is  used  can  owe  more  to  the  political  priorities  of  the 
government  and  the  state  than  to  actual  breaches  of  legislation.  For  example 
changes  to  the  PTA  in  1989  which  allow  the  police  to  seize  previously 
privileged  materials  were  said  to  be  intended  to  clamp  down  on  alleged 
paramilitary  fund-raising.  Yet  by  early  1992  this  provision  had  been  used  on 
two  occasions  against  media  organisations.  It  is  clearly  much  easier  to 
legitimate  repressive  laws  for  purposes  which  are  unambiguously  'anti-terrorist', 
than  those  which  impact  upon  freedom  of  the  media. 
Furthermore,  according  to  some  commentators,  the  1989  Official  Secrets  Act 
has'turned  out  to  be  something  of  a  damp  squib'  (Dorrill  1993:  3).  Emphasising Policing  the  Media  38 
the  selectivity  with  which  the  law  is  enforced,  several  books  have  now  been 
published  which  are  in  clear  breach  of  the  Act  and  no  prosecutions  have 
followed,  including,  for  example,  Fred  Holroyd's  account  of  his  activities  with 
M16  in  Ireland  in  the  1970s  (Holroyd  with  Burbridge  1989).  It  seems  likely  that 
the  government  is  not  keen  to  have  a  rerun  of  the  Spycatcher  affair,  when 
government  lawyers  chased  Peter  Wright's  book  half  way  round  the  world. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  Act  has  had  some  effect  on 
broadcasting.  The  BBC's  Editorial  Policy  Meeting  has  debated  the  impact  of 
the  Act  on  who  could  be  interviewed  on  radio  and  television.  The  confidential 
minutes  show  that  ex  intelligence  operatives  such  as  Colin  Wallace  and-Fred 
Holroyd  were  considered  out  of  bounds: 
to  allow  Colin  Wallace  to  speak  on  air  would  be  in  breach  of  Section  1; 
but  it  remained  unclear  as  to  whether  a  journalist  reporting  on  him  would 
be  safe  under  Section  5.  Robin  Walsh  (ACRB  (NCA))  said  Fred  Holroyd 
had  been  making  himself  available  for  interviews  in  the  regions.  Anne 
Sloman  (Ed  SCAP)  said  they  were  not  worth  the  trouble;  they  had  been 
interviewed  for  over  an  hour  for'My  country  -  Right  or  Wrong?  '  and  the 
results  had  been  unbroadcastable  (Minute  79,  EPM  16  May  1989:  3). 
They  also  decided  that  there  were  some  individuals  who  were  not  technically 
covered  by  the  Act  but  who  it  would  be  difficult  to  interview.  The  prohibition  on 
ex  members  of  the  intelligence  services  was  deemed  also  to  apply  to  civil 
servants  such  as  Clive  Ponting.  BBC  solicitor  John  Coman  said  that,  there  was 
a  difficulty  over  the  definition  of  who  was,  or  had  been,  a  member  of  the 
security  forces.  Clive  Ponting  had  not  been  a  member  in  fact,  but  had  been 
considered  to-be  as  good  as'(Minute  79,  EPM  16  May  1989:  3).  Here  we  can 
see  the  clear  effect  of  secrecy  legislation  on  British  broadcasting. 
Although  there  was  no  explicit  reference  to  the  media  in  the  Prevention  of 
Terrorism  Act  in  1974,  it  made  the  IRA  illegal  in  Britain.  This,  together  with  the 
Home  Secretary's  view  that  he  would  'personally  regard'  IRA  interviews  as 
'wholly  inappropriate'  (cited  in  Curtis  1984a:  161)  was  interpreted  by 
broadcasters  as  making  interviews  with  the  IRA  illegal  or  at  least  effectively 
impossible  (Schlesinger  et  al  1983:  126).  Certainly,  there  were  no  further 
interviews  with  active  republican  paramilitaries  until  1979.  The  INLA  interview 
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half  years.  Just  as  IRA  interviews  ceased  when  the  IRA  was  made  illegal  in 
Britain,  so  did  INLA  interviews.  The  INLA  were  made  illegal  in  the  same  week 
as  the  interview  was  broadcast,  effectively  stopping  further  appearances. 
Since  then  there  have  been  no  interviews  with  active  professing  republican 
paramilitaries  on  British  television.  14 
Mrs  Thatcher  asked  the  Attorney  General  to  consider  taking  legal  action 
against  the  BBC  for  the  INLA  interview.  Section  11  of  the  PTA  was  considered 
for  the  first  time.  This  was  a'completely  new  departure  in  the  relationship 
between  broadcasting  and  the  state'  (Schlesinger  et  al  1983:  127).  The 
Carrickmore  affair  followed  hot  on  the  heels  of  the  INLA  interview.  In  the 
course  of  compiling  a  report  on  the  IRA,  a  Panorama  crew  filmed  an  IRA 
roadblock  in  the  village  of  Carrickmore  in  Northern  Ireland.  15  There  was  an 
outcry  in  parliament  and  in  the  press,  with  Mrs  Thatcher  calling  on  the  BBC  to 
'put  its  house  in  order'.  The  police  seized  -  again  for  the  first  time  -a  copy  of 
the  untransmitted  film  under  Section  11  of  the  PTA  (Curtis  I  984a:  164-172). 
In  August  1980  the  Attorney  General  Sir  Michael  Havers  issued  the  official  view 
of  the  PTA  arguing  that  there  was  enough  evidence  to  prosecute  the  BBC 
under  Section  11  for  both  incidents.  He  did  not  do  so,  according  to  the 
Guardian,  because'he  clearly  decided  that  a  court  case  would  have  caused  an 
embarrassing  row  about  press  freedom'  (cited  in  Curtis  1984a:  171).  Suchan 
intimidatory  use  of  the  law  against  the  broadcasters  was  not  envisaged  when 
the  PTA  was  brought  in.  Havers  legal  judgement  remains  untested  by  the 
courts. 
The  row  around  the  INLA  interview  and  the  'Carrickmore'  affair  represent  a 
turning  point  in  the  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland  in  two  distinct  senses.  They 
signalled  the  willingness  of  the  government  to  use  the  full  force  of  the  law 
against  the  broadcasters,  a  precedent  for  escalating  further  hostilities.  And  it 
was  a  sign  of  the  relative  success  of  the  government  in  their  battle  to  keep  the 
voice  of  armed  republicanism  off  the  screen.  However  this  victory  was  quickly 
followed  by  a  further  problem;  The  rise  of  Sinn  Fdin.  It  was  therefore  fitting  that 
the  next  major  row  should  be  about  the  portrayal  of  Sinn  F6in  politician  Martin 
McGuinness. 
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The  legacy  of  the  Carrickmore  affair,  the  1979  assassination  of  Airey  Neave' 
the  1984  Brighton  bombing  (in  which  Mrs  Thatcher  herself  narrowly  escaped 
death),  coupled  with  the  major  rows  over  the  Falklands  and  the  coverage  of  the 
Miners  Strike  in  1984/85,  set  the  context  for  government  relations  with  the 
broadcasters.  In  the  Summer  of  1985,  the  government  was  at  a  critical  stage  in 
Anglo-Irish  negotiationSl6and  there  had  been  much  controversy  about  the  way 
in  which  US  television  had  covered  the  hijack  of  a  TWA  plane.  The  networks 
were  accused  of  favouring  the  hijackers  by  interviewing  them  and  televising 
their  demands.  Referring  to  the  hijacking  Mrs  Thatcher  suggested,  in  a  speech 
in  the  US,  that  the  media  had  supplied  the  'terrorists'  with  the  'oxygen  of 
publicity'. 
The  details  of  the  row  over  Real  Lives  are  well  known:  The  Sunday  Times, 
sensing  a  story  in  the  forthcoming  programme,  started  the  ball  rolling  by  asking 
Mrs  Thatcher  (who  was  in  the  US  at  the  time)  a  hypothetical  question  about 
how  she  would  react  to  a  television  interview  with  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  IRA. 
They  also  sought  comments  from  the  Home  Secretary,  the  Northern  Ireland 
Secretary  and  at  least  two  of  the  BBC's  governors,  both  of  whom  had  not  been 
previously  aware  of  the  programme.  The  Sunday  Times  report  prompted  the 
Home  Secretary  to  issue  a  press  statement  and  a  day  later,  at  the  insistence  of 
the  BBC,  reluctantly  to  write  a  formal  letter  of  complaint.  Leon  Brittan  insisted 
that  he  was  not  writing  in  his  capacity  as  Minister  for  Broadcasting,  for  that 
would  be  censorship.  'I  do  on  the  other  hand  also  have  a  ministerial  - 
responsibility  for  the  fight  against  the  ever  present  threat  of  terrorism',  he  wrote. 
The  programme  would  give'an  immensely  valuable  platform'and  would'in  my 
considered  judgement  materially  assist  the  terrorist  cause'.  The  film  had 
already  been  referred  to  senior  management  but  after  the  Sunday  Times  story 
it  was  viewed  and  passed  by  the  entire  board  of  management  (except  the 
Director-General  who  was  on  holiday  and  had  also  not  been  aware  of  the 
programme).  Delaying  of  the  programme  until  the  DG  returned  from  holiday 
was  difficult  since  'At  the  edge  of  the  Union'  was  the  cover  story  in  that  week's 
edition  of  the  Radio  Times.  (Milne  1988:  187).  Relations  between  the  governors 
and  management  had  been  unsettled  over  the  previous  year  and  the  governors 
were  put  out  at  not  having  known  about  the  programme.  17  They  broke  with  the 
usual  practice,  insisted  on  viewing  the  film  and  banned  it.  Apparently,  only 
after  their  statement  had  been  drafted  were  the  words  'in  its  present  form' 
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The  Prime  Minister  and  the  Home  Secretary  congratulated  the  BBC.  A  deep 
division  was  opened  up  between  the  governors  and  the  board  of  management, 
with  the  public  implication  that  the  judgement  of  the  management  was  lacking. 
At  a  further  meeting  of  the  governors,  at  which  the  management  tried  to  have  - 
the  decision  reversed,  the  ban  was  confirmed.  A  twenty  four  hour  strike,  on  the 
day  the  programme  was  to  have  been  screened,  followed  which  included  ' 
journalists  from  throughout  broadcasting,  not  just  from  the  BBC.  The  Director 
General  considered  resigning  and  the  Controller  Northern  Ireland  did,,  but  was 
persuaded  to  change  his  mind. 
'At  the  edge  of  the  Union'  featured  two  elected  representatives  from  Derry, 
Gregory  Campbell,  a  member  of  Ian  Paisley's  DUP  and  Sinn  F6in's  Martin, 
McGuinness.  The  cameras  followed  them  as  they  went  about  their  daily  tasks. 
Both  men  were  seen  in  political  and  domestic  settings,  both  talked  of  their 
support  for  political  violence.  There  was  no  commentary  and  no  hostile 
questioning.  To  that  extent  the  programme  was  marked  out  from  routine  news 
and  current  affairs  coverage,  and  qualified  more  as  a  documentary.  In  another 
respect,  though  it  had  all  the  classic  hallmarks  of  'balance'  between  the  'two 
extremes'.  In  a  sense,  the  appearance  of  Gregory  Campbell  was  a  side  issue 
in  the  row.  The  question  which  'At  the  edge  of  the  Union'  threw  into  sharp  relief 
was  the  coverage  of  Irish  republican  politicians.  In  the  early  1980s  Sinn  F6in 
stood  for  and  were  elected  to  council  seats  across  Northern  Ireland'8.  This 
increased  the  democratic  legitimacy  of  Provisional  republican  politics,  'and 
consequently  the  difficulties  for  the  government  in  removing  the  voice  of  armed 
republicanism  from  the  screen.  From  the  start,  the  broadcasters  treated  Sinn 
176in  differently  than  other  political  parties.  On  the  one  hand  they  are 
democratically  elected  members  of  a  legal  political  party,  and  hence  'legitimate' 
with  a  right  to  access  to  the  media.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were  public 
supporters  of  the  armed  struggle  and,  potentially  at  least,  covert  members  of 
the  Provisional  IRA  and  so  'illegitimate'  with  no  right  of  access.  Indeed  Martin 
McGuinness  had  been  alleged  to  be  a  past  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  IRA  in  the 
Sunday  Times. 
Rather  than  try  to  wean  Sinn  Fdin  from  the  IRA,  government  strategy  has  been 
to  try  to  marginalise  the  party  as  part  of  the  wider  attempt  at  'containing'  the 
Troubles.  This  has  all  been  done  under  the  guise  of  'fighting  terrorism'.  in  the 
official  view,  Sinn  176in  are  simply  a'front'for  the  Provisional  IRA  and  as  such Policing  the  Media  42 
no  more  deserve  air  time  than  the  IRA  themselves.  Television  programmes 
which  feature  Sinn  Fdin  politicians  are  therefore  expected  to  be  clearly  hostile. 
The  BBC's  internal  referral  procedures  had  anticipated  this  problem  in  1980 
giving  the  Director  of  News  and  Current  Affairs  the  job  of  deciding  which  people 
'are  or  may  be  associated  with'  'terrorism'.  The  problem  with  Real  Lives,  from 
the  official  perspective  was  that  it  allowed  McGuinness  to  appear  as  a 
legitimate  politician.  The  scene  which  aroused  the  most  ire  was  one  in  which 
McGuinness  was  shown  at  home  with  one  of  his  children  sitting  on  his  knee. 
For  Stuart  Young,  Chair  of  the  Board  of  Governors  who  seems  to  have  been 
less  inclined  to  ban  it  than  some,  the  film'made  them  out  to  be  nice  guys, 
bouncing  babies  on  their  knees'  whilst  for  Daphne  Park,  who  was  more 
inclined  to  ban  it,  it  was  a'Hitler  loved  dogs'film  (cited  in  Milne  1989:  188  + 
190).  To  portray  McGuinness  as  a  rational  human  being  who  lived  in  many 
deeply  familiar  and  ordinary  ways  was  beyond  the  pale  of  acceptable  coverage. 
In  the  Real  Lives  affair  the  government  came  closer  than  ever  before  to  direct 
censorship. 
Recent  developments 
Between  1974  and  1988,  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  had  been  used  to 
seize  material  from  broadcasters  on  one  occasion.  Since  then  there  have  been 
numerous  legal  threats  against  both  the  press  and  television.  The  powers 
under  PACE  seem  to  have  been  first  used  to  seize  photos  and  film  from  press 
photographers  and  local  television  companies  following  the  riots  in  Bristol  in 
1986.19  Since  then  the  powers  have  been  used  following  the  clashes  between 
police  and  pickets  outside  Wapping  in  January  1987,  once  in  1988,  four  times 
in  1989  and  eight  times  in  the  first  ten  months  of  1990  (Birt  1990:  18), 
including,  notably,  after  the  anti  poll  tax  demonstration  that  year.  20  According 
to  John  Birt,  the  BBC's  then  Deputy  Director-General  there  are  now  routine 
requests  to  the  BBC  from  the  police  for  footage  of  disturbances,  most 
commonly  to  regional  BBC  offices  following  trouble  at  football  matches.  In  the 
main  these  requests  are  refused  and  the  police  do  not  apply  for  a  court  order. 
(Birt  1990) 
The  Andersonstown  Killings 
At  the  funeral  of  the  Gibraltar  dead  in  Milltown  cemetery,  West  Belfast,  a 
loyalist  paramilitary  launched  a  gun  and  grenade  attack  on  the  mourners  killing Policing  the  Media  43 
three  people  and  wounding  more  than  fifty.  Three  days  later  at  the  funeral  of 
one  of  the  Milltown  dead,  a  car  drove  at  high  speed  towards  the  cortege. 
Fearing  another  loyalist  attack  mourners  surrounded  the  car,  dragged  it's 
occupants  out,  beat  them  and  carried  them  off.  The  two  occupants,  were 
members  of  the  British  Army,  both  were  armed  and  one  fired  a  shot.  They  were 
later  killed  by  the  IRA.  The  approach  of  the  car,  the  initial  surge  to  surround  it 
and  the  firing  of  one  of  the  soldier's  guns  were  captured  on  television  and  stills 
cameras  and  broadcast  around  the  world  that  night.  Pictures  of  the  soldiers 
stripped,  battered  and  bruised  bodies  filled  the  front  pages  of  many  British 
newspaperS21  while  news  reports  revealed  a  widespread  sense  of  revulsion 
amongst  media  personnel.  On  Monday  March  22  the  RUC  Chief  Constable,  Sir 
John  Hermon,  'requested'  that  the  BBC,  ITN  and  RTE  (the  national 
broadcasting  channel  in  the  Republic  of  Ireland)  hand  over  untransmitted  film 
of  the  attack.  The  broadcasters  refused,  unless  faced  with  a  court  order.  In 
parliament  the  next  day  Mrs  Thatcher  set  out  the  options  for  the  broadcasters 
in  straightforward  terms: 
I  believe  that  everyone,  the  media  included,  has  a  bounden  duty  to  do 
everything  they  can  to  see  that  those  who  perpetrated  the  terrible 
crimes,  which  we  saw  on  television,  which  disgusted  the  whole  world, 
are  brought  to  justice.  Either  one  is  on  the  side  of  justice  in  these 
matters,  or  one  is  on  the  side  of  terrorism  (BBC2  Newsnight  2250  22 
March  1988). 
Although  all  three  television  companies  initially  refused  to  hand  over  their  film, 
Mrs  Thatcher's  attack  was  entirely  directed  against  the  BBC.  The  BBC's  initial 
refusal  cited  staff  safety: 
Our  policy  on  requests  for  untransmitted  material,  including  requests 
from  the  RUC,  is  that  we  do  not  make  such  material  available.  This 
policy  is  to  protect  our  film  crews  -  to  protect  the  lives  of  our  staff  (Daily 
Mail  22  March  1988). 
By  the  next  day,  there  were  signs  that  other  factors,  such  as  press  reporting 
and  comments  in  parliament  allied  to  perceptions  of  public  opinion,  were 
starting  to  have  an  effect.  David  Nicholas  of  ITN  echoed  the  BBC  line  on  staff 
safety,  but  went  on  to  add  'Saturday's  events  were  heinous  crimes,  and  I 
understand  why  people  are  saying  "why  aren't  you  helping  the  police?  "' Policing  the  Media  44 
(independent  23  March  1988).  The  pressure  on  the  broadcasters  mounted  as 
negotiations  with  the  RUC  continued  during  the  day.  The  next  evening  around 
6.30  pm  Senior  RUC  officers  arrived  at  BBC  and  ITN  headquarters  in  Belfast 
and,  saying  that  they  were  acting  under  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act,  the 
Emergency  Provisions  Act  and  the  Criminal  Law  Act  1967,  demanded  copies 
of  untransmitted  material.  The  BBC's  Controller  Northern  Ireland,  Colin  Morris 
was  told  that  if  he  refused,  that  the  Editor,  News  and  Current  Affairs,  John 
Conway,  would  be  arrested.  The  BBC  and  ITN  complied.  The  next  day  RTE 
too  handed  over  its  untransmitted  footage.  The  BBC's  Director  General  said 
'the  BBC  has  never  set  itself  above  the  law'  (Daily  Telegraph  24  March  1988). 
This  was  the  second  time  that  police  had  seized  film  material  acting  under  the 
PTA. 
However,  there  remains  some  doubt  as  to  the  applicability  of  Section  11  to 
seizing  media  materials.  As  with  the  seizure  of  the  Carrickmore  film  and  the 
later  1980  opinion  of  the  Attorney  General,  the  legality  of  the  RUC  action  was 
de  facto.  The  power  has  still  not  been  tested  in  the  courts.  ITN's  Editor  David 
Nicholas  emphasised  that  ITN  'does  not  consider  itself  above  the  law  and  it  is 
open  to  the  authorities  to  use  the  due  process  of  the  law  in  its  enquiries' 
(Guardian  23  March  1988).  But  the  due  process  in  this  case  does  not  involve  a 
court  order.  When  the  RUC  raided  the  Belfast  offices  of  BBC  and  ITN  they 
were  not  acting  with  any  kind  of  search  warrant  or  court  order,  they  simply 
threatened  to  arrest  senior  broadcasters.  Unlike  the  Police  and  Criminal 
Evidence  Act  there  are  no  provisions  under  the  PTA  which  specifically  relate  to 
the  seizure  of  film  or  other  media  material  and  consequently  no  safeguards.  It 
is  an  offence  under  Section  11  to  withhold  information  without  'reasonable 
excuse'.  The  definition  of  'reasonable  excuse'  is  unclear.  More  importantly  it 
remains  unclear  that  a  prosecution  under  Section  11  would  necessarily  . allow 
the  RUC  access  to  the  information,  since  the  PTA  only  gives  the  power  to 
prosecute  for  the  witholding  of  evidence,  not  the  power  to  seize  that  evidence. 
it  seems  that  this  point  was  acknowledged  in  government  circles  prior  to  the 
film  being  handed  over.  The  Daily  Express  reported  an  off-the-record  briefing 
in  which  'a  senior  cabinet  minister'  acknowledged  that'the  legal  position  over 
the  film  was  obscure...  The  minister  said  that  if  the  case  failed  in  the  courts, 
then  Northern  Ireland  Secretary  Tom  King  would  take  a  fresh  look  at  the 
Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act,  and  how  it  applied  to  possible  evidence  held  by 
the  media'  (Daily  Express  23  March  1988).  According  to  the  Independent's 
legal  corespondent  anyprosecution  could  not  be  used  to  force  the  media  to Policing  the  Media  45 
surrender  the  un  transmitted  footage  and  would  require  a  wide  interpretation  of 
the  word  "information"'  (Independent  23  March  1988)  Thus  if  the  BBC,  ITN  and 
RTE  had  refused  to  release  the  footage  under  threat  from  the  RUC,  it  is  not 
certain  that  any  case  could  have  been  won  on  the  basis  of  the  PTA.  This  is 
perhaps  why  the  RUC  constructed  the  legal  cocktail  of  the  PTA  backed  up  by 
the  Emergency  Provisions  Act  and  the  Criminal  law  Act.  Once  BBC  personnel 
had  been  threatened  with  arrest  under  Section  11,  the  RUC  still  needed  to  find 
some  power  to  seize  the  film  material.  They  quoted  Section  13  of  the  EPA 
1978  which  states  that  a  constable  may  seize'anything  which  he  suspects  is 
being,  has  been  or  is  intended  to  be  used  in  the  commission  of  a  scheduled 
offence'.  The  scheduled  offence  in  this  case  is  the  refusal  to  hand  over  the 
film.  This  emergency  power  was  then  backed  up  with  the  threat  under  the  non 
emergency  Criminal  Law  Act  1967  of  arrest  for  failing  to  disclose  information 
requested  by  a  police  officer. 
The  American  magazine  Newsweek  ran  into  trouble  later  in  the  year  when  they 
published  an  interview  with  'a  staff  officer  in  the  Northern  Command'  of  the  IRA 
(Foote  1988).  In  Australia  on  August  5,  Mrs  Thatcher  had  observed:  'the  IRA  is 
a  proscribed  organisation  in  Britain  and  anyone  who  interviews  them  I  should 
expect  to  be  committed  for  an  offence'  (Independent  25  October  1988).  Inthe 
light  of  this  the  Crown  Prosecution  Service  examined  whether  the  article 
contravened  section  11  of  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act.  They  ruled  that  the 
interview  was  not  illegal  and  a'well  placed  Whitehall  source'  told  the 
Independent  that  Mrs  Thatcherhad  been  wrong'  (25  October  1988). 
Nevertheless,  here  was  a  further  warning  for  the  British  media.  In  1989  the 
PTA  was  used  to  seize  untransmitted  film  of  Fr.  Patrick  Ryan,  from  Thames 
television  (Bolton  1989).  The  Daily  Telegraph  was  forced  to  hand  over 
photographs  under  the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  in  October  1989 
although  the  BBC  defeated  an  RUC  court  order  later  in  the  month  arguing  that 
the  PACE  legislation  did  not  then  apply  to  Northern  Ireland.  22  In  1991  the  new 
clause  17  introduced  in  1989  was  used  for  the  first  time  against  Channel  Four 
(see  below)  and  at  the  beginning  of  1992  it  was  used  against  American  network 
ABC  in  relation  to  the  Lockerbie  bombing. 
Gibraltar 
The  Real  Lives  affair  was  followed  by  increasing  government  pressure  on  the 
BBC  and  the  relationship  between  the  governors  and  management  seems  to Policing  the  Media  46 
have  deteriorated  even  further.  The  Tebbit  attack  on  the  BBC's  coverage  of  the 
US  bombing  of  Libya,  the  BBC's  libel  payout  to  two  Conservative  MPs,  the 
1987  sacking  of  the  Director  General  Alasdair  Milne  by  the  Governors  and  the 
Special  Branch  raid  on  BBC  Scotland  the  following  weekend,  left  the  BBC  weak 
and  demoralised  (Leapman  1987;  Milne  1988).  Meanwhile,  government  policy 
on  independent  broadcasting  had  been  on  the  move.  Nineteen  eighty-eight 
was  to  see  the  government  widen  its  attack  to  both  broadcasting  systems.  This 
time  the  controversy  did  not  arise  because  of  interviews  with  members  of  Sinn 
Fdin  or  the  IRA.  Television  reporting  on  the  Gibraltar  killings  touched  that 
other  especially  tender  nerve:  the  conduct  of  the  British  military  and  intelligence 
services. 
At  approximately  3.41pm  on  the  afternoon  of  Sunday  March  6  1988,  three 
members  of  the  IRA,  Mairead  Farrell,  Dan  McCann  and  Sean  Savage  were 
shot  dead  in  Gibraltar.  The  killings  occurred  in  a  main  street  of  the  tiny  British 
colony  at  the  southern  tip  of  Spain.  First  reports  suggested  a  reasonably 
straight  forward  story.  Three  armed  members  of  the  IRA  were  shot  dead  by 
Gibraltar  police  after  planting  a  massive  car  bomb  and,  '  in  some  reports, 
engaging  in  a  gun  battle.  Later  that  evening-the  MoD  changed  their  account, 
acknowledging  that  military  personnel  had  been  involved  in  the  killings  (Miller 
1991). 
However,  at  around  half  past  three  the  next  afternoon,  the  Foreign  Secretary 
Geoffrey  Howe  said  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  no  bomb  had  been  found 
and  that  the  three  IRA  members  were  unarmed.  Roger  Bolton,  the  editor  of 
This  Week,  Thames  television's  networked  Current  Affairs  programme 
describes  his  reaction  to  the  story: 
I  had  a  late  lunch  and  when  I  came  back  to  the  office  sat  down  with 
Julian  Manyon  and  Chris  Oxley  (respectively  reporter  and  producer  of 
'Death  on  the  Rock')...  They  thought  me  somewhat  preoccupied  with 
Ireland  so,  rather  playfully,  asked  me  if  I  was  going  to  do  anything  about 
the  shootings.  'No,  there's  nothing  left  to  say'.  Almost  at  that  moment 
Oracle  updated  its  report  on  Gibraltar  quoting  the  Foreign  Secretary's 
statement  to  the  House  of  Commons...  I  drew  in  my  breath.  Well,  that 
put  a  very  different  perspective  on  the  whole  matter.  (Bolton  1990:  191) 
Bolton  set  a  team  to  work  on  researching  a  programme  almost  immediately. Policing  the  Media  47 
Death  on  the  Rock 
Following  the  deaths  at  Milltown  and  Andersonstown,  after  which  hostilities 
between  broadcasters  and  the  state  were  renewed,  'there  were  now',  according 
to  Roger  Bolton,  'even  more  compelling  reasons  to  continue  the  story, 
(1990:  203).  The  This  Week  team  uncovered  new  evidence  about  the 
shootings,  though  without  any  co-operation  from  official  sources.  In  London 
'Death  on  the  Rock'was,  guided  through  internal  politics  at  Thames  as  well  as 
the  referral  system.  Senior  management  at  Thames  were  kept  informed  and 
Bolton  told  the  IBA  that  he  thought  the  film  would  be  a  'sensitive  one'  (Bolton 
1990:  224).  The  IBA  indicated  that  they  would  want  to  preview  the  film.  It  was 
passed  by  the  Thames  hierarchy  and  dispatched  to  the  IBA  for  approval  at  613M 
on  April  26. 
The  government  had  been  aware  that  the  programme  was  being  made  because 
of  regular  requests  from  the  Thames  team  to  official  sources  for  guidance. 
They  had  also  been  given  an  indication  of  the'likely  shape'  of  the  programme 
over  a  week  before  transmission.  A  special  cabinet  sub  committee  had  co- 
ordinated  government  responses  to  the  shootings,  particularly,  information 
management.  According  to  Roger  Bolton  the  activities  of  the  Thames 
journalists  had  been  reported  to  the  committee  at  regular  intervals  (Bolton 
1990:  223). 
One  hour  before  Thames  dispatched  a  copy  of  the  programme  to  the  IBA  The 
Foreign  Secretary  personally  telephoned  Lord  Thomson,  the  Chair  of  the  IBA 
saying  that  he  was  concerned  was  that  the  programme  might  prejudice  the 
Inquest  on  the  killings.  Howe  asked  Thomson  to  postpone  the  programme  until 
after  the  inquest  in  Gibraltar.  Thomson  said  he  would  look  into  the  matter. 
IBA  staff  viewed  the  programme  the  next  day  and  asked  for  three  changes  to 
be  made  in  the  commentary.  According  to  Bolton  'senior  staff  in  the 
Programme  Division,  together  with  the  IBA's  officer  for  Northern  Ireland,  felt 
that  the  programmes  summing  up  suggested  too  strongly  that  the  coroner's 
Inquest  would  be  unable  to  establish  the  truth,  and  that  the  Gibraltar  police 
evidence  would  be  unreliable.  I  accepted  these  two  points  but  the  IBA 
accepted  my  arguments  on  the  third  point  which  concerned  the  Prime  Minister's Policing  the  Media  48 
prior  knowledge  of  the  detection  of  an  IRA  unit  in  Spain.  '  (Bolton  1990:  228). 
Inside  the  IBA,  the  programme  was  referred  up  to  the  most  senior  personnel, 
via  the  Director  of  Television  to  the  Director  General  and  the  Chairman,  all  of 
whom  viewed  and  passed  the  programme  successively  on  the  evening  of  April 
27.  Legal  advice  sought  by  the  IBA  indicated  that  the  programme  would  not 
prejudice  the  forthcoming  inquest  because  the  programme  was  broadcast  in  a 
different  jurisdiction.  This  was  the  end  of  what  Windelsham  and  Rampton  were 
to  call  the  'tortuous  process'  of  referral  (1989:  75).,  The  next  morning  the  IBA 
informed  'Geoffrey  Howe's  Private  Secretary  of  their  decision  and  then  the 
Cabinet  was  informed.  At  around  noon  Howe  again  phoned  the  IBA,  this  time 
speaking  with  David  Glencross,  the  Director  of  Television.  This  time  he  raised 
the  issue  of  contamination  of  evidence  and  referred  to  the  Salmon  Report  on 
the  law  of  contempt  which  states: 
The  Press,  Television  and  Radio  have  always  considered  that  once  any 
type  of  tribunal  has  been  appointed  it  is  inappropriate  for  them  to  , 
conduct  anything  in  the  nature  of  a  parallel  inquiry  and  they  have  never 
done  so.  We  regard  it  as  of  the  utmost  importance  that  this  restraint 
should  continue  to  be  exercised.  (cited  in  Windelsham  and  Rampton 
1989:  136) 
But,  neither  a  tribunal  nor  an  inquest  had  at  that  stage  been  appointed  or 
scheduled.  It  is  worth  noting  here  that  neither  of  the  objections  of  the  Foreign 
Secretary  had  the  slightest  legal  basis.  23  What  is  more  important,  for  the 
government,  is  the  appearance  of  legalistic  legitimacy.  Shortly  after  Howe's 
second  phone  call,  the  Foreign  Office  invited  lobby  correspondents  to  a  press 
conference  in  which  they  revealed  the  contact  with  the  IBA.  24  Thomson 
responded  with  a  statement  that  afternoon  and  the  programme  went  ahead  as 
planned  at  9PM  that  evening.  This  left  the  IBA  at  the  centre  of  what  the  Daily 
Telegraph  described  as  it's  'greatest  crisis  since  it  was  set  up  in  1954,  just  at  a 
time  when  the  government  is  preparing  the  most  radical  restructuring  of 
commercial  television  for  30  years'  (30  April  1988).  25 
The  account  given  by  'Death  on  the  Rock'  directly  contradicted  the  official 
version,  which  was  based  on  Geoffrey  Howe's  statement  to  parliament  on 
March  7  and  developed  in  unattributable  briefings  to  papers  such  as  the 
Sunday  Times  (Miller  1991;  Private  Eye  1989).  Howe  claimed  that  the  IRA 
personnel  had  been'challenged  by  the  security  forces.  When  challenged  they Policing  the  Media  49 
made  movements  which  led  the  military  personnel,  operating  in  support  of  the 
Gibraltar  police,  to  conclude  that  their  own"lives  and  the  lives  of  others  were 
under  threat.  In  the  light  of  this  response,  they  were  shot.  Those  killed  were 
subsequently  found  not  to  have  been  carrying  arms'  (Hansard  7  March  1988 
Col.  21)  However,  eye-witnesses  interviewed  for'Death  on  the  Rock'  alleged 
that  there  had  been  no  challenge  and  that  the  IRA  members  had  made  no 
movements,  simply  putting  their  hands  up  as  if  in  surrender.  26  Their  testimony 
raised  the  possibility  that  the  killings  were  simply  extra-judicial  executions.  27 
As  well  as  fitting  conveniently  with  wider  policy  initiatives  on  broadcasting,  it 
should  be  remembered  that  the  government  reaction  to  the  programme  was 
part  of  a  wider  attempt  to  win  the  symbolic  and  legal  battle  to  present  the 
killings  as  lawful.  As  we  have  noted  a  cabinet  sub  committee  was  set  up 
specially  to  deal  with  this  problem.  Consequently  we  can  see  government 
strategy  in  this  area  as  operating  at  a  number  of  levelS.  28  Attacking  the  , 
broadcasters  serves  as  a  tool  for  disciplining  journalists,  undermining  public 
service  broadcasting,  hastening  policy  objectives  on  broadcasting  and  publicly 
legitimating  the  actions  British  military  forces.  The  furore  over'Death  on  the 
Rock'  also  had  the  result  of  diverting  attention  from  arguments  about  what 
actually  happened  in  Gibraltar  on  March  6  1988. 
Government  strategy  in  relation  to  perceptions  of  the  killings  took  two  main 
forms.  The  first  was  to  say  nothing  about  the  events  of  March  6  in  public,  the 
second  involved  unattributable  briefings  given  to  selected  journalists. 
Misinformation  was  also  used  in  order  to  undermine  the  credibility  of  those  who 
contradicted  the  official  account.  We  will  return  to  the  information  management 
aspects  of  these  approaches  in  later  chapters,  but  for  present  purposes  it  is 
the  attacks  on  'Death  on  the  Rock'which  are  of  interest. 
Both  the  Home  Secretary  and  the  Northern  Ireland  Secretary  called  the 
programme  'trial  by  television'  and  Mrs  Thatcher,  when  asked  if  she  was  furious 
commented  that  it  was  'deeper  than  that'.  In  a  television  interview  in  Japan 
she  said: 
Trial  by  television  or  guilt  by  accusation,  is  the  day  that  freedom  dies... 
Press  and  television  rely  on  freedom.  Those  who  do  rely  on  freedom 
must  have  the  duty  and  responsibility  and  not  try  to  substitute  their  own 
system  for  it  (cited  in  the  Daily  Telegraph  30  April  1988). Policing  the  Media  50 
In  their  response  the  IBA  neatly  turned  Mrs  Thatcher's  phrase  the  'oxygen  of 
publicity',  back  on  her: 
The  IBA  believes  that  to  postpone  the  programme  until  after  an  inquest 
which  is  apparently  a  long  time  away  would  give  the  IRA  more'oxygen  of 
publicity'  and  would  certainly  not  prevent  it  being  shown  elsewhere. 
The  government  kept  up  the  pressure  all  through  the  summer  until  the  inquest 
in  September.  When  one  of  the  Thames  witnesses  appeared  to  retract  his 
testimony  during  the  month  long  proceedings,  knives  were  unsheathed  in,  the 
press  and  the  government  more  or  less  obliged  Thames  to  hold  some  form  of 
inquiry  into  the  programme.  The  inquiry  took  on  a  quasi  legal  form  in  order  that 
it  might  gain  some  credibility  and  it  was  carried  out  by  a  Privy  Councillor  (who 
was  also  a  former  Conservative  Northern  Irelbnd  Minister)  and  a  QC  who  were 
felt  to  have  the  authority  to  gain  access  to  the  relevant  evidence  (Trethowan 
1989:  vii-viii).  Windelsham  rejected  the  criticisms  of  the  Foreign  Secretary  on 
prejudice  and  contamination  and  largely  cleared  the  programme,  making  only  a 
small  number  of  minor  critical  points: 
The  programme  makers  were  experienced,  painstaking  and  persistent. 
They  did  not  bribe,  bully  or  misrepresent  those  who  took  part.  The 
programme  was  trenchant  and  avoided  triviality.  Despite  the  various 
criticisms  which  we  have  noted  in  our  report,  we  accept  that  those  who 
made  it  were  acting  in  good  faith  and  without  ulterior  motives 
(Windelsham  and  Rampton  1989:  144). 
Spotlight 
BBC  Northern  Ireland  also  made 
ýrogramme 
on  the  killings  to  fill  their 
Spotlight  current  affairs  slot.  Revealed  by  the  press  on  May  4,  the  BBC  press 
office  maintained  that'a  programme  is  under  consideration,  but  has  not  yet 
been  finalised.  It  is  in  its  early  stages  and  we  don't  have  a  transmission  date  or 
details  of  its  possible  content'  (hish  News  4  May  1988).  The  day  before,  a 
senior  NIO  official  had  phoned  the  BBC  in  Belfast  to  enquire  about,  the  timing 
and  subject  matter  of  the  programme'  (Be/fast  Telegraph  4  May  1988).  A 
spokesperson  said  that  if  the  BBC  decided  to  show  the  programme  'clearly  the 
same  criticism  could  be  levelled  at  them  as  was  levelled  at  Thames  TV  -  that  of Policing  the  Media  51 
prejudicing-  a  coroner's  inquest'  (Irish  News  4  May  1988).  At  this  stage  the 
programme  had  still  to  receive  clearance  from  the  BBC  hierarchy. 
Foreign  Secretary  Geoffrey  Howe  phoned  the  Chair  of  the  BBC  governors, 
Marmaduke  Hussey  at  around  noon  on  Wednesday  May  4  in  an  attempt  to  stop 
the  programme  being  shown.  He  used  the  same  arguments  as  had  been  used 
against'Death  on  the  Rock'  and  sought  assurances  that  interviews  with 
witnesses  to  the  shootings  would  not  be  broadcast.  A  Foreign  Office 
spokesperson  told  the  Independent  (5  May  1988):  'we  are  not  objecting  to 
documentaries  on  the  Gibraltar  shootings.  We  are  concerned  that  interviews 
with  eyewitnesses  could  prejudice  the  inquest'.  In  contrast  to  the  Real  Lives 
affair  the  Chair  of  the  Governors  deflected  the  request  onto  the  Director 
General,  Michael  Checkland.  Hussey  commented:  'I  pointed  out  to  the  Foreign 
Secretary  that  programme  making  matters  must  be  dealt  with  by  the  Director- 
General  who  is  now  considering  the,  matter  with  Northern  Ireland  management. 
Once  full  information  is  available,  he  or  I  will  be  able  to  respond  to  the  Foreign 
Secretary'  (The  Times  5  May  1988). 
A  rough  cut  of  the  programme  was  viewed  by  the  editor  of  the  programme, 
Andy  Coleman,  the  Editor  News  and  Current  Affairs,  John  Conway  and  the 
Head  of  Programmes  Arwel  Ellis  Owen  on  the  evening  of  May  4  (The  Times  5 
May  1988).  They  passed  the  programme  for  transmission  and  referred  it  up  to 
Controller  Colin  Morris,  who  viewed  it  later  that  evening,  also  recommending 
that  it  be  shown.  The  next  day  the  programme  was  apparently  sent  down  the 
line  to  London,  where  a  collection  of  senior  management,  including  the 
Director  General,  watched  it  the  next  day.  The  decision  to  broadcast  was  taken 
during  the  day  of  May  5  and  announced  less  than  two  hours  before 
transmission.  In  line  with  the  convention,  broken  during  the  Real  Lives  crisis, 
the  governors  did  not  view  the  film,  relying  on  the  judgement  of  the  Director 
General  and  his  senior  staff.  Emphasising  this,  the  reply  to  Geoffrey  Howe's 
telephone  call  came  from  the  Director  General  Michael  Checkland  and  not 
Marmaduke  Hussey  to  whom  Howe  had  originally  spoken. 
it  is  interesting  to  note  the  different  ways  in  which  the  BBC  and  the  IBA/Thames 
dealt  with  the  government  pressure  over  their  respective  programmes  on 
Gibraltar.  The  special  position  of  the  BBC  in  relation  to  the  government  and  to 
international  perceptions  means  that  it  is  easier  for  the  government  to  move  the 
BBC  in  the  direction  that  it  wants.  Another  factor  is  that  there  are  a  variety  of Policing  the  Media  52 
different  ITV  companies  as  well  as  the  regulatory  body  the  ITC  (then  the  IBA). 
The  degree  of  centralised  control  which  is  possible  in  the  BBC  is  less  easy  to 
maintain  over  the  ITV  companies. 
BBC  management  were  in  a  'tight  corner'  (Bolton  1990:  246)  over  Spotlight.  it 
is  very  unusual  for  decisions  about  programmes  broadcast  only  in  Northern 
Ireland  to  be  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  local  management  and  referred  up 
through  the  BBC  hierarchy  (Owen  1989).  This  is  because  BBC  Northern 
Ireland  is  assumed  to  be  a  safer  pair  of  hands  than  'outside'  journalists 
covering  Northern  Ireland.  Journalists  from  Britain  are  required  to  keep  BBCNI 
management  informed  of  programmes  concerning  Northern  Ireland  at  all 
stages.  In  this  case,  there  was  some  feeling  among  senior  executives  in 
London  that  there  had  been  a  breakdown  of  referral  procedures.  Consequently 
there  was  some  dismay  at  the  lack  of  time  that  remained  to  adequately  check 
the  programme,  although  there  apparently  was  time  for  a  total  of  five  editorial 
viewings  of  the  programme  on  May  4  and  5.  During  the  discussions  on  May  5 
which  involved  Northern  Ireland  staff,  as  well  as  the  Head  of  Regional 
programming  Geraint  Stanley  Jones,  the  Controller  Editorial  Policy,  John 
Wilson  and  the  DG  there  was  apparently  some  suggestion  that  the  script 
should  be  changed  and  that  the  programme  be  delayed  for  a  week  (Irish  News 
6  May  1988).  There  was  a  corresponding  feeling  in  BBC  Northern  Ireland  that 
the  referral  system  was  overweening  and  unnecessary.  Alex  Thomson,  the 
reporter  on  the  programme,  is  reported  to  have  said  that  he  believed  the  BBC 
had  an  'over-managed'  editorial  system.  'To  take  five  editorial  viewings  to  get  it 
on  the  air  is  ridiculous'  he  said  (Irish  News  6  May  1988).  Thomson  himself  was 
apparently  denied  access  to  the  meeting  at  which  it  was  finally  decided  to  show 
the  documentary.  There  was  some  lobbying  for  network  transmission,  which 
according  to  Bolton  would  'usually'  have  been  the  case.  However,  Alex 
Thomson  was  apparently  told  'look,  you've  won  one  battle,  don't  push  your  luck' 
(Bolton  1990:  246).  Almost  at  the  last  minute  the  decision  was  taken  to 
broadcast  the  programme  largely  intact.  Some  in  BBC  Northern  Ireland  felt  that 
the  extended  referral  process  masked  a  chronic  indecision  on  the  part  of  senior 
management.  Others  suggested  that  BBC  executives  were  vulnerable  to 
pressure  from  the  Prime  Minister.  This  seems  to  have  been  the  view  of  even 
some  of  the  management  in  BBC  NI 
In  this  view,  the  decision  to  broadcast  hinged  on  Mrs  Thatcher's  performance  at 
Prime  Minister's  Questions  that  afternoon.  According  to  one  BBC  insider,  the Policing  the  Media  53 
perception  amongst  some  BBC  staff  was  that'If  she  [Thatcher]  had  made  an 
outcry  in  particularly  strong  terms  the  impression  was  that  they  may  well  have 
shelved  it'  (Telephone  interview  February  1990).  The  Prime  Minister  was 
noticeably  less  forthright  at  Questions  that  day.  There  was  no  repetition  of  the 
legal  threat  of  contempt  via  prejudice.  Indeed  Mrs  Thatcher  seemed  to 
acknowledge  that  there  was  no  legal  case,  but  simply  a  custom  or  convention: 
Trial  by  television  was  not  so  much  a  matter  of  the  specific  rules,  but 
rather  a  dependence  on  customs  and  conventions  that  had  been 
referred  to  by  Lord  Justice  Salmon  (Times  6  May  1988). 
After  the  programme  went  out  the  feeling  inside  the  BBC  was  that  heads  would 
have  to  roll.  Alex  Thomson.  apparently  had  his'head  on  the  chopping  block,, 
but  by  that  time  he  had  already  been  offered  another  job.  The  axe  does  seem 
to  have  fallen  on  a  more  senior  neck,  that  of  Arwel  Ellis  Owen.  On  the  day 
following  transmission,  Owen  gave  a  radio  interview  in  which  he  criticised  the 
BBC's  caution  in  the  face  of  governmental  attack.  In  particular  he  is  said  to 
have  alleged  that  the  transmission  of  the  programme  hinged  on  the  tone  of  Mrs 
Thatcher's  comments  at  Question  Time.  29  The  interview  came  to  the  attention 
of  senior  management  when  it  was  proposed  that  it  should  be  transmitted  on 
Radio  Four's  PM  programme.  It  was  then  pulled  on  the  instructions  of  the 
Director  General  and  staff  were  instructed  not  to  refer  to  it  in  public.  Hints  of 
criticism  can  be  found  in  a  public  lecture  delivered  by  Owen  almost  a  year  later 
in  Oxford.  Asking  why  the  decision  on  Spotlight  was  taken  in  London,  he 
argued  that'When  a  government  quotes  "national  security"  as  its  reason  for 
expressing  an  interest  in  say,  the  two  programmes  I  have  mentioned  ('Death  on 
the  Rock'  and  Spotlight)  -  the  Corporation  slips  easily  into  its  role  as  a  "national 
institution"  -  protecting  the  public  interest  -  locally  and  nationally  -  as  well as 
protecting  its  own  independence  and  credibility.  The  lessons  of  Real  Lives 
were  fully  understood'  (Owen  1989:  28).  30 
Owen  was,  by  the  time  Spotlight  was  broadcast,  already  scheduled  to  take  up, 
an  appointment  for  a  sabbatical  year  as  the  first  Guardian/Nuffield  Fellow  at 
Oxford  University  in  October  1988.  He  was  then  supposed  to  return  to  the 
BBC,  where  insiders  say  he  was  tipped  to  get  a  more  senior  job  in  BBC  Wales. 
Certainly  Owen  appears  to  have  expected  to  return  to  the  BBC  following  the 
scholarship.  He  started  his  Nuffield  lecture  by  saying  he  was  indebted  to  the 
BBC  'for  releasing  me  for  a  sabbatical  year.  I  look  forward  to  rejoining  my Policing  the  Media  54 
colleagues  at  the  BBC'(Owen  1989:  2).  This,  however,  was  not  to  be.  In  effect, 
and  very  quietly,  he  was  sacked,  or  as  senior  management  at  the  BBC  prefer  to 
put  it'eased  oUt'.  31  It  is  a  mark  of  the  great  sensitivity  of  this  story  that  until 
now  this  information  has  never  been  published. 
The  Committee' 
The  representation  of  the  forces  of  law  and  order  was  also  the  focus  of  the  next 
major  confrontation  between  the  media  and  the  state.  On  2  October  1991 
Channel  Four  transmitted  a  programme  in  it's  Dispatches  series  made  by 
independent  company  Box  productionS.  32  Titled  'The  Committee',  the 
programme  alleged  a  secret  conspiracy  between  members  of  the  Protestant 
business  community,  loyalist  paramilitaries  and  members  of  the'security 
forces'.  Citing  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  the  RUC  demanded  that  the 
company  reveal  the  identity  of  the  main  source  of  the  programme  and  when 
Box  and  Channel  Four  refused,  the  RUC  took  them  to  court.  The  moves  seem 
to  have  originated  with  the  RUC  and  continued  with  the  aid  of  the  Metropolitan 
police  in  London.  In  roughly  comparable  previous  cases  such  as  Carrickmore, 
the  use  of  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  was  only  considered  after  the 
political  row  had  erupted,  as  part  of  a  strategy  of  intimidating  the  broadcasters. 
In  the  Andersonstown  case,  considered  above,  the  broadcasters  complied  with 
RUC  threats  following  press  and  government  pressure.  In  this  case  though, 
there  was  no  great  political  row  and  no  manufactured  controversy  inthe  press 
of  the  sort  usual  on  these  occasions.  Indeed  the  fact  that  the  RUC  were  taking 
Channel  Four  to  court  was  kept  secret  for  around  six  months  following  Channel 
Four's  lawyers  interpretation  of  the  new  powers  contained  in  the  1989  update 
of  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act. 
After  the  programme  was  broadcast  both  Sir  Hugh  Annesley,  Chief  Constable 
of  the  RUC  and  Peter  Brooke,  the  Northern  Ireland  Secretary  asked  Channel 
Four  to  hand  any  evidence  they  might  have  to  the  RUC.  The  day  after, 
Annesley  took  the  unusual  step  of  issuing  a  four  page  press  statement  utterly 
rejecting'  the  programme  as  an  'unjust  and  unsubstantiated  slur'  on  the  RUC.  33 
Channel  Four  responded  that  it  was  regrettable  that  the  Chief  Constable  had 
dismissed  the  film  without  'investigating  it  or  awaiting  the  additional  evidence 
which  he  knows  Channel  Four  is  providing'.  On  October  7  Channel  Four 
provided  the  RUC,  the  Special  Branch  and  the  NIO  with  a  dossier  of 
information  on  the  alleged  'committee'.  However  on  October  31  The  RUC, Policing  the  Media  55 
through  the  Metropolitan  police,  applied  for  production  orders  under  schedule 
7,  paragraph  3  of  the  PTA,  requiring  Channel  Four  and  Box  productions  to 
reveal  the  identity  of  their  sources,  particularly  source'A'.  Following  this, 
'further  material  not  included  in  the  original  dossier  was  handed  over'  (C4  Press 
Release  29  April  1992).  Channel  Four  and  Box,  who  had  not  been  present  at 
the  initial  hearing,  applied  to  discharge  or  vary  the  orders  and  then  to  clarify 
their  ambit.  Finally  the  television  companies  appeared  before  the  court  on 
January  21  1992  and  stated  that  they  could  not  fully  comply  with  the  orders. 
The  RUC  then  referred  the  matter  to  the  Attorney  General,  who,  on  April  29, 
obtained  leave  to  commit  C4  and  box  for  contempt  of  court.  Let  us  remember 
that  this  entire  legal  procedure  was  conducted  in  secrecy.  Only  when  the 
Attorney  General  obtained  leave  to  commit  the  broadcasters  did  the  story 
become  public.  The  contempt  case  opened  towards  the  end  of  July  1992,  with 
the  possibility  that  Channel  Four  could  be  subject  to  unlimited  rolling  fines  or 
even  sequestration  of  assets  as  in  the  case  of  the  National  Union  of 
Mineworkers  during  the  pit  strike  of  1984/5. 
In  the  face  of  closing  down  one  of  Britain's  four  television  networks,  the  court 
opted  for  a  pragmatic  judgement.  It  found  in  favour  of  the  RUC,  but  limited  the 
fine  to  a  one  off  amount  of  E75,000  plus'not  insubstantial'  costs.  Recognising 
that  closing  Channel  Four  down  would  not  be  likely  to  change  themorall 
position  of  its  directors  or  to  achieve  the  disclosure  of  the  information,  Lord 
Justice  Woolf  stated  'the  court  in  my  judgement  must  accept  the  reality  of  the 
situation'  (Woolf  and  Pill  1992:  20).  But,  evidently  viewing  his  judgement  as  a 
precedent,  Woolf  indicated  that  part  of  the  reason  for  his  pragmatism  was  that  'I 
have  particularly  in  mind  the  fact  that  it  may  not  have  been  appreciated  by  the 
companies  in  this  case  the  dangers  which  were  implicit  in  giving  an  unqualified 
undertaking  [of  confidentiality  to  their  sources],  although...  this  should  have 
been  in  their  mind.  This  will  not  apply  to  the  future  but  is  a  compelling  factor  in 
the  present  situation'  (Woolf  and  Pill  1992:  20).  This  judgement  has  the  effect 
of  warning  journalists  what  will  happen  if  they  are  ever  again  tempted  to  put  the 
public  interest  above  the  law. 
The  C4/Box  case  was  a  further  departure  in  the  use  of  legal  powers  over  the 
media  in  two  distinct  ways.  Firstly,  the  case  was  kept  secret.  Secondly,  it  was 
the  first  use  of  an  additional  provision  of  the  1989  version  of  the  PTA.  Section 
17,  schedule  7  confers  powers  to  obtain  information  including  material  which 
would  otherwise  be  excluded  under  the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  (in Policing  the  Media  56 
this  case  journalistic  material).  The  criteria  for  gaining  access  to  this  material  is 
that'there  are  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that  the  material  is  likely  to  be 
of  substantial  value'  in  a'terrorist  investigation'  and  that  it  is  in  the  public 
interest  (See  Woolf  and  Pill  1992).  This  provision,  the  objective  of  which  was 
originally  said  by  the  government  to  be  uncovering  funding  for  paramilitary 
organisations,  has  now  emerged  as  a  severe  limitation  on  media  reporting  of 
Northern  Ireland.  34  In  the  High  Court,  the  import  of  this  was  made  clear  by  Lord 
Justice  Woolf. 
1,  of  course,  appreciate  that  the  companies  [C4  and  Box]  would  say  that 
'A'  would  never  have  co-operated  but  for  the  undertakings  and  without 
his  co-operation  there  would  have  been  no  programme.  As  it  was  in  the 
public  interest  the  programme  be  broadcast,  so  the  public  interest 
required  them  to  give  the  undertaking.  However,  this  in  law  is  an 
impermissible  approach  for  the  companies  to  adopt  (Woolf  and  Pill 
1992:  16-17). 
In  other  words,  in  the  view  of  the  law,  broadcasters  should  not  make 
programmes  about  Northern,  Ireland  using  (non-official  or  unauthorised) 
confidential  sources. 
The  key  issue  is  to  what  extent  can  the  rule  of  law  remain  inviolate  in  relation  to 
journalistic  activity  when  the  wrongdoing  which  is  being  alleged  by  journalists  is 
centrally-  co-ordinated  by  agencies  of  law  and  order  themselves: 
Even  if  they  decided  improperly  to  adopt  this  approach  they  should  have 
at  least  tried  to  secure'A's'  co-operation  by  qualified  undertaking  or 
sought  advice  of  the  highest  level  of  government  which  should  have 
been  available  in  view  of  Channel  Four's  standing  as  to  the  propriety  of 
the  action  they  were  proposing  (Woolf  and  Pill  1992:  17). 
As  Liz  Forgan  of  Channel  Four  then  argued,  'presumably'  this  would  be  'with  an 
eye  to  indemnity  if  the  appropriate  official  agreed  with  the  thrust  of  the 
programme.  But  what',  she  continued,  'if  it  were  the  behaviour  of  a  government 
agency  that  a  journalist  was  seeking  to  expose?  And  since  any  guarantee  has 
to  be  given  before  the  witness  tells  his  story,  let  alone  before  it  can  be  checked, 
it  is  hard  to  see  how  any  government  figure  could  take  the  proposition 
seriously'  (Forgan  1992b). Policing  the  Media  57 
The  RUC  did  not  let  the  matter  rest  there.  Hugh  Annesley  the  Chief  Constable 
again  took  the  unusual  step  of  issuing  a7  page  press  release,  alleging  that 
Channel  Four  had  been  the  subject  of  a  hoax  by  a  loyalist  intent  on  discrediting 
the  RUC.  As  with'Death  on  the  Rock'there  then  followed  a  series  of  stories 
based  on  official  briefings  attempting  to  discredit  the  programme.  These 
appeared  in  the  Daily  Telegraph,  the  Sunday  Times  and  the  Sunday  ExpreSS.  35 
Among  them  was  the  predictive  suggestion  on  August  9  1992  that  the  RUC  was 
considering  taking  Channel  Four  to  court  for  a  second  time  in  relation  to  the 
Dispatches  programme.  On  29  September  the  police  did  take  action,  arresting 
the  Dispatches  researcher  Ben  Hamilton  at  6.30  in  the  morning  and  charging 
him  with  contempt.  The  nature  of  the  charges  were  never  officially  spelt  out 
and  were  eventually  dropped  when  the  case  came  to  trial. 
Direct  Censorship 
The  skirmishes  and  rows  over  Northern  Ireland  starting  in  1971  had  meant  a 
continual  tightening  of  the  broadcasters  internal  procedures,  so  that  by  1980 
the  voice  of  armed  republicanism  had  successfully  been  banished  from  the 
screen.  The  challenge  to  government  policing  of  the  media  which  the  rise  of 
Sinn  Fdin  represented,  exacerbated  the  already  increasing  attempts  at  control 
under  successive  Thatcher  administrations.  If  in  1985,  Real  Lives  was  the 
furthest  the  government  had  gone  stopping  short  of  direct  censorship,  'Death 
on  the  Rock'  proved  to  be  the  furthest  they  could  go.  The  logic  of  the  attempt 
to  remove  Republican  views  from  the  screen  was  to  stop  Sinn  FC-in  from  being 
interviewed  at  all,  but  since  they  are  a  legal  political  party,  it  would  be  very  hard 
to  legitimate  such  a  step  in  the  international,  community.  This  left  the 
government  in  a  bind.  They  had  already  gone  as  far  as  they  were  able,  unless 
a  way  could  be  found  to  separate  Sinn  Fdin  as  'politicians'  from  Sinn  F6in  as 
'terrorists'. 
In  all  the  controversy  around  the  Real  Lives  affair,  this  dilemma  remained 
relatively  obscure.  But  there  is  evidence  that  some  top  broadcasters  were 
thinking  this  issue  through  to  its  logical  conclusions.  For  example,  the  BBC 
Assistant  Director-General  Alan  Protheroe  (1985:  6)  had  recognised  the 
tendency: 
Does  the  government  therefore  wish  to  prevent  the  expression  on  the  air Policing  the  Media  58 
of  views  with  which  it  disagrees  from  democratically  elected  supporters  - 
at  local  council,  Assembly  or  parliamentary  level?  Or  does  it  wish  to 
say,  'You  can  use  Sinn  IF&  people  on  the  air  if  they're  talking  about  the 
drains  in  the  Bogside  or  the  state  of  the  pavements  in  West  Belfast  -  but 
you  can't  use  them  if  they  mutter  a  word  about  the  need  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  armed  struggle'? 
In  the  event  the  government  opted  for  the  more  restrictive  former  option  some 
three  years  later  when  introducing  a  ban  on  direct  interviews  with  Sinn  Fdin 
and  others.  The  Ban  is  an  unprecedented  intervention  in  peace  time.  It  is  the 
only  piece  of  direct  censorship  legislation  operating  in  Britain.  The  British 
Home  Office  notice  prohibits  the  broadcasting  of  'any  words  spoken...  by  a 
person  who...  represents  or  purports  to  represent'  a-listed  organisation  or'the 
words  support  or  solicit  or  invite  support  for  such  an  organisation'. 
The  precise  meaning  of  the  text  of  the  notice  was  not  immediately  clear  to  the 
broadcasters  and  much  time  was  spent  in  drawing  up  guidelines  followed  by 
consultations  with  the  Home  Office.  The  Home  Office  then  set  out  its  own 
interpretation  'so  that  the  BBC  would  be  left  in  no  doubt'  (BBC  1989b:  Appendix 
V).  For  example,  there  was  much  confusion  about  the  precise  definition  of 
'represent'  in  the  notice  and  whether  Sinn  F6in  spokespersons  could  be  held  to 
'represent'  their  party  24  hours  a  day,  whatever  they  said.  The  Home  Office 
interpretation  was  that'A  member  of  an  organisation  cannot  be  held  to 
represent  the  organisation  in  all  their  daily  activities'.  The  crucial  distinction 
therefore  is  in  which  capacity  a  speaker  appears. 
BBC  television  news  made  use  of  this  definition  of  'represent'  for  the  first  time 
on  February  16  1989  when  they  interviewed  Gerry  Adams  about  jobs  in  West 
Belfast.  Thirty  seconds  of  sound  on  film  was  broadcast  in  Northern  Ireland, 
with  Adams  speaking  as  MP  for  West  Belfastý  rather  than  Sinn  Fdin  MP  for 
WestBelfast.  The  Media  Show  took  this  definition  of  'represent'  to  its  logical 
conclusion  when  they  interviewed  Sinn  FC-in  councillor  Jim  McAllister  speaking 
about  his  role  in  Ken  Loach's  film  Hidden  Agenda.  McAllister  was  representing 
himself  as  an  actor  rather  than  as  a  Sinn  F6in  Councillor  even  though  his 
acting  role  in  the  film  is  that  ofr-  a  Sinn  F6in  Councillor  (8  May  1990).  However, 
following  the  Home  Office  letter,  there  continued  to  be  occasions  on  which  the 
broadcasters  disagreed  among  themselves  about  the  'representativeness'  of  a 
particular  statement  (BBC  news  and  ITN  have  made  a  number  of  opposite Policing  the  Media  59 
decisions  on  particular  news  events)  and  there  has  been  criticism  of  the 
broadcasters  for  censoring  comments  which  were  spoken  by  Sinn  Fdin 
members  acting  in  other  capacities. 
The  clearest  result  of  this  uncertainty  has  been  that  broadcasters  have 
routinely  erred  on  the  side  of  caution  in  editorial  decision  making,  thus 
extending  the  Ban  well  beyond  the  letter  of  the  notice.  At  the  BBC  a  decision 
was  taken  at  the  Corporation's  bi-weekly  Editorial  Policy  Meeting  to  ban 
subtitles  from  news  bulletins.  According  to  one  BBC  executive  this  was 
because  'it  looked  so  dramatic  -  It  looked  like  we  were  seeking  to  make  a  point' 
(Miller  1990).  In  the  climate  of  government  hostility  at  the  time,  the  last  thing 
the  BBC  were  interested  in  was  making  a  point.  Perhaps  the  most  widely 
known  extension  of  the  notice  was  the  IBA's  banning  of  the  Pogues  song 
'Streets  of  Sorrow/Birmingham  Six'.  The  song  proclaims  the  innocence  of  the 
Guildford  Four  and  the  Birmingham  Six,  jailed  for  IRA  bombings  in  the  1970s. 
It  followed  a  widespread  campaign  to  expose  what  the  campaigners  saw  as 
miscarriages  of  justice.  The  IBA,  however,  believed  that  the  song  contained 
words  which  'support  or  solicit  or  invite  support'  for  one  of  the  listed 
organisations  because  of  their'general  disagreement  with  the  way  in  which  the 
British  government  responds  to  and  the  courts  deal  with  the  terrorist  threat  in 
the  UK  (Observer2O  November  1988).  Ironically  the  courts  then  went  on  to 
accept  that  both  the  Guildford  Four  and  the  Birmingham  Six  were  wrongly 
convicted.  The  most  far  reaching  extension  of  the  Ban  was  the  subtitling  of 
Bernadette  McAliskey  the  former  MP  and  civil  rights  activist  on  a  BBC 
discussion  programme.  Asked  her  view  on  political  violence  in  the  cause  of 
Irish  Republicanism  she  said'Well,  I  have  to  put  it  in  context.  Quite  honestly,  if 
I  supported  it  fully,  if  I  could  justify  it,  I  would  join  the  IRA.  But  since  I  am  not  a 
soldier,  since  I  cannot  within  myself  justify  it,  then  I'm  not.  But  I  can  understand 
it,  I  can  explain  it,  I  can  articulate  it  and  I  can  offer,  what  I  believe  to  be  a 
rational  way  out  of  it,  which  is  discussion  and  negotiation,  wherever  it  is  in  the 
world'.  Her  first  eight  words  were  broadcast  and  then  the  rest  of  her 
contribution  to  the  programme  was  subtitled  because  it  was  deemed  by  BBC 
lawyers  to  be  supportive  of  the  IRA.  The  atmosphere  of  caution  in  the  BBC  had 
now  reached  the  pitch  that  understanding  the  actions  of  the  IRA  could  now 
apparently  be  construed  as  support  for  it  (Miller  1993c).  Prior  to  this  the  BBC 
guidelines  on  what  was  covered  by  this  part  of  the  Notice  maintained  that 
'Generalised  comments  about  or  even  in  favour  of  terrorism  in  Ireland  or  about 
Irish  republicanism  are  not  prevented'  (BBC  1989c:  40).  Following  the Policing  the  Media  60 
McAliskey  episode,  the  Controller  Editorial  Policy  rewrote  the  guidelines 
although  he  has  maintained  that  'I  will  continue  to  apply  the  guidelines  as 
narrowly  as  I  reasonably  can'.  36 
The  effect  of  the  confusion  and  caution  on  news  reporting  has  been  a  dramatic 
drop  in  Sinn  F6in  interviews  in  the  five  years  following  the  Ban.  In  the  year 
immediately  after  its  introduction  Sinn  F6in  interviews  on  British  television 
network  news  declined  by  63%  compared  with  the  year  before.  In  addition  the 
interviews  which  were  carried  were  shorter  and  less  informative  (Henderson  et 
al  1990).  With  the  emergence  of  the'Hume-Adams'  peace  process  in  which 
Sinn  176in  were  leading  players  the  basics  of  political  reporting  required 
interviews  with  Sinn  176in  representatives.  In  a  departure  under  the  ban  Sinn 
176in  leaders  were  interviewed  at  length  on  television  news  programmes  in  late 
1993.  This  led  to  Conservative  MP,  Dame  Jill  Knight  to  complain  (inaccurately) 
that  broadcasters  were  breaching  the  Ban.  As  a  result  John  Major  said  that  a 
review  would  be  instituted  to  see  if  the  ban  needed  to  be  tightened  (Miller 
1993e).  However,  within  weeks,  official  sources  were  letting  it  be  known  that 
the  Ban  could  be  lifted  quickly  pending  progress  of  the  peace  process. 
What  emerges  from  the  series  of  confrontations  between  broadcasters  and 
government  over  the  past  twenty  five  years  is  a  picture  in  which  the  tendency  is 
to  ever  greater  restriction  on  the  arena  for  public  comment.  This  has 
functioned  in  tandem  with  a  tendency  within  broadcasting  organisations  to 
tighter  and  tighter  editorial  procedures  to  pre-empt  government  intervention. 
We  have  already  seen  how  this  operates  in  times  of  controversy.  Let  us  now 
look  at  the  effect  of  such  pressure  and  intimidation  on  broadcasting  guidelines 
which  govern  routine  reporting. 
Self  censorship 
According  to  Anthony  Smith  'caution  has  grown  over  broadcasting  like  lichen 
over  standing  stones'  (cited  in  Briggs  1979:  246).  Indeed  it  can  be  argued  that 
the  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  has  resulted  in  a  substantial  chill  factor 
throughout  the  whole  media  system  in  Britain. 
The  reference  upwards  system 
The  development  of  an  internal  system  of  control  whereby  journalistic  activities Policing  the  Media  61 
are  increasingly  subject  to  scrutiny  by  top  management  -  the  reference  upwards 
system  -  was  set  in  motion  in  1971.  This  followed  the  attacks  on  the 
broadcasters  and  the  agreement  on  the  part  of  both  the  BBC  and  ITA  that  they 
were  against  the  'terrorists'.  The  system  has  two  main  components:  firstly,  the 
referral  procedure  through  which  all  programmes  on  Northern  Ireland  have  to 
go;  and  secondly,  the  more  specialised  rules  on  interviewing  members  of 
republican  organisations.  The  BBC's  News  Guide  produced  in  1972,  laid  down 
that  all  reports  on  Northern  Ireland  should  be  referred  to  the  Controller,  - 
Northern  Ireland  or  other  senior  Belfast  staff  and  that  interviews  with  the  IRA 
must  be  referred  to  Editor  News  and  Current  Affairs  in  London.  The  federated 
structure  of  the  ITV  network  has  meant  that  referral  is  in  the  first  instance 
internal  to  the  various  television  companies,  with  advice  being  sought  from 
Ulster  Television.  The  ITC  (formerly  the  IBA)  though,  has  the  final  say,  and 
there  have  been  many  examples  of  the  IBA  overruling  individual  programme 
companies  since  the  1970s. 
The  BBC  standing  instructions  were  reissued  and  tightened  following  the 
Carrickmore  incident,  strengthening  the  role  of  the  Controller  Northern  Ireland 
(See  Curtis  1984a).  They  were  tightened  again  following  the  Real  Lives 
episode.  In  an  agreed  statement  the  boards  of  management  and  governors 
stated  that'the  Director-General  has  reinforced  to  all  staff  the  vital  importance 
of  these  procedures  being  strictly  observed  at  all  times.  '  (cited  in  Rudin 
1985:  288).  The  guidelines  were  reissued  in  1987  and  included  a  number  of 
changes  in  relation  to  Northern  Ireland. 
In  the  1980  guidelines'all  programme  proposals  having  a  bearing  on  Ireland  as 
a  whole  and  on  Northern  Ireland  in  particular'  (BBC  1980b:  45)  must  be  referred 
to  the  Controller  Northern  Ireland.  By  1987  this  had  been  tightened  further  to 
include'all  programmes  and  items'with  the  added  rider  thatProgramme 
proposals  and  responses  to  them  should  be  confirmed  in  writing'  (BBC 
1987:  55). 
The  major  development  in  the  period  between  1980  and  1987  was  the 
evolution  of  the  guidelines  to  deal  with  the  rise  of  Sinn  F6in  in  electoral  politics. 
In  1980  proposals  to  interview  members  of  'terrorist  organisations  and  those 
who  are  or  may  be  associated  with  such  organisations'  had  to  be  referred  up  to 
the  Head  of  Department  and  from  there  to  senior  management  for  approval  by 
the  Director  General.  There  was  though,  a  problem  of  definition  which  was  to Policing  the  Media  62 
be  resolved  by  reference  to  the  Director  of  News  and  Current  Affairs,  Richard 
Francis,  who  would  decide  who  he'deemed'to  be  closely  associated.  Gerry 
Adams  of  Sinn  F61n  was  deemed  closely  associated  in  1981  and  permission 
had  to  be  sought  from  the  DG  to  interview  him  (Curtis  1  984a:  180).  This  system 
rapidly  became  untenable  with  Sinn  Fdin's  electoral  success  in  1982  and  the 
1983  election  of  Gerry  Adams  to  the  Westminster  parliament.  Thus  by  1987 
the  BBC  had  evolved  a  two  tier  system  of  referral  for  different  categories  of 
republican  interviewee.  In  the  case  of  members  of  Sinn  FC-in37  the  'Head  of 
Department  must  make  a  fundamental  judgement'  about  the  status  of  the 
interviewee  and  then  follow  either  the  established  referral  procedure  to  the 
Director  General  or  the  alternative.  This  latter  procedure  is  for  elected 
representatives  'who  are  to  be  interviewed  in  connection  with  their  legitimate 
activities'  (BBC  1987:  56).  These  interviews  need  only  be  referred  to  the  Editor, 
News  and  Current  Affairs,  Northern  Ireland.  Although  'when  in  doubt' 
journalists  are  advised  to  consider  referring  to  senior  management  and  to  the 
Assistant  Director  General  (BBC  1987:  57).  By  1989,  the  guidelines  had 
developed  to  cover  the  preferred  hostile  style  with  which  members  of  Sinn  F6in 
are  to  be  interviewed: 
Generally  whenever  interviews  are  allowed  they  should  be  used 
sparingly,  short  clips  often  being  more  appropriate  than  long  extracts. 
Challenging  questions  should  be  used  to  get  valid  contributions  to  the 
examination  of  the  issues.  (BBC  1989a:  79) 
At  the  end  of  the  1980  and  1984  guidelines  there  is  a  paragraph  which  claims 
that  the  purpose  of  the  revision  of  the  reference  procedures: 
Is  not  to  inhibit  the  proper  pursuit  of  journalism,  but  to  clarify  procedures 
in  the  light  of  case  histories  studied  by  News  and  Current  Affairs  Editors 
since  the  Standing  Instructions  were  first  written  in  1971.  These 
directions  should  not  therefore  be  read  as  restrictions.  (BBC  1980b:  47; 
1984:  53) 
By  1987  even  this  modest  statement  is  gone.  A  further  change  seems  to  be 
related  to  the  BBC's  embarrassment  over  the  Real  Lives  case,  to  which  the 
Radio  Times  had  devoted  it's  cover  story  only  to  find  the  programme  pulled  at 
the  last  minute.  It  requires  that  even  publicity  for  BBC  programmes  be  referred 
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Because  the  public  perception  of  a  programme  can  be  significantly 
affected  by  the  way  it  is  promoted  -  in  the  press,  in  Radio  Times  and 
over  BBC  airwaves  -  the  promotion  of  programmes  affecting  Northern 
Ireland  must  be  referred...  Some  instances  will  require  specific  clearance 
by  Managing  Directors.  (BBC  1987:  55) 
In  the  1987  guidelines  there  is  a  one  page  section  dealing  with  terrorism  in 
general  in  which  it  is  noted  that  the'BBC  is  opposed  to  terrorism'.  It  is  also 
noted  that'some  terrorist  activity  enjoys  virtually  no  popular  support  and  is 
totally  reprehensible'.  But  'it  is  also  true  that  sometimes  yesterday!  s  terrorists 
have  become  today's  prime  ministers  and  that  one  man's  [sic]  terrorist  may  be 
another  man's  freedom  fighter'  (BBC  1987:  81).  The  guidelines  then  go  on  to 
demonstrate  this  last  statement  in  practice  by  indicating  that  BBC  guidelines 
have  different  procedures  for  interviewing  'terrorists'  in  the  UK  context  than  for 
those  overseas.  In  the  latter  case  referral  to  the  news  editor  or  Head  of 
Department  is  acceptable.  By  1989,  all  proposals  to  interview  'terrorists'  from 
anywhere  in  the  world  required  to  be  referred  through  senior  line  management 
and  the  Controller,  Editorial  Policy,  John  Wilson.  This  development  apparently 
occurred  under  the  direction  of  John  Birt  on  the  grounds  that  maintaining  a 
separate  editorial  policy  on  Northern  Ireland  left  the  BBC  in  an  anomalous 
position.  38  It  has  however,  raised  the  difficulty  of  how  to  define  a  'terrorist' 
rather  more  sharply  especially  given  the  changing  international  status  of 
groups  such  as  the  ANC  and  the  PLO. 
In  December  1989  the  BBC's  guidelines  were  published  for  the  first  time,  doing 
away  with  the  odd  status  of  the  News  and  Current  Affairs  Index.  39  The  new 
guidelines  exhibit  a  further  tightening  of  rules  and  some  further  extension  of 
their  scope.  Referral  is  now  to  be  conducted  not  only  at  the  planning  stages  of 
a  programme  but  for  the  duration  of  the  production  process. 
Staff  outside  Northern  Ireland  must  without  fail  seek  advice  from  and 
discuss  with  local  staff  their  programme  plans  affecting  Northern  Ireland, 
at  all  stages...  It  is  very  important  that  the  BBC  in  Belfast  is  kept 
aware  of  the  evolution  of  projects,  including  the  inevitable  changes 
which  take  place  as  ideas  are  developed.  (BBC  1989c:  38,  emphasis  in 
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In  1987,  the  guidelines  covered  interviews  with  'terrorists'.  By  1989  they  had 
widened  to  cover  all  'terrorist'  appearances. 
Publicly  evident  events  like  gunshots  at  gravesides  and  other 
demonstrations  at  funerals  are  common  in  Northern  Ireland.  As  part  of 
the  political  scene  they  should  be  reported  when  relevant.  There  are 
other  managed  events  of  a  surreptitious  kind  over  which  special  care 
must  be  taken:  restricted  news  conferences,  demonstrations  of 
manpower  such  as  road  blocks,  or  training  sessions.  Sometimes 
reporters  will  be  invited  to  such  events,  perhaps  at  instant  notice. 
Sometimes  the  BBC  will  be  supplied  with  material,  maybe  a  video. 
Referral  is  always  necessary  in  these  cases'although  occasionally 
it  will  be  after  the  event  because  of  pressure  of  circumstances  (BBC 
1989c:  81  emphasis  in  original). 
Following  the  funerals  resulting  from  the  Gibraltar  killings  there  had  been  some 
debate  about  outlawing  media  coverage  of  paramilitary  funerals  and  especially 
military  salutes  and  other  ceremonies.  These  debates  have  obviously  had  their 
effect. 
The  internal  rules  of  referral  for  ITV  companies  have  also  been  strengthened. 
Both  the  1979  and  1985  versions  of  the  guidelines,  require  that  producers 
should  not  plan  to  interview  members  of  a  proscribed  organisation  without 
'previous  discussion'  with  the  company's  top  management.  The  proposal  then 
has  to  be  referred  to  the  IBA  if  it  is  decided  to  go  ahead.  (Independent 
Broadcasting  Authority  1979;  1985:  8.1  (i)).  In  the  1991  ITC  programme  code, 
which  replaced  the  guidelines,  a  producer  needs  to  gain  'the  specific  consent  of 
the  licensee's  chief  executive  or  most  senior  programme  executive' 
(independent  Television  Commission  1991:  5.2).  In  addition  all  commercial 
television  companies  are  'required'  to  consult  the  ITC  on  interviews  with 
members  of  proscribed  organisations.  Along  with  alterations  in  the  BBC 
guidelines,  cited  above,  the  ITC  now  requires  (from  1991)  that  film  of'a  volley 
of  shots  or  a  show  of  arms  by  men  in  hoods'  be  referred  to  the  most  senior 
programme  executive  or  designated  alternative  within  the  company  before  they 
are  included  in  programmes. 
BBC  guidance  on  Northern  Ireland  has  increased  from  three  paragraphs  in 
1972  to  just  over  four  pages  in  1980,  four  and  a  half  pages  by  1984,  just  over  5 Policing  the  Media  65 
in  1987  and  finally  to  nearly  8  in  1989.  In  1980,1984  and  1987,  the  guidelines 
included  one  page  on'Terrorism'.  By  1989,  this  had  increased  to  nearly  six 
pages.  The  IBA  guidelines  simply  headed'Crime,  Anti-social  behaviour,  etc'  in 
1985  were  two  pages  in  length.  By  1991  the  additional  word  'terrorism'  had 
been  added  to  the  heading  and  the  guidelines  were  three  and  a  half  pages  in 
length. 
There  is  a  long  history  of  broadcasters  agreeing  with  the  official  definition  of 
the  republican  opposition.  Lord  Hill's  declaration  thatas  between  the  British 
Army  and  the  gunmen  the  BBC  is  not  and  cannot  be  impartial'  (Hill  1974:  209), 
set  the  pattern.  Echoing  this  David  Nicholas,  editor  of  ITN,  objected  to  the 
introduction  of  the  Broadcasting  Ban  on  the  grounds  that  ITN  interviews  with 
Sinn  F6in  were  conducted  'responsibly': 
Because  we  all  understand  what  these  extremist  organisations  stand  for 
is  abhorrent  to  many  people.  British  public  opinion  has  never  been  more 
resolute  than  it  is  now,  in  my  opinion,  in  defeating  terrorism  and  that 
owes  a  lot  to  the  full  and  frank  reporting  that  we've  been  able  to  conduct 
on  Northern  Ireland  over  nineteen  years.  (ITN  2200  19  October  1988) 
Here  Nicholas  claims  to  act  'responsibly'  in  the  name  of  'public  opinion'. 
Opinion  which,  he  maintains,  the  broadcasters  have  helped  to  create  with  their 
'full  and  frank'  coverage. 
Some  journalists  who  have  argued  that  the  ban  is  counterproductive,  implicitly 
agree  with  supporters  of  the  ban  that  the  main  object  of  covering  Sinn  Fdin  and 
the  IRA  is  not  to  explain  the  conflict  but  to  discredit  the  republicans  as  part  of 
the  campaign  to  defeat  'terrorism'.  Their  difference  with  supporters  of  the  Ban 
is  that  they  see  it  as  a  means  of  'inhibiting'  the  exposure  of  Sinn  Fdin. 
The  close  coincidence  of  the  views  of  the  Broadcasters  and  the  State  on 
'terrorism'  has  meant  that  Sinn  Fdin  have  never  been  allowed  them  what 
Douglas  Hurd  called  aneasy  platform'.  On  the  contrary  much  coverage  has 
been  directed  at  discrediting  the  Party  as  part  of  the  campaign  to  defeat 
'terrorism'.  One  of  the  objections  of  the  broadcasters  has  been  that  they  no 
longer  have  control  over  their  part  of  the  battle.  In  part,  the  caution  of  the 
broadcasters  is  not  simply  about  being  intimidated  by  the  government,  it  also 
includes  a  strategy  to  defend  their  legitimacy  to  the  outside  world.  Thus P61icing  the  Media  66 
broadcasters  are  opposed  to  the  Notice.  But  they  are  not  in  favour  of  free 
reporting.  They  would  prefer  that  the  government  would  trust  them  not  to  be 
really  impartial. 
Conclusion 
The  legitimation  of  government  activity  rests  centrally  on  its  claim  to  be 
democratic  and  thus  to  have  the  monopoly  control  over  the  means  of  legitimate 
violence.  Attempts  to  reconstitute  the  impulse  to  censorship  as  'restrictions'  in 
the  interests  of  'national  security'  are  therefore  a  central  feature  of  government 
rhetoric.  During  the  Real  Lives  controversy  Mrs  Thatcher  argued: 
The  BBC,  in  my  view  -  because  we  don't  censor,  never  do,  we  request 
sometimes  -  should  never  show  things  which  help  anyone  who  wishes  to 
further  their  cause  by  the  use  of  violence.  And  that  is  why  we  said,  have 
a  look  at  it  again.  The  BBC  and  the  Governors  who  are  ultimately 
responsible  to  the  public  did  have  a  look  at  it  again,  and  have  made  their 
decision,  and  I  am  very  pleased  with  it  (cited  in  World  in  Action  1988).  , 
This  legitimation  was  returned  to  again  during  the  attempt  to  prevent  the 
broadcast  of  'Death  on  the  Rock.  In  his  letter  to  Marmaduke  Hussey,  Foreign 
Secretary  Howe  emphasised  that'there  is  no  question  of  the  Government 
seeking  to  muzzle  the  media.  There  is  no  thought  of  ministers  challenging  the 
constitutional  independence  of  the  broadcasting  authorities'  (Independent  7 
May  1988) 
The  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  government  has  been  to  try  to  incorporate  and 
co-opt  the  media  as  part  of  a  national  security  design  -  as  simply  another 
weapon  in  the  'fight  against  terrorism'.  This  strategy  has  met  with  some 
success  in  that,  as  we  have  seen,  broadcasters  have  tended  on  the  whole  to 
accept  the  state  definition  of  the  conflict  in  Ireland  as'terrorism'  versus 
'democracy'.  However  this  has  in  some  ways  damaged  the  position  of  the 
broadcasters. 
In  Northern  Ireland  there  was  a  souring  of  relations  between  the  Republican 
movement  and  the  media  in  the  late  1980s  (Hearst  1989;  Bolton  1990; 
Journalist  1991)  In  Britain,  BBC  executives  now  complain  of  'a  fundamental 
change  of  attitudes  in  the  crowds'  (Birt  1990,14)  towards  the  cameras.  John Policing  the  Media  67 
Birt  has  argued  that  this  is  related  to  a  perception  that  camera  crews  are  on  the 
side  of  the  police. 
During  the  Trafalgar  Square  [Poll  Tax]  riot  there  were  cries  of  'Maggie's 
Boys'.  At  Bournemouth  it  was  'police  narks'  and  'You're  on  their  side'. 
What  this  suggests  -  and  this  is  the  firm  conviction  of  BBC  crews  with 
long  experience  on  the  ground  -  is  a  growing  perception  among  crowds 
that  all  film  shot  during  public  disturbances  can  and  will  be  used  against 
them,  in  court  cases;  that  broadcasters  are  no  longer  there  simply  to 
observe  and  report;  that  we  are  in  effect  gatherers  of  evidence  and  -  by 
only  one  remove  -  an  extension  of  the  arm  of  authority  (Birt  1990:  14-15) 
For  their  part  the  media  are  legitimated  precisely  by  their  apparent  distance 
from  the  state.  It  is  of  crucial  importance  that  the  broadcasters  can  present 
themselves  as  having  different  concerns  to  those  of  the  state  even  where  these 
result  in  them  taking  a  public  position  in  alliance  with  the  state.  In  fact,  even 
within  this  perspective,  there  can  be  a  real  divergence  of  interest  between 
broadcasters  and  the  government.  Broadcasting  is  not  a  simple  instrument  of 
the  government,  nor  on  the  other  hand  is  it  an  open  door  for  the  powerless. 
The  extent  to  which  the  broadcasters  can  present  themselves  as  independent 
of  the  government  depends  partly  on  their  collusion  with  state  views  of  the 
conflict  in  Ireland,  but  also  importantly  on  the  continued  interrogation  of  the 
actions  of  both  the  state  and  the  insurgents.  The  ability  of  broadcasting  to 
provide  an  intelligible  account  of  the  conflict  depends  on  the  extent  to  which 
such  interrogations  continue  to  be  broadcast.  We  will  assess  some  of  the  other 
sources  of  resistance  to  the  complete  closure  of  the  media  system  in  later 
chapters.  For  the  present  let  us  note  that  what  remains  of  Public  Service 
Broadcasting  in  Britain  can  still  muster  significant  resources  to  investigate  and 
critique  government  policy,  albeit,  that  in  practice,  such  critiques  tend  to  be 
hemmed  in  by  formidable  limits  and  restrictions.  If  broadcasters  go  too  far  they 
are  very  likely  to  be  subjectlo  attacks  from  government  and  sections  of  the 
press.  One  result  of  this  is  that  programmes  are  not  made,  or  are  censored 
before  they  can  be  shown.  Between  1959  and  1993  over  100  programmes  on 
Northern  Ireland  were  banned,  censored  or  delayed  (,  Cuvh-s  .  and  -Jý-psov, 
1993). 
Government  strategy  has  been  to  limit  and  preferably  eliminate  any  hearing  for 
its  enemies  in  Ireland,  while  at  the  same  time  ensuring  that  it's  activities  are Policing  the  Media  68 
portrayed  as  favourably  as  possible.  By  1979  the  government  had  largely 
succeeded  in  excluding  republican  paramilitaries  from  television.  It  is  worth 
remembering  that  the  last  republican  paramilitary  was  interviewed  in  1979  and 
that  the  last  member  of  the  IRA  interviewed  on  British  television  was  in  1974. 
The  rise  of  Sinn  Fdin  created  new  problems  for  both  the  government  and  the 
broadcasters.  The  most  important  reason  for  objections  to  the  Real  Lives  was 
that  Martin  McGuinness  who  in  the  conventional  register  is  an  'extremist',  was 
portrayed  as  an  elected  politician  who  appeared  at  the  domestic,  personal  and 
political  levels  as  'ordinary'  and  'rational'. 
By  the  late  1980s  the  British  government  had  been  relatively  successful  in 
excluding  analysis  of  Irish  republicanism  and  it's  armed  variety  from  the  British 
broadcasting  system.  Active  members  of  the  IRA  were  not  interviewed  and 
coverage  of  Sinn  F6in  was  minimal  and  generally  hostile.  However,  in 
government  circles,  success  was  thought  to  be  only  partial.  The  desire  to 
remove  the  legal  political  part  of  the  Provisional  republican  couplet  from 
television  altogether,  resulted  in  the  most  direct  and  extensive  interference  with 
freedom  of  expression  in  the  history  of  British  broadcasting.  The  use  of  the 
law,  intimidation  and  direct  censorship,  do  not  exhaust  the  information 
management  repertoire  of  the  government.  The  next  two  chapters  explore  the 
tactics  used  in  public  relations  strategies. 
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I  There  is  still  some  dispute  over  whether  Eden  intended  to  'take  over'  the  BBC  during  the 
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26  The  full  transcdpt  of  the  programme  can  be  found  in  Windelsham  and  Rampton  1989:  28- 
68. 
27  Such  doubts  about  the  official  story  were  not  laid  to  rest  following  the  inquest  on  the  killings 
in  September  1988,  which  delivered  a  majority  verdict  of  lawful  killing.  In  the  view  of  human 
rights  and  civil  liberties  organisations  the  inquest  was  an  inadequate  forum  for  examining 
whether  the  killings  were  extra  judicial  executions  and  the  question  therefore  remained  open 
(See  Amnesty  International  1989;  Bonnech6re  1988;  Kitchin  1989;  Tweedie  1988). 
28  These  will  reflect  various  alliances  and  priorities  among  different  sections  of  the  state. 
29  Incidentally,  senior  management  at  the  BBC  deny  that  Mrs  Thatcher's  performance  had  any 
bearing  on  the  decision  to  broadcast  the  programme.  one  senior  executive  involved  in  the 
decision  making  commented  to  the  author  that  'that  is  just  ridiculous.  It  does  not  work  like  that' 
(Interview,  London  February  1993) 
30  This  contrasts  quite  markedly  with  the  analysis  of  Owen's  immediate  superior  at  the  time  of 
the  controversy,  Colin  Morris,  the  Controller  Northern  Ireland.  He  put  it  as  follows: 
it  was  perfectly  proper  for  government  ministers  to  appeal  to  the  BBC  and  Thames 
Television  not  to  transmit  their  programmes  -  talk  about  Ministerial  blackmail  and  arm- Policing  the  Media  71 
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from  Ministers  of  the  Crown  must  be  treated  with  great  respect  and  earnest 
consideration.  So  we  went  ahead...  this  time  to  the  Government's  discomfiture.  But 
next  time,  should  our  commitment  to  the  truth  lead  us  to  support  the  official  position  in 
a  contentious  issue,  then  our  account  will  have  added  authority  because  we  have  been 
consistent  in  the  exercise  of  our  impartiality.  Had  we  withdrawn  a  programme  we 
conscientiously  believed  should  be  transmitted,  why  should  the  public  have  any  faith 
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and  The  response  from  John  Wilson  of  the  BBC,  'Censorship  and  the  BBC',  Guardian,  Letters 
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The  Development  of  Propaganda  Strategies  in  Northern 
Ireland 
Although  the  same  channels  of  communication  are  available  to  those 
involved  in  protecting  the  existing  order,  they  seldom  manipulate  them 
so  skilfully  as  their  opponents 
Brigadier  Frank  Kitson  1971,  p.  17. 
Let  us  assume  Section  31  has  been  lifted  and  an  RTE  reporter  is  free  to 
interview  Gerry  Adams  in  the  wake  of  the  Enniskillen  atrocity...  I  believe 
that  by  manipulating  the  concept  of  consensus  the  Provos  can  always 
draw  and  often  win  any  such  interview  even  if  the  interview  takes  place 
within  minutes  of  the  most  appalling  atrocity. 
Eoghan  Harris,  RTE  television  producer,  November  1987 
The  terrorists,  working  through  their  political  wings  and  their  own  often 
highly  experienced  propagandists,  can  also  relatively  easily  get  some  of 
their  general  propaganda  into  the  mass  media.  Such  propagandising 
does  not  necessarily  involve  infiltrating  fully  trained  terrorist  activists  into 
media  organisations.  The  terrorists  can  readily  find  useful  idiots  to  latch 
on  to  cryptoterrorist  propaganda  and  parrot  its  slogans  in  the  name  of 
radical  and  critical  comment.  According  to  these  trendy  journalists  and 
left-wing  politicians,  Northern  Ireland  is  a  brutally  repressive,  colonial 
society...  With  independent  journalists  like  this,  the  Provisional  Sinn 
Fein  hardly  needs  to  conduct  a  political  campaign  to  change  mainland 
opinion 
Paul  Wilkinson  1990,  p.  31. 
Information  Vs  propaganda 
Journalists  covering  Northern  Ireland  routinely  refer  to  the  'propaganda  war' 
which  accompanies  the  conflict.  Some  of  the  participants  in  the  conflict  are 
keen  to  distance  themselves  from  such  a  label.  In  a  policy  statement  some 
years  ago  the  Northern  Ireland  Information  Service  drew  a  distinction  between 
$propaganda'  which  is  the  'manipulation  of  facts  and  non-facts  in  such  a  way  as 
to  achieve  an  objective  which  is  basically  to  mislead'  and  'Information'  which: 
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is  the  dissemination  of  facts  which  are  designed  to  inform  and  educate. 
it  is  very  important  to  draw  this  distinction  when  looking  at  the  problems 
faced  by  the  public  service  in  its  task  of  -  and  responsibility  for  - 
informing  the  public  (reproduced  in  Hardy  1983). 
The  NIO,  so  the  argument  goes  is  automatically  disadvantaged  in  a 
propaganda  war  because  it  has  to  fight  fair.  The  Director  of  Information  at  the 
NIO,  David  Gilliland,  argued  this  point  to  an  American  journalist  in  1981: 
A  government  cannot  win  a  propaganda  war.  Terrorists  and  their 
spokesmen  can  say  or  do  anything  they  like  and  the  perception 
becomes  the  fact.  We  can  only  hammer  away  at  telling  the  truth,  but  the 
truth  gets  overwhelmed  in  the  sea  of  propaganda  (Hickey  1981:  13). 
In  practice,  the  term  propaganda  is  applied  almost  exclusively  to  the  media 
strategies  of  'terrorists'.  But,  in  the  contemporary  literature  there  is  almost  no 
direct  investigation  of  the  'terrorists"  media  strategies  (e.  g.  Alexander  and 
Latter  1990;  Alexander  and  Picard  1991;  Alali  and  Eke  1991).  Some  writers 
analyse  the  activities  of  'terrorists'  without  so  much  as  speaking  with  any 
member  of  the  organisation  they  seek  to  comment  on.  Joanne  Wright's  study 
of  the  propaganda  activities  of  the  IRA  and  Rote  Armee  Fraktion  (RAF)  entirely 
lacks,  as  far  as  can  be  seen,  any  contact  with  members  or  former  members  of 
the  Republican  movement.  Part  of  her  research,  she  says,  was  undertaken  in 
the  Linenhall  Library  in  Belfast  (Wright  1991:  vii),  itself  only  a  ten  minute  taxi 
ride  from  the  Republican  Press  Centre  in  the  Falls  Road. 
The  Power  of  Propaganda 
The  importance  of  defining  an  organisation  as  propagandist  is  that  propaganda 
is  widely  assumed  to  be  very  powerful.  It's  effects  are  seen  as  insidious  and 
unconscious.  In  this  view,  Government  officials,  Academics  and  journalists 
need  to  be  constantly  on  their  guard  lest  they  be  unwittingly  subverted  by 
'propaganda'.  According  to  Paul  Wilkinson,  terrorist  propaganda  is  especially 
worrisome: 
We  should  never  underestimate  their  skill  in  disseminating...  illusions 
among  the  public  and  among  politicians  and  other  influential  groups.  At 
its  most  subtle  and  effective,  this  form  of  propaganda  campaign  may 
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of  a  terrorist  organisation.  If  government,  faced  with  these  more 
sophisticated  challenges,  do  not  succeed  in  dealing  effectively  with  the 
terrorists'  political  and  psychological  subversion,  they  may  indeed  be  on 
the  slide  to  disaster  (Wilkinson  1990:  30) 
Amongst  counterinsurgency  writers  and  politicians  in  Britain  'terrorist 
propaganda'  organisations  are  held  to  be  highly  effective  in  their  use  of  the 
media.  This  perception  can  fairly  be  called  the  orthodox  position.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  also  a  diametrically  opposed  view  to  be  found  on  the  left  and  in 
some  Irish  republican  writings.  In  this  view  it  is  the'British  propaganda 
machine'which  is  able  to'use'the  media  almost  at  whim  in  order  to  dominate 
news  agendas. 
Defining  Propaganda 
It  is  perhaps  wise  to  pause  here  for  a  second  to  consider  some  definitional 
aspects  of  propaganda.  It  is  plain  that  in  common  usage,  the  term  propaganda 
is  pejorative.  Some  writers  are  quite  happy  to  apply  the  term  only  to  those 
groups  of  which  they  disapprove.  Thus  there  is  a  large  body  of  writing  in 
English  on  the  propaganda  of  enemies  of  Western  nations,  such  as  the  Soviet 
Union  or  the  'terrorists'.  It  is  worth  looking  briefly  at  the  definitions  of 
propaganda  used  in  such  writing  in  order  to  reveal  the  assumptions  behind  it. 
Both  Wright  (1991:  73)  and  Tugwell  (1987:  409)  use  the  definition  established 
by  NATO:  'Any  information,  ideas,  doctrines  or  special  appeals  disseminated  to 
influence  the  opinion,  emotions,  attitudes  or  behaviour  of  any  specified  group  in 
order  to  benefit  the  sponsor  either  directly  or  indirectly'.  This  is  clearly  not  in 
principle  a  partisan  definition,  but  in  the  work  of  the  counterinsurgency  theorist 
it  is  only  applied  to  the  enemies  of  the  West.  Such  writers  are  apparently 
unable  to  conceive  that  Western  governments  might  also  engage  in  'special 
appeals'  to  their  own  benefit  and  so  discussions  of  the  media  strategies  of 
governments  as  propaganda  are  sparse  indeed.  The  activities  of  Western 
governments  are  referred  to  (in  passing)  as'counter-propaganda'  (Wright 
1991:  207;  Alexander  and  Latter  1990:  24).  Indeed  the  suggestion  that 
governments  may  engage  in  propaganda  is  seen  by  some  as  perilously  close 
to  swallowing  the  'propaganda'  of  the  'terrorists',  Wilkinson  argues  that  one  of 
the  'key  propaganda  themes'  of  'terrorists'  is  'to  undermine  all  claims  to 
legitimacy  on  the  part  of  the  incumbents...  It  is  no  longer  they  who  are 
legitimate  and  whose  authority  and  word  you  should  believe,  but  we  the 
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using  official  definitions,  the  British  government  and  its  agencies  have  engaged 
in  overt  and  covert  propaganda  in  Northern  Ireland. 
On  the  other  hand  there  are  some  writers  who  use  the  term  propaganda  to 
refer  only  to  the  activities  of  the  British  government  in  Northern  Ireland.  This  is 
overly  simplistic.  The  British  government  does  engage  in  propaganda  activities 
in  Northern  Ireland  which  are  not  matched  by  any  of  the  other  participants,  but 
it  is  too  simple  to  call  the  rest  of  the  propaganda  simply  the  dissemination  of 
information.  The  differences  in  methods  and  tactics  that  do  exist  are 
identifiable.  These  relate  to  such  factors  as  resources,  cultural  capital  and  the 
legal  framework  rather  than  simply  whether  an  organisation  has  links  with 
'terrorism'  or  the  government.  We  should  remember  that  there  are  a  myriad  of 
contending  organisations  competing  for  media  space.  In  addition  to  the 
institutions  of  the  British  government,  the  Republican  movement  and  the 
Loyalist  paramilitaries,  there  are  a  range  of  political  parties,  pressure  groups, 
trades  unions,  religious  organisations,  community  groups  etc.  which  routinely 
compete  for  space  in  the  media.  Recognising  this  is  a  first  step  towards 
thinking  in  more  complex  ways  about  media  strategies. 
Towards  a  neutral  definition? 
Some  critics  have  argued  that  the  term  propaganda  should  be  used  in  a  non 
pejorative  or'neutral'  sense.  One  widely  cited  definition  is  that  of  Jowett  and 
O'Donnell: 
Propaganda  is  the  deliberate  and  systematic  attempt  to  shape 
perceptions,  manipulate  cognitions,  and  direct  behaviour  to  achieve  a 
response  that  furthers  the  desired  intent  of  the  propagandist  (Jowett  and 
O'Donnell  1992:  4) 
This  is  not  very  different  from  the  NATO  definition  used  by  the 
counterinsurgents  and  cited  above.  It  is,  however,  hard  to  resist  the  temptation 
to  regard  propaganda  pejoratively,  especially  when  the  authors  go  on  to 
contrast  the  manipulative  intent  of  the  propagandist  with  the  'free  and  open 
exchange  of  ideas'  (1992:  8).  Such  an  exchange,  guaranteed,  they  argue,  by 
the  First  Amendment  in  the  US,  is'in  the  long  run...  the  greatest  deterrent  to 
the  misuse  of  propaganda'  (1992:  271).  A  society  without  propaganda  would 
evidently  be  one  with  no  serious  divisions  of  interest  in  which  disputes  were 
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however,  things  are  not  so  agreeably  simple.  The  central  problem  with 
attempts  at  workable  definitions  of  propaganda  is  that  the  question  of  who  is 
the  propagandist  is  always  contested.  The  identification  of  a  propagandist  in 
the  real  world  is  a  matter'of  political  argument  which  is  linked  to  specific 
interests  and  ideologies.  This  does  not  mean  that  there  are  not,  in  principle, 
ways  of  evaluating  the  information  (or  propaganda)  for  accuracy  or  of  deciding 
between  competing  versions  of  reality  on  the  basis  of  the  available  evidence. 
In  the  present  work  it  is  recognised  that  propaganda  is  a  'matter  of  the  politics 
of  information'  (Robins  eta[  1987:  8).  This  reminds  us  that  propaganda  is  only 
a  small  part  of  the  media  and  information  strategies  of  governments.  As  we 
saw  in  previous  chapters  the  entire  apparatus  of  government  secrecy  and  the 
intimidation  and  regulation  of  media  institutions  are  the  ever  present 
companions  of  the  media  strategies  of  the  powerful.  The  capacity  of  non 
government  organisations  to  pass  laws  and  regulate  media  institutions  is 
obviously  limited.  ' 
The  next  section  examines  changes  in  official  British  Policy  on  Northern  Ireland 
and  relates  these  to  changes  in  Information  management  and  organisation.  I 
will  suggest  that  these  changes  came  about  partly  as  a  response  to  the  political 
problems  of  pursuing  a  strategy  of  containment.  Thus  the  scaling  down  of 
Army  responsibility  both  operationally  and  in  terms  of  information  strategy  was 
done  partly  because  it  was  a  way  of  trying  to  manage  deep  divisions  within  the 
state  apparatus.  The  gradual  and  uneven  increases  in  PR  sophistication  and 
the  increasing  priority  given  to  media  management  has  been  a  response  both 
to  events  within  Northern  Ireland  and  to  struggles  within  political  organisations 
over  the  importance  of  information  work. 
Changes  in  Information  Strategies  since  the  1960s 
The  Unionist  Prime  Minister  Basil  Brooke  had  created  a  Cabinet  Publicity 
Committee  in  1943  and  the  Information  Service  as  a  separate  entity  came  into 
existence  in  1955.  But,  it  was  not  until  the  mid  sixties  that  'modern'  ideas  about 
marketing  and  image  entered  Northern  Ireland  politics  under  the  impetus  of 
Finance  Minister  Terence  O'Neill.  2  In  1962  Ex  Belfast  'Telegraph  journalist 
Tommy  Roberts  was  appointed  as  Public  Relations  officer  at  the  Ulster  Office 
in  London  by  O'Neill,  in  the  face  of  Cabinet  Office  objections.  His  job  was  to 
remedy  the'bad  industrial  press'which  O'Neill  thought  that  Northern  Ireland 
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Roberts,  while  remaining  based  in  London,  operated  informally  as  his  press 
secretary  on  his  almost  annual  visits  to  the  US  (O'Neill  1972:  88). 
On  the  election  of  O'Neill's  successor  James  Chichester-C  lark  as  Prime 
Minister,  some  members  of  the  cabinet  decided  that  the  new  prime  minister 
needed  a  press  secretary.  Information  Officer,  David  Gilliland,  was  offered  the 
newly  created  post,  but  he  made  his  acceptance  conditional  on  two  demands. 
Firstly  that  he  would  have  immediate  access  to  the  Prime  Minister  and  secondly 
that  he  would  attend  Cabinet  meetings  (Belfast  Telegraph  21  May  1987). 
These  proposals  were  met  with  considerable  resistance.  According  to  one 
Stormont  Information  Officer,  the  Cabinet  was  used  to  meeting  in  secret  with 
$none  of  these  rotten  press  chaps  around'  (Interview,  Belfast  August  1989)  The 
terms  were,  however,  agreed.  A  New  York  public  relations  firm  was  also 
appointed  in  1970  and  their  official  function  waspromoting  economic 
investment  in  Northern  Ireland'  (Stormont  Hansard  12  February  1970:  158). 
The  Coming  Crisis 
As  the  conflict  over  civil  rights  mounted  in  the  late  1960sthe  pressure  to  explain 
what  was  happening  in  the  North  intensified  and  the  potential  contradictions  of 
the  unionist  public  relations  approach  of  trying  to  show  the  positive  side  of 
'Ulster'  became  more  and  more  exposed.  The  first  and  major  problem  that  the 
government  faced  in  the  aftermath  police  attack  on  civil  rights  marchers  in 
Derry,  on  the  October  5  1968,  was  the  realisation  amongst  journalists  that 
something  very  odd  had  been  happening.  Twenty  years  later  Mary  Holland  of 
the  Observer  recalled  that: 
even  allowing  for  all  that's  happened  in  between,  the  shock  of  what 
happened  in  Derry  on  October  5th  still  sears  the  memory.  As  far  as  we 
were  concerned  this  was  a  British  city  and  these  were  British  police.  In 
1968  I'd  never  seen  a  policeman  use  a  baton  let  alone  charge  a  crowd  of 
demonstrators,  trapped  in  a  narrow  street,  with  such  naked  eagerness. 
(Irish  Times  3  October  1988) 
Jon  Snow,  now  of  Channel  Four  News  has  recounted  that: 
All  of  us  who  went  to  Northern  Ireland  for  the  first  time  in  the  early 
seventies  were  absolutely  shattered  by  what  we  saw.  We  were  shocked 
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this  was  part  of  Britain  that  appeared  to  be  50  years  behind  what  we  had 
grown  up  amongst.  ('Pack  up  the  Troubles'  Critical  Eye  Channel  Four  24 
October  1991) 
Lack  of  Policy 
Although  there  was  pressure  for  reform  from  the  Labour  government  at 
Westminster  (Callaghan  1973),  the  Unionists  decided  that  the  problem  in  the 
North  was  not  one  of  substance  but  of  image.  Five  days  after  the  RUC  batoned 
civil  rights  marchers  on  the  streets  of  Derry  on  October  5  1968  the  American 
Consul  General  in  Belfast  visited  the  Stormont  Cabinet  Secretariat  and  was 
briefed  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  senior  officials  on  the  situation.  According  to 
his  reports  to  Washington  the  government  did  not  appear  to  have  any  plans  to 
deal  with  the  substance  of  the  civil  rights  grievances.  Instead  they  were  acting 
to  try  and  improve  the  perception  of  Northern  Ireland  (Cronin  1987:  284-5).  In 
the  words  of  one'Information  Officer  who  worked  at  Stormont  at  the  time: 
At  that  time  there  was  no  actual  message  r that  could  [be]  put  out  other 
than  to  say  that  the  Unionist  government  was  a  happy  band  of  brothers 
who  were  doing  the  best  they  could  to  stamp  the  Catholics  in  the  face 
because  they  were  very  difficult.  But  there  was  no  line  of  policy  at  all. 
(interview,  Belfast  August  1989) 
In  these  circumstances,  on  January  23  1969  the  Northern  Ireland  Information 
Service  issued  a  long  press  release  stressing  not'what  is  wrong  with  Northern 
Ireland'  but'what  is  right  in  Ulster'  (Cronin  1987:  289-290).  As  the  American 
Consul  General  reported  back  to  the  US: 
The  government  feels  that  the  Ulster  image  is  vital  to  the  province's 
economic  progress...  Stormont  has  always  placed  a  primary  emphasis 
on  attracting  industry  to  this  area.  Its  trump  has  been  the  stable  and 
peaceful  social  and  political  environment  as  well  as  initial  financial 
incentives.  The  government  has  voiced  its  apprehension  that  continued 
bad  publicity  will  hurt  the  province's  chances  for  economic  growth  (cited 
in  Cronin  1987:  289) 
inexperience  of  PR 
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a  heavy  burden  on  the  information  service.  As  the  media  deluged  Belfast  and 
Derry  the  Government  Information  Service  at  Stormont  were  overwhelmed  by 
demands  for  information.  Stormont  had  moved  quickly  in  late  1968  to  appoint  a 
UTV  producer,  Bill  McGookin,  in  a  part  time  position  as  the  first  RUC  press 
officer.  In  March  1969  the  appointment  was  made  full  time  and  a  press  office 
was  set  up  staffed  by  McGookin  and  one  police  officer.  3  In  the  Army  PR  at  the 
Lisburn  HQ  had  been  a  quiet  backwater.  In  1968  a  new  PRO,  Colin  Wallace, 
was  appointed  and  he  was  to  accompany  the  British  Army  into  Derry  on  that 
first  day  in  August  1969.  For  the  RUC  the  media,  especially  the  non  local 
media,  were  an  oppositional  force.  Maurice  Tugwell  has  written 
In  the  RUC'PR'  itself  was  a  completely  new  idea.  At  first  there  was  a 
tendency  in  the  RUC  to  hostility  towards  a  news  media  that  seemed  to 
be  implacably  biased  against  the  force.  (Tugwell  1980:  247) 
This  is  partially  confirmed  by  an  RUC  press  officer: 
Believe  it  or  not,  when  this  trouble  first  erupted  in  Northern  Ireland  the 
RUC  had  no  guns,  it  had  no  information  at  all...  with  the  result  that  when 
the  world  fell  in,  so  to  speak,  and  the  news  media  of  the  world 
descended  on  them...  the  RUC  simply  didn't  have  the  structure  of  the 
means  of  explaining  its  position,  and  the  result  was  that  the  RUC 
received  a  very  very  severe  jugging  from  local,  national  and  international 
opinion.  And  it  took  long  years  to  retrieve  the  situation  (cited  in 
Hamilton-Tweedale  1987:  292). 
More  staff  joined  the  Stormont  Information  Service  during  1969,  but  they  were 
still  overwhelmed  with  around  5  Information  Officers.  As  one  Guardian 
reporter,  writing  in  1970,  put  it: 
The  cultural  shock  of  the  mass  descent  of  Fleet  St  is  still  not  over.  In  the 
early  days  the  whole  machinery  of  official  information  was  disastrously 
geared  to  the  requirements  of  the  occasional  facility  trip.  It  certainly  was 
not  built  to  withstand  the  Attilla  like  assault  it  got  after  the  first  riots  in 
Londonderry.  (UK  Press  Gazette  6  July  1970) 
The  historical  insulation  of  Northern  Ireland  from  the  world  meant  that  public 
relations  techniques  were  woefully  inadequate.  As  David  Gilliland  has 
acknowledged,  at  that  time  he  was  simply  'inexperienced'  (Be/fast  Telegraph  21 The  Development  of  Propaganda  Strategies  in  Northern  Ireland  81 
May  1987).  Prior  to  the  Civil  Rights  agitation  little  government  advertising  or 
promotional  publicity  had  been  issued.  Ulster  Commentary,  a  local  freesheet, 
first  published  in  March  1946  (Newsletter  1  July  1975),  was  still  being  produced 
and  in  December  1968  the  current  issue  was  ridiculed  by  the  Irish  Times  for 
claiming  that  Northern  Ireland  was  'one  of  the  most  peaceful  countries  in  the 
world'  (Irish  Times  17  December  1968). 
One  indication  of  the  inexperience  in  official  PR  was  that  in  September  1970 
the  Belfast  Telegraph  complained  that  the  Information  Service  was  releasing 
press  statements  without  a  phone  number  on  the  releases  for  journalists  to  ring 
back  (Belfast  Telegraph  30  September  1970).  The  method  for  putting  across 
the  message  about  the  image  of  Northern  Ireland  was  also  not  particularly 
sophisticated.  As  one  Information  Officer  recalled: 
In  those  days  I  don't  think  any  of  us  realised  that  there  was  a  great  deal 
more  to  dealing  with  journalists  than  just  pouring  them  gallons  of  drink 
and  being  a  hail-fellow-well-met  (interview,  Belfast  August  1989). 
The  role  of  the  media 
Although  both  local  and  national  news  had  reported  the  growing  unrest  in 
Northern  Ireland  from  the  Divis  riots  in  1964,  it  was  not  until  the  October  5 
demonstration  in  Derry  that  the  North  really  took  off  for  the  national  and 
international  media  (Butler  1991;  Cathcart  1984).  Before  1968  very  few 
networked  current  affairs  programmes  had  covered  the  political  situation  in 
Northern  Ireland  and  two  that  were  made  were  not  shown  in  Northern  Ireland 
after  UTV  vetoed  them.  The  British  press  also  seems  to  have  largely  ignored 
Stormont  (Downing  1982:  128  +  131).  Mary  Holland,  who  was  then  writing  for 
the  Observer  has  recalled  her  scepticism  about  the  existence  of  discrimination 
and  that  it  was  only  after  persistent  phonecalls  from  Gerry  Fitt  MP  that  she  was 
persuaded  to  cover  civil  rights  activist  Austin  Currie  squatting  in  a  council 
house  allocated  to  a  young  single  Protestant.  She  thought  it  was  a  good  story 
but  even  then  'the  enormity  of  what  I  was  seeing  still  didn't  really  hit  me'  (Irish 
Times  3  October  1988).  Fitt  persuaded  her  'reluctantly'  to  go  to  Derry  the  week 
before  the  October  5  demonstration.  Back  in  London  at  an  editorial  conference 
she  described  what  she  had  seen  and  learnt  of  discrimination  in  housing  and 
gerrymandering  in  Derry: 
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Astor,  the  editor  of  the  Observer,  cut  me  short.  'Write  it',  he  said  'Take 
as  much  space  as  you  like,  just  write  it'.  (Irish  Times  3  October  1988) 
The  widespread  sympathy  for  the  civil  rights  protesters  among  the  British 
media  was  to  change  after  the  IRA  campaign  began  in  earnest  in  1971. 
Chibnall  argues  that'press  ideology  is  profoundly  liberal  (1977:  19)  and  so: 
As  long  as  extra-parliamentary  opposition  was  restricted  to  civil  rights 
campaigning  it  could  be  treated  as  a  legitimate  area  of  controversy 
about  which  sensible  and  responsible  people  could  hold  different 
opinions.  But  as  soon  as  the  relatively  peaceful  protester  gave  way  to 
the  petrol  bomber  and  then  the  gunman,  and  opposition  became 
insurrection,  responsible  debate  had  to  be  restricted  to  the  discussion  of 
the  most  effective  means  of  eradicating  the  behaviour.  (Chibnall 
1977:  19) 
This  attributes  too  much  of  the  change  in  coverage  to  the  concept  of  press 
ideology.  It  is  a'media  centric'  (Schlesinger  1990)  account  which  assumes  that 
changes  in  journalistic  practice  can  be  explained  as  emanating  more  or  less 
directly  from  changes  in  ruling  class  ideology.  In  this  version,  the  government 
and  the  forces  of  law  and  order  don't  have  to  do  anything  to  convince 
journalists.  The  mere  presence  of  the  British  Army  is  enough  to  secure  a 
kneejerk  response  from  the  media.  However,  it  is  clear  that  there  was  a  major 
change  in  the  public  relations  of  the  British  government  between  1969  and 
1971.  At  least  part  of  the  explanation  must  relate  to  the  source  organisations 
which  supply  journalists  with  information.  The  Government  Information  Service 
at  Stormont  were  overwhelmed,  the  RUC  had  only  just  appointed  its  first  press 
officer  and  both  organisations  had  little  credibility  and  authoritativeness  for 
journalists.  After  all,  civil  rights  demands  for  reform  were  being  echoed  by  the 
Westminster  government.  4  Once  the  Army  moved  in  the  ideological  resources 
of  the  British  state  were  tied  closely  to  the  defence  of  that  position.  While  the 
Information  Service  at  Stormont  expanded  quite  rapidly,  Army  HQ  moved  much 
faster.  The  Army's  experience  in  53  'operations  of  the  counter  revolutionary 
type'  (Ministry  of  Defence  1969)  between  1945  and  August  1969  meant  that  it 
gave  a  much  higher  priority  to  PR  than  did  either  the  Northern  Ireland 
government  or  the  RUC.  The  Army  press  office  had  increased  in  size  from  just 
two  staff  in  1968  to  forty  by  1971.  It  also  began  24hr  operation  (Foot  1990:  9), 
something  which  the  NIO  did  only  during  crisis  situations.  The  massive 
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prominent  source  for  journalists.  To  be  sure,  there  were  many  journalists 
whose  kneejerk  response  was  to  support  the  Army,  but  in  explaining  changes 
in  coverage  by  reference  to  'press  idoelogy',  the  huge  increase  in  Army  public 
relations  activity  is  assumed  to  be  inconsequential. 
When  the  Army  were  brought  in  their  attitude  to  the  problem  relied  heavily  on 
past  experience  of  counterinsurgency  campaigns.  The  tarnished  public  image 
of  the  police  together  with  the  fact  that  they  were  overstretched  and 
understaffed  partly  conditioned  their  relationship  with  the  army.  In  the  view  of 
one  Information  Officer  at  Stormont  at  the  time: 
You've  got  to  remember  that  the  Army  were  very  much  in  the  driving  seat 
in  those  days.  They  were  the  hard  men,  they  had  the  numbers.  The 
RUC  were  seen  as  a  bunch  of  wankers.  The  Northern  Ireland  Office 
were  just  wets  who  didn't  know  what  time  of  day  it  was.  The  Army  felt 
that  they  were  the  people  who  knew  how  to  handle  a  situation  of  this 
sort,  they'd  done  it  in  Malaya  and  they'd  done  it  God  knows  where.  And 
they  were  being  held  back  in  Northern  Ireland  by  all  these  wets  and 
incompetent  policemen  (Interview,  Belfast  August  1989). 
But  by  1971  many  in  the  Army  felt  that  the  propaganda  war  against  the  IRA  was 
beginning  to  be  lost,  especially  in  the  aftermath  of  internment.  5  The  response 
was  the  setting  up  of  the  Information  Policy  Unit  in  late  1971.  Officially  its  role 
was  to  supplement  the  work  of  the  Army  press  office  in  releasing  information  to 
the  media.  In  fact,  this  was  a  cover  for  its  real  function  which  was 
opsychological  operations'  (psyops)  otherwise  known  as  disinformation. 
information  Policy  worked  closely  with  the  intelligence  community  and  the 
Foreign  Office.  Hugh  Mooney  of  the  Information  Research  Department  at  the 
Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office  joined  Information  Policy  in  November 
1972.  IRD  was  itself  closely  involved  with  M16  and  had  experience  of 
disinformation  work  in  previous  colonial  type  conflicts.  But  Information  Policy 
also  worked  with  M15  and  army  intelligence  against  a  background  of 
institutional  rivalry  and  conflict.  According  to  Duncan  Campbell: 
The  intelligence  scene  in  Northern  Ireland  in  1973  was  a  nightmare. 
The  MoD  ordered  a  new  head  of  Army  information  services  to  take  joint 
control  of  both  public  relations  and  Psyops.  Whitehall  wanted 
propaganda  in  the  province  under  control.  But  the  Psyops  unit  was  also 
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Service  (SIS  or  M16)  officials  in  the  North,  who  were  openly  at  war  with 
each  other  as  well  as,  often,  the  civil  ministries  (Campbell  1990:  16). 
The  effect  of  such  divisions  on  the  credibility  of  the  Army  Information  Service 
were  quite  severe.  David  McKittrick  (1990:  5)  of  the  Independent  summed  it  up 
in  the  following  terms: 
It  came  to  be  regarded  as  probably  the  most  unreliable  of  the  many 
agencies  involved  in  the  conflict  earning  itself  the  nickname  of  'the 
Lisburn  Lie  machine'.  The  IRA  was  found  to  be  more  truthful  than  the 
army. 
According  to  some  writers,  this  state  of  disarray  was  not  matched  on  the 
republican  side.  Maurice  Tugwe116  has  written  that  the  problem  was  that 
'normal  army  public  relations'  staffs  were  only  skilled  in  dealing  with  the  press 
in  'a  society  free  of  mass  indoctrination.  This  was  not  the  same  as  bearing  the 
brunt  of  a  sophisticated  propaganda  attack'  (Tugwell  1980:  247)  such  as  Sinn 
Fein  were  alleged  to  have  carried  out.  However,  the  Republican  press  centre 
only  came  into  existence  in  1970  after  the  NIO,  RUC  and  Army  had  increased 
their  PR  operations.  By  contrast  with  official  PR  it  was  not  formally  organised 
and  statements  were  delivered  by  hand  to  news  rooms.  Sinn  176in  was  not  the 
large  political  organisation  it  is  today  and  its  contacts  with  journalists  tended  to 
be  informal.  In  that  temporal  sense  it  was  the  IRA  whose  activities  were 
counterpropaganda.  The  public  relations  skills  of  some  leading  IRA  members 
were  also,  to  say  the  least,  embryonic.  According  to  Simon  Winchester  of  the 
Guardian,  IRA  press  conferences  were'usually  marked  by  considerable 
confusion'.  He  has  described  a  meeting  between  the  press  and  IRA  leader 
Seamus  Twomey,  in  1972: 
This  was  a  great  cloak  and  dagger  operation  with  people  arriving  at 
staggered  times,  and  ostensibly  going  to  see  a  homeless  family's  relief 
centre.  Unfortunately  for  the  IRA,  the  word  got  out,  and  so  the  hall  was 
besieged  with  reporters,  making  it  quite  obvious  to  any  passing  army  ý 
patrol  what  was  going  on.  Mr  Twomey  arrived  very  late,  and  seemed  not 
quite  aware  of  what  he  was  supposed  to  do  (cited  in  Curtis  1984a:  264) 
Following  the  introduction  of  Direct  Rule  and  the  return  of  the  Labour 
government  in  late  1974  It  is  clear  that  tensions  between  the  Army  and  the  NIO 
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The  existence  of  the  'black  propaganda'  unit  at  Army  HQ  in  Lisburn  on 
occasion  caused  difficulties  for  the  NIO  in  the  sense  that  the  unit  operated 
against  the  NIO  and  in  terms  of  its  more  general  negative  impact  on  the 
credibility  of  the  British  government  in  Northern  Ireland  (Foot  1990;  Miller 
1993b). 
U/sterisation,  Criminalisation,  Normallsation  and  the  primacy  of  the  police 
Following  the  Ulster  Workers  Council  (UWC)  strike  in  which  the  strikers 
brought  down  the  power  sharing  executive,  the  British  government  resigned 
itself  to  the  containment  of  the  conflict  and  set  about  trying  to  rigorously 
redefine  the  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  in  military  and  law  and  order  terms 
rather  than  as  a  political  problem.  This  meant  a  shift  in  the  day  to  day  running 
of  security  matters  from  the  Army  to  the  police  under  a  policy  known  as  the 
primacy  of  the  police.  The  Army's  presence  was  gradually  scaled  down  and, 
officially  at  least,  their  only  role  was  to  support  the  police.  This  had  the  result 
of  ensuring  that  a  greater  proportion  of  those  killed  in  Northern  Ireland  would 
be  RUC  officers  and  UDR  soldiers,  and  a  lesser  proportion  from  British  Army 
regiments.  At  the  same  time  the  policy  of  criminalisation  was  adopted  in 
relation  to  paramilitary  organisations,  pre-eminently  republican  groups. 
Secretary  of  State,  William  Whitelaw,  had  granted  paramilitary  prisoners 
Special  Category  Status  in  1972,  which  meant  that  they  were  effectively  treated 
as  Prisoners  of  War.  This  was  now  withdrawn. 
Both  Ulsterisation  and  Criminalisation  were  consistent  with  the  British  attempt 
to  normalise  the  conflict  by  labelling  the  armed  actions  of  the  IRA  as  simply 
criminal  and  by  claiming  that  these  criminals  were  dealt  with  by  means  of  the 
civil  law  (albeit  with  extensive  emergency  additions).  Republican  claims  that 
they  were  engaged  in  a  war  to  end  the  British  occupation  of  the  six  counties 
were  thus  less  easy  to  sustain  than  when  the  British  had  more  or  less 
acknowledged  the  War  situation  by  allowing  Special  Category  Status. 
During  the  UWC  strike  Army  information  officers  had  regularly  undermined  the 
Secretary  of  State,  Merlyn  Rees  (Miller  1993b)  and  so  attempts  were  made  to 
curtail  the  activities  of  the  Army  Information  Service.  The  introduction  of  the 
policies  of  Ulsterisation  and  criminalisation  meant  the  radical  pruning  of  the 
Army  press  office.  The  NIO  set  up  a  committee  which  the  NIO  claimed  was  to 
co-ordinate  information  policy.  It  was,  according  to  one  NIO  official,  'the 
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The  army  stopped  24  hour  operation  in  1977,  reducing  to  18  and  then  12 
hours.  By  1983  the  press  office  closed  at  6pm  with  one  press  officer  on  call.  In 
February  1976  the  Army  had  more  than  40  press  officers,  by  1981  there  were 
21  press  officers  including  7  at  HQ  in  Lisburn  (Curtis  1984a:  253).  By  1989  the 
Army  press  office  was  down  to  a  total  of  three  press  officers  in  head  quarters. 
The  RUC's  press  operation  was  correspondingly  expanded.  The  Army  were 
now  instructed  to  refer  all  questions  about  security  matters  to  the  police. 
Following  the  removal  of  Colin  Wallace  from  Information  Policy  allegedly  for 
leaking  classified  information7,  the  Army  were  also  instructed  that  statements 
about  security  incidents  must  be  passed  to  the  N  10  so  that  'a  view'  could  be 
taken  on  them.  8  But  the  RUC  were  not  above  suspicion  and  the  ruling  that 
security  statements  on  serious  issues  be  checked  by  the  NIO  was  also  applied 
to  the  police. 
The  ending  of  active  psychological  operations  in  Northern  Ireland  had  much  to 
do  with  changes  in  British  strategy.  The  shift  to  normalisation  would  not 
support  an  active  disinformation  policy.  However,  the  curbing  of  the  power  of 
the  army,  which  normalisation  secured,  can  also  be  seen  as  an  attempt  by  the 
Northern  Ireland  Office  to  resolve  the  serious  internal  divisions  by  gaining 
control  over  the  army.  The  drive  to  reconstitute  the  conflictwithin  social 
democratic  norms  required  that  the  government  appear  to  act  within  the  civil 
law  rather  than  in  a  manner  more  reminiscent  of  an  anti-colonial 
counterinsurgency  campaign.  This  is  to  say  that  Ireland  was  too  close  to  home 
and  too  vulnerable  to  the  spotlights  of  the  international  and  British  media  to  be 
treated  in  precisely  the  same  way  as  previous  colonial  counterinsurgency 
campaigns9.  My  argument  is,  therefore,  that  the  media  themselves  played  a 
prominent  role  in  spurring  the  search  by  the  government  for  more  'legitimate' 
ways  of  describing  the  conflict. 
The  key  pattern  of  public  relations  activities  since  the  introduction  of 
normalisation  has  been  the  gradual  decline  in  the  availability  of  security 
information.  Starting  with  the  army  the  decline  has  continued  with  the  police. 
By  1977: 
The  'watchkeepers'  who  man  the  army  press  desk  at  Lisburn  24  hours  a 
day,  no  longer  volunteer  blow  by  blow  details  of  every  attack  and 
shooting  incident.  Instead  they  draw  reporters  attention  only  to  the 
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There  was  also  a  change  in  the  language  of  public  relations,  shifting  from  the 
style  of  counterins  urgency  to  that  of  law  and  order  and  criminality: 
An  incident  that  in  the  past  would  have  been  reported  like  this:  'shots 
were  fired  at  an  army  foot  patrol  in  Belfast',  might  now  be  reported  by  the 
army  like  this:  'There  was  an  attempt  to  murder  members  of  an  army  foot 
patrol  in  Belfast'  (Ryder  1977). 
By  1980  this  approach  seems  to  have  been  proceeding  quite  effectively. 
According  to  Thames  TV  journalist  Peter  Gill: 
These  obstacles  are  making  it  formidably  difficult,  sometimes  impossible, 
to  report  on  the  Army's  counter-insurgency  role  in  a  way  that  we  would 
expect  and  rightly  be  expected  to  cover  other  people's  wars...  New  and 
unpublished  restrictions  on  press  coverage  introduced  earlier  this  year 
by  army  headquarters  in  Northern  Ireland  and  the  Royal  Ulster 
Constabulary  -  restrictions  dating  from  changes  in  commend  in  both 
forces  at  the  turn  of  the  year  -  mean  that  only  the  barest  of  information 
on  incidents  is  released  and  little  else...  There  is in  current  force  an 
overriding  policy  that  Press  attention  on  the  army's  role  in  Northern 
Ireland  should  be  kept  to  an  absolute  minimum.  No  public  justification 
for  these  restrictions  has  been  offered,  but  the  outlook  seems  to  be  that 
an  absence  of  Press  and  particularly  TV  coverage  may  help  in  winding 
down  the  conflict.  (Gill  1980). 
Attempts  at  normalisation  suffered  a  severe  set  back  with  the  republican 
hunger  strikes  of  1980  and  1981.  However,  the  attempt  to  normalise  the 
conflict  has  continued  ever  since.  In  1982  The  RUC  press  office  was  merged 
with  its  Command  Centre  to  form  Force  Control  and  Information  Centre  (FCIC). 
Uniformed  police  officers  now  answered  calls  from  journalists  as  well  as  doing 
other  tasks.  This  afforded  less  opportunity  for  journalists  to  get  to  know  RUC 
spokespeople  and  quickly  gave  rise  to  complaints  from  journalists  and  they 
'quickly  renamed  it  the  "Force  Control  of  Information  Centre"'.  (emphasis  in 
original,  Ryder  1989:  233) 
The  new  arrangement  had  the  merit,  from  the  point  of  view  of  normalisation,  of 
centralising  all  operational  information  and  making  it  more  susceptible  to 
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arrival  of  John  Hermon  as  Chief  Constable.  In  contrast  with  the  previous  Chief 
Constable,  Sir  Kenneth  Newman,  Hermon  was  very  hostile  to  the  media'O  and 
his  instinct  was  to  give  out  as  little  information  as  possible.  In  the  view  of  some 
journalists,  this  defensiveness  hampered  the  positive  portrayal  of  the  RUC. 
In  1989  a  special  committee  was  set  up  to  co-ordinate  publicity  for  the  20th 
Anniversary  in  August  of  the  redeployment  of  British  troops.  The  Northern 
Ireland  Information  Strategy  Group  included  representatives  from  Whitehall, 
the  Northern  Ireland  Office,  the  RUC  and  the  Army.  One  of  it's  major  roles  was 
, to  minimise  the  emphasis  attached  to  the  Army's  involvement'  (Observer  13 
August  1989).  The  army  attempted  to  stay  out  of  the  picture  preferring  to  refer 
journalists  to  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  and  the  RUC.  Requests  for  facilities 
and  trips  with  army  patrols  were  turned  down. 
In  the  late  1980s  the  RUC  practice  of  detailing  all  security  incidents  ceased  and 
the  RUC  adopted  the  policy  of  confirming  some  incidents  only  if  journalists  got 
to  hear  of  them  from  other  sources.  This  means  that  some  security  incidents 
are  not  reported  at  all  and  helps  to  foster  the  notion  that  Northern  Ireland  is 
'getting  back  to  normal'.  In  one  example,  a  shooting  incident  in  the  Markets 
area  of  Belfast,  which  occurred  in  July  1990,  was  not  reported  in  the  local 
press.  The  RUC  confirmed  that  the  incident  had  taken  place  in  response  to  an 
enquiry,  a  month  later,  from  a  journalist  who  had  learnt  of  the  incident  from 
other  sourcesP 
The  Hunger  strikes  and  the  rise  of  Sinn  F6in 
In  the  1940s  and  1950s  the  Unionist  government  had  spent  many  years  trying 
to  convince  the  British  to  employ  an'Ulsterman'  in  Washington  or  New 
York  to  counter  republican  propaganda.  The  British  refused,  but  the  H  Block 
prison  protests  were  to  awaken  such  interest  in  the  US,  some  of  it  hostile  to  the 
British,  that  the  Foreign  Office  finally  appointed  a  press  officer  in  New  York  in 
1980.  Three  further  appointments  were  made  to  British  Information  Service  in 
New  York  by  August  1981  (Daily  Telegraph  24  August  1981).  Even  then,  the 
view  in  the  civil  service  was  that  it  was  the  British  who  lost  the  propaganda  war 
on  the  Hunger  Strikes  (Gormally  et  al  1993:  61).  The  propaganda  campaign 
around  the  issue  of  criminalisation  resulted  in  the  biggest  mass  mobilisations 
since  the  civil  rights  marches.  They  also  resulted  in  an  increased  spend  on 
Public  Relations  at  the  N1012  and  the  distribution  of  a  large  number  of 
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1981d).  Ironically,  the  H-Block  protests  were  also  a  key  spur  for  Republican 
public  relations. 
As  one  commentator  has  put  it,  a  consequence  of  the  hunger  strikes  was  that 
'the  IRA  and  Sinn  Fdin  were  immeasurably  strengthened  and  gained  a  political 
cohesion  which  they  never  had  before'  (Smyth  1987:  188).  According  to  leading 
Sinn  Fdin  members  one  key  element  which  allowed  for  more  effective  public 
relations  during  the  hunger  strikes  was  the  attempt  by  the  government  to  close 
down  the  Press  centre  and  Sinn  Fdin  newspaper  Republican  News.  According 
to  Danny  Morrison,  the  then  editor  of  Republican  News  and  subsequently  Sinn 
176in's  Director  of  Publicity  a: 
new  feature  of  1981  was  having  a  mass  movement  with  a  public 
leadership.  Before  1978,  if  I  had  been  doing  an  interview  with  you,  I 
would  never  have  given  my  right  name.  In  1978  when  Roy  Mason 
moved  against  the  staff  of  the  Republican  Press  Centre  in  Belfast  and 
tried  to  get  Republican  News  closed  down,  we  all  appeared  in  court 
charged  in  our  own  names  with  conspiracy  and  IRA  membership.  But 
his  moving  against  us  was  so  clumsy,  it  strengthened  our  position  to 
such  an  extent  that  when  the  charges  were  dropped,  we  were  all  able  to 
'go  public'.  For  the  first  time  since  Maire  Drumm  was  killed  in  October 
197613,  Sinn  F6in  had  people  standing  up  in  public  saying:  'I'm  a 
member  of  Sinn  F6in,  the  IRA  is  right,  the  armed  struggle  is legitimate, 
the  Brits  are  wrong,  the  loyalists  are  wrong'  and  so  on.  This  was  a 
totally  fresh  approach.  Before,  our  politics  had  always  been  talked 
about  and  sold  beneath  the  counter.  Now  [they  were]  being  put  forward 
openly  (Morrison  1985:  88-89) 
It  was  Bobby  Sands'  election  to  Westminster  as  the  MP  for  Fermanagh/South 
Tyrone  which  launched  Sinn  176in  onto  the  electoral  battlefield  and  demanded  a 
much  greater  investment  in  media  relations.  In  1980  the  Republican  Press 
Centre  in  the  Falls  Road  had  only  one  full  time  volunteer  (Curtis  1984a:  273). 
In  1981,  Richard  McAuley  told  American  Journalist  Neil  Hickey'Do  you  know 
the  sum  total  of  the  famous  republican  propaganda  machine  everyone  talks 
about?  I'm  it'  (Hickey  1981:  26).  By  1989  the  Press  Centre  had  three  people  in 
the  press  office  plus  Richard  McAuley  as  Six-County  Director  of  Publicity  and 
Danny  Morrison  as  national  Director  of  Publicity.  14  Sinn  Fdin's  Dublin  office  at 
this  time  included  up  to  three  people  in  the  press  office.  In  the  early  1980's  the 
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paid  by  An  PhoblachtlRepubfican  News  (Curtis  1984a:  272).  This  was  no 
longer  the  case  by  the  early  1990s-15  As  a  result  of  their  entry  into  electoral 
politics  many  more  Sinn  F6iners  came  into  contact  with  the  media. 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  hunger  strike  there  was  a  much  greater  emphasis  in 
government  public  relations  on  promoting  a  positive  image  for  Northern  Ireland 
as  part  of  the  emphasis  on  the  'return  to  normal'.  The  Tourist  Board  became 
important  in  this  regard,  as  did  the  Industrial  Development  Board  created  in 
1982.  The  task  of  the  board  is  the  promotion  of  inward  investment  and  job 
opportunities.  From  the  beginning  public  relations  was  a  major  part  of  its 
function.  The  main  objective  in  this  area  was  'to  present  a  positive  image  of 
Northern  Ireland  and  the  IDB  at  home  and  abroad  to  enable  IDB  programmes 
to  succeed  in  securing  new  employment  opportunities'  (IDB  1985:  14). 
The  Anglo-Irish  Agreement 
The  signing  of  the  Anglo-Irish  Agreement  was  generally  well  received  in  the 
international  media  and  in  Britain  and  Dublin.  Even  right  wing  papers  like  the 
Sun  and  the  Daily  Express  supported  the  Agreement  in  opposition  to  unionist 
sentiment  (Grattan  1988).  It  led,  however,  to  a  Loyalist  backlash  and  concerted 
criticism  in  parts  of  the  local  press,  particularly  the  Unionist  morning  paper  the 
Newsletter.  The  opposition  of  loyalists  to  NIO  policy  meant  a  further  shift  in 
NIO  public  relations  strategy.  Now,  there  was  heavy  pressure  on  the 
Newsletter  to  change  its  policy  on  the  agreement.  This  meant  that  Newsletter 
journalists  were  excluded  from  briefings  and  private  dinners  at  Stormont. 
According  to  the  editor  of  the  Newsletter,  Sam  Butler: 
It  means  you're  not  invited  to  various  receptions  at  Stormont  and 
Hillsborough,  you're  not  privy  to  the  sorts  of  briefings  that  go  on,  and  the 
Northern  Ireland  Office  is  particularly  good  at  giving  briefings  to  its 
friends.  If  you're  not  one  of  its  friends  then  you  don't  get  told  basic 
information  (Hard  News  Channel  Four  19  October  1989). 
The  key  result  of  normalisation  has  not  been  that  control  shifted  from  the  Army 
to  the  RUC,  but  that  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  became  the  lead  department  in 
all  matters.  This  is  reflected  in  the  staffing  of  government  information 
departments.  In  1976  the  army  had  40  press  officers  to  the  NIO's  26 
Information  Officers.  By  1981  they  had  around  the  same  number  (21  in  the 
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were  information  officers  compared  with  3  press  officers  in  the  Army.  The  RUC 
meanwhile  had  60  staff  in  FCIC,  most  of  whom  were  police  officers  on  rotation 
with  7.5  permanent  civilian  staff. 
The  Dual  Strategy 
The  central  approach  of  successive  British  governments  in  Northern  Ireland 
has  been  one  of  containment.  Home  Secretary  Reginald  Maudling  provided  an 
early  illustration  of  this  when  he  memorably  revealed  that  the  aim  of  the  British 
government  was  to  reduce  the  violence  to'an  acceptable  level'  (Sunday  Times 
insight  Team  1972:  309).  But  as  O'Dowd  et  al  have  pointed  out  the  strategy  of 
containment  is  not  simply  about  repression  or  cou  nterin  surge  ncy.  When  the 
British  introduced  Direct  Rule  to  Northern  Ireland  in  1972  they  followed  a  dual 
strategy  in  which  they: 
Accelerated  the  drive  for  reforms  and  the  reconstitution  of  the  rule  of 
law,  while  at  the  same  time  drawing  upon  the  latest  repertoire  of 
counterins  urgency  thinking  and  practices  derived  from  colonial 
experiences  elsewhere.  (O'Dowd  et  al  1980:  201) 
This  strategy  developed  over  time  and  has  been  inflected  according  to  both  the 
party  in  power  and  perhaps  more  importantly  the  balance  of  forces  within  the 
state.  For  example,  the  strategy  of  criminalisation  adopted  by  the  British  state 
following  the  collapse  of  the  power  sharing  executive  in  1974  stressed  the 
essential  criminality  of  the  assault  on  the  state  by  abolishing  'special  category 
status'  for  political  offences.  During  Roy  Mason's  term  as  Secretary  of  State,  in 
the  late  Seventies,  this  was  supplemented  with  an  attempt  to  portray  the 
problems  of  Northern  Ireland  as  not  simply  emanating  from  'terrorism'  but  also 
from  the  evils  of  unemployment.  This  compares  with  the  approach  of  the 
Thatcher  government,  at  least  in  the  early  1980s,  which  introduced  the  rhetoric 
of  self  reliance  as  well  as  cut-backs  and  increasing  unemployment  (ODowd  et 
al  1982).  More  recently  there  has  been  a  much  greater  emphasis  on  social  and 
economic  matters  and  particularly  on  industrial  regeneration  and  development. 
This  priority  runs  in  tandem  with  the  campaign  against  'terrorism'. 
Most  research  studies  which  have  concentrated  on  the  analysis  of  news 
coverage  or  on  the  production  of  news  have  tended  to  ignore  or  play  down 
attempts  to  communicate  the  reform  part  of  the  NIO  strategy.  Nevertheless,  it 
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which  stresses  two  basic  messages:  On  the  one  hand  that  the  problem  is  the 
terrorist  'assault  on  democracy'  (NIO  1989:  20)  and  on  the  other  that  the  people 
of  'Ulster'  are  'a  community  on  the  move'  in  which  local  'entrepreneurial  flair' 
and  'Ulster  generosity'  are'rendering  bigotry  irrelevant'  (NIO  1989). 
In  1989  the  NIO  issued  a  publicity  booklet  which  contains  its  analysis  of  the 
conflict.  The  booklet  begins  with  a  black  and  white  photo  of  the  bombed  out 
wreckage  of  the  main  street  of  a  small  town  in  Northern  Ireland  which  is 
juxtaposed  with  a  colour  image  of  the  same  street  after  reconstruction.  The 
accompanying  text  reads: 
This  is  one  of  the  small  towns  in  Northern  Ireland  targeted  by  terrorists 
during  the  past  twenty  years.  But  townspeople  refused  to  give  up. 
Within  hours  the  windows  had  been  replaced  and  it  was  business  as 
usual.  Within  months,  roofs  were  repaired,  walls  rebuilt  and  the  scarred 
facades  repainted.  Such  spirited  resolve  is  the  real  story  of  Northern 
Ireland  and  its  people;  a  community  that  is  carving  out  international 
respect  for  its  resilience,  work  ethic,  enterprise  and  hospitality. 
This  'true  face'  is  then  contrasted  with  that  promoted  by  the  media: 
More  and  more  there  is  world  wide  acceptance  that  this,  not  the  media 
image  of  the  masked  terrorist,  is  the  true  face  of  Northern  Ireland. 
it  would  seem  from  this  argument  that  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  is  not  too 
keen  on  the  images  of  violence  which  routinely  fill  television  reports  on  the 
conflict  in  the  North.  These  images  are  blamed  on  the  media  and  there  is  an 
implicit  call  for  more  'responsible'  or'realistid  representations.  Yetsuch 
images  are  not  only  purveyed  by  the  media  themselves.  In  fact,  the  image  of 
the'masked  terrorist'  seen  below  (Figure  2.1)  is  taken  from  a  Northern  Ireland 
office  television  commercial  for  the  confidential  telephone.  Ironically  the 
Northern  Ireland  Office  attempted  to  use  this  image  covertly  to  subtly  influence 
viewers  to  use  the  confidential  telephone.  The  IBA  refused  to  pass  the  ad  for 
broadcast  until  the  NIO  increased  the  length  of  the  shot  from  four  frames  to 
eight  to  remove  its  subliminal  character. 
In  1993,  the  implicit  contradictions  of  the  government  approach  became  open 
conflict.  Officials  at  the  Tourist  Board  complained  that  a  series  of  NIO 
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Figure  2.1  The'media  image  of  the  masked  terrorist'?  An'image  of  brief 
duration'from  a  Northern  Ireland  Office  television  commercial. 
advertising  campaigns.  Tourist  Board  adverts  showed  idyllic  scenes  under  the 
heading,  'The  Northern  Ireland  you'll  never  know  unless  you  go'.  Meanwhile, 
the  NIO  ads  which  could  be  seen  by  viewers  in  the  South  receiving  Ulster 
Television,  showed  graphic  images  of  political  violence  including  killings.  The 
Tourist  Board's  Chair,  Hugh  O'Neill,  was  reported  as  complaining  that'The 
feedback  we  have  had  from  the  South  is  that  the  new  TV  commercial  has  had 
an  adverse  affect  on  our  campaign'  (Watt  1993). 
While  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  is  anxious  to  promote  images  of  a  'return  to 
normality'  and  play  down  images  of  conflict,  it  is  also  involved  in  creating  its 
own  images  of  violence.  This  seeming  paradox  is  the  key  to  understanding  the 
activities  of  'official'  sources  in  Northern  Ireland. 
Some  sections  of  the  media  apparently  believe  that  the  NIO  produces 
information  instead  of  propaganda.  On  the  publication  of  the  booklet  referred 
to  above,  the  Belfast  Telegraph  reported  that: 
The  book  candidly  admits  and  portrays  the  scale  of  the  terrorist 
campaign  which  has  gained  Ulster  such  an  adverse  reputation  abroad... 
This  warts  and  all  portrayal,  aimed  at  improving  international 
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more  insidious  propaganda  as  attention  focuses  on  Northern  Ireland 
during  the  forthcoming  anniversary  (Belfast  Telegraph  28  July  1989). 
The  distinction  is  thus  drawn  between  the  honest'warts  and  all'  approach  and 
the  more  sinister  propaganda  of,  presumably,  'extremist'  groups. 
But  is  this  characterisation  of  the  Information  Service  justified.  Does  the 
Publicity  material  it  distributes  contain  only  facts  and  undisputed  information? 
Are  such  distinctions  between  truth  and  propaganda  warranted  or  are  they 
themselves  and  integral  part  of  the  propaganda  war? 
Propaganda  in  Practice 
The  question  of  propaganda  is  more  sharply  raised  by  the  credibility  of 
government  information.  The  official  position  is  that  the  Government 
Information  Service  exists  to  provide  the  media  and  public  with  unvarnished 
facts.  Yet  on  occasion  information  from  official  sources  in  Northern  Ireland  is 
simply  false. 
Even  information  on  the  conflict  which  is  apparently  merely  factual  can  be 
distorted.  The  official  statistics  on  the  conflict  are  misleading  in  two  ways.  First 
of  all,  the  absolute  numbers  of  deaths  is  inaccurate.  There  is  some  evidence 
that,  at  least  in  the  1970s,  the  British  Army  occasionally  failed  to  acknowledge 
deaths  of  their  personnel  at  the  hands  of  the  IRA,  attributing  them  instead  to 
accidental  causes  in  Germany  in  order  to  boost  military  morale  and  deny  it  to 
the  IRA  (Morton  1989).  Secondly,  the  compilation  of  statistics  on  conflict 
related  deaths  do  not  distinguish  between  the  deaths  of  paramilitaries  and 
those  of  civilians.  The  RUC  labels  all  of  these  deaths  simply  as  civilian.  This 
accords  with  the  official  view  that  the  'terrorists'  are  simply  criminals,  rather 
than  an  opposing  (para)military  force.  It  also  allows  British  politicians  to  make 
statements  attributing  all  deaths  in  the  conflict  to  the  IRA,  ignoring  the  irony 
that  many  of  these  were  actually  IRA  volunteers  killed  by  British  forces.  For 
example  Margaret  Thatcher  has  commented  that'l  hope  Amnesty  has  some 
concern  for  the  more  than  2000  people  murdered  by  the  IRA  since  1969' 
(Guardian  1  April  1988). 
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It  is  now  well  established  (and  has  been  admitted  by  the  government),  that  the 
task  of  the  Information  Policy  branch  of  Army  headquarters  in  the  early  to  mid 
1970s  was  disinformation.  False  stories  were  spread  in  order  to  discredit  the 
IRA  as  well  as  other  enemies  of  the  Intelligence  services,  such  as  Loyalist 
politicians  and  the  Labour  government  (See  Curtis  1984a;  Foot  1990). 
Information  Policy  was  closed  down  in  disputed  circumstances  in  the  mid  1970s 
and  it  seems  that  such  a  large  scale  active  disinformation  operation  has  not 
existed  since.  However,  the  carefully  drafted  government  statement 
acknowledging  disinformation  left  a  number  of  questions  unanswered: 
It  has  not,  since  the  mid-1  970s,  been  the  policy  to  disseminate 
disinformation  in  Northern  Ireland  in  ways  designed  to  denigrate 
individuals  and/or  organisations  or  for  propaganda  purposes  (Hansard 
30  January  1990:  111) 
Later,  Defence  Secretary,  Tom  King,  specifically  drew  attention  to  the  wording 
of  this  statement,  inferring  that  disinformation  was  still  being  used  for  other 
purposes: 
I  did  not  say  that  it  has  not  been  the  practice  to  use  disinformation  where 
it  is  necessary  to  protect  lives,  and  for  sound  and  absolutely  honourable 
security  reasons  (Hansard  1  February  1990:  456) 
Some  might  agree  with  Conservative  MP,  Julian  Amery,  that'it  is  perfectly 
appropriate  and  right  to  use  disinformation  to  protect  ordinary  military 
operations'  (Hansard  1  February  1990:  456),  but  they  might  be  less  sanguine  if 
the  object  of  the  lies  were  simply  to  protect  the  image  of  the  government, 
obstruct  the  due  process  of  law  and  manipulate  public  opinion. 
The  use  of  disinformation  in  Northern  Ireland  is  intimately  connected  with  the 
use  of  force  by  the  state.  If  the  strategy  of  successive  British  governments 
since  1974  has  been  to  redefine  the  actions  of  the'security  forces'  as 
consistent  with  social  democratic  criteria,  then  it  is  essential  that  the  police  and 
the  army  be  seen  to  act  within  the  law.  When  this  became  difficult,  the 
avenues  taken  have  included  changing  the  law,  obstructing  and  controlling  the 
justice  system  and  lying  to  the  media. 
Allegations  that  the  police  and  Army  have  engaged  in  the  illegal  use  of  force 
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the  RUC  in  1982,  by  Merseyside  Deputy  Chief  Constable,  John  Stalker, 
concluded,  however,  that: 
The  circumstances  of  those  shootings  pointed  to  a  police  inclination,  if 
not  a  policy,  to  shoot  suspects  dead  without  warning,  rather  than  to 
arrest  them.  Coming,  as  these  incidents  did,  so  close  together,  the 
suspicion  of  deliberate  assassination  was  not  unreasonable  (Stalker 
1988:  253). 
Between  1969  and  1990,  'security  forces'  in  Northern  Ireland  have  been 
responsible  for  the  deaths  of  over  350  people.  Over  half  of  these  were 
uninvolved  civilians  (Irish  Information  Partnership  1990).  In  the  early  years  of 
the  troubles  a  pattern  of  public  relations  responses  to  such  incidents  emerged. 
The  pattern  was  not  changed  by  the  closing  down  of  the  Information  Policy  unit 
in  the  mid  1970s.  The  cases  of  two  of  the  civilians  killed  by  the  SAS  in  1978 
became  widely  known  examples  of  Army  disinformation.  In  the  first  case. 
William  Hanna,  a  Protestant  civilian,  was  killed  during  an  SAS  ambush  of  three 
unarmed  IRA  members.  'Following  the  incident  the  Army  press  office  at  Lisburn 
distributed  versions  of  what  had  happened  which  some  people  at  headquarters 
knew  to  be  inaccurate,  suggesting  deliberate  deception  rather  than  mistakes 
made  in  haste'(Urban  1992:  61).  The  Army  statement  an  21  June,  the  day  of 
the  shooting,  alleged  that'The  men  were  challenged,  and  there  was  an 
exchange  of  gunfire.  Four  men  were  shot  dead'  (cited  in  Murray  1990:  221  - 
222).  The  SAS  soldiers  also  maintained  that  Hanna  had  'moved  as  if  to  go  for 
a  gun'  (cited  in  Murray  1990:  225). 
The  next  month  the  SAS  killed  16  year  old  John  Boyle,  the  day  after  Boyle  had 
stumbled  upon  an  arms  cache  in  a  local  graveyard.  He  rushed  home  to  tell  his 
father,  who  phoned  the  police.  It  seems  that  Boyle  returned  to  the  graveyard 
the  next  day  out  of  curiosity,  whereupon  he  was  shot  by  the  SAS,  who  had  the 
graveyard  staked  out. 
The  first  statement  (from  the  army]  said  a  patrol  spotted  three  men  acting 
suspiciously  and  when  challenged  one  pointed  a  rifle  at  them.  One  of 
the  soldiers  then  fired  five  shots  killing  John  Boyle.  The  second 
statement  said  only  one  man  was  present  and  he  pointed  a  rifle  at  the 
soldiers  when  challenged;  later  two  other  men  came  to  the  scene  (these 
were  Boyle's  Father  and  brother]  and  they  were  arrested  and  handed 
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the  man,  that  this  was  impracticable  as  he  was  10  yards  from  them 
pointing  a  rifle  in  their  direction  (Murray  1990:  232). 
The  Army  statement  added  that  'the  rifle  was  later  found  with  its  magazine  fitted 
and  ready  to  fire'  (cited  in  Curtis  1984a:  77).  In  fact,  the  Boyles  had  no 
paramilitary  connections  and  the  rifle  was  unloaded.  The  SAS  men  were  tried 
and  acquitted  of  murder,  but  the  judge,  Lord  Lowry,  declared  that  he  was 
unable  to  decide  if  Boyle  had  picked  up  the  rifle.  Lowry  stated  that  the  SAS 
statement  was'self  justificatory,  and,  in  the  context  of  the  Boyle  family's 
reputation,  untrue'  (cited  in  Urban  1992:  65). 
These  examples  are  good  illustrations  of  the  Army's  PR  response  when 
soldiers  wound  or  kill  civilians  or  paramilitary  personnel.  It  is  generally  agreed 
by  journalists  and  critics  that  RUC  PR  has  been  much  more  reliable  than  that  of 
the  Army.  But  while  they  have  not  engaged  in  organised'black  propaganda' 
operations  and  their  reputation  and  credibility  for  journalists  has  been  relatively 
high  (Curtis  1984a;  Hamilton-Tweeddale  1987;  Ryder  1989),  when  it  comes  to 
explaining  deaths  caused  by  their  own  personnel  they  have  been  less  than 
reliable.  As  one  Northern  Ireland  Office  official  sardonically  observed:  'the 
RLIC  itself  was  not  beyond  reproach  in  these  matters'  (Interview,  Belfast  July 
1990). 
Perhaps  the  best  known  examples  of  RUC  disinformation  are  the'shoot-to-kill' 
operations  of  1982  which  resulted  in  six  deaths  and  one  wounding.  In  the  first 
case  IRA  members  Eugene  Toman,  Sean  Burns  and  Gervaise  McKerr  were 
said  to  have  been  killed  after  their  car  had  driven  at  speed  through  a 
checkpoint.  The  story  changed  the  next  day  when  the  RUC  said  that  the  car 
had  stopped  briefly  at  the  checkpoint  before  accelerating  towards  the 
policeman  who  had  waved  it  down  knocking  him  over  and  driving  off.  The 
police  statement  continued:  'Other  police  opened  fire  on  the  vehicle  which 
drove  off  in  an  attempt  to  escape.  In  doing  so,  it  careered  of  the  road,  down  a 
bank.  When  police  arrived  at  the  scene  it  was  found  that  the  three  occupants 
were  dead'  (cited  in  Curtis  1984a:  78).  But  in  fact  no  police  officer  was  knocked 
down  and  the  car  was  riddled  with  over  a  hundred  bullets  many  of  which  had 
been  fired  from  the  front  or  side  of  the  car  rather  than  the  back  as  would  have 
been  the  case  if  RUC  officers  had  fired  from  the  alleged  checkpoint.  In  addition 
Toman  stumbled  from  the  car  when  it  came  to  rest  and  was  shot  through  the 
heart  by  a  police  officer  (Curtis  1984a;  Stalker  1988;  Urban  1992).  Within  a 
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Carroll.  The  RUC  press  office  again  alleged  that  the  INLA  members  had 
broken  though  a  random  police  road  block  injuring  a  police  officer.  In  fact  Grew 
and  Carroll  had  been  under  surveillance  for  some  time  and  were  waved  down 
by  police  just  after  they  had  crossed  the  border  into  Northern  Ireland.  An 
unmarked  police  car  pulled  up  behind  them  and  an  undercover  police  officer 
got  out  and  'walked  towards  the  passenger  side  of  the  suspect  vehicle,  where 
Carroll  was  sitting.  He  fired  his  pistol  through  the  window,  killing  the  INLA  man. 
Constable  Robinson  then  walked  around  the  front  of  the  car,  reloading  his 
pistol  as  he  went,  and  fired  four  times  at  Grew,  slaying  him  as  well.  Neither  of 
the  INLA  men  was  armed'(Urban  1992:  152).  In  between  these  killings  the 
RUC  also  shot  and  killed  seventeen  year  old  civilian  Michael  Tighe  and 
wounded  his  friend  Martin  McAuley.  The  official  police  story  was  that  on  a 
routine  patrol  an  armed  man  had  been  seen  entering  a  hayshed 
.  The  police 
approached  and  heard  voices  and  the  cocking  sound  of  a  rifle  mechanism. 
Two  warnings  were  shouted  and  then  McAuley  and  Tighe  were  both  seen 
pointing  weapons  at  the  RUC  officers.  The  police  later  admitted  that  they  had 
been  keeping  the  hayshed  under  surveillance  and  they  had  seen  no  armed 
man.  The  guns  recovered  in  the  hayshed  were  pre-war  Mauser  rifles,  but  they 
were  unloaded  and  there  was  no  ammunition  in  the  shed.  According  to 
McAuley,  who  survived,  there  was  no  initial  warning  and  no  chance  to 
surrender  (Stalker  1988).  According  to  the  RUC  these  cases  were  examples  of 
honourable  disinformation  to  protect  informers  (See  Stalker  1988). 
RUC  disinformation  has  not,  though,  been  confined  to  incidents  in  which 
informers  might  play  a  role.  They  have  also  consistently  issued  statements  at 
variance  with  independent  evidence  in  other  situations.  In  the  1970s  the  RUC 
press  office  refused  to  acknowledge  that  suspects  were  being  ill  treated  in 
interrogation  centres  in  Omagh,  Gough  barracks  and  Castlereagh  (Taylor 
1980).  They  also  spread  unattributable  smears  against  a  police  surgeon  who 
had  worked  at  Castlereagh  and  had  confirmed  that  he  had  seen  between  150 
and  160  suspects  with  injuries  inflicted  by  police  officers  (Curtis  1984a:  63-67). 
The  circumstances  surrounding  injuries  and  deaths  as  a  result  of  plastic  bullets 
have  also  be  routinely  disputed  (Curtis  1982).  One  prominent  example  is  the 
killing  of  John  Downes  in  August  1984.  American  journalist  Sally  Belfrage  was 
present  on  the  Internment  commemoration  march  on  9  August  1984  and 
contrasts  what  she  saw  with  the  RUC  statement  on  the  death.  After  some 
stone  throwing  and  a  police  response  with  plastic  bullets  the  march  reached  its 
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Gerry  Adams'  voice  came  amplified  from  the  rostrum  to  plead  for  peace 
and  calm.  The  police  lowered  their  guns  and  the  marchers  dribbled 
back  into  the  street...  Though  depleted,  the  crowd  still  filled  the  square. 
The  people  had  recovered  in  a  second;  even  little  children  weren't  sent 
home.  Adams  asked  everybody  to  sit  down  to  show  their  pacific 
intentions  and  to  provoke  no  more  reaction.  They  obeyed  immediately 
and  became  a  sea  of  sitting  families,  ringed  entirely  now  by  armed  and 
helmeted  police  backed  up  by  their  vehicles  (Belfrage  1988:  58). 
Adams  went  on  to  introduce  Martin  Galvin  the  Noraid  leader  who  had  been 
banned  from  entering  Northern  Ireland  by  the  government: 
As  Galvin  took  the  microphone,  the  police  charged.  They  came  in  from 
all  sides,  ramming  and  running  into  people  with  armoured  cars, 
bludgeoning  them  with  truncheons,  loosing  hundreds  of  plastic  bullets 
point-blank  into  the  crowd.  The  air  was  full  of  puffs  of  smoke  and 
cracking  reports  as  spectators  went  down.  There  was  nowhere  for  most 
of  them  to  run,  and  they  were  beyond  screaming:  it  was  a  matter  of 
huddling  in  knots  and  praying  and  crying.  Television  cameras  recorded 
the  brutality.  John  Downes,  attending  the  rally  with  his  wife  and 
eighteen-month-old  baby,  was  shot  in  the  heart  in  full  view  of  the  lens  of 
the  man  from  the  Daily  Mail.  The  press  people  themselves  were 
manhandled,  threatened  and  hit...  In  moments  the  square  was  still  but 
for  the  police  with  their  smoking  guns  and  knots  of  hysterical,  weeping 
people  who  were  shot  at  if  they  tried  to  move.  The  injured  lay  bleeding 
everywhere.  One  man  had  a  gaping  hole  in  his  cheek  which  spurted 
every  time  he  breathed.  A  seven-year-old  bled  heavily  from  one  ear; 
and  elderly  man  lay  unconscious,  shot  in  the  back  of  the  head.  Medics 
were  frantically  trying  to  revive  John  Downes,  but  he  had  already  turned 
blue  (Belfrage  1988:  58-59) 
The  RUC  statement  was,  according  to  Belfrage,  'so  at  variance  with  the 
witnessed,  documented,  photographed  experience  of  the  world's  press  that  you 
could  only  wonder  at  the  effrontery': 
They  [the  police]  were  attacked  and  obstructed  by  groups  within  the 
crowd,  which  numbered  in  excess  of  2,000,  obviously  determined  to 
prevent  Galvin's  arrest  and  who  had  been  instructed  from  the  platform  to 
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entrance  to  Connolly  House,  the  door  of  which  had  been  barricaded 
after  Galvin  had  entered,  a  total  of  31  plastic  bullet  rounds  were 
discharged  -a  number  of  them  in  the  air  to  disperse  the  crows...  Initial 
reports  indicate  that  20  persons  were  taken  to  hospital,  and  a  22  year 
old  man,  who  was  identified  as  a  rioter,  was  found  dead  on  arrival at 
hospital  (cited  in  Belfrage  1988:  59). 
Translated  into  the  language  of  official  public  relations  this  comes  out  as  'we 
are  not  required  to  lie  down  and  let  people  walk  all  over  us'  (Interview  with 
senior  RUC  press  officer  Belfast  July  1989) 
The  use  of  disinformation  is  not,  however,  just  a  matter  of  generic'British  lies'. 
Internal  rivalries  also  have  an  important  bearing  on  public  relations  tactics. 
Such  rivalries  can  on  occasion  reveal  that  disinformation  is  used  to  cover 
mistakes.  For  example,  after  the  first  Army  statement  on  the  killing  of  John 
Boyle  in  1978,  the  RUC  press  office  told  journalists  that  the  story  was  untrue. 
'The  RUC  was  furious  with  the  army,  which  it  considered  to  have  behaved  in  an 
irresponsible  manner'  (Urban  1992:  64).  Rivalries  also  seem  to  have  been  a 
facto  inthe  PR  response  to  the  killing  of  Protestant  civilian  Kenneth  Stronge. 
He  happened  to  be  in  the  vicinity  when  the  IRA  launched  a  mortar  attack  on 
North  Queen  Street  police  station  in  Belfast  in  July  1988.  The  RUC  issued  a 
statement  claiming  that  Stronge  was  killed  in  crossfire.  However,  it  was  later 
confirmed  he  was  killed  by  security  force  bullets  (Irish  Information  Partnership 
1990:  210-211).  Statements  also  alleged  that  RUC  officers  had  returned  fire 
from  within  the  station,  but  in  fact  the  operation  was  run  by  the  SAS.  Their 
handling  of  the  operation  apparently  allowed  the  IRA  team  to  escape  and 
greatly  annoyed  the  RUC  who  had  themselves  passed  the  intelligence 
information  that  the  stations  was  about  to  be  attacked  onto  the  SAS.  According 
to  David  Hearst  of  the  Guardian: 
The  commanding  officer  of  the  [SAS]  team  insisted  on  having  full 
operational  command  of  the  station  and  turfed  out  the  police  reservist 
who  operated  the  gold  coloured  levers  which  activated  the  steel  doors. 
The  plan  was  to  leave  the  doors  slightly  ajar,  so  that  when  the  (IRA]  unit 
struck,  the  SAS  would  rush  out  and  engage  the  car  in  rapid  fire.  When 
the  attack  came,  the  SAS  pulled  the  wrong  lever,  closing  the  door 
instead  of  opening  it.  By  the  time  they  got  out,  it  was  too  late  (cited  in 
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It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  such  treatment  by  the  SAS  might  lead  disgruntled 
RUC  officers  to  talking  unofficially  to  the  press,  while  at  the  same  time  the  RUC 
press  office  is  supporting  the  official  line  that  the  'terrorists'  were  to  blame  for 
the  death  of  Mr  Stronge. 
One  question  which  arises  from  these  examples  is  who  knows  about  the  lies? 
Merlyn  Rees,  for  example  has  claimed  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  Information 
Policy  Unit  when  he  was  Secretary  of  State  for  Northern  Ireland  (Hansard  1 
February  1990:  450-452).  At  Army  HQ,  Information  Policy  staff  were  aware  that 
some  of  the  material  they  produced  was  untrue,  but  it  seems  that  at  least  some 
of  the  ordinary  Army  press  officers  were  not.  John  Stalker  found  that  false 
stories  about  the  1982  killings  were  given  to  the  CID  officers  who  investigated 
the  killings  as  well  as  to  the  media,  and  then'finally  and  disastrously,  the 
fabricated  stories  surfaced  at  the  Crown  Court'  (Stalker  1988:  59).  The  stories 
originated  not  with  the  officers  who  carried  out  the  killings  but  with  'a  handful  of 
Special  Branch  officers': 
They  were  senior  enough  to  carry  a  great  deal  of  authority.  After  each 
operation,  one  or  more  of  them  gathered  as  a  group  with  others,  in  what 
one  of  them  described  as  a'Chinese  Parliament,  which  meant  that 
everyone  made  a  decision  but  no  one  was  responsible  for  it.  The 
prepared  story  would  be  refined  to  fit  in  with  the  events  as  they 
happened,  and  a  jointly  agreed  account  arrived  at.  A  press  statement 
was  then  prepared  and  released  (Stalker  1988:  59) 
The  drama-documentary  'Shoot  to  KiWshows  a  RUC  high  level  committee 
including  the  head  of  the  press  office  as  taking  the  decision  to  issue  the  press 
statement.  The  director  of  'Shoot  to  Kill',  Peter  Kosminsky,  has  confirmed  to  me 
that  this  reconstruction  was  based  on  information  from  Detective  Chief 
Superintendent  John  Thorburn,  Stalker's  Deputy,  who  had  in  turn  derived  the 
information  from  interviews  with  members  of  the  committee  (Telephone 
interview  May  1990).  BBC  journalist  and  ex  member  of  the  Royal  Tank 
Regiment,  Mark  Urban  suggests  that  such  killings  were  allowed  to  go 
unchecked  because  of  a  lack  of  real  political  control  over  the  Army  and  the 
police.  According  to  Urban,  during  the  1980s  at  least,  senior  civil  servants: 
did  not  consider  themselves  to  be  in  real  control  either  of  the  RUC's  or 
the  Army's  special  operations.  The  chief  constable,  as  overall  director  of 
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undercover  units  and  their  activities  off  the  agenda.  A  senior  Stormont 
figure  recalls,  'We  just  tended  to  hide  behind  the  operational 
independence  of  the  RUC.  We  couldn't  be  responsible  for  detailed 
operational  matters,  only  for  broad  policy'...  The  result  was  one  of  those 
compromises,  typical  of  British  government,  in  which  real  power  is 
exercised  by  those  who  are  not  responsible  to  Parliament  or  the 
electorate  who,  in  return  shield  those  who  are  responsible  from  painful 
decisions  (Urban  1992:  167-168  his  emphasis) 
We  have  already  noted  that  from  the  mid  1970s,  the  Army,  and  then  the  police 
press  offices  were  required  to  communicate  statements  on  security  incidents  to 
the  NIO  for  a'view'  to  be  taken  on  them.  This  system  was  still  in  place  in  1982 
and  the  false  statements  issued  by  the  RUC  were  relayed  to  the  NIO  before 
being  released  to  the  media.  According  to  a  senior  Information  Service  source: 
I  had  become  more  and  more  suspicious  of  some  of  the  facts  or 
statements  being  issued  from  Army  and  RUC  sources  and  we  had 
agreed  at  one  of  the  meetings  with  the  RUC  and  Army  information 
people  that  any  statements  to  be  issued  had  to  be  factual.  For  example 
'three  men  were  shot  dead  at  a  road  check  in  Co.  Armagh'  Until  we 
knew  what  the  facts  were,  the  only  statement  that  the  RUC  could  issue  - 
and  I  personally  had  to  clear  it  -  was  that  there  had  been  a  shooting 
incident...  They  could  say  an  incident  had  occurred,  no  Security  forces 
had  been  injured,  three  people  were  believed  to  have  been  hurt.  Until  it 
was  absolutely  and  clearly  established  that  those  three  people  had  been 
killed,  nothing  could  be  said  except  for  those  bare  facts.  Then 
subsequently,  a  statement  would  have  to  be  issued  which  would  say  that 
the  police  had  been  involved  in  a  road  check,  that  an  incident  happened 
and  three  men  had  been  killed  but  it  had  to  be  factual  at  all  times.  Now 
what  actually  happened  was  that  I  was  telephoned  about  an  incident...  - 
it  must  have  been  well  after  midnight  -  and  I  was  told  the  RUC  intended 
to  issue  a  statement  that  a  policeman  had  been  knocked  down  by  a  car, 
the  police  had  opened  fire  on  the  car  and  I  said  'are  you  absolutely 
certain  that  those  are  the  facts?  That  somebody  was  placed  in  danger 
by  this  car  and  that  the  police  did  open  fire  on  it  and  that  as  a 
consequence  of  that  three  men  were  killed?  '  'Pretty  Sure'.  So  I  said  'Not 
good  enough.  Go  back  and  say  nothing  until  you  get  the  facts'.  Quite 
clearly  what  then  happened  is  people  got  together  and  created  a 
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back  to  me  I  said:  'you  have  checked  with  senior  officers?  '  'Yes'.  'And 
those  are  the  facts?  '  'Yes'.  And  so  a  statement  was  issued  to  that 
effect.  But  when  one  then  saw  the  car,  in  which  people  were  killed,  it 
didn't  quite  gel  with  the  statement.  And  so  there  was  an  example  where 
the  Information  Service  was  improperly  used...  But  there  is  a  point 
beyond  which  you  cannot  go,  because  if  you  sayare  those  the  facts?  ' 
'Yes'.  'and  those  been  approved  and  authorised  by  senior  officers?  '  well 
that's  a  point  beyond  which  you  can't  go  (Interview,  Belfast  July  1990). 
It  seems  clear  from  this  statement  that  at  least  some  senior  NIO  officials  were 
aware  that  the  RUC  was  releasing  information  to  the  media  which  was  untrue, 
but  it  is  possible  that  they  did  not  know  about  it  officially. 
Since  the  1970s  it  has  become  commonplace  for  killings  to  be  followed  by 
statements  that  the  victims  variously  made  suspicious  movements,  were  armed, 
pointed  a  gun  at  the  'security  forces'  or  opened  fire.  It  is  also  important  that 
statements  imply  that'security  forces'  came  across  the  suspects  by  accident 
rather  than  admitting  fore-knowledge.  This  is  important  both  to  protect 
informers  and  to  deflect  allegations  of  a  deliberate  ambush.  Between  1982  and 
June  1991  there  were  at  least  67  killings  by  security  forces  in  disputed 
circumstances: 
A  large  proportion  of  the  victims  were  unarmed  when  they  were  killed. 
Twenty  six,  or  39%,  had  no  weapons  when  shot  while  four  were  carrying 
imitation  handguns  or  rifles.  Of  the  37  who  had  access  to  arms  there 
were  claims  afterwards  that  nine  were  in  no  position  to  use  weapons, 
mostly  because  they  were  on  their  way  to  arms  dumps  when  killed... 
Nearly  two  thirds  had  not  been  directly  involved  in  violence  when  they 
met  their  deaths  (Moloney  1991  b) 
RUC  and  Army  press  offices  have  regularly  issued  statements  in  which  the 
victims  of  shootings  are  alleged  to  have  caused  injury  to  soldiers  or  police 
officers  or  have  driven  through  a  checkpoint  (Armagh  killings  of  Sean  Burns, 
Eugene  Toman,  Gervaise  McKerr,  Seamus  Grew  and  Roddy  Carroll  in  1982. 
Killing  of  Joyriders  Karen  Reilly  and  Martin  Peake  in  1990;  Cullyhanna  killing  of 
Fergal  Caraher  and  wounding  of  his  brother  M[ce6l  also  in  1990),  were  armed 
(killing  of  Desmond  Grew  and  Martin  McCaughey  in  October  1990),  made 
movements  as  if  for  a  weapon  or  to  detonate  a  bomb  (1988  Gibraltar  killings), 
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killings,  1988),  opened  fire  or  were  believed  to  have  opened  fire  (1982  Armagh 
killings)  or  were  believed  to  be  on  active  service  (Pearse  Jordan  November 
1992).  Security  sources  have  also  regularly  claimed  that  they  had  no 
foreknowledge  and  just  happened  to  be  in  the  vicinity  by  accident  (Daniel 
Doherty  and  William  Fleming,  in  Derry  in  December  1984,  three  would  be 
robbers  carrying  imitation  guns  at  a  Bookies  on  the  Falls  Road  in  January 
1990,  UVF  member  Brian  Robinson,  1990,  Gibraltar  killings,  1988). 
The  issuing  of  manifestly  false  on  the  record  statements  by  the  RUC  has 
become  less  common  since  the  mid  1980s.  The  use  of  unattributable 
disinformation  has,  however,  continued.  This  has  been  described  by  some  as 
an  increase  in  sophistication  (Committee  on  the  Administration  of  Justice, 
forthcoming).  The  advantage  of  unattributable  'steers'  is  that  they  can  then  be 
denied  by  the  RUC  press  office.  This  might  be  thought  to  be  acceptable  were  it 
only  related  to  protecting  informants  or  the  lives  of  members  of  the  security 
forces,  but  it  is  hard  to  see  how  some  of  the  false  stories  emerging  from  official 
sources  can  be  connected  with  either  operational  security  or  the  public  interest. 
Unless,  that  is,  the  concept  of  public  interest  is  stretched  to  include  automatic 
protection  of  state  personnel  from  the  due  process  of  the  law. 
It  is  difficult  to  see,  for  example  how  false  stories  about  'terrorist  suspects' 
making  movements,  opening  fire,  breaking  through  road  blocks  etc.  could  be 
calculated  to  protect  the  lives  of  informants.  It  is  also  difficult  to  account  for 
false  stories  about  the  victims  of  plastic  bullets,  such  as  John  Downes  and 
others  (Curtis  1982)  in  terms  of  operational  security. 
The  purpose  of  'honourable'  disinformation  is  said  to  be  to  protect  informers  by 
pretending  that  encounters  with  'terrorists'  happen  fortuitously.  Butwhen 
statements  are  issued  in  which  events  such  as  road  blocks,  are  fabricated,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  any  IRA  personnel  involved  in  such  an  incident  will  be 
fooled  since  they  will  actually  be  present  when  the  shooting  occurs  and  will 
know  if  there  has  been  a  road  block.  Such  considerations  do  not  of  course 
apply  if  the  IRA  members  are  killed.  It  is  repeatedly  alleged  that  security 
personnel  have  'finished  off  wounded  suspects  by  firing  a  series  of  single 
shots  at  their  heads  from  close  range.  This  would  certainly  be  one  way  of 
ensuring  that  first  hand  accounts  of  shootings  do  not  reach  the  IRA. 
It  seems  likely  that  in  addition  to  the  protection  of  informers  and  military  lives 
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legitimacy  of  state  actions.  Firstly  there  is  the  immediate  impact  of  011  fficia 
killing  on  public  opinion,  both  in  the  nationalist  community  and  internationally. 
It  is  here  that  media  management  is  most  important.  Urban  cites  officers  at 
Lisburn  as  'readily'  admitting  to  have  misled  the  media.  Various  Army  and  RUC 
officers  privately  acknowledge  that  'it  is  not  illegal  to  lie  to  the  press'  (Urban 
1992:  77). 
By  the  time  any  killing  is  investigated  by  the  courts,  the  media  tend  to  be  less 
interested.  The  courts  and  the  legal  process  are  the  second  arena  in  which 
legitimacy  is  important  for  the  government.  The  legal  process  has  however 
been  systematically  eroded  by  successive  governments  and  the  Inquest  system 
to  determine  the  circumstances  of  controversial  deaths  is  regarded  by  Civil 
Liberties  organisations  as'flawed  from  start  to  finish'  (Committee  on  the 
Administration  of  Justice  1992): 
The  role  of  the  inquest  in  Northern  Ireland  has  been  radically  curtailed 
by  Government  legislation  in  1980  and  extensive  legal  hearings  since. 
The  jury  can  no  longer  deliver  a  verdict  nor  add  riders  to  its  findings. 
Currently  the  sole  function  is  to  ascertain  who  died  where  and  when,  and 
how  the  death  was  caused.  Thus  the  jury  has  been  effectively  precluded 
from  making  any  comment  on  the  actions  of  the  security  forces  and  in 
particular  coming  to  a  decision  as  to  whether  the  death  was  lawful  or 
unlawful.  The  inquest  system  suffers  from  a  further  major  flaw:  the 
coroner  cannot  compel  any  person  to  attend  who  may  have  been 
responsible  for  the  death  (Committee  on  the  Administration  of  Justice 
1993) 
The  existence  of  the  courts  and  the  appearance  of  due  process  is,  though, 
important  for  information  management.  According  to  Urban  senior  army 
officers  and  politicians  are 
aware  of  the  importance  of  maintaining  an  appearance  of  the  rule  of  law. 
Some  believed  that  the  best  way  to  do  this  was  to  soothe  nationalist 
unease  after  an  incident  by  allowing  inquests  or  outside  police  inquiries 
to  proceed  but  to  limit  the  damage  which  could  be  done  by  restricting  the 
information  given  to  outsiders  attempting  to  scrutinise  sensitive 
operations  (Urban  1992:  76). 
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only  intended  to  protect  informers,  but  also  to  preserve  the  'myth  of  the  "clean 
kill"  -  that  IRA  members  lost  their  lives  because  they  were  encountered,  armed 
and  in  the  middle  of  an  operation,  when  the  security  forces  had  no  choice  but 
to  engage  them'  (Urban  1992:  200).  Urban  concludes  that:  'As  one  incident  has 
followed  another,  the  ability  of  lawyers  to  examine  them  in  the  courts  has  been 
drastically  reduced,  the  authorities  have  felt  progressively  less  need  to  justify 
their  actions  by  deliberate  disinformation'  (Urban  1992:  246). 
Conclusions 
it  is  clearly  demonstrable  that  by  their  own  defintions  official  agencies  in 
Northern  Ireland  engage  in  propaganda.  The  type  and  extent  of  propaganda 
activities  have  not  remained  static,  nor  have  they  simply  become  more 
sophisticated.  Instead,  propaganda  strategies  have  closely  followed  changed 
in  British  government  policy.  The  use  of  disinformation  did  not  cease  with  the 
closing  down  of  the  Information  Policy  Unit  in  the  mid  1970s.  Disinformation 
continues  today.  The  government  have  claimed  its  use  is  for'absolutely 
honourable  security  reasons'.  The  evidence,  however,  is  that  disinformation  is 
also  used  to  protect  'security  forces'  personnel  from  the  due  process  of  law  and 
to  legitimise,  what  would  otherwise  be  regarded  by  the  media,  the  public  and 
the  legal  process  as  extra  judicial  executions.  The  next  chapter  considers  the 
audiences  approached  in  public  relations  strategies,  the  tactics  and  techniques 
used  and  assesses  factors  influencing  the  success  and  failure  of  public 
relations  strategies. 
Footnotes 
I  There  is  some  potential  for  such  organisations  to  pressure  the  media  by  political  or  violent 
means,  but  such  actions  represent  the  actions  of  the  relatively  powerless. 
2  This  Is  not  to  suggest  that  O'Neill  was  a  moderniser  In  terms  of  economic  or  social  policy. 
According  to  Bew  et  at  'Modemlsation'  under  O'Neill  was  concerned  largely  with  'symbols'  of 
progress  which  were  a  'blatantly  cosmetic!  marketing  exercise  (Bew  et  al  1979:  155  &  153). 
3  Letters  to  the  Author  from  Bill  McGookin,  RUC  Force  Control  and  Information  Centre,  31 
May  1991  and  26  June  1991 
4  even  although  they  were  motivated  by  a  desire  not  to  get'sucked  into'what  Home  Secretary 
Callaghan  called  the  'Irish  bog'(Callaghan  1973:  15) 
5  This  is  agreed  upon  by  both  investigative  journalist  Duncan  Campbell  (1990:  16),  the  one- 
time  head  of  Information  Policy  Maurice  Tugwell  (Tugwell  1980:  223)  and  David  Charters  a 
colleague  of  Tugwell's.  For  Charters  this  problem  was  due  to  failings  of  political  leadership  and The  Development  of  Propaganda  Strategies  in  Northern  Ireland  107 
the  failure  to  Invest  in  psyops  sooner 
The  British  government,  for  its  part,  showed  a  complete  lack  of  understanding  of  the 
power  (for  good  and  evil)  of  propaganda.  Apart  from  letting  itself  get  trapped  into 
propaganda  disasters  such  as  internment,  the  Government  does  not  appear  to  have 
made  a  conscious  effort  to  'sell'  the  British  case  either  to  the  people  of  the  province  or 
to  the  rest  of  the  United  Kingdom.  Nor  was  there,  until  1972,  an  organised  plan  to 
counter  IRA  propaganda  or  to  discourage  bad  journalism:  until  that  time  the  IRA  held 
the  Initiative  In  the  propaganda  war  (Charters  1977:  26) 
6  it  should  be  remembered  that  Tugwell  was  the  head  of  Information  Policy  in  the  early  1970s. 
7  This  official  story  was  somewhat  doubtful  since  It  was  Wallace's  job  to  leak  confidential 
Information.  Wallace  maintains  that  he  was  removed  for  attempting  to  put  a  stop  to  official 
dirty  tricks  Including  undermining  the  Labour  government  (see  Dorril  and  Ramsay  1991;  Foot 
1990;  Leigh  1988). 
8  According  to  Anne  McHardy: 
The  Northern  Ireland  Office  Is  now  adamant  that'dirty  tricks'will  not  be  used  again, 
neither  will  any  form  of  propaganda  not  based  strictly  on  the  truth.  All  army  statements 
are  therefore  vetted  by  Mr  Mason's  staff  at  Stormont  Castle  (Guardian  26  February 
1977,  cited  In  Hamilton-Tweedale  1987:  333). 
Andrew  Stephen  echoed  this: 
Since  these  embarassing  episodes,  there  has  been  a  much  tighter  control  over  what 
the  Army  press  officers  are  allowed  to  say  to  joumalilsts.  In  effect  the  Northern  Ireland 
Office  tells  them  what  they  can  and  cannot  say;  the  Army  has  to  obtain  Northern 
Ireland  Office  permission  to  Issue  statements  with  even  the  remmotest  political 
ramiricatl.  ons.  (Observer2g  February  1976). 
9  This  point  was  acknowledged  by  David  Charters,  a  colleague  of  Maurice  Tugwell,  in  the 
Royal  United  Services  Institute  Journal.  Writing  in  1977  his  article  is  unusual  in  that  it  openly 
debates  psychological  operations  and  Intelligence  matters: 
The  Army's  counter  Insurgency  doctrine,  evolved  over  25  years  of  fighting  insurgency 
In  the  Empire,  was  difficult  to  apply  In  Ulster  because  the  doctrine  was  not  designed  for 
domestic  use...  The  restrictions  and  harsh  measures  which  had  made  a  successful 
campaign  possible  In  Malaya  could  not  be  applied  readily  in  Britain,  with  its  long 
tradition  of  Individual  liberty  and  freedom  of  the  press.  In  Malaya,  thousands  of  miles 
away  from  home,  operations  beyond  the  jungle  fringe  could  be  conducted  in  almost The  Development  of  Propaganda  Strategies  in  Northern  Ireland  108 
complete  secrecy;  In  Ulster,  the  daily  movements  of  a  patrol  may  be  seen  on  TV  that 
evening  In  Belfast  and  in  London.  Moreover,  because  Northern  Ireland  is 
constitutionally  part  of  the  United  Kingdom,  the  problem  is  a  domestic  one,  and 
politicians  In  London  are  more  Inclined  to  Intervene  directly  in  the  actual  conduct  of 
security  policy  and  operations.  (Charters  1977:  25-26) 
Of  course,  part  of  the  reason  why  politicians  were  more  likely  to  intervene  (to  the  chagrin  of  the 
Army)  was  that  the  media  was  covering  the  conflict. 
10  According  to  one  broadsheetjoumallst  Hermon  had  a: 
deep  distrust  of  the  press...  He  didn't  understand  the  media,  he  was  frustrated  with 
them  and  his  Instinct  was  to  pretend  that  they  didn't  exist  of  if  they  did  exist  he  would 
keep  them  at  arms  length  (Interview,  Belfast  August  1990). 
11  Sunday  Tfibune,  26  August  1990. 
12  In  1976177  the  PR  budget  of  the  NIO  was  E584,665,  by  1979  it  had  risen  to  E1,431,237  plus 
E344,181  for  advertising  (See  Appendix  2  for  known  details  of  funding  for  the  NIO  and  RUC). 
13  Drumm,  Vice  President  of  Sinn  F61n  was  shot  dead  while  in  the  Mater  hospital  as  a  patient. 
14  Interview  with  MIcedl  Holden,  Sinn  Fdln  press  officer,  Belfast  July  1989.  Morrison  was 
arrested  and  Imprisoned  shortly  after  this  (See  Sinn  F6In  International  Publicity  and  Information 
Committee  1  990a;  1  990b  for  a  Sinn  FdIn  view  on  this). 
Is  Information  from  telephone  Interviewwith  Richard  McAuley  May  1991. Chapter  Three 
Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic 
Organisations  work  with  the  media  for  various  reasons  in  various  ways.  A  high 
profile  in  the  media  may  be  aimed  to  increase  membership,  establish  a  problem 
on  the  policy  agenda,  provide  a  morale  boost  to  members,  increase  monetary 
resources,  pressure  an  ally  or  an  enemy,  provoke  or  inhibit  the  actions  of 
others  or  any  of  a  range  of  strategic  objectives.  Different  objectives  may 
require  the  targeting  of  different  audiences  and  the  use  of  different  media.  The 
media  targeted  in  order  to  reach  international  opinion  will  be  quite  different 
from  those  used  to  communicate  with  supporters  inside  Northern  Ireland.  It  is 
also  clear  that  messages  targeted  at  a  particular  audience  in  the  mass  media 
may  also  impact  on  other  (intended  or  unintended)  audiences.  In  recognition 
of  this,  some  sources  try  to  tailor  information  so  that  it  speaks  different 
messages  simultaneously  to  different  audiences. 
It  is  possible  for  an  organisation  to  regard  a  particular  media  strategy  as  a  run 
away  success,  while  at  the  same  time  being  convinced  that  the  mainstream 
media  are  implacably  biased  against  them.  Furthermore,  such  perceptions 
need  not  be  inaccurate.  It  is,  in  fact,  quite  possible  to  succeed  in  a  particular 
media  strategy  despite  the  continued  hostility  of  the  media  at  large. 
Targets  and  audiences 
Some  organisations  attempt  to  reach  a  very  wide  range  of  separate  audiences 
via  different  channels.  Others  only  aim  to  influence  a  very  narrow  group  of 
people.  Small  organisations  in  the  civil  liberties  and  human  rights  field  tend 
only  to  target'opinion  formers'  and  the  policy  agenda.  Thus  Belfast  based  civil 
liberties  group,  the  Committee  on  the  Administration  of  Justice,  mainly  deals 
with  broadsheet  newspapers  such  as  the  Guardian,  Independent  and  Irish 
Times  and  the  London  based  Irish  Information  Partnership,  saw  it's  task  as 
influencing  'opinion  formers'.  In  the  case  of  the  CAJ,  such  a  strategy 
recognises  the  weak  position  of  human  rights  campaigners  in  relation  to  parts 
of  the  media.  According  to  Michael  Ritchie  of  the  Committee: 
the  tabloids  in  Britain  are  like  a  lost  cause.  They  wouldn't  be  interested 
in  the  human  rights  of  the  situation  in  Northern  Ireland 
...  If  you  try  to 
impact  on  the  debate  in  the  BBC  nationally  you  are  probably  doing  as 
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much  as  you  can  do  as  far  as  mass  national  UK  impact  is  concerned 
(interview,  Belfast  April  1992) 
In  general  Unionist  Public  Relations  also  targets  a  quite  narrow  range  of 
audiences.  The  Democratic  Unionist  Party  (DUP)  targets  perhaps  the  narrower 
range  of  the  two  major  parties.  According  to  DUP  press  officer  Sammy  Wilson: 
I  think  that  probably  we're  fairly  parochial,  if  there's  a  failing  in  our  use  of 
the  media  it  is  that  we  have...  used  it  more  to  appeal  to  people  who 
already  support  us  rather  than  trying  to  use  it  to  appeal  to  people  who 
either  haven't  made  their  minds  up  or  are  opposed  to  us  and  of  course, 
that  tends  to  colour  the  kind  of  things  that  you  put  to  the  media  and  the 
kind  of  phraseology  you  use  and  everything  else.  As  far  as  views  of 
people  outside  of  Northern  Ireland  are  concerned,  I  suppose  its  part  of 
just  our  insularity  that  we  have  felt  that  we  can  ignore  them  and  I  think 
that  that's  probably  been  a  weakness  (interview,  Belfast  June  1993). 
Whereas,  DUP  leaders  such  as  Ian  Paisley  have  their  own  contacts  with  the 
media  in  London,  the  party's  publicity  efforts  predominantly  centre  on  the  local 
media  within  Northern  Ireland.  According  to  Wilson: 
If  you  look  at  our  fax  list,  the  one  which  is  used  most  is  the  fax  list  for  the 
local  papers.  We  have  a  fax  list  with  all  of  the  English  papers  on;  I  think 
it's  probably  used  about  once  a  month,  if  that  (Interview,  Belfast  June 
1993) 
The  Ulster  Unionist  Party  is  more  mindful  of  wider  audiences,  and  does  expend 
some  effort  in  lobbying  the  US  congress,  for  example.  By  contrast  Sinn  F6in, 
the  Social  Democratic  and  Labour  Party  (SDLP)  and  the  Northern  Ireland 
office  have  quite  developed  strategies  for  relating  to  the  media. 
Targeting  the  audience 
The  widest  range  of  audiences  are  targeted  by  official  sources.  some,  such  as 
the  Northern  Ireland  Tourist  Board  and  Industrial  Development  Board  have 
specific  sections  of  various  communities  in  mind  in  their  PR  efforts.  For  the 
Tourist  Board  the  target  is  primarily  potential  holidaymakers  and  secondarily 
general  images  of  Northern  Ireland.  The  media  are  perceived  as  a  particularly 
good  method  of  communication. Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  ill 
Almost  40  per  cent  of  Northern  Ireland's  holiday-making  visitors  say  they 
made  the  decision  to  come  here  after  reading  a  positive  magazine  or 
newspaper  feature  on  the  province's  attractions.  (Northern  Ireland 
Tourist  Board  1990:  9) 
The  aim  of  the  Industrial  Development  Board's  publicity  on  the  other  hand  is  to 
shape  business  perceptions  of  Northern  Ireland  and  more  generally  to  alter 
public  perceptions  (industrial  Development  Board  1990:  56). 
The  most  sophisticated  targeting  of  different  audiences  via  different  types  of 
media  is  the  practice  followed  by  the  Northern  Ireland  Office.  The  NIO  is  the 
lead  department  in  matters  of  PR  strategy.  It  attempts  to  oversee  the  activities 
of  the  Royal  Ulster  Constabulary  (RUC),  Army,  Industrial  Development  Board 
(IDB),  Northern  Ireland  Tourist  Board  (NITB)  and  Central  Office  of  Information 
(COI).  This  is  not  to  say  that  such  attempts  at  co-ordination  work  smoothly  at 
all  times,  as  we  shall  see  below.  The  Northern  Ireland  Office  operates  what 
can  be  termed  a'hierarchy  of  access'.  This  general  hierarchy  though,  is 
traversed  by  media  type,  and  by  professional  and  personal  relationships.  For 
example,  there  have  periodically  been  complaints  from  print  journalists  that 
better  facilities  are  offered  to  broadcast  journalists.  Indeed  in  late  1981  the 
then  Northern  Ireland  Secretary  Jim  Prior  was  threatened  with  a  news  black  out 
by  the  National  Union  of  Journalists  if  the  practice  continued.  (Belfast 
Telegraph  30  September  1981,  Sunday  World  I  November  1981)  Additionally 
there  are  clear  differences  within  as  well  as  between  media  types,  for  example, 
between  news  reporters  and  features  writers  or  TV  documentary  makers. 
Journalists  may  move  between  different  positions  as  their  careers  progress  or 
they  may  be  simultaneously  working  in  more  than  one  capacity.  The 
relationship  of  any  given  group  of  journalists'  with  the  NIO  is  also  constantly  in 
flux.  Nevertheless  it  is  possible  to  categorise  four  main  politico-geographical 
groups  of  journalists'who  are  dealt  with  according  to  the  hierarchy.  In  the 
lower  part  of  the  hierarchy  are:  1)  Dublin  journalists  and  2)  Local  journalists, 
who  work  for  regional  newspapers,  or  broadcast  outlets.  The  upper  part  of  the 
hierarchy  includes:  3)  Journalists  for  London  based  media  outlets  (including 
both  Belfast  and  London  resident  news  reporters  and  TV  current  Affairs  and 
documentary  makers)  and  4)  International  journalists  (both  London  and  home 
based). 
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Carrying  on  a  tradition  which  goes  back  at  least  30  years,  Dublin  journalists 
seem  to  be  the  least  favoured  of  all  those  who  cover  the  situation  in  Northern 
Ireland.  This  can  perhaps  best  be  illustrated  by  the  treatment  accorded  to 
Garret  Fitzgerald  the  former  Taoiseach  (Prime  Minister)  of  the  Republic  of 
Ireland,  when  he  worked  as  a  journalist.  In  1960  the  Northern  Ireland 
Information  Service  was  approached  by  Fitzgerald  in  his  position  as  the  Dublin 
correspondent  of  the  Financial  Times  for  information  on  economic  affairs  in 
Northern  Ireland.  The  Information  Service  tried  to  exert  pressure  on  the 
Financial  7-imes  to  drop  Fitzgerald  in  favour  of  their  existing  Northern  Ireland 
correspondent,  who  worked  for  a  unionist  paper  in  Belfast.  The  Director  of  the 
Information  Service  wrote  to  the  Cabinet  Publicity  Committee  arguing  that: 
Any  Dublin  writer  wishing  to  become  a  commentator  on  Northern  affairs 
should  be  discouraged  as  far  as  can  tactfully  be  managed  and  that  no 
special  arrangements  should  be  made  to  supply  him  with  press 
releases.  The  fact  that  Fitzgerald  is  a  very  able  economist  and  writer 
and  that  he  has  got  a  firm  foothold  in  the  Financial  Times  and  the 
Economist  Intelligence  Unit  as  well  as  a  link  with  overseas  papers 
makes  it  all  the  more  important  that  we  should  keep  our  services  to  him 
to  a  minimum  in  an  effort  to  restrict  his  scope  to  the  South.  Whatever 
about  economics  being  non-  political,  Fitzgerald's  viewpoint  and 
sympathies  are  Southern  and  this  must  colour  all  his  writings.  (PRONI 
CAB9F/1  23/72,  Memo  from  Eric  Montgomery  March  18  1960) 
The  publicity  committee  chaired  by  the  Prime  Minister  Basil  Brooke  agreed  with 
the  Director  of  Information  and  concluded: 
the  Director  should  continue  to  provide  only  the  basic  minimum  co- 
operation  with  Dublin  writers  as  at  present.  (PRONI  CAB9F/123/72, 
Minutes  of  97th  Cabinet  Publicity  Committee  meeting  March  23  1960) 
In  the  last  twenty  years  there  have  been  many  allegations  from  Dublin 
journalists  that  they  are  denied  information  given  to  others.  When  the  Director 
of  Information  Services  tried  to  set  up  a  lobby  system  in  the  mid  1970's  it  was 
Dublin  journalists  who  were  blamed  for  breaking  it  up.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  the  NIO,  a  group  lobby  system  was  impossible  because  while: 
the  locals  and  to  a  great  extent  the  Nationals  obeyed  the  rules...  there 
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obey  the  rules  and  you  got  shopped.  (Interview,  Belfast  August  1989) 
The  practice  of  the  Information  Service  has  been  shaped  by  the  perception  that 
Dublin  journalists  are  more  likely  to  be  critical  of  the  NIO.  They  are,  in  effect,  a 
lost  cause. 
Local  Vs.  British  Journalists 
When  journalists  who  work  for  media  in  the  North  of  Ireland  are  denied  access 
by  the  NIO  it  is  often  in  favour  of  those  working  for  British  national  outlets, 
particularly  TV  Current  Affairs  or  lobby  journalists.  I  will  therefore  deal  with 
local  and  British  journalists  together.  Because  the  audience  for  the  local  media 
is  by  and  large  limited  to  Northern  Ireland  a  journalist  on  a  local  paper  is likely 
to  be  well  down  the  hierarchy  of  access  of  the  Information  Service.  As  one 
senior  Information  Officer  related: 
Local  journalists  with  the  best  will  in  the  world  are  simply  local 
journalists.  Their  interests  are  in  the  Northern  Ireland  scene  and  just 
occasionally  they  will  ask,  how  is  Northern  Ireland  going  to  be  affected 
by  Nuclear  legislation,  or whatever  and  so  briefings  for  local  journalists 
were  simply  about  the  nitty  gritty  of  every  day  Secretary  of  State  and 
Ministerial  life  and  there  was  never  any  deep  political  probing...  I  haven't 
met  one  single  Northern  Ireland  Journalist  who  was  worth  five  minutes  of 
my  time  (Interview,  Belfast  August  1989). 
In  an  early  example  of  the  practice  that  goes  with  this  view,  Secretary  of  State 
William  Whitelaw's  PR  officer,  Keith  McDowall,  attempted  to  exclude  all  but  the 
correspondents  of  London  papers. 
For  several  days  towards  the  end  of  last  week,  Mr  McDowall  gave 
confidential  "lobby"  briefings  about  what  the  Secretary  of  State  had  been 
doing  during  the  day.  But  these  were  confined  to  English  reporters  only. 
No  Belfast  based  papers  were  invited  to  send  reporters,  never  mind 
Dublin  based  Irish  dailies  or  evenings.  (hish  Times  6  April  1972) 
Local  Journalists  often  resent  this  treatment.  Some  protest  to  the  NIO  about 
the  facilities  they  are  offered.  The  proximity  of  local  journalists  to  the  MIS 
means  that  they  are  much  more  often  in  touch  with  it  as  a  regular  source  than 
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programmes.  Local  daily  news  reporters  tell  of  their  daily  routine  involving  the 
regular'ring  round'of  sources  and  half-hourly  'check  calls'to  the  RUC  press 
office.  This  means  that  the  availability  of  the  a  regular  flow  of  news  items  is 
more  crucial  on  a  day  to  day  basis. 
When  access  is  denied  to  local  journalists,  it  may  be  in  favour  of  London  based 
media  outlets,  with  the  emphasis  on  television  current  affairs  programmes.  in 
the  hierarchy  of  access,  media  outlets  which  cover  all  of  the'United  Kingdom, 
are  more  important  for  many  messages.  But  public  opinion  in  general  may 
sometimes  be  an  incidental  target  for  image  conscious  Ministers.  The 
suspicion  of  thwarted  local  journalists  is  that  Northern  Ireland  ministers,  none 
of  whom  are  actually  elected  by  Northern  Ireland  voters,  can  sometimes  be 
more  interested  in  their  profile  in  government  or  in  their  own  political  party  or 
constituency  than  the  content  of  the  message.  More  importantly  the  local 
media  in  the  six  counties  of  Northern  Ireland  are  not  read  by  the  British 
establishment  or  the'opinion  formers'which  the  Information  Service  targets. 
Current  Affairs  and  documentary  programmes  are  very  high  on  the'hierarchy  of 
access'  operated  by  official  sources.  This  can  allow  the  current  affairs 
journalist  more  access  to  interesting  and  complex  information  and  therefore  the 
opportunity  to  interpret  the  information.  This  is  precisely  why  official  agencies 
attempt  to  elucidate  the  exact  nature  of  queries  and  even  of  proposed 
programmes  before  permitting  access.  The  access  which  is  granted  is  heavily 
bounded  by  the  interests  of  the  sources,  but  in  the  end  they  are  betting  on 
slightly  longer  odds  than  with  hard  news  stories  which  have  less  space  and 
time  and  are  less  likely  to,  do  investigative  reports.  Thus  Bernard  Ingham, 
Press  Secretary  to  Mrs  Thatcher  during  most  of  her  time  as  Prime  Minister  has 
described  current  affairs  programmes  as  the'main  irritant'  (Ingham  1991:  355) 
in  relations  between  Government  and  television.  By  the  time  he  retired  in  1990 
Ingham: 
knew  of  no  Departmental  head  of  Information  in  Her  Majesty's 
government  who  would  trust  current  affairs  television  producers  any 
further  than  he  or  she  could  throw  them.  It  was  impossible  to  have 
confidence  in  any  agreement  reached  with  them  (Ingham  1991:  356) 
The  differences  I  have  identified  between  the  various  local  and  national  media 
can  be  partly  explained  by  the  strategies  and  priorities  of  sources  like  the  NIO. Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic 
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A  final  key  area  of  interest  for  the  NIO  is  international  opinion.  Information 
Work  for  journalists  from  other  countries  involves  additional  tactics  not  used  for 
British  or  Irish  journalists  as  well  as  messages  which  emphasise  more  heavily 
the  'positive  aspects'  of  Northern  Ireland. 
Interest  in  overseas  journalists  is  again  subject  to  a  hierarchy  of  access. 
Journalists  from  western  countries  are  seen  as  more  important  than  journalists 
from  what  was  the  Eastern  bloc  or  the  third  world.  Indeed  journalists  from 
Eastern  Europe  have,  on  occasion,  even  been  refused  official  co-operation  and 
prevented  from  setting  foot  in  Northern  Ireland.  At  the  time  of  the  H-  Block 
protests  in  1980,  two  Soviet  journalists  were  told  by  the  British  authorities  that 
they  were: 
Unfortunately  unable  to  make  available  the  facilities  for  interviews  at  the 
time  requested  and,  in  these  circumstances...  it  was  probably  best  that 
they  should  not  make  the  trip.  (Irish  Times  19  March  1980) 
Even  amongst  western  Journalists  degrees  of  access  can  depend  on  the 
importance  to  the  British  government  of  the  country  they  are  from.  French  and 
German  journalists,  for  example,  are  higher  up  the  priority  list  than  their 
counterparts  from  Norway,  Denmark,  Sweden  or  Finland.  When  confronted 
with  a  Scandinavian  TV  crew,  one  Information  Officer  explained, 
That  gave  me  a  real  pain  in  the  head,  because  I  had  no  interest  in  what 
Sweden  or  Norway  thought.  I  really  didn't  care,  because  it  wasn't  going 
to  affect  the  situation  of  HMG  one  little  bit...  But  Paris  was  different. 
French,  Germans,  in  particular  Parisian  journalists,  I  used  to  make  a  fair 
bit  of  time  for.  (interview,  Belfast  August  1989) 
But  the  main  target  for  information  efforts  overseas  has  long  been  the  United 
States  of  America.  This  is  because  of  the  large  Irish-American  community  in 
the  US  and  its  effect  through  elections  and  lobbying  on  US  politics.  America  is 
an  ally  and  can  exert  some  influence  on  British  government  policy.  It  is  also 
because  the  republican  movement  has  many  supporters  in  the  US.  One 
Information  Officer  explained  the  thinking  of  the  Information  Service: 
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because  they  were  the  people...  we  had  to  get  to...  because  they  really 
could  influence  policy  in  terms  of  [the]  United  Kingdom.  Because  here 
was  the  leading  nation  in  the  Western  world  [and]  if  the  US  government 
had  thought  that  the  United  Kingdom  was  wrong  in  their  policy  towards 
Ireland...  then  somehow  one  had  to  get  the  opinion  formers  onside.  And 
so  I  devoted  a  great  deal  of  my  time  to  the  American  journalists...  to  see 
if  we  couldn't  possibly  influence  opinion  there.  And  if  you  could 
influence  the  media  then  you  could  influence  the  senators,  Congress 
and  eventually  perhaps,  the  Whitehouse  (Interview,  Belfast  August 
1989). 
In  London  the  major  targets  amongst  American  reporters  were  the  heads  of 
bureaux  because: 
I  took  the  view  that...  they  were  high  flyers  in  their  own  papers  and  if  one 
got  to  know  them  while  they  were  in  London  and  if  you  never  sold  them 
a  bum  steer  -  some  day  somewhere  at  some  time  you  might  get  to  see 
them  in  America  when  they  were  bigger  guys...  And  I  must  say  that 
proved  a  very  effective  thing  to  do  (interview,  Belfast  August  1989). 
The  efforts  of  unofficial  sources  to  influence  international  agendas  have  been 
more  limited.  However,  there  remains  a  clear  contrast  between  the  strategies 
of  organisations  such  as  the  Sinn  F6in  and  the  IRA  and  those  of  the  UDA.  Part 
of  the  rationale  for  IRA  attacks  is  to  keep  the  issue  of  Northern  Ireland  on  the 
political  agenda.  As  such  IRA  attacks  have  been  described  by  Sinn  F6in  and 
IRA  spokespeople  as'armed  propaganda',  as  in  this  comment  from  Gerry 
Adams: 
The  tactic  of  armed  struggle  is  of  primary  importance  because  it 
provides  a  vital  cutting  edge.  Without  it  the  issue  of  Ireland  would'not 
even  be  an  issue.  So,  in  effect,  the  armed  struggle  becomes  armed 
propaganda  (Adams  1986:  64). 
But  such  tactics  are  a  blunt  instrument  in  terms  of  reaching  particular 
audiences.  Bombings  and  killings  capture  the  headlines  to  a  greater  or  lesser 
extent.  However,  the  reporting  of  killings  by  the  IRA  is  difficult  to  target  at  one 
set  of  journalists  rather  than  another.  It  is  the  development  of  Sinn  Fdin  public 
relations  that  has  meant  a  growing  sophistication  in  media  strategies.  The 
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not  only  have  strategies  and  audiences  become  more  targeted  but  there  are 
new  audiences  to  reach  (i.  e.  potential  voters)  in  the  North  and  South  of  Ireland. 
There  are  different  target  audiences,  there  are  different  journalists 
speaking  to  those  target  audiences.  Tonight,  for  example,  we're  issuing 
a  statement  [in  Dublin].  It  is  a  statement  issued  with  the  Southern  media 
and  audience  in  mind.  The  statement  that  is  being  issued  in  the  North  is 
with  another  audience  in  mind  (Interview,  Belfast  May  1991). 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  1988  Broadcasting  Ban,  Sinn  F6in  launched  a  new 
International  Publicity  and  Information  Committee,  which  produced  the  Ireland 
International  News  Briefing,  targeted  at  overseas,  especially  American 
audiences.  According  to  Gerry  Adams: 
It  is  also  worth  mentioning  our  efforts  to  upgrade  our  own  international 
work.  Sinn  Fdin  is,  contrary  to  enemy  propaganda,  a  poor  organisation 
with  meagre  material  and  financial  resources,  two  essential  and  basic 
requirements  of  international  work.  However,  we  have  in  conjunction 
with  those  involved,  stýrted  to  modernise  solidarity  work  in  the  USA,  and 
in  Europe,  and  we  are  currently  reviewing  this  work  in  Britain,  and,  at  a 
slower  pace,  Australia  (Adams  1990:  9) 
The  LIDA  by  comparison  has  not  regarded  public  relations  as  a  central  activity, 
largely  confining  itself  to  claiming  responsibility  for  acts  of  violence.  According 
to  some  sources  part  of  the  objections  to  the  former  UDA  leader  Andy  Tyrie 
was  his  perceived  high  media  profile.  According  to  David  Adams  of  the  Ulster 
Democratic  Party,  which  took  over  the  UDA's  Ulster  Information  Service  when 
the  UDA  was  banned: 
Some  of  these  people  in  the  past  became  personalities  in  their  own  right 
and  ... 
began  to  believe  their  own  publicity  and  forgot  they  weren't 
actually  there  just  for  the  sole  purpose  of  appearing  on  television 
(Interview,  Lisburn  June  1993). 
The  UDA!  s  lack  of  concern  for  it's  media  profile  was  illustrated  when  they  were 
banned  from  television  in  1988.  Although  they  said  they  opposed  the  ban  UDA 
spokespersons  were  remarkably  sanguine  about  its  impact.  According  to  press 
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The  ban  doesn't  affect  us  in  the  sense  that,  the  media,  both  television, 
radio  and  the  press  only  carried  the  bad  things,  normally,  about  the 
LIDA.  Through  our  magazine  and  regular  meetings,  we  communicate 
with  our  people  and  the  ban  has  absolutely  no  effect...  We're  a  close 
knit  organisation,  we're  locally  based.  Our  meetings  take  place  at  the 
local  level...  So  all  in  all  our  message  continues  ('Politics',  Media  Skills, 
UTV  2  February  1990). 
How  is  the  Message  Delivered? 
information  and  impression  management  represent  attempts  to  pursue 
definitional  advantage  -  to  shift  perceptions  in  the  direction  of  the  information 
manager.  Policing  the  information  which  reaches  the  public  is  the  pre-eminent 
task  of  the  information  manager,  but  it  involves  much  more  than  issuing  or  not 
issuing  statements.  Belfast  City  Councillor  Sammy  Wilson,  press  officer  of  the 
Democratic  Unionist  Party  explains: 
The  first  [thing]  is  a  question  of  timing,  making  sure  that  statements  go 
out  on  time  for  deadlines.  The  second  thing  is  just  having  an  eye  for 
what  kind  of  things  the  media  are  likely  to  pick  up  on  ... 
The  third  is  to 
build  up  a  contact  with  particular  journalists  (Interview,  Belfast  June 
1993). 
For  Sinn  Fdin,  innovation  in  PR  is  a  key  to  gaining  media  attention.  According 
to  Richard  McAuley: 
We  are  very  conscious  of  the  need  to  set  the  agenda  or  to  impact  onto 
the  political  agenda.  You  can  best  do  that  by  being  innovative,  by  either 
issuing  statements  which  are  unusual.  There  is  a  limit  to  how  far  we  can 
go  in  regard  to  that.  We  plan  for  it  when  it  is  possible  to  plan  for  it 
(interview,  Belfast  May  1991). 
All  parties  to  the  conflict  are  consistently  engaged  in  attempting  to  manage 
their  own  image  and  that  of  their  opponents.  For  organisations  such  as  Sinn 
176in  and  the  DUP,  who  tend  to  get  a  fairly  bad  press,  this  can  be  particularly 
important.  According  to  Sammy  Wilson: 
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of  'kick  the  Pope'  party  you  know,  'shoot  the  IRA'  and  that  was  about  the 
limit  of  our  involvement  and  we  sat  down  and  we  planned  out  a  series  of 
press  conferences.  We  did  one  about  pension,  our  view  about 
pensioners,  our  view  about  housing  and  the  economy  and  we  steered, 
we  deliberately  because  we  felt  it  was  something  that  we  needed  to  do, 
we  deliberately  steered  away  from  the  kind  of  usual  controversial 
constitutional  or  security  issues  (interview,  Belfast  June  1993). 
Similarly  for  Sinn  F6in: 
Although  I'm  aware  of  the  dangers  of  being  trapped  in  a  reactive  mode, 
the  media  reality  for  me  is  that  much  of  the  stuff  that  we  get  carried 
tends  to  fall  into  reactive  mode...  We  need  to  snipe  at  their  agenda  while 
presenting  our  agenda,  but  doing  it  in  a  way  where  people  aren't 
presenting  Sinn  F6in  as  being  the  begrudging  party,  or  as  being 
negative  or  as  the  wreckers  (Interview,  Belfast  May  1991). 
Small  alternative  organisations  may  find  it  difficult  to  promote  their  own  - 
agendas  in  the  media.  Importing  agendas  already  in  existence  elsewhere  may 
then  be  one  route  to  publicity.  At  the  Committee  on  the  Administration  of 
Justice,  Michael  Ritchie  argued: 
Northern  Ireland  is  a  small  story  in  terms  of  UK  news  but  if  there  is  any 
way  that  we  can  get  the  issue  raised  in  (a]  forum  [like]  the  UN  Committee 
Against  Torture...  then  that  does  become  more  newsworthy  (interview, 
Belfast  April  1992). 
Innovation  and  the  development  of  public  relations  and  campaigning  skills  are 
clearly  seen  as  important  by  most  organisations  in  gaining  media  attention. 
However,  inventiveness  can  be  supplemented  by  the  ability  to  offer  'information 
subsidies'  (Gandy  1980)  such  as  media  facilities. 
Controlling  Information 
The  ability  to  control  media  access  is  distributed  unevenly  among  news 
sources.  Official  sources  are  the  aristocracy  of  information  supply.  Organising 
media  facilities  for  a  'positive'  news  story  can  bolster  the  image  of  an 
organisation.  Thus  the  Army  are  keen  to  lay  on  'good  news'  stories  about  the 
things  they  do  to'help  the  community'.  An  opportunity  to  use  military  know-how Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  120 
or  technology  to  help  out  on  civilian  tasks  will  be  seen  as  the  perfect 
opportunity  for  a  media  facility.  According  to  a  Lisburn  press  officer: 
We  don't  get  very  many  opportunities  to  do  that,  so  when  we  do,  we  tend 
to  pull  out  the  stops  a  little  bit  because  it  is  a  means  of  showing  that  the 
Army  here  was  helping  the  community  and  not  involved  with  the  troubles 
or  operations  at  all...  If  you  like  it  is  a  bit  of  cheap  publicity  (Interview, 
Lisburn  August  1989). 
Alternatively  a  pre-arranged  opportunity  to  apparently  surprise  a  Northern 
Ireland  Minister  or  even  the  Prime  Minister  on  a  doorstep,  can  be  controlled  so 
that  journalistic  cross  examination  is  very  limited.  Official  information 
managers  tend  to  maintain  that  these  appearances  by  politicians  to  open 
shopping  centres  or  inspect  the  troops  are  real  events  which  the  media  have 
almost  accidentally  heard  of.  Bernard  Ingham  recalls  that  Mrs  Thatcher's  trips 
to  Northern  Ireland'were  planned  in  great  secrecy.  Number  10  and  the 
Northern  Ireland  Office  never  confirmed  them  until  they  were  underway. 
Nonetheless,  reporters  and  cameramen  always  managed  to  follow  her  around 
in  flocks'  (Ingham  1991:  308). 
This  is  disingenuous.  It  is  true  that  Ministerial  visits  are  not  confirmed  until 
they  are  underway,  but  the  itinerary  of  ministerial  appointments  is  intimated  to 
the  media  in  advance  under  a  mutual  agreement  that  it  will  not  be  made 
public'.  In  addition,  transport  and  other  facilities  are  often  laid  on.  Downtown 
Radio's  Political  Correspondent  Eamon  Mallie  describes  a  typical  visit: 
Journalists  are  managed  from  the  moment  Mrs  Thatcher  puts  her  foot  on 
soil  here.  What  happens  is:  There  is  a  bus,  the  journalists  are  packed 
into  the  bus,  herded,  shepherded,  brought  to  point  A,  B,  C,  D  etc.,  but 
very  rarely  given  the  opportunity  to  pose  a  question.  She  leaves  here 
and  we  still  don't  get  a  chance  to  challenge  her  on  whatever  issue  is 
current  on  the  day.  So  that's  a  major,  major  problem  for  me  as  a 
practising  journalist  here  (Hard  News,  Channel  Four  19  October  1989). 
Ingham  has  stated  that  he  found  'press,  radio  and  television  in  Northern 
Ireland,  just  about  the  most  difficult  to  deal  with  in  the  whole  of  the  United 
Kingdom'  (1991:  308).  He  complains  that'They  had  no  compunction  about 
forming  a  scrum  around  Mrs  Thatcher,  seething  with  indignation  at  the  thought 
that  she  might  have  something  better  on  her  mind  than  talking  to  them.  I  could Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  121 
absolutely  rely  on  interviewers  to  go  on  and  on,  to  coin  a  phrase,  in  the  hope  of 
tripping  her  up'.  On  one  occasion  the  scrum  seems  also  to  have  formed 
around  Ingham  himself.  'it  was  inevitable  you  would  be  knocked  about',  he 
says.  'And  sure  enough  when  I  fought  what  became  known  as  the  War  of 
Ingham's  Buttock,  by  simply  bouncing  one  or  two  marauders  off  my  backside  as 
they  piled  in  with  their  microphones,  complaints  were  registered'  (Ingham 
1991:  309).  The  journalists  put  it  slightly  differently,  complaining  that'Mr 
Ingham  used  his  elbows  and  shoulders  to  stop  reporters  talking  to  her  and  also 
knocked  microphones  away'  (Irish  News  25  January  1983). 
A  similar  pattern  obtains  on  'door  stepping'  photo-opportunities  for  Northern 
Ireland  Ministers.  Eamon  Mallie  has  complained  that: 
A  pattern  has  emerged  whereby  the  Secretary  of  State  will  take  only  one 
question  from  each  news  organisation.  If  he  doesn't  like  the  tone  of  the 
question  he  ignores  it  and  refuses  to  answer,  moving  on  to  a  question 
from  the  next  broadcasting  organisation  (Guardian,  14  August  1989). 
The  official  response  came  in  the  form  of  a  letter  printed  in  the  Guardian  the 
very  next  day  from  the  Director  of  the  Information  Service,  Andy  Wood: 
Absolute  rubbish.  There  is  no  rationing  -  simply  the  constraints  on  time 
which  apply  to  any  Secretary  of  State  (15  August  1989). 
But  in  less  formal  circumstances,  the  former  head  of  the  Information  Service, 
David  Gilliland,  told  a  UTV  schools  programme  about  the  problems  for  the 
Secretary  of  State: 
If  he  is  trapped  behind  his  desk  with  cameras  staring  at  him  and  being 
pressed  very  hard  on  these  particular  issues  he  might  find  it  very  difficult 
indeed  to  escape  looking  shifty  and  dishonest,  perhaps  because  he  has 
to  evade  a  number  of  questions  which  might  effect  peoples  lives  or 
deaths.  So  yes,  it  is  contrived  on  occasions  to  put  a  minister  on  a 
doorstep  in  the  open  air  so  that  when  he  [has]  said  as  much  as  he 
deems  to  be  in  the  public  interest  then  he  is  able  to  say'well  I  have 
another  appointment.  Thank  you  very  much'  and  go  (Politics'  Media 
Skills,  UTV  2  February  1990). 
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forces'  is  tightly  controlled  until  it  is  advantageous  to  allow  access.  The  RUC's 
Force  Control  and  Information  Centre  (FCIC),  monitors  and  controls  all  RUC 
radio  traffic  throughout  Northern  Ireland.  The  ability  to  monitor  almost  all 
security  incidents  in  Northern  Ireland  from  a  central  location  obviously  allows 
the  RUC  to  gain  an  almost  total  monopoly  on  security  information.  The  use 
made  of  this  information  has  often  been  criticised.  The  comments  of  Edward 
Daly,  Bishop  of  Derry,  provide  a  useful  example: 
After  an  incident  in  the  North  almost  all  information  about  it  is  controlled 
by  the  RUC  through  its  press  office.  Access  by  reporters  and 
photographers  is  refused  until  the  RUC  deems  fit  (Daly  1989:  3). 
This  approach  has  the  merit  for  the  RUC  that  coverage  can  be  allowed  if  it  is 
advantageous  and  prohibited  if  it  is  not.  Allowing  coverage  of  the  aftermath  of 
an  IRA  attack  is  particularly  likely.  As  one  RUC  press  officer  explained'We 
underline  things  which  are  positive  for  us  and  on  the  other  side  we  ensure  full 
reporting  of  horrific  crimes  and  things  which  reflect  badly  on  the  terrorists' 
(interview,  Derry  August  1989).  Bringing  in  camera  crews  for  close  up  footage 
is  recognised  by  the  RUC  as  making  television  coverage  of  the  aftermath  of  an 
IRA  bombing  more  likely.  If  a  bombing  damages  a  religious  building  or  civilian 
housing  this  will  be  a  particularly  good  candidate  for  a  media  facility.  The  sight 
of  Christmas  decorations  blowing  in  the  ruins  of  a  soldier's  house  was  cited  by 
this  press  officer  as  'quite  a  powerful  image'  and  thus  suitable  for  a  media 
facility. 
visits 
Media  facilities  such  as  those  above  are  mainly  laid  on  for  local  and  Belfast 
based  national  journalists  who  are  already  covering  Northern  Ireland  regularly. 
Organising  an  entire  programme  of  briefings,  meetings  and  events  is  aimed 
more  at  London  and  especially  overseas  journalists.  Even  small  organisations 
in  the  civil  liberties  or  human  rights  field,  on  occasion  set  up  rounds  of  briefings 
for  relevant  opinion  leaders  or  journalists.  Sinn  176in  will  offer  interested 
journalists  the  opportunity  of  staying  for  a  few  days  in  the  home  of  a  local 
nationalist  family.  But  it  is  official  sources  who  actually  employ  Information 
Officers  exclusively  to  organise  such  trips.  In  addition  the  Northern  Ireland 
Office,  the  Central  Office  of  Information,  the  Foreign  Office,  the  Industrial 
Development  Board  and  the  Tourist  Board  are  all  in  a  position  to  provide 
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opinion  leaders.  On  occasion  expenses  can  even  include  intercontinental 
flights. 
'Providing  a  Balanced  View  of  Britain'? 
The  Overseas  Visits  and  Information  Studies  Division  (OVIS)  of  the  Central 
Office  of  Information,  organises  and  pays  for  visits  to  Britain  and  Northern 
Ireland  by  politicians,  business  people  andinfluential  media  figures'  (COI 
1989:  23).  The  Information  service  at  Stormont  has  had  a  Visits  Officer  since  at 
least  1965.  In  1988  the  NIO  organised  a  total  of  55  individual  visits  and  15 
group  visits  including  172  people  in  total.  Between  January  and  early  August 
1989  a  further  95  people  had  been  on  NIOViSitS.  3  The  Northern  Ireland 
Tourist  Board  and  the  Industrial  Development  Board  also  organise  a  large 
number  of  visits  for  journalists  and  others.  4 
The  Northern  Ireland  Office  organises  at  least  two  types  of  visit  to  Northern 
Ireland.  First  there  is  the  trip  to  show  the  nicer  side  of  Northern  Ireland  and 
second,  there  is  the  political  tour  which  includes  briefings  with  politicians,  civil 
servants,  the  Army,  police  and  others.  Journalists  in  Northern  Ireland  tell 
apocryphal  stories  of  the  business  men  who  were  taken  on  the  wrong  trip  round 
areas  of  high  unemployment  and  poverty.  In  1970  Stanley  England  described 
the  routine  of  a  visit  to  the  Newsletter. 
The  usual  length  of  stay  is  three  days.  We  try  to  pack  in  as  much  as  we 
can  in  the  time  available'  says  Stanley.  It  is  also  part  of  Stanley's  job  to 
see  that  the  visitors  are  made  comfortable  and  entertained.  The  best 
hotels  are  used  and  each  evening  there  is  a  dinner  party  at  which  guests 
can  relax  and  converse  informally  with  influential  Ulstermen  (Newsletter 
27  November  1970). 
Daily  dinner  parties  would  be  complemented  by  a  tour  round  the: 
'other  side  of  the  picture,  the  progressive  aspects  of  life  -  new 
industries,  our  advances  in  housing,  education  and  agriculture'...  A 
typical  tour  would  include  visits  to  the  Belfast  shipyard,  a  linen  factory, 
Craigavon,  a  dairy  farm  and  the  New  University  (Newsletter  27 
November  1970). 
More  than  twenty  years  later  sponsored  visitors  to  Northern  Ireland  continue  to Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  124 
be  shown  the'progressive  aspects  of  life'  by  the  Facility  Visits  section  of  the 
Information  Service,  now  staffed  by  two  Information  Officers.  The  itinerary  of 
one  tour  for  Japanese  business  people: 
included  stops  at  a  couple  of  Japanese  owned  factories,  where  the  local 
managers  duly  said  no,  they  had  never  had  any  security  worries  -  but 
yes,  the  labour  costs  were  incredibly  low  (The  Economist  30  June  1990). 
Conducted  by  'an  irrepressible  Mr  Richard  Needham,  the  minister  for  the 
economy'  (The  Economist  30  June  1990): 
the  working  day  ends  with  a  tour  of  Belfast.  Mr  Needham  provides  the 
commentary:  'You  can  have  a  quiet  time  here  although  we  still  have  the 
occasional  terrorist  threat'.  A  security  car  drives  at  a  discreet  distance  in 
front  of  the  bus.  Sectarian  areas  such  as  the  Falls  Road  are  avoided 
(Burns  1990). 
The  tour'wound  up  with  a  dinner  in  their  honour  in  Stormont's  parliament 
buildings'  (Economist,  30  June  1990): 
Oysters,  Irish  stew  and  Irish  coffee  are  an  the  menu.  Mr  Needham 
draws  on  the  history  of  the  Japanese  and  their  tortured  relations  with  the 
neighbouring  Koreans  to  try  to  convey  a  sense  of  the  complexity  of  it  all. 
Few  of  the  Japanese  appear  to  understand  the  comparison.  'I  would  just 
like  to  correct  the  minister  on  one  point:  our  civil  war  was  100  years  ago' 
says  Mr  Yoki  Okabe,  senior  managing  director  of  the  Sukimo  bank  in 
London  (Burns  1990). 
Later: 
The  evening  allowed  visitors  and  hosts  to  sing'Danny  Boy'with  enough 
spirit  to  rival  the  Mitsubishi  Heavy  Industry  male-voice  choir  (The 
Economist  30  June  1990). 
One  of  the  three  British  journalists  present  recounted  what  happened  next: 
at  the  dinner  Needham  launched  into  a  rendering  of  Danny  Boy,  which 
the  Japanese  just  couldn't  figure  out  at  all,  but  we  had  all  been  given 
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this  together.  I've  never  been  so  embarrassed  in  my  life  actually 
(Telephone  interview  July  1992). 
The  second  type  of  tour  includes  a  programme  of  briefings  and  tours  round 
other  parts  of  Belfast  not  shown  to  business  people  whose  investment  is 
sought.  Kevin  Cullen  of  the  Boston  Globe  has  recounted  his  experience: 
I  found  that  I  was  welcome  and  that  there  was  a  desire  to  possibly  plan 
my  entire  itinerary  while  I  was  there...  In  subsequent  visits  when  I  made 
it  quite  clear  that  it  would  be  easier  for  me  to  arrange  my  own  interviews 
and  that  I  would  appreciate  the  co-operation,  with  a  couple  of  days 
notice,  of  having  someone  from  the  NIO  at  my  disposal.  I  found  that  the 
co-operation  wasn't  as  readily  forthcoming  (Untransmitted  interview  for 
Hard  News  19  October  1989). 
One  senior  Information  Officer  told  me  that  the  NIO  organised  interviews  for 
journalists  with'everyone  except  the  Shinners'  (i.  e.  Sinn  F6in),  (interview, 
Belfast  August  1989).  Enquiring  about  itineraries  can  also  be  a  useful  guide  to 
the  type  of  story  a  journalist  is  likely  to  write.  If  a  journalist  indicates  that  a  visit 
to  the  Republican  Press  Centre  is  planned  it  is  not  unknown  for  startled 
journalists  to  be  offered  a  Northern  Ireland  Office  escort  up  the  Falls  Road. 
Roy  Greenslade  was  told  that  the  tour  he  went  on  would-be'warts  and  all:  we 
do  not  go  in  for  "snow"  jobs'  (Greenslade  1993b).  This  has  been  translated  by 
Edward  Daly,  Bishop  of  Derry  and  referred  to  as'the  carefully  planned  and 
guided  tours  organised  by  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  during  which  they  meet 
all  the  nice,  safe,  intelligent  and  very  respectable  people'  (Daly  1989:  7). 
In  practice  journalists  (and  others  such  as  politicians  and  academics)  are 
briefed  in  two  main  areas  corresponding  to  the  two  major  strands  of  NIO  public 
relations.  The  high  quality  of  life  and  the  marginality  of  the  troubles  are 
emphasised  together  with  briefings  about  the  security  situation.  Greenslade 
describes  the  visit  of  ten  Commonwealth  journalists  as  including  lessons  in  'the 
lexicon  of  surreality': 
An  official  from  the  Belfast  Development  Office  says  in  earnest'This 
place  isn't  what  you  think  it  is.  It  is  vibrant,  a  good  place  to  live  and 
work,  with  a  good  quality  of  life'.  All  the  problems  were  in  the  past. 
Housing  is  no  longer  an  issue.  Inward  investment  is  booming.  The  city 
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thriving...  The  positive  message  was  insistent  "most  people  here  have 
normal,  happy  lives.  There  is  a  high  degree  of  normality"  I  noted  the 
looks  of  bafflement  (among  the  journalists).  Had  they  flown  into  Leeds 
or  Edinburgh  by-mistake.  Perhaps  they  had  disembarked  in  the  Channel 
Islands.  Excuse  me,  asked  one,  but  what  about  the  IRA  bombings? 
Belfast's  champion  publicist  was  not  fazed.  Pointing  to  the  new  building 
opposite,  he  replied  amiably:  'There  was  a  small  bomb  there  recently. 
As  you  can  see  it's  all  been  repaired.  When  they  bomb  we  build  them 
back  bigger  and  better  then  before.  '  With  incredulity  stretched  we 
boarded  the  coach  for  a  tour  of  the  city  that  he  said  'is  definitely  not  a 
war  zone'  (Greenslade  1993b). 
But  on  a  tour  of  the  war  zones  descriptions  of  the  troubles  started  to  impinge: 
We  had  reached  West  Belfast  and  suddenly,  finally,  came  the  word  that 
was  to  impinge  on  every  briefing  thereafter,  like  a  sorrowful  refrain  from 
an  Irish  lament:  the  troubles  were  'unfortunate'.  He  said:  'There  are, 
unfortunately,  small  pockets  of  unemployment'.  Around  a  corner:  'That 
police  installation  unfortunately  has  to  be  a  bit  of  a  fortress'.  Moments 
later:  'unfortunately  there  are  a  lot  of  stolen  cars  in  this  area'.  On  the 
Crumlin  Road,  our  coach  shadowed  by  the  jail  on  one  side  and  the 
courthouse  on  the  other,  he  shook  his  head  -at  the  fortifications  and  said: 
'Unfortunately,  some  see  our  judges  and  prosecutors  as  targets' 
(Greenslade  1993b). 
These  themes  are  also  elaborated  in  briefings  given  to  journalists  by 
government  officials.  But  there  are  a  number  of  ways  of  delivering  such 
information. 
Leaks,  briefings  and  off  the  record  information 
The  institutional  ised  system  of  confidence  and  unattributable  disclosure 
operated  in  Whitehall  and  in  Northern  Ireland  exists  for  a  variety  of  reasons. 
One  advantage  of  giving  information  off  the  record  is  that  it  can  then  be  denied. 
But  there  is  another  way  in  which  disguising  the  source  of  information  is 
important.  That  is  in  promoting  messages  which  apparently  do  not  have  official 
fingerprints  on  them. 
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government  information  management  (Cockerell  et  al  1984;  Hennessy  1987). 
There  were  a  number  of  attempts  to  set  up  a  lobby  system  in  Northern  Ireland. 
In  the  early  1970s  the  army  operated  a  lobby  type  briefing  and  Northern  Ireland 
Secretary  William  Whitelaw  tried  to  introduce  one  in  1972  (Irish  Times  6  April 
1972).  There  was  a  further  attempt  to  introduce  the  system  in  the  late  1970s 
and  in  1983  James  Prior  or  the  minister  for  information,  Nicholas  Scott,  briefed 
journalists  every  week  on  lobby  terms  (Irish  News  16  April  1983).  These 
systems  broke  down  after  a  short  time.  It  was  an  initiative  from  journalists 
which  prompted  the  next  attempt  to  set  up  a  regular  briefing  on  lobby  terms. 
Belfast  journalists  instituted  an  informal  monthly  briefing  session,  called  the 
Friday  Club  in  the  late  1980s,  to  which  they  would  invite  relevant  senior 
speakers  on  non-attributable  and,  it  was  hoped,  less  formal  terms.  The  club 
met  on  a  Friday  for  lunch,  usually  at  the  Europa  Hotel.  In  1988  and  1989  they 
were  addressed  by  David  Fell,  Permanent  Secretary  of  the  Department  of 
Economic  Development,  Peter  Robinson  MP  of  the  Democratic  Unionist-Party, 
Bob  Myers  the  US  Consul  in  Belfast,  Archbishop  Robin  Eames  and  Bob 
Cooper  of  the  Fair  Employment  Agency  amongst  others.  Gerry  Adams  of  Sinn 
Fdin  was  invited  but  declined  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  against  party  policy  to 
accept  hospitality  from  journalists  or  give  lobby  type  briefings. 
At  one  lunch,  in  June  1988,  Northern  Ireland  Minister  Brian  Mawhinney 
suggested  that  the  lobby  be  resurrected.  This  was  opposed  by  at  least  three 
broadsheet  journalists  who  argued  that  it  would  make  journalists  over- 
dependent  on  official  handouts.  The  response  of  one  of  the  journalistic 
supporters  of  the  proposal  was:  'That  only  happens  with  lazy  journalists'. 
Mawhinney  himself  offered  to  brief  any  lobby  system  personally.  The  proposal 
was  however  rejected,  much  to  the  apparent  chagrin  of  the  Minister  who 
reportedly  refused  to  shake  hands  with  one  of  the  journalists  who  had  spoken 
against  the  proposal  or  to  look  him  in  the  eye  (Interviews  with  Belfast 
journalists  August  1989;  August  1990;  August  1990).  Relationships  between 
journalists  and  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  therefore  remained  on  a  less 
structured  system  of  collective  briefing. 
Background  Briefing  Documents 
'Official  sources  say,  'sources  close  to  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  have 
confirmed'.  These  are  the  telltale  phrases  associated  with  off  the  record 
briefings.  As  well  as  face  to  face  briefings  with  journalists,  the  Northern 
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Since  1980,  at  least  123  of  these  documents  have  been  issued  (see  Appendix  I 
for  a  list).  Produced  by  the  Information  Department  or  the  Foreign  Office,  they 
are  regularly  sent  to  selected  journalists  in  plain  brown  envelopes.  According 
to  a  senior  Information  Officer:  'We  would  stand  over  them  but  we  don't 
particularly  want  them  attributed  to  the  NIO'  (interview,  Belfast  July  1990). 
Journalists  working  in  Northern  Ireland  do  not  receive  these  briefings,  which 
are  mainly  intended  for  use  by  overseas  journalists. 
Some  sources  in  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  are  sceptical  about  the  value  of 
this  type  of  briefing  document.  In  the  view  of  one  Stormont  Information  Officer, 
they  are  'not  worth  a  damn'.  However,  they  have  on  occasion  been 
reproduced  unacknowledged  in  published  material.  Thus  volume  one  of  David 
Barzilay's  four  volume  study  of  the  British  Army  in  Ulster  (Barzilay  1973) 
includes  large  sections  (on  pages  119-124)  of  the  Information  Research 
Department  produced  briefing  The  IRA:  Aims,  Policy,  Tactics.  Once  such 
writings  are  published,  official  sources  can  use  them  as  impartial  and 
independent  commentaries.  The  authors  themselves  may  then  be  called  upon 
by  journalists  as  'experts'  on  'terrorism'.  In  another  example,  in  January  1988, 
one  document'The  Provisional  IRA:  International  Contacts  Outside  the  United 
States'  (FCO  1988)  was  drawn  on  by  counter-insurgency  journalist  Christopher 
Dobson  (see  Irish  Independent  2  May  1988  and  Daily  Telegraph  3  May  1988; 
cf.  Dobson  and  Payne  1982).  Much  of  the  information  was  inaccurate  and, 
following  legal  action,  the  Foreign  Office  was  forced  to  withdraw  some  of  it. 
British  author  Liz  Curtis  was  amongst  those  named  in  the  document. 
However,  the  Foreign  Office  refused  to  remove  her  name  from  the  briefing  thus 
labelling  her  as  an  'international  contact"of  the  IRA  (Guardian  11  May  1988, 
New  Statesman  and  Society  1  July  1988). 
Planting  stories 
Perhaps  the  most  effective  way  of  disguising  the  source  of  government 
information  is  to  pretend  that  it  is  not  government  information.  Official  sources 
in  Northern  Ireland  do  this  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  they  attempt  to  'place'  ready 
made  news  stories  or  features  in  suspecting  or  unsuspecting  media  and 
second  they  try  to  use  academics,  journalists  or  others  to  promote  their 
perspectives. 
Both  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  and  the  Industrial  Development  Board  employ 
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is  issued  free  of  charge  without  copyright  restrictions.  Indeed,  the  features 
issued  by  the  NIO  do  not  state  that  'Northern  Ireland  News  Features'  are 
produced  by  the  British  government,  instead  there  is  a  contact  address  which 
mentions  only  the'Northern  Ireland  Information  Service  (Features  Section)'. 
Each  of  the  regular  packages  are  issued  with  the  simple  statement  that  'The 
enclosed  articles  highlight  some  of  the  many  positive  aspects  of  life  in  Northern 
Ireland.  You  are  welcome  to  use  the  material  as  you  wish,  and  cuttings  of  what 
you  publish  would  be  appreciated'.  A  typical  issue  includes  the  following 
stories  'Belfast  shows  its  other  face',  'New  life  for  Irish  boglands',  'Peace  village 
at  folk  museum'  and  'University  and  Industry  work  together'. 
The  production  and  distribution  of  Television  items  used  to  be  quite  important 
for  public  relations  efforts.  Started  in  the  late  1950s  under  the  control  of  the 
Unionist  government  they  were  still  important  in  the  early  1970s.  According  to 
the  Director  General  of  British  Information  Services  in  New  York,  W.  E.  H. 
Whyte: 
We  take  a  specimen  radio  newsline  and  check  how  many  radio  stations 
in  the  end  actually  have  used  it.  If  it  is  a  good  one  -  for  example,  a  piece 
of  two  minutes  by  the  Prime  Minister  -  we  can  get  about  4,500  radio 
stations  using  it  once  or  more  across  the  USA...  We  can  do  the  same  for 
TV  clips,  TV  news  briefs,  TV  news  features  that  we  disseminate.  One 
can  do  this  also  with  some  precision  for  commercial  publicity.  We  keep 
a  score  sheet  of  the  number  of  press  releases  on  new  commercial 
products  and  processes  which  are  published.  The  percentage  over  the 
last  two  years  has  been  100  (Commons  Expenditure  Committee 
1973:  16). 
However  the  increasingly  wide  dispersion  of  television  broadcasting  and  the 
comparatively  well  resourced  nature  of  US  television  has  meant  that  TV  is  no 
longer  so  widely  used. 
The  London  Radio  Service 
The  most  significant  and  least  known  of  all  the  attempts  to  place  material  in 
overseas  media  involves  the  semi-covert  use  of  radio  news  bulletins.  The 
London  Radio  Service  (LRS)  provides  verbatim  transmission  of  ministerial 
speeches  and  press  conferences  as  well  as  producing  its  own  news  reports, 
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programmes  around  the  world.  These  reports  and  features  are  provided  free 
and  often  the  London  Radio  Service  (LRS)  provides  the  technical  capacity  to 
receive  its  products  down  phone  lines  for  a  nominal  fee  of  about  E25,  which 
was  described  by  one  LRS  news  editor  as  'peanuts'  (interview,  London  August 
1990). 
News  and  features  are  posted  to  British  Embassies  and  consulates  on  tape  or, 
more  directly,  by  telephone  or  satellite.  They  are  provided  in  a  variety  of 
languages  and  the  service  is  expanded'to  reflect  FCO  priorities.  '  (COI 
1989a:  2)  For  example,  the  Caribbean  Service  was  established  in  the  aftermath 
of  the  invasion  of  Grenada  by  the  USA  in  1984  (COI  1989a:  6-7).  According  to 
sources  in  the  COI,  the  LRS  has  developed  from  an  old  style  Path6  news  type 
propaganda  outfit  to  supplying  what  is  now  called  'indirect  propaganda'.  Inthe 
1970's: 
It  was  essentially  still  being  run  by  civil  servants  with  a  strong  Foreign 
Office  input,  therefore  they  would  dictate  policy  and  the  result  was  that 
we  tended  to  just  pump  propaganda.  It  was  successful,  but  not  as 
successful  as  it  could  have  been.  [But  now]  it  has  become  a  normal 
news  service.  So  we're  well  away  from  propaganda  to  what  I  would  call 
indirect  propaganda...  The  whole  point  is  that  you  can't...  take  the  old 
approach  by  saying  there's  the  good  guys  and  the  bad  guys  and  the  bad 
guys  have  to  be  shown  as  pretty  nasty,  bayoneting  babies...  Now  you 
have  to  be  totally  impartial,  while  still  pushing  the  line  (Interview,  London 
August  1990). 
The  speed  of  reaction  is  facilitated  by  the  access  which  the  Information  Service 
has  to  government  Ministers.  On  occasions,  according  to  sources  in  the  NIO, 
Ministers  have  made  statements  on  US  radio  within  the  hour  of  an  event 
occurring:  'Long  before  anybody  else  could  get  in  on  the  act'  (interview, 
London  August  1990).  One  example  is  Mrs  Thatcher's  condemnation  of  the 
London  bombings  in  July  1982  (Simon  1982:  6). 
The  main  interviewees  on  the  LRS  are  the  Prime  Minister,  Foreign  Secretary, 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  Defence  Secretary  and  Northern  Ireland 
Secretary  (COI  1989:  4).  It  is  clear  that  government  ministers  are  featured 
overwhelmingly  and  there  few  if  any  interviews  with  critics  of  the  British 
government  or  even  with  members  of  British  opposition  parties.  On  the  rare 
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diplomats  have  been  relatively  upbeat  about  its  success.  Patrick  Nixon,  the 
head  of  BIS  in  1982  related: 
We  have  a  satellite  link  with  the  Central  Office  of  Information  in  London, 
and  when  a  government  minister  makes  an  important  statement  of 
policy,  and  we  think  that  it's  newsworthy  for  our  customers,  we  can  feed 
it,  if  necessary  live,  as  we  did  on  many  occasions  during  the  hunger 
strike...  direct  through  special  lines  into  ten  radio  networks.  These  ten 
networks  in  turn  service  no  less  than  6,000  of  the  9,000  radio  stations  in 
the  country.  And  this  means  that  we  can  put  our  policies  right  at  the  top 
of  the  news  ffile  on  Four',  BBC  Radio  Four  23  November  1982). 
One  of  the  reasons  that  it  is  relatively  easy  for  the  LRS  to  place  materials  in 
radio  schedules  is  that  many  radio  stations  are  poorly  resourced.  This  is  well 
recognised  by  the  COI,  as  one  editor  related:  'radio  is  the  Cinderella  of 
broadcasting.  If  it's  free  they'll  take  it'  (Interview,  London  August  1990). 
Another  valuable  feature  of  LRS  products,  from  the  official  point  of  view,  is  that 
there  is  no  indication  for  radio  listeners  that  the  material  originates  with  the 
British  government: 
The  distinguishing  feature  of  COI  radio  as  compared  with  other  radio 
services  is  that  material...  is  then  broadcast  by  a  station  as  if  it  were  its 
own  (COI  1989a:  1). 
Some  radio  stations  are  themselves  apparently  not  aware  that  the  London 
Radio  Service  is  a  semi-covert  British  government  operation.  But,  because 
they  get  it  free,  many  do  not  to  ask  many  questions.  According  to  one  news 
editor: 
A  lot  of  stations  are  surprised  that  we're  government.  They  don't  put  two 
and  two  together.  Because  we  don't  put  an  obvious  government  line 
across...  Four  or  five  years  ago  I  was  talking  to  people  in  broadcasting  in 
the  Middle  East  and  they  were  stunned  when  I  said'No  we're  not  BBC.  ' 
They  thought  we  were  BBC.  They  had  their  doubts  because  BBC  have 
copyright.  You  can't  touch  or  tamper  with  the  content  of  the  tape...  or 
the  line  of  the  tape,  whereas  with  us,  you  can  do  what  you  like  with  it.  At 
the  end  of  the  day  someone  could  take  the  cut  (interview]  out  and  write  a 
script  around  it  which  has  the  opposite  effect.  We  find  that  most  places 
don't  do  that  because  they  haven't  got  time  to  do  it  (interview,  London Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic 
August  1990). 
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It  is  worth  observing  that  this  semi-covert  approach  is  probably  illegal  in  the 
US.  Any  information  emanating  from  aToreign  principal'  is  required  under  the 
Foreign  Agents  Registration  Act  to  be  identified  as  such.  All  written  or  printed 
information  distributed  by  British  Information  Services  in  New  York  features  a 
standard  form  of  words  indicating  that'This  material  is  prepared,  edited,  issued 
or  circulated  by  British  Information  Services...  which  is  registered  under  the 
Foreign  Agents  Registration  Act  as  an  agent  of  the  British  government'. 
Copies  of  all  such  material  is  required  under  the  Act  to  be  filed  with  the 
Department  of  Justice  and  available  for  public  inspection.  Not  to  do  so  is  a 
criminal  offence.  However,  the  products  of  the  London  Radio  Service  are  not 
labelled  as  the  product  of  the  British  government,  nor  are  they  filed  with  the 
Department  of  Justice. 
Using  other  people 
Off-the-record  briefings  are  useful  in  disguising  the  source  of  an  official 
statement,  but  they  still  indicate  that  information  emanates  from  official 
sources.  Early  NIO  broadsheets  and  leaflets  often  used  the  words  of  public 
figures  who  might  be  thought  to  be  independent,  or  critical,  of  the  state.  For 
example,  the  then  director  of  British  Information  Services  in  New  York  said  in 
1973  that: 
Some  of  the  most  effective  material  in  this  context  comes  from  Dublin: 
from  the  statements  of  the  last  Prime  Minister,  Mr  Lynch,  the  Cardinal, 
Cardinal  Conway,  and  the  former  Irish  Minister  of  Justice,  Mr  O'Malley, 
particularly  on  such  matters  as  denouncing  the  support  given  in  the  USA 
to  the  IRA  in  way  of  funds  (Commons  Expenditure  Committee  1973:  18). 
The  philosophy  of  this  approach  was  explained  in  the  confidential  planning 
notes  of  the  film  Northern  Ireland  Chronicle  which  were  leaked  in  1981.  It 
argued  that  statements  about  the  criminality  of  those  convicted  for'scheduled, 
offences  would  be'far  more  cogently  made  by,  say,  a  Catholic  bishop  than...  by 
any  on-or-off-screen  Government  spokesman'.  Interviewees  from  the  British 
Government  might  not  be  convincing,  but,  Unionist  politicians  too  were  out, 
particularly  since  the  target  audience  for  the  film  was  the  US.  6  The  Unionists: 
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to  reject.  That  Molyneaux  would  speak  out  against  the  IRA  is  obvious; 
that,  say,  John  Hume  or  Bishop  Daly  would  might  be  a  revelation. 
These  are  the  people  who,  in  terms  of  the  film,  will  carry  the  most 
authority  and  have  the  most'muscle'  (cited  in  Curtis  1984a:  200). 
On  occasion  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  will  use  journalists  as  proxies  either  by 
distributing  their  writings,  citing  them  in  publicity  material,  inviting  them  to 
social  events  or  even  to  act  as  witnesses  in  court  cases.  The  Belfast  journalist, 
Martin  Dillon,  has  recounted  the  British  government's  invitation  to  him  to  give 
evidence  in  the  US  at  court  hearings  held  to  consider  the  extradition  of 
Republican  prisoner  Joe  Doherty.  One'classified'  British  government 
memorandum  he  received,  while  making  a  decision  about  whether  to  testify, 
revealed  government  strategy,  outlined  at  a  meeting  in  July  1983: 
It  would  be  prudent  for  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  during  the  peiod 
leading  up  to  the  defence's  response  to  our  depositions,  to  give  thought 
to  possible  witnesses  on  the  general  situation  in  the  Province  at  the  time 
of  Doherty's  offences.  It  would  be  important  for  any  such  witness  to  be 
dissociated  from  the  British  Government,  and  for  him  to  be  able  to  paint 
a  picture  of  declining  violence  and  impartial  law  enforcement  and  judicial 
procedures.  While  such  high  profile  figures  as  Conor  Cruise  O'Brien, 
Lord  Fitt  or  Robert  Kee  could  be  difficult  to  land,  the  bigger  the  'fish'  the 
better  (Dillon  1992a:  xxvi). 
In  the  event  Dillon  declined  the  offer  and  his  place  was  taken  by  Professor  Paul 
Wilkinson  of  St  Andrews  University. 
The  constant  attention  paid  to  the  right  message  delivered  by  the  right  person 
is  also  influenced  by  the  mode  of  delivery.  Thus,  'for  years  the  Foreign  Office 
was  criticised  for  failing  to  put  across  the  government's  case  on  Ulster,  sending 
diplomats  with  plummy  accents  to  defend  the  thesis  that  Ulster  people  really 
did  want  "the  British  to  stay...  (Jenkins  and  Sloman  1985:  83).  The  solution  was 
to  send  the  press  officer  from  the  Department  of  the  Environment  in,  Belfast  on 
a  four  year  secondment.  Cyril  Gray  was  clear  about  the  advantages  of  not 
having  a  'plummy'  accent: 
I  find  it  quite  remarkable  the  impact  that  an  obvious  Irish  accent  has  on 
often  very  difficult  Irish-American  audiences.  They  may  be  many 
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knowledge  of  Ireland.  Nonetheless,  they  do  ask  very  detailed  questions 
at  all  times  and,  to  be  frank,  it's  the  only  kind  of  detail  you  could  know  if 
you  are  yourself  Irish  and  have  been  there  (cited  in  Jenkins  and  Sloman 
1985:  83). 
Success  of  propaganda:  The  question  of  resources 
There  is  a  profound  inequality  in  the  resources  available  to  organisations  to 
'play'  the  media.  Resources  include  the  degree  to  which  an  organisation  is 
institutionally  secure,  the  amount  of  money  and  other  financial  resources  it  can 
call  on  and  the  cultural  capital  which  the  organisation  can  command 
(Schlesinger  1990:  79-81). 
The  degree  to  which  an  organisation  has  a  secure  existence  is  obviously 
centrally  related  to  it's  ability  to  formulate  and  execute  media  strategies.  Less 
institutional  ised  organisations  are  much  more  dependent  on  public  support  or 
the  hard  work  of  low  paid/unpaid  committed  activists.  The  NIO  and  RUC  are 
heavily  institutionalised,  being  central  institutions  of  the  state  funded  by 
taxation.  The  publication  and  circulation  of  information  is  for  them  a 
continuous,  permanently  important  activity. 
By  contrast  the  least  institutionalised  organisations  arise  around  specific  issues 
or  events  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  and  have  little  or  no  funding.  We  can  think  of 
campaigns  against  Plastic  Bullets  or  Strip  searching  or  groups  set  up  to 
challenge  particular  legal  decisions.  Recent  campaigns  to  free  victims  of 
wrongful  imprisonment,  such  as  the  Birmingham  Six  and  the  Guildford  Four, 
started  off  in  this  way.  Such  informal  groups  may  then  disband  if  they  are 
successful  and  their  members  may  or  may  not  join  other  campaigns.  Groups 
which  do  not  have  fully  secure  institutional  bases  are  especially  vulnerable  to 
disagreements  and  splits  within  their  ranks  or  to  the  activities  of  other  groups  in 
the  same  area.  In  small  organisations  a  split  may  result  in  two  separate 
organisations  emerging  each  claiming  to  embody  the  'real'  spirit  of  the  parent 
body.  This  happened  a  number  of  times  with  the  Troops  Out  Movement  in  the 
1970s  and  1980s.  Similarly,  membership  organisations  can  be  fatally  wounded 
if  they  lose  out  in  the  competition  for  members.  Such  factors  are  therefore 
important  in  the  strategies  of  organisations.  State  institutions  do  not  have  to 
keep  a  watching  brief  on  their  membership. 
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are  longer  term  and  broader  based  organisations  such  as  well  established 
pressure  groups  (e.  g.  Amnesty  International  or  Liberty)  and  the  political  parties 
of  the  North.  The  status  of  these  will  obviously  change  as  new  parties  are 
founded  (for  example  the  DUP  and  the  SDLP  are  both  products  of  the  troubles) 
or  as  older  established  parties  lose  influence.  The  Ulster  Unionist  Party  ran 
the  Northern  Ireland  government  for  50  years.  They  remain  the  single  biggest 
party,  but  their  power  has  waned  considerably  since  the  abolition  of  the 
Stormont  parliament.  However,  the  'institutional  isation'  of  an  organisation  is 
affected  by  other  factors  than  its  closeness  to  the  centres  of  political  power. 
The  status  of  illegal  and  underground  organisations  is  a  case  in  point.  The  IRA 
is  illegal  in  Britain  and  Ireland  and  yet  there  is  a  sense  in  which  it  is  more 
institutional  ised  than  many  single  issue  pressure  groups.  We  might  speak  of 
the  IRA  as  an  institution  within  the  nationalist  'community'  of  Northern  Ireland, 
or  as  an  oppositional  institution.  Such  opposing  forces  and  those  associated 
with  them  are  very  vulnerable  to  the  resources  of  the  state.  Thus  it  is  that  the 
Republican  press  centre  was  raided  by  the'security  forces'  in  1978  and  again 
in  1990.  In  the  latter  raid  the  police  apparently  'wrecked'  the  centre  by  knocking 
down  walls  and  lifting  floorboards  and  also  confiscating  tapes,  computer  disks 
and  contacts  books  (Farish  1990).  Such  vulnerability  obviously  affects  the 
ability  of  an  organisation  to  relate  to  the  media.  This  includes  some  civil 
liberties  groups  whose  strategies  are  planned  with  half  an  eye  to  their  own 
security.  The  Irish  Information  Partnership  was  formally  set  up  from  an  address 
in  Belgium,  partly  because,  according  to  Marian  Laragy  of  the  Partnership: 
there  was  a  certain  sense  that  no-one  was  quite  clear  how  safe  England 
was  as  a  base  to  operate  from  in  the  sense  that  people  tended  to  get 
arrested  under  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act.  Nobody  knew  whether 
material  would  be  confiscated,  whether  there  would  be  a  need  to  send 
us  elsewhere  (Interview,  London  October  1991). 
Finance 
The  institutions  of  the  state  command  the  largest  budgets  and  spend  by  far  the 
most  on  publicity  and  public  relations.  In  1989  the  British  government  spent 
around  F-20  million  on  press  and  publicity  work  on  Northern  Ireland.  (Appendix 
two  gives  a  compilation  of  available  data  on  government  PR  spending. 
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base.  Sinn  Fdin  press  officers  are  not  paid,  and  the  main  costs  of  the  centre 
are  telephone  and  fax  bills.  According  to  Sinn  Fdin's  northern  Director  of 
Publicity,  Richard  McAuley: 
If  they're  really  lucky  and  the  party's  feeling  particularly  generous,  then 
they  might  get  50p  for  their  lunch...  seriously.  There  would  be  a  very 
small  allocation  of  money  set  aside  every  week  just  for  milk  and  tea  bags 
and  lunches  and  literally  you're  talking  about  a  tenner.  Outside  of  that, 
any  other  money  that's  spent  on  the  office  is  spent  on  equipment,  either 
in  terms  of  phone  bills,  fax  bills  or  buying  computer  disks  (Telephone 
interview  October  1991). 
According  to  McAuley,  the  fax  and  phone  bills  come  to  around  E400  and  E800 
per  quarter  and  spending  on  disks,  paper  etc.  comes  to  around  El  00  per 
month.  Added  with  the  money  for  lunches  etc.  this  makes  an  annual  budget  of 
under  E7,000.  Even  supposing  this  is  an  underestimate  by  a  factor  of  two  it  is 
still  less  than  the  salary  of  a  single  government  Information  Officer.  The 
availability  of  finance  is  crucial  to  the  survival  of  alternative  source 
organisations.  The  Irish  Information  Partnership,  for  example,  was  largely 
funded  by  the  financial  dealings  of  Chief  Executive  David  Roche  and  sales  of 
their  publication  Irish  Information  Agenda.  Thus  it  was  that  the  stock  market 
crash  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1980s  led  to  the  closure  of  the  Partnership. 
Finance  also  has  a  central  bearing  on  the  employment  of  full  time  personnel  to 
deal  with  the  media.  Official  organisations  have  the  resources  to  employ  large 
numbers  of  press  officers  and  PR  support  staff.  In  1989/90  official  sources  in 
Northern  Ireland  had  at  the  very  least,  145  full  time  posts  in  public  relationS.  7 
By  contrast  the  Unionist  Party  had  one  paid  press  officer  for  a  short  period  in 
1970  (Harbinson  1973).  8  The  1982  Northern  Ireland  Assembly  which  returned 
very  limited  powers  to  an  elected  body  in  Belfast  meant  that  resources  became 
available  for  the  employment  of  press  officers.  Sammy  Wilson  of  the  DUP  was 
first  appointed  press  officer  in  this  period.  However  with  the  dissolution  of  the 
Assembly,  the  paid  posts  lapsed.  More  recently  the  SIDLP  employed  a  press 
officer  on  a  three  year  contract  in  the  late  1980s.  According  to  Jonathon 
Stephenson,  who  filled  the  post,  the  Party: 
can't  be  absolutely  certain  that  they  have  enough  money  for  a 
permanent  job  and  it  certainly  isn't  a  pensionable  one  (interview,  Belfast Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic 
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Stephenson's  contract  was  not  renewed  because  of  financial  shortages.  9  In 
Northern  Ireland  none  of  the  political  parties  are,  at  the  time  of  writing,  able  to 
employ  a  paid  full  time  press  officer.  Such  financial  considerations  have 
obvious  implications  for  media  strategies.  In  the  view  of  Sammy  Wilson,  press 
officer  of  the  DUP: 
Time  is  the  biggest  problem.  The  second  thing  is  that  we're  not  very 
well  resourced.  I  am  contactable  by  fax  and  phone,  people  can  get 
messages  to  me  and  I  can  get  statements  out  on  their  behalf  if  they  can't 
do  it  themselves  but  most  of  our  spokesmen  also  find  that  there's  a  time 
constraint  because  they're  maybe  councillors  as  well  and  have  got  their 
jobs...  Really,  the  media  require  somebody  who  they  can  easily  contact 
and  very  few  politicians  in  Northern  Ireland  are  easily  contactable  unless 
they're  engaged  full-time  (Interview,  Belfast  June  1993). 
The  DUP's  main  opponents  for  votes,  the  UUP,  have  more  full  timers,  by  virtue 
of  the  fact  that  they  have  ten  MPs  compared  with  the  DUP's  three.  According 
to  Sammy  Wilson: 
With  having  fewer  people  who're  available  to  the  press,  therefore  the 
range  of  people  who  you  can  get  and  promote  in  the  media  is  that  much 
more  difficult  (Interview,  Belfast  June  1993). 
Levels  of  financial  resourcing  will  tend  to  be  positively  related  to  the  cultural 
and  institutional  resources  of  any  organisation  but  they  are  not  a  simple 
determinant  of  these  more  intangible  but  crucially  important  assets. 
Cultural  capital 
Organisations  with  considerable  cultural  resources  are  able  to  move  in  social 
circles  and  to  influence  agendas  which  are  closed  to  less  well  resourced 
bodies.  Correspondingly,  the  ability  to  move  in  such  circles  also  gives  a 
greater  access  to  information  and  a  certain  invulnerability  to  the  encroachment 
from  the  law  or  the  police.  Counterinsurgency  writers  such  as  Alan  Hooper 
make  much  of  the  legal  difficulties  facing  official  sources  when  commenting  on 
incidents  such  as  shootings.  The  'security  forces'  he  says  'so  often  have  to 
wait  for  legal  proof  to  underseal  their  credibility'.  He  goes  on  to  specify  that  it  is Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  138 
'the  law  of  libel  and  the  rules  of  subjudice'which  prevent  the  publication  of 
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mation  which  would  [enable]  objective  journalists  to  set  the  incident  in 
context'  (Hooper  1982:  139).  However,  it  is  clear  that  the  Army  and  the  RUC 
have  a  long  tradition  of  hiding  behind  sub  judice  at  the  same  time  as  they  are 
giving  off  the  record  unattributable  briefings  to  favoured  journalists.  The 
reason  given  by  Sir  Geoffrey  Howe  in  his  'request'  that  'Death  on  the  Rock'  be 
postponed  was  a  fear  that  it  might  prejudice  the  inquest.  The  MoD  press  office 
gave  the  same  reason  for  refusing  to  brief  the  programme  makers.  Yet  at  the 
same  time  they  were  briefing  favoured  journalists  at  the  Sunday  Times,  Sunday 
Telegraph  and  other  papers  (Miller  1991). 
The  structural  inequality  in  the  resources  available  to  source  organisations  do 
not  by  themselves  doom  a  media  strategy  to  failure.  The  level  of  resources  at 
the  disposal  of  an  organisation  are  not  static  but  can  change.  They  can  be 
deliberately  or  inadvertently  enhanced  or  damaged  by  credibility  building 
strategies.  In  fact,  all  aspects  of  the  strategies  of  organisations  can  affect 
credibility  and  therefore  the  resources  available  to  7bA^,  "  - 
In  the  1970s,  the  Army's  authority  as  a  source  was  compromised  by  some  of 
their'psyops'  activities.  Partly  as  a  result  of  this  the  Army  were  moved  to  a 
supporting  role  in  the  conflict  and  thus  wound  down  their  PR  operation.  That  is 
to  say  that  balance  of  power  within  the  state  can  heavily  influence  the  financial 
resources  available  for  PR.  Resources  can  also  be  influenced  by  deliberate 
media  strategies.  Increased  membership  can  bring  in  more  money  and  more 
credibility  with  government  or  with  the  media.  The  building  of  credibility  is  thus 
one  of  the  central  objectives  of  less  well  off  organisations.  The  Irish 
Information  Partnership,  for  example,  saw  one  of  its  tasks  as  compiling  an 
alternative  set  of  data  on  the  conflict  to  the  official  RUC  statistics.  It  was  thus 
seen  as  crucial  that  the  information  was  credible  and  authoritative.  This  meant 
that  the  Partnership  refrained  from  analysis.  According  to  Marian  Laragy  of  the 
partnership: 
we  didn't  always  get  to  sit  down  and  write  up  papers  on  the  outcome  of 
the  stuff  but  we  didn't  see  that  as  totally  important 
...  We  were  very 
careful  about  that  at  the  start.  We  would  hardly  string'a  sentence 
together  on  anything  to  draw  up  an  analysis  because  when  you  are 
approached  by  someone  in  the  media  -  if  it  was  me,  for  instance,  who 
took  the  call,  immediately  it  was  an  Irish  accent  and  immediately  there 
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In  this  case  it  was  not  only  credibility  in  the  eyes  of  the  media  which  was 
important,  but  also  credibility  with  other  organisations  active  on  Irish  questions: 
there  was  a  lot  of  reaction  from  Irish  people  here  in  community 
organisations,  about  the  fact  that  the  Partnership  was  based  in  Belgium. 
One  organisation  put  round  the  rumour  that  we  were  the  CIA.  It  was 
great  fun  as  far  as  they  were  concerned  but  it  wasn't  especially 
comfortable  for  us  (Interview,  London  October  1991). 
Credibility  building  strategies  require  the'placement'  of  an  organisation  in  a 
,  market  niche'.  The  Committee  on  the  Administration  of  Justice  was  formed  in 
1981  to  monitor  civil  liberties  issues  in  Northern  Ireland.  It  is  affiliated  to 
Liberty  (formerly  NCCL)  and  has  built  itself  into  a  formidable  and  respected 
campaigning  body.  In  order  to  do  that,  it  was  seen  as  important  that  the 
Committee  avoid  contentious  areas  of  civil  rights  which  would  divide  the  cross 
community  alliance.  According  to  Michael  Ritchie  of  CAJ: 
CAJ  is  quite  a  broad  alliance  and  I  think  it  is  only  because  we  have 
managed  to  kind  of  maintain  that  alliance  that...  we  have  managed  to  be 
as  successful  as  we  have  been.  In  order  to  maintain  that  alliance  it  is 
quite  important  that  we  do  not,  for  example  take  any  position  on  the 
national  question  and  that  we  do  not  kind  of  involve  ourselves  in  any 
other  political  question  (Interview,  Belfast  April  1992). 
Taking  up  self  determination  as  a  human  right  is  problematic  for  CAJ,  as  is  the 
issue  of  abortion  rights  as  both  might  provoke  fundamental  splits  among  the 
membership. 
Resources  are  important  for  small  organisations.  Without  finance  or  the 
continued  commitment  of  unpaid  activists  an  organisation  may  disappear.  The 
presence  of  full  time  activists  is  also  important  for  co-ordination  and  availability 
to  the  media  or  other  organisations.  However,  the  more  credibility  and 
respectability  an  organisation  has  the  more  effectively  it  can  operate  with  fewer 
financial  resources.  On  the  other  hand  the  strategies  adopted  by  some  groups 
may  consciously  avoid  portraying  themselves  as  'respectable'  in  order  to 
maintain  principles  and  keep  out  of  what  are  seen  as  the  clutches  of 
incorporation. Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic 
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All  organisations  may  have  divisions  on  issues  of  policy  or  practice.  Debates 
about  the  direction  of  the  organisation  may  be  conducted  in  private  although  on 
occasion  they  may  overflow  into  the  public  arena  of  the  media.  Different 
factions  may  supply  information  to  the  media  which  embarrasses  or 
compromises  the  opposing  faction.  Alternatively  they  may  allow  information 
which  shows  themselves  in  a  good  light  to  appear.  Similar  factors  explain  the 
relationships  between  organisations.  The  relative  unity  of  different  groups  or 
organisations  will  influence  their  access  to  routine  media  coverage  and 
potentially  to  the  policy  agenda.  Unity  may  improve  the  coverage  that  an 
organisation  gets,  although  disunity,  and  especially  competitive  media 
strategies,  may  result  in  more  coverage  and  a  higher  profile  for  a  contested 
debate. 
The  rise  of  public  relations  in  Britain  since  the  1940s  and  50s  has  been 
accompanied  by  a  struggle  by  press  officers  for  status,  power  and  financial 
reward  and  by  attempts  to  'professional  ise'  the  occupation.  Administrative  civil 
servants  have  often  found  their  relationship  with  press  officers  difficult 
because  of  the  short  history  and  low  status  of  press  officers  who  may,  however, 
be  able  to  insist  on  access  to  confidential  files  or  top  meetings  to  which, 
traditionally,  only  senior  civil  servants  had  been  allowed  (cf.  Cockerell  et  al 
1984;  Ingham  1991;  Harris  1990). 
The  Northern  Ireland  Office,  like  other  government  departments  consists  of  a 
variety  of  different  professional  groups  (for  our  purposes  here  we  can 
distinguish  politicians,  Information  Officers  and  Administrative  civil  servants) 
each  of  which  have  their  own  professional,  political  and  personal  agendas. 
When  the  Northern  Ireland  government  started  appointing  press  officers  to  the 
Northern  Ireland  departments  in  the  1960s  this  caused  consternation  amongst 
senior  civil  servants.  In  1969  the  first  Prime  Ministerial  press  secretary  was 
appointed  from  amongst  the  ranks  of  press  officers  at  Stormont.  Ex-journalist 
David  Gilliland  accepted  the  new  job  on  two  conditions  -  that  he  should  have 
immediate  access  to  the  cabinet  and  attend  cabinet  meetings.  The  civil  service 
were  not  happy  with  his  demands.  According  to  Gilliland  "I  think  their  first 
reaction  was'What  a  cheek!...  (Belfast  Telegraph  21  May  1987).  His  demands 
were,  however,  eventually  met. 
Among  administrative  civil  servants  such  perceptions  were  partly  premised  on Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  141 
a  suspicion  of  the  media.  Journalists  may  be  seen  as  prone  to  exaggeration, 
distortion  and  sensationalism,  unable  to  resist  a  'good  story'  and  as  favouring 
'bad  news'  over  good.  This  encourages  an  unwillingness  to  deal  with  the 
media  and  a  preference  for  minimum  disclosure.  According  to  one  NIO 
information  Officer: 
The  civil  service  never  believed,  it  still  doesn't  believe,  that  there  is  the 
slightest  need  to  have  press  chaps  running  about  telling  the  public  what 
the  government  is  doing  and  'God  what  business  is  it  of  the  public's?  ' 
(Interview,  Belfast  August  1989). 
Many  press  officers  come  from  a  journalistic  background,  and  this  is  often 
reason  enough  for  civil  servants  to  distrust  them.  John  Oliver,  former 
Permanent  Secretary  at  Stormont  put  this  view  in  his  memoirs: 
It  is  essential,  absolutely  essential,  that  the  press  officer  be  in  the 
confidence  of  the  senior  officers  and  feel  free  to  approach  them  with 
advice.  This  is  not  so  easy  for  the  administrator  to  accept  as  may 
appear  on  the  surface,  because  the  press  officer  is  after  all  a  journalist, 
he  trades  in  news,  he  mixes  with  working  journalists  and  editors  and  he 
is  therefore  extremely  vulnerable  to  pressure  and  is  a  possible  source  of 
leakage  of  confidential  information  (Oliver  1978:  149-150). 
For  Information  Officers,  civil  servants  like,  this  are  hopelessly  naive. 
According  to  one  Director  of  the  Northern  Ireland  Information  Service,  it  is  more 
likely  to  be  administrative  civil  servants  that  disclose  unauthorised  information: 
Actually  some  of  the  main  stream  civil  servants  are  far  more  guilty  of 
leaking  and  briefing  -  far,  far  more  guilty  of  doing  it  than  Information 
Officers,  because  at  the  end  of  the  day,  to  take  a  purely  practical, 
pragmatic  view  of  it,  who  is  the  bugger  that  gets  rung  up  late  at  night 
when  the  first  editions  come  out?  It  is  the  poor  sodding  press  officer.  It 
is  not  some  twat  sitting  down  in  the  bowels  of  the  policy  division  who 
thinks  it  might  be  fun  to  have  lunch  with  The  Guardian.  Look  back  at  the 
civil  servants  who  have  been  prosecuted  under  the  Official  Secrets  Act. 
Ponting  and  Sarah  Tisdall  -  neither  of  them  was  an  Information  Officer 
(interview,  Belfast  July  1990). 
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unwanted  disclosure,  while  maximising  positive  publicity,  rather  than  acting  as 
a  conduit  channelling  information  to  the  media.  According  to  the  same  sources 
timing  is  a  particularly  important  concern  here: 
It  does  happen  that  something  comes  barrelling  along  out  of  a  clear  blue 
sky  and  you  think'my  God.  If  I  had  been  asked  about  that  or  told  about 
that,  I  would  certainly  have  advised  against  publication  on  that  day, 
perhaps...  When  you  are  working  in  a  mainstream  division  or  a  research 
division,  you  get  a  very  small  overview  of  the  whole  office-wide  activity. 
You  tend  to  think  that  your  particular  report,  your  recommendations, 
whatever  you  are  working  on  is  the  only  thing  that  is  vital  and  that 
matters,  and  you  can  lose  sight  of  things  which  should  be  put  in 
conjunction  with  this  publication.  Like  is  the  minister  going  to  face 
questions  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  afternoon...  Is  it  judicious  to  put 
it  out  that  very  morning  or  the  day  before.  Is  there  anything  else  going 
on  in  the  department  that  you  are  not  aware  of  which  appears  to  run 
counter  to  it,  which  may  appear  to  suggest  that  the  department  is  split 
(interview,  Belfast  July  1990). 
In  short  the  Information  Division  of  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  polices 
enclosure  and  disclosure  and  guards  an  image  of  the  department  as  a  unified 
organisation. 
Similar  organisational  divisions  occur  in  other  bodies.  In  a  political  party  like 
Sinn  F6in  which  has  a  centralised  press  office  with  a  strong  position  within  the 
republican  movement,  approaches  from  journalists  to  ordinary  party  members 
or  even  elected  councillors  are  more  likely  to  be  referred  to  the  Republican 
Press  Centre.  In  contrast,  the  SIDLP  is,  as  their  press  officer  put  it,  very  much  a 
party  of  'notables'.  SIDLP  MPs  or  representatives  each  have  their  own  media 
contacts  and  tend  to  conduct  their  own  PR.  According  to  Jonathon  Stephenson 
this  means  that: 
There  is  some  opposition  still  in  the  party  to  the  idea  of  a  central 
structure,  which  I  find  a  little  bit  difficult...  The  party  is  not  really  used  to 
having  a  central  press  operation.  Its  local  constituent  parts,  particularly 
its  MPs  very  much  do  their  own  press  work.  The  duty  of  a  press  officer  is 
not  necessarily  to  tell  the  press  things  all  the  time.  It's  sometimes  the 
duty  of  the  press  officer  to  know  what  not  to  tell  the  press.  It  would  be 
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case  in  this  party  (Interview,  Belfast  August  1990). 
Tensions  between  civil  servants  and  Information  Officers  in  the  NIO  are 
regarded  as'old  fashioned'in  some  Whitehall  departments.  In  the  NIO, 
Information  Officers  speak  of  administrative  civil  servants  being  'very  switched 
on'  to  the  media.  Nevertheless  tensions  still  exist.  But,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is 
also  clear  that  among  the  more  'switched  on'  civil  servants,  the  protective  role 
of  the  Information  Service  may  well  hamper  active  divisional  or  sub-department 
media  strategies.  Let  us  consider  an  example  where  administrative  civil 
servants  in  an  attempt  to  move  forward  a  policy  initiative  by  a  carefully  planned 
media  strategy  came  up  against  attempts  at  enclosure  from  the  'Information' 
Service. 
Closing  down  the  H-Blocks 
During  the  period  of  protests  in  the  H-Blocks  of  the  Maze  Prison  in  the  late 
nineteen  seventies  and  early  eighties  access  for  journalists  was  tightly 
controlled.  The  first  republican  prisoner  started  refusing  to  wear  prison  uniform 
in  September  1976,  but  it  was  not  until  March  1979  that  a  small  group  of 
journalists  was  allowed  in,  although  they  were  not  allowed  to  speak  to  the 
protesting  prisoners.  During  the  1980/81  hunger  strikes  journalists  were  simply 
not  permitted  to  interview  hunger  strikers.  When  Bobby  Sands  stood  for  and 
was  elected  to  parliament  the  NIO  still  refused  access.  Some  journalists  got  in 
on  ordinary  visitors  passes.  'But  if  their  identity  as  journalists  was  discovered, 
they  were  required  to  sign  a  form  saying  they  would  not  publish  anything  about 
the  visit.  '  (Curtis  1984a:  259)  In  the  mid  1980's  American  journalist  Sally 
Belfrage  was  compelled  to  pretend  she  was  a  relative  of  a  prisoner  in  order  to 
gain  access  to  the  prison  (Belfrage  1988). 
Since  the  end  of  the  1981  hunger  strike,  journalists  had  periodically  requested 
access  to  the  prison.  In  the  late  1980s  the  first  newspaper  correspondents 
were  allowed  access.  The  BBC's  Paul  Hamann  had  been  trying  to  gain  access 
to  the  Maze  prison  since  the  early  1980s  (Dugdale  1990),  but  it  was  not  until 
May  1990  that  he  was  finally  given  permission  to  film  inside  the  H-Blocks.  This 
unprecedented  access  was  advocated  by  the  Prison  Department  of  the  NIO 
with  a  number  of  objectives  in  mind.  According  to  the  programme's  producer 
Steve  Hewlett,  there  was  a  desire  to  pre-empt  Sinn  F6in's  commemoration  in 
the  coming  year  of  the  tenth  anniversary  of  hunger  striker,  Bobby  Sands'  death 
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down.  A  precondition  for  this  was  that  the  prison  regime  was  no  longer  seen  as 
a  problem.  BBC  journalist  Peter  Taylor  commented  to  me  that: 
Once  you  have  lanced  the  boil,  if  you  like,  demythologised  the  place,  I 
think  if  you  are  an  administrator,  it  creates  a  climate  in  which  you  can 
move  rather  more  readily,  without  always  worrying  about  what  the 
media's  going  to  say  (Telephone  interview  May  1991). 
But  the  priorities  of  the  Prison  Department  ran  into  conflict  with  those  of  the 
Information  Service.  Andy  Wood,  a  former  deputy  of  Bernard  Ingham  at 
Downing  St,  was  worried  that  the  film  would  'backfire'  on  the  Northern  Ireland 
office.  This  was  a  particular  concern  since  both  Taylor  and  Harmann  had 
made  programmes  which  have  been  banned  or  censored.  Taylor's 
programmes  on  torture  of  suspects  in  interrogation  centres  caused  rows  in  the 
1  970s  (Taylor  1979)  and  Hamann  had  made  the  Real  Lives,  programme  'At  the 
Edge  of  the  Union'which  resulted  in  one  of  the  most  serious  clashes  between 
the  government  and  broadcasters  in  the  1980s.  According  to  Hamann: 
Andy  Wood  did  everything  he  could  to  stop  us  getting  in.  He  made  it 
quite  clear,  in  front  of  us,  which  surprised  us,  that  this  would  backfire'in 
an  enormous  way...  He  thought  Thatcher  would  go  bananas.  This 
programme,  like  'Edge  of  the  Union'  -  he  said  this  -  would  be  accused  of 
giving  succour  to  terrorism  (Telephone  interview  May  1991). 
Eventually  though  the  programme,  'Enemies  Within',  was  broadcast  in 
November  1990.  It  was  an  important  film  made  by  two  journalists  with 
substantial  experience  of  investigative  reporting  on  Northern  Ireland.  In  many 
respects  the  film  was  critical  of  the  official  perspective  on  Northern  Ireland,  in 
that  it  allowed  republican  and  loyalist  prisoners  to  explain  their  motivations  and 
political  philosophy  (See  Taylor  1990a;  1990b).  It  also  showed  that  the  prison 
authorities  unofficially  recognised  republican  and  loyalist  military  command 
structures  in  the  H-Blocks  which  is  contrary  to  the  official  position  that  the 
prisoners  are  simply  criminals.  Such  coverage  is  rare  on  British  television  (see 
Chapter  Five).  But  the  key  point  for  the  Prisons  department  was  that  the  prison 
should  cease  to  be  popularly  regarded  as  a  blot  on  the  landscape.  Two  days 
after  the  transmission  of  'Enemies  Within',  the  BBC  reported  that  the  NIO 
intended  eventually  to  close  the  prison  (Fortnight  1991a:  20)  The  NIO  did  not 
formally  confirm  this  until  June  28  the  next  year  (Fortnight  1991  b:  26)  by  which 
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purposes  is  to  note  that  a  conventional  textual  analysis  of  the  programme 
would  have  been  unlikely  to  suggest  that  the  programme  was  of  benefit  to  the 
NIO.  However,  as  we  have  seen,  the  strategy  of  the  Prison  department  in  fact 
overrode  such  considerations  and  allowed  the  programme  makers  free  access 
to  the  prison  in  order  that  they  could  'lance  the  boil'  of  the  prisons  image. 
Here,  a  part  of  the  bureaucracy  was  able  to  succeed  in  its  specific  media 
strategy  by  allowing  current  affairs  journalists  to  make  a  programme  which 
would  otherwise  have  been  likely  to  attract  government  antipathy. 
Lack  of  Control 
Information  which  may  affect  a  source's  image  or  credibility  can  reach  the 
media  in  ways  which  are  not  part  of  any  media  strategy.  One  way  this  can 
happen  is  through  a  lack  of  internal  control  or  communication  within  an 
organisation.  Among  official  sources  in  Northern  Ireland  this  is  a  particular 
problem  for  the  RUC  (and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  Army)  since  these  are  the 
organisations  whose  operatives  routinely  come  into  contact  with  journalists  at 
potential  news  events  involving  public  order. 
Chibnall,  for  example,  looks  at  PR  techniques  in  terms  of  the  perceived  aims  of 
the'control  agency'.  He  then  refers  to'harassment  and  repression'  as  being  a 
control  agency  technique  (Chibnall  1977:  182).  However,  while  journalists  and 
photographers  are  often  harassed  or  indeed  have  been  shot  with  Plastic  bullets 
by  the  Army  or  RUC10,  it  seems  clear  that  the  role  of  the  press  office  is  not  to 
co-ordinate  such  harassment  but  to  deal  with  the  fallout  should  the  harassment 
be  publicised.  Thus  in  some  circumstances  Army  or  RUC  treatment  of 
journalists  can  work  against  the  image  presented  by  the  press  office. 
Similar  tensions  are  evident  in  the  Republican  movement,  although  they  are 
compounded  by  the  secrecy  with  which  the  IRA  operates.  Thus  carefully 
planned  Sinn  F6in  PR  efforts  may  be  compromised  by  IRA  actions  which 
according  to  Richard  McAuley: 
impact  on  our  media  strategy  and  political  strategy.  But  it  is  not 
something  we  have  any  control  over.  It's  a  real  headache,  but  it's  a 
headache  that  we  have  had  to  learn  to  live  with  (Interview,  Belfast  May 
1991). 
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A  second  way  in  which  unintended  information  can  be  disclosed  is  by 
straightforward  human  error.  Sometimes  official  secrecy  is  maintained  in  order 
to  prevent  embarrassment  for  a  government  or  political  party.  But  details  are 
not  always  released  deliberately  even  by  sophisticated  PR  organisations. 
One  example  is  the  case  of  British  military  incursions  into  the  Republic  of 
Ireland.  Until  the  end  of  September  1988  the  issue  of  incursions  invariably 
brought  protests  from  the  Irish  government.  On  July  31  1988,  for  example, 
according  to  local  people,  and  one  security  source,  a  helicopter  'hovered  for 
some  time  directly  over  Monaghan,  a  town  some  four  miles  inside  the  border, 
before  circling  the  area  for  ten  minutes'  (Guardian  17  August  1988).  At  the 
time  the  Army  Press  Office  claimed  that  the  helicopter  had  overflown  the  border 
by  only'several  hundred  metres'and  that  the  incursion  was  a  mistake:  'We 
know  these  have  taken  place.  It  is  unfortunate,  they  are  navigational  errors. 
They  are  in  no  way  deliberate.  We  would  not  have  any  clearance  for  that' 
(Guardian  17  August  1988). 
The  Guardian,  however,  alleged  that  pilots  had  been  told  they  could  'fly  up  to 
five  nautical  miles  into  the  Republic'  and  that'far  from  objecting  to  overflights, 
some  of  the  recent  sorties  have  been  at  the  invitation  of  Irish  security  forces, 
(17  August  1988).  The  Dublin  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  dismissed  the 
story  as'malicious  rubbish'  and  according  to  Fortnight  'one  normally  suave 
Dublin  official'  subjected  one  of  the  Guardian  journalists  'to  a  three  hour  going 
over'  because  of  it  (Fortnight  November  1988). 
But  unfortunately  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  new  security 
minister  at  Stormont,  Ian  Stewart,  let  the  cat  out  of  the  bag  at  an  off-the- 
record  lunch  at  Stormont.  'Of  course  there  is  an  agreement  on 
overflights',  he  blithely  told  journalists  at  a  getting-to-know-you 
encounter  at  Stormont...  [leaving]  the  mouths  of  his  officials  agape' 
(Fortnight  November  1988).  11 
As  David  McKittrick  pointed  out  it  'appears  that  both  governments  have  for 
some  time  been  engaged  in  something  of  a  pantomime.  (Independent  28 
September  1988)  The  Irish  government  was  then  forced  into  acknowledging 
that  there  had  been  a  secret  agreement  on  overflights. 
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Ireland  but  it  is  clear  that  there  are  important  differences  and  contests  between 
different  branches  of  the  state  apparatus,  (for  example  the  RUC  and  the  Army 
or  the  NIO).  The  rivalry  and,  at  times,  internecine  warfare  between  the  various 
intelligence  organisations  (M15,  M16,  Army  Intelligence,  RUC  Special  Branch)  in 
Northern  Ireland  are  a  hardy  perennial  of  Ireland  watchers.  There  have  even 
been  allegations  that  people  have  been  killed  as  a  result  of  some  of  these 
tensions.  (See  Bloch  and  Fitzgerald  1983;  Foot  1990;  Holroyd  with  Burridge 
1989). 
These  are  long  term  rivalries  for  spheres  of  influence  which  are  overlaid  by 
divisions  about  the  most  appropriate  strategy  for  combating  the  IRA.  Army 
concerns  often  centre  on  the  constraints  imposed  on  military  action  by 
politicians  and  civil  servants,  whose  concerns  are  in  turn,  more  related  to 
legitimising  military  action  within  the  rule  of  law  (Bew  and  Patterson  1985; 
Dorril  and  Ramsay  1991;  O'Dowd  et  al  1980;  1982;  Urban  1992;  Verrier  1983). 
it  is  occasionally  useful  for  an  organisation  to  further  its  aims  by  waging  the 
rivalry,  at  least  partially,  in  the  media.  The  activitips  of  the  Information  Policy 
Unit  at  Army  HQ  in  Lisburn  in  the  early  1970s  often  involved  issuing  false 
information  or  stories  which  would  reflect  badly  on  other  official  organisationS.  12 
But  such  activities  are  not  confined  to  disinformation  work,  they  are  a  regular 
part  of  the  operation  of  official  sources  in  Northern  Ireland. 
The  raised  public  profile  of  M15  in  1992  seems  also  to  be  related  to  particular 
policy  objectives.  The  public  naming  of  the  new  head  of  M15  (an  organisation 
which  until  then  did  not  officially  exist)  was  rapidly  followed  by  the 
(unattributable)  news  that,  following  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  M15  was 
looking  for  new  areas  in  which  to  operate:  Thus  stories  appeared  suggesting 
that  M15  wanted  to  take  over  all  'anti  terrorist'  operations  in  Britain  from  the 
Special  Branch.  Most  importantly,  confidential  minutes  of  a  Metropolitan  Police 
policy  committee  meeting  were  leaked  to  the  Irish  Times  and  then  printed  in 
British  papers.  These  allegedly  showed  that  the  Met  had  'little  hard 
intelligence'on  recent  IRA  activities  in  Britain.  Such  manoeuvring  via  the  press 
seems  to  be  clearly  aimed  at  governmental  audiences  rather  than  the  public  at 
large,  although  it  does  result  in  a  more  visible  public  profile  for  the  secret  state. 
Shortly  after  this  the  government  decided  that  M15  would  take  over  anti-terrorist 
operations  within  Britain  from  the  Special  Branch,  thus  securing  a  measure  of 
resource  and  personnel  allocation  for  M15.13 
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audience  is  a  routine  tactic  in  both  official  and  alternative  sources.  In  the  case 
of  M15,  the  competition  is  with  the  Special  Branch  and  the  audience  is 
government  policy  makers.  In  other  cases  the  audience  and  the  competitor 
may  be  the  same.  For  example  the  RUC  report  on  the  shooting  of  three  would 
be  robbers  by  undercover  soldiers  in  1990  was  leaked  to  the  media  shortly 
after  it  had  been  sent  to  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  for  his  decision. 
The  report  revealed  that  the  RUC  had  recommended  against  prosecuting  the 
soldiers  and  was  seen  as  an  attempt  to  pressure  the  DPP: 
The  RUC's  recommendation  carries  no  legal  weight  but,  since  it  is 
known,  might  make  it  difficult  for  the  DPP  to  oppose  without  revealing  a 
controversial  division  of  opinion  between  him  and  the  security  forces 
(Moloney  1990c). 
Such  interdepartmental  rivalries  and  attempts  to  influence  other  parts  of  the 
state  apparatus  are  obviously  premised  on  the  view  that  the  pressured  part  of 
the  apparatus  cannot  be  guaranteed  to  operate  to  the  advantage  of  the 
leaker.  14 
Source  Competition 
Competition  for  credibility  and  legitimacy  are  central  and  conscious  objectives 
of  the  major  participants  in  the  Northern  Ireland  conflict.  Source  competition 
may  involve  second  guessing  an  opponent,  carefully  timing  a  disclosure, 
selective  release  of  information  or  any  of  a  host  of  PR  tactics  and  techniques. 
Different  organisations  have  varying  opportunities  to  use  the  range  of  tactics 
available  and  these  will  be  partly  conditioned  by  the  resources  or  credibility  of 
the  organisation.  Thus  organisations  which  are  less  financially  secure  than  the 
Northern  Ireland  Office  cannot  organise  expenses  paid  trips  to  Northern 
Ireland.  The  most  obvious  attempts  to  impose  different  understandings  on  the 
media  and  on  public  debate  generally  are  the  promotion  of  contending 
legitimations  of  the  use  of  force.  The  use  of  the  term'terrorist'  and  the  change 
in  British  government  strategy  in  the  mid  70s  to  'normal  isation  and 
'criminal  isation'  were  deliberate  attempts  to  ensure  that  the  republican  assault 
on  the  Northern  Ireland  state  was  shorn  of  all  possible  legitimacy.  Similarly  the 
republican  contention  that  the  border  is  the  root  cause  of  the  conflict  in  Ireland 
sets  out  to  undermine  British  claims  to  sovereignty  and  the  right  to  the  ýI 
monopoly  use  of  legitimate  force.  It  is  the  active  concern  of  both  to  label  the 
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propaganda'  claims  that  all  the  problems  of  Ireland  can  be  laid  at  the  door  of 
the  British.  We  might  also  note  that  the  strýtegy  of  official  sources  has  been  to 
try  and  attach  all  the  blame  to  the  IRA.  Thus: 
Since  1985  the  RLIC  has  maintained  a  policy  of  not  commenting  on 
individual  allegations  against  those  said  to  be  police  informers.  In  a 
standard  prepared  statement  yesterday  the  RUC  confirmed  its  policy: 
'No  inference  is  to  be  drawn  from  the  RUC's  silence  in  individual  cases. 
Attention  has  often  focused  wrongly  an  whether  a  person  was  giving 
information  to  the  police  rather  than  on  the  fact  that  a  person  was 
brutally  murdered  by  self-appointed  executioners'  (Guardian  19  July 
1989). 
Similarly,  when  John  Hermon  was  appointed  Chief  Constable  of  the  RUC  his: 
'first  order  was  to  forbid  police  from  disclosing  the  religion  of  terrorist  victims, 
ostensibly  because  this  was  fuelling  tit-for-tat  retaliations'  (Ryder  1989:  233). 
But,  as  Ryder  has  argued  this  is  hardly  going  to  be  effective  in  Northern 
Ireland,  'given  that  most  Ulster  citizens  can  be  safely  labelled  by  religion 
because  of  their  name  and  address,  given  the  rigid  sectarian  geography' 
(Ryder  1989:  233).  It  might  be  thought  that  the  real  impact  of  such  a  measure 
would  be  on  the  British  public  who  would  henceforth  be  deprived  of  vital 
contextualising  information,  thus  strengthening  the  perception  that  the  conflict 
is  incomprehensible.  Moreover,  since  virtually  all  sectarian  killings  are  of 
Catholics  by  Loyalist  paramilitaries,  the  absence  of  this  information  might 
reinforce  the  perception  fostered  by  the  British  government  that  the  root  cause 
of  the  troubles  is  the  IRA. 
Competition,  co-operation  and  agenda  building 
There  are  also  a  variety  of  ways  in  which  sources  may  seek  to  co-operate  with 
each  other  in  campaigning  on  a  particular  issue  or  in  attempting  to  legitimise 
their  own  actions.  The  key  to  success  in  this  area  is  credibility.  Legitimising 
the  activities  of  the  RUC  and  British  Army  in  international  human  rights  arenas 
can  be  difficult  for  the  British  government.  Part  of  the  reason  for  the  formation 
of  the  Standing  Advisory  Commission  on  Human  Rights  in  1973  was  its 
function  in  legitimating  the  British  government's  position  that  democratic  checks 
and  balances  existed.  In  order  to  be  effective  in  this  way  SACHR  had  to  be  set 
up  as  an'independent'  body.  While  appointments  to  the  Commission  are  made 
by  the  government,  SACHR  is  expected  to  monitor  and  criticise  British  policy Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  150 
on  occasion.  This  then  allows  the  government  to  point  to  SACHR  as  a  check 
on  the  possibility  of  the  over  enthusiastic  exercise  of  police  power.  in  practice 
the  NIO  tries  to  manage  the  public  statements  of  SACHR  and  tends  to  ignore 
their  findings.  According  to  former  Commission  member  Tom  Hadden,  the  NIO: 
will  be  concerned  not  to  have  the  Commission  doing  things  which  it 
views  as  damaging  to  its  position,  for  example,  the  Chairman  of  the 
Commission  was  brought  along  to  the  Moscow  meeting  of  the  CSCE 
(Conference  on  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe).  He  delivered  a 
statement  at  that  meeting  which  I  certainly  wouldn't  have  made.  That 
wasn't  discussed.  I  thought  it  was  a  totally  inappropriate  statement 
given  the  Commission's  experience.  The  statement  says,  in  essence, 
here  is  an  independent  human  rights  commission  which  is  doing  a 
human  rights  job  well.  What  it  didn't  say  was  that  everything  that  we 
had  said  over  the  last  5  years  had  been  ignored  (by  the  government]. 
That  was  a  case  for  the  Government  using  the  existence  of  the 
Commission  for  its  own  ends  (Interview,  London  April  1992). 
Similarly  the  Committee  on  the  Administration  of  Justice  (CAJ)  tries  to  influence 
the  drafting  of  legislation  by  requesting  meetings  with  the  NIO.  Such  meetings 
may  or  may  not  bring  results,  but  the  experience  of  the  CAJ  is  that  the  fact  of 
the  meetings  have  been  used  to  legitimate  government  statements.  As  Michael 
Ritchie  put  it: 
In  the  House  of  Commons,  the  fact  the  NIO  had  met  with  us  was 
mentioned  by  them  on  two  or  three  occasions,  as  if  to  say  there  was 
public  debate  about  the  Bill  and  they  had  engaged  in  consultations.  I 
suppose  the  danger  [is]  you  kind  of  get  pulled  into  the  argument  about 
whether  or  not  it  was  democratic  consultation.  We  protested  a  wee  bitý 
strongly  about  that  to  them.  That  is  the  one  thing  that  we  have  to  watch 
-  that  we  are  not  co-opted  in  some  way  (interview,  Belfast  April  1992). 
However,  the  campaigning  activities  of  civil  and  human  rights  activists  can  also 
make  a  real  difference  to  the  activities  of  official  bodies  especially  if  allegations 
of  human  rights  violations  are  published  in  the  media  (Whelan  1992). 
Building  credibility  is  crucial  to  an  organisation  like  the  Irish  Information 
partnership  and  can  enable  it  to'bridge  the  gap'between  campaigns  on  single 
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institutional  ised  and  credible  organisations.  By  compiling  the  best  available 
statistical  information  it  could  appear  credible  and  independent  to  official 
organisations.  This  allowed  extensive  dealings  with  the  Labour  Party 
spokesperson  on  Northern  Ireland  Kevin  McNamara.  According  to  Marian 
Lar.  agy: 
We  would  have  had  a  reputation  with  the  campaigning  people  who  gave 
us  the  information  and  with  MacNamara.  I  think  we  were  useful  to  him 
because  all  politicians  need  to  be  able  to  stand  there  and  have  the  facts 
at  the  finger  tips  (interview,  London  16  October  1991). 
The  work  of  the  Partnership  was  also  able  to  provide  the  factual  information 
which  journalists  need  and  some  will  use: 
I  think  that  the  business  of  drawing  attention  to  the  killings  by  the 
security  forces  was  important.  I  think  to  some  extent  to  we  probably 
made  it  easier  for  other  people  in  the  world  of  journalism  to  open  up 
(Interview,  London  October  1991). 
Media  strategies  are  planned  to  deny  any  possible  advantage  to  opponents. 
Following  bombing  incidents  in  Northern  Ireland,  the  RUC  seal  off  the  area  and 
control  all  access  to  the  site  of  the  bombing.  Television  crews,  especially,  may 
be  allowed  access  to  the  scene  if  it  is  felt  that  the  footage  will  have  positive 
results  for  the  RUC  or  negative  ones  for  the  IRA.  An  explosion  near  a  school, 
an  old  peoples  home,  a  hospital  or  a  religious  institution  provides  a  particularly 
good  photo  opportunity  illustrating  the'barbarity'  of  the  IRA  in  threatening 
'innocent"s  and  vulnerable  civilians.  However  for  the  RUC  such  publicity  may 
be  in  the  words  of  an  RUC  press  officer'a  double  edged  sword'  (interview, 
Derry  August  1989).  While  it  may  deliver  the  desired  message  about  the  evils 
of  the  IRA  to  the  public,  it  may  also  be  perceived  by  the  media  or  public  as 
promoting  fear.  Furthermore,  the  graphic  illustration  of  the  damage  which  the 
IRA  is  able  to  wreak  is  in  some  ways  a  public  illustration  of  the  inability  of  the 
RUC  to  'contain'  the  troubles,  the  result  of  which  may  be  a  boost  to  IRA  morale. 
These  worries  also  inform  police  and  government  information  policy  in 
combating  the  IRA  campaign  in  England.  On  the  one  hand  the  government 
wants  to  emphasise  the  injury,  destruction  and  disruption  caused  by  bombings 
and  bomb  hoaxes,  in  order  to  discredit  the  IRA  and  to  promote  public  vigilance. 
On  the  other  hand  they  are  anxious  to  play  down  the  extent  of  the  devastation 
and  disruption  in  order  to  avoid  handing  the  IRA  a  'propaganda  victory'.  After Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  152 
the  bombing  of  the  City  of  London  in  1993,  it  was  reported  that'Ministers  were 
yesterday  ordered  off  TV  and  radio  to  avoid  giving  the  IRA  publicity.  The 
decision  -  taken  on  advice  from  the  security  services  -  came  despite  world-wide 
coverage  of  the  blast'  (The  Sun  26  April  1993).  Concerns  such  as  these  lie 
behind  calls  from  government  Ministers  for  journalists  to  report  less  of  the 
violence  and  more  of  the'real'side  of  Northern  Ireland.  However,  this  is  one  of 
the  major  contradictions  of  the  strategies  of  all  organisations  engaged  in  force 
(including  the  IRA,  the  Ulster  Defence  Association  (UDA)/Ulster  Freedom 
Fighters  (UFF)  and  the  British  government).  It  is  a  strategy  which  is  often 
hindered  by  the  routine  operations  of  media  institutions. 
News  Values 
There  is  an  important  sense  in  which  the  priorities  of  journalists  and  those  of 
the  state  are  different.  The  professional  imperatives  of  news  journalism  tend  to 
make  violence  the  main  rationale  for  reporting  Northern  Ireland  (Schlesinger 
1987;  Elliot  1977).  It  seems  that  in  the  early  1970s  some  news  desks  were  so 
convinced  (presumably,  partly,  by  their  own  prior  reporting)  that  Northern 
Ireland  was  synonymous  with  violence,  that  they  were  reluctant  to  print  stories 
which  gave  a  different  view.  Simon  Hoggart  has  related  his  experiences: 
Years  ago  I  wrote  an  article  about  holidaying  in  Northern  Ireland.  I 
praised  the  gorgeous  countryside,  the  friendly  people,  the  opportunities 
for  riding.  fishing  and  boating  and  mentioned  how  -  not  surprisingly  -  it 
was  wonderfully  uncrowded.  Sadly  The  Guardian,  for  which  I  then 
worked,  refused  to  print  it  on  the  grounds  that  some  things  were  so 
improbable  that  nobody  would  believe  them  even  if  they  were  endorsed 
by  a  team  of  notaries  public  headed  by  George  Washington  with  his  little 
axe  (Observer  Magazine  25  February  1990). 
It  has  often  been  assumed  by  critics  of  the  media  that  the  concentration  on 
violence  indicated  that  there  was  a  simple'fit'  between  official  definitions  of  the 
conflict  and  news  reports.  But  it  is  clear  from  government  statements  that  the 
coverage  of  violence  is  eschewed  and,  somewhat  disingenuously,  blamed  on 
the  media.  Former  Downing  Street  press  secretary,  Bernard  Ingham  put  it  as 
follows: 
Against  a  background  of  continuing  violence,  the  journalists,  objectives 
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They  wanted  to  accentuate  the  negative,  the  difficulties  and  the  conflict, 
whereas  Mrs  Thatcher  -  and  I  must  say  myself  -  wanted  to  underline  the 
positive  achievements  in  Northern  Ireland,  to  highlight  the  peaceful 
normality  of  life  over  most  of  the  province  and  to  encourage  the  public  in 
their  fight  against  terrorism.  Once  I  raised  with  both  the  BBC  and  ITN 
the  frustration  felt  in  Belfast  that  a  festival  and  parades  there  attended 
by  the  Mayors  of  Dublin  and  Belfast  had  passed  off  peacefully  -  and 
without  any  coverage  whatsoever  (Ingham  1991:  309). 
However,  official  sources  in  Northern  Ireland  operate  a  dual  strategy  with 
regard  to  media  coverage.  It  is  not  uncommon  for  the  Northern  Ireland  Office, 
the  RUC  or  even  for  officials  promoting  the  government  view  on  employment 
discrimination,  to  emphasise  the  deeds  of  the  IRA  thereby  painting  a  picture  of 
Northern  Ireland  as  a  battle  zone,  where  violence  is  endemic.  Indeed,  publicity 
material  from  the  NIO  prominently  features  such  images  in  combination  with  an 
emphasis  on  the  positive  qualities  of  life  in'Ulstee  (Miller  1993a). 
The  republican  movement  has  similar  problems.  In  order,  at  least  partly,  to 
counter  'normal  isation'  and  the  'containment'  (Rolston  1991)  of  the  troubles,  the 
IRA  continue  to  plan  attacks  which  'expose'  the  inability  of  the  State  to  control 
their  struggle.  At  the  same  time  Sinn  Fdin  spokespersons  routinely  complain 
about  the  fixation  of  journalists  with  the  activities  of  the  IRA.  If  the  perception  is 
that  Sinn  176in  is  simply  a  vehicle  for  championing  the  IRA,  according  to  Gerry 
Adams: 
it  is  because  that  has  been  the  issue  on  which  the  media  has 
concentrated  down  the  years.  Eighty  percent  of  all  statements  issued 
through  Republican  press  centres  have  been  on  social,  economic  or 
political  issues  in  particular,  most  of  which,  incidentally,  have  been 
ignored  (cited  in  Morrison  1989:  8). 
Some  journalists  do  write  committed  articles  consciously  pointing  out  the 
positive  side  of  Northern  Ireland.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  mid-range 
tabloid  newspapers  such  as  the  Daily  Mail  and  was  a  feature  of  the  coverage  of 
Today  under  the  editorship  of  Northern  Ireland  born  David  Montgomery 
(Odling-Smee  1989).  Nevertheless,  violence  remains  the  main  rationale  for 
coverage.  It  is  the  predominance  of  news  values  of  this  type  which  allow  a 
contrast  to  be  drawn  between  routine  images  of  Northern  Ireland  and  the  'other 
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Industrial  Development  Board  writing  to  an  American  business  audience  under 
the  title:  'Despite  Its  Bad  Media  Image,  Northern  Ireland  Proves  To  Be  a  Good 
Place  To  Do  Business'  (Walters  1984:  12). 
But  the  NIO  continues  to  promote  this  dual  view  in  spite  of  its  contradictions 
and  the  disadvantages  as  journalists,  used  to  a  diet  of  atrocity  stories,  are  less 
than  keen  on  good  news.  One  such  story  was  the  delivery  of  aircraft  ordered 
by  the  United  States  Air  Force  from  Shorts  manufacturers  in  1984.  The  story 
was  announced  in  a  press  release  and,  in  co-operation  with  the  NIO,  some 
enthusiasm  was  drummed  up  amongst  journalists.  The  BBC  sent  a  camera 
crew  and  filmed  the  impressive  array  of  dignitaries  present  including  a  Northern 
Ireland  Minister,  the  US  Ambassador,  US  generals  and  the  USAF  band. 
According  to  Shorts  'the  largest  single  contract  ever  received  by  Shorts,  was 
won  in  the  face  of  extremely  stiff  competition  and  has  resulted  in  a  substantial 
intake  of  new  employees'  (Press  Release  8  August  1984).  This  item  seemed 
destined  for  the  evening  news  until  the  IRA  intervened.  In  County  Derry  a  tour 
by  Irish  Northern  Aid  supporters  featured  an  appearance  by  two  armed  and 
masked  members  of  the  IRA.  Cameras  were  present  and  the  incident  made 
the  television  news  that  night  (BBC1,2100,8  August  1984).  The  story  from 
Shorts,  however,  was  dropped.  The  IRA,  however,  did  not  gain  favourable 
publicity  from  this.  The  BBC  reporter  dismissed  the  incident  as  a  publicity 
stunt.  The  issue  is  not  the  way  in  which  the  'stunt'  was  covered,  but  simply  that 
it  was  covered  in  preference  to  the'good'  news  story.  16  It  is  clear  that  incidents 
like  the  appearance  of  two  armed  and  masked  IRA  members  contain  a'news 
value'  that  the  Shorts  story  simply  did  not.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that 
this  type  of  publicity  stunt  is  not  necessarily  viewed  as  a  success  in  the 
Republican  movement.  According  to  Richard  McAuley  of  Sinn  F6in: 
I'm  not  sure  that  having  armed  IRA  volunteers  getting  onto  a  bus  with 
someone  from  NORAID  is  actually  a  constructive  thing  to  do 
... 
We 
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tainly  didn't  know  it  was  going  to  happen.  The  IRA  in  Derry  decided 
for  their  own  reasons  it  was  an  opportunity,  they  saw  it  as  a  publicity 
stunt  and  they  did  it.  I  think  in  the  United  States  it  probably  was  not 
something  which  should  have  been  done  (interview,  Belfast  May  1991). 
According  to  McAuley  such  stunts  owe  more  to  a  lack  of  co-ordination  between 
Sinn  F6in  and  the  IRA  than  to  efficient  public  relations: 
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some  IRA  volunteer  in  Derry  onto  television.  Anything  that  gets  IRA 
volunteers  on  television  they  would  see  as  a  good  thing.  But  the  linkage 
between  NORAID  and  the  IRA  is  politically  not  something  that  I  think 
would  work  to  our  advantage.  If  one  had  had  the  opportunity  to  consider 
a  proposal  that  that  be  done  then  my  advice  would  have  been  no  don't 
do  it.  Sensationalist  news  very  rarely  works  to  our  advantage.  Because 
it's  tending  to  pander  to  the  baser  instincts  of,  particularly  British  public 
opinion,  about  what  the  IRA  is,  who  they  are  and  who  supports  them, 
and  also  about  these  crazy,  sort  of  loony  Irish  Americans  who  come  to 
Ireland  so  that  the  IRA  can  parade  in  front  of  them  (interview,  Belfast 
May  1991). 
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  image  of  the  IRA  as  an  efficient  military  force, 
keeping  the  might  of  the  British  Army  under  pressure  is  not  regarded  as  good 
PR  by  Sinn  F6in.  The  opportunity  to  film  the  RA  in  action  is  more  likely  to  be 
afforded  to  international  film  crews  who  are  themselves  more  likely  to  be  able 
to  broadcast  the  resulting  footage.  The  last  such  incident  in  Britain  over  filming 
in  Carrickmore  caused  a  major  controversy  (See  Chapter  Two).  There  is  also  a 
sense  in  which  this  image  is  useful  to  present  to  an  international  audience. 
According  to  McAuley: 
The  hope  is,  presumably  on  the  part  of  the  IRA  that  the  reports  will 
reflect  an  analysis  of  the  conflict  at  least  in  that  part  of  the  North  where 
the  IRA  are  in  control,  have  territorial  advantage,  that  the  British  are 
under  pressure.  The  building  of  the  hilltop  forts  and  the  closing  of  the 
border  roads,  all  of  that  reinforces  that  image.  That  sort  of  film 
reinforces  an  image  of  the  IRA  having  a  political  as  well  as  a  military 
advantage  (Interview,  Belfast  May  1991). 
it  is  difficult  to  argue  from  this  that  journalists  simply  recycle  or  transmit  the 
'bureaucratic  propaganda'  of  official  sources  or  the  'terrorist  propaganda'  of  the 
republican  movement.  There  is  a  methodological  point  here,  which  is  that  it  is 
possible  to  show  that  much  of  British  mainstream  coverage  (as  opposed  to 
current  affairs  or  features)  is  dominated  by  news  about  'terrorism'  and  the  evils 
of  the  IRA  which  is  oriented  towards  the  views  of  the  powerful.  At  the  same 
time  we  find  that  official  sources  are  still  not  able  to  secure  the  prominence 
they  would  like  for  stories  about  the  'other  side'  of  life  in  Northern  Ireland.  In 
the  same  way  we  find  that  even  when  alternative  sources  such  as  the  IRA 
manage  to  secure  news  attention,  it  is  still  not  the  kind  of  attention  necessarily Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic 
desired  by  the  Republican  Centre  Press. 
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The  'good  news'  part  of  British  strategy  meets  with  relatively  little  success  in 
the  news  media,  foundering  on  a  contradiction  within  the  strategy  of  official 
sources  and  on  the  rock  of  news  values.  Similarly,  for  the  republicans,  the 
problem  is  the  contradictory  elements  of  the  armalite  and  the  ballot  box 
strategy.  Republicans  want  to  get  coverage  for  the  political  policies  of  Sinn 
F6in,  but  the  violence  of  the  IRA  is  more  newsworthy. 
Success  and  Failure 
The  measurement  of  'success'  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  a  given 
organisation  may  have  a  variety  of  aims.  Thus  a  small  and  resource  poor 
group  may  be  aiming  simply  to  increase  it's  membership.  It  may  not  get 
positive  or  even  a  great  deal-of  coverage,  but  this  might  not  be  necessary  for 
the  successful  completion  of  its  strategy.  Similarly  a  resource  rich  organisation 
may  get  lots  of  positive  coverage  while  at  the  same  time  its  strategy  involved 
getting  less  coverage.  In  that  sense  it  could  be  said  to  be  unsuccessful,  while 
appearing  to  be  successful  in  terms  of  its  media  profile. 
In  general  there  is  a  fair  measure  of  agreement  on  who  gets  the  good  publicity. 
Thus  we  find  The  NIO's  David  Gilliland  arguing  that  the  NIO  could  have  been 
given  a  much  rougher  ride  by  the  media: 
Journalists  are  there  to  get  the  news  and  to  print  the  news  and  they're 
not  really  there  to  take  on  a  spoon  everything  that  the  government 
hands  out.  And  so  I  think  if  there  had  been  more  drive  and  a  more 
analytical  approach  to  the  information  that  was  given  by  the  journalists 
themselves,  well  then  Government  would  perhaps  have  come  under 
greater  cross  examination  (Hard  News,  Channel  Four  19  October  1989). 
Roy  Greenslade  found  that  the  Commonwealth  journalists  he  accompanied  on 
an  NIO  tour  almost  all  saw  the  conflict  in  colonial  terms  before  they  went: 
'The  British  government  doesn't  want  to  give  the  people  of  Northern 
Ireland  their  rights  and  is  trying  to  suppress  them',  says  Khadija  Riyami, 
from  Tanzania.  'I  don't  condone  the  violence,  but  they  have  a  cause,.  It 
is  the  most  common  view.  John  Boyce,  associate  editor  of  the  Barbados 
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government  of  some  form  of  rights.  There  is  a  large  colonial  flavour  to 
the  dispute...  And  how  do  they  view  the  IRA?  'l  won't  call  them  terrorists' 
says  Muhammed  Ayub,  a  news  editor  in  Lahore,  Pakistan.  'We  have  a 
similar  situation  in  Kashmir  where  people  are  struggling  for  their  freedom 
from  India'. 
After  their  NIO  sponsored  visit  almost  all  had  changed  their  minds: 
On  the  journey  back,  I  discover  that  almost  all  have  certainly  changed 
their  minds.  No-one  holds  any  more  to  the  colonial  theory.  No-one 
views  it  as  the  Irish  people  fighting  for  their  rights.  If  there  was  little 
sympathy  for  the  IRA  before  the  trip,  there  was  less  after  it...  One  who 
was  disabused  of  the  colonialist  scenario,  John  from  Barbados,  said: 
'Originally,  I  thought  the  British  Government  were  being  unfair.  Now  I 
have  a  better  grasp  of  it  I  see  it  as  two  communities  and  their  political 
parties  fighting  among  themselves'.  Ayub,  from  Pakistan,  was  certain: 
'No,  I  can't  compare  it  with  Kashmir,  where  the  vast  majority  of  the 
people  are  fighting  against  the  government.  Here  there  are  two 
communities  fighting  each  other  with  the  government  in  between' 
(Greenslade,  1993b). 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Northern  Ireland  Office,  such  trips  seem  to  pay 
great  dividends  in  shaping  the  perceptions  of  journalists  from  around  the  world. 
There  is  also  a  widespread  recognition  that  the  republicans  are  not  given 
sympathetic  coverage.  According  to  Jeffrey  Donaldson  of  the  Ulster  Unionist 
Party: 
Sinn  Fdin  do  get  a  fairly  bad  press.  You  get  the  occasional 
documentary  from  Channel  4  which  we  would  argue  is  not  helpful  in  that 
at  times  it  tries  to  present  Sinn  Fein  as  a  rational  political  organisation. 
But  I  think  in  general,  John  Hume  and  the  SDLP  get  a  very  good  press 
and  I  think  in  general,  many  sections  of  the  media  are  broadly 
sympathetic  to  John  Hume  (Interview,  Belfast  June  1993). 
This  is  endorsed  at  the  SUP.  According  to  Jonathon  Stephenson  this  is 
because  Sinn  Fdin  have: 
a  bigger  mountain  to  climb  than  we  have...  They  are  approaching  a Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  158 
much  more  hostile  media  environment  than  we  are.  In  a  way  I  got  a 
slight  shock  when  I  joined  the  SIDLP  straight  from  the  TUC,  because  I 
was  used  to  swimming  against  the  tide  of  public  opinion  on  almost  every 
issue  you  care  to  mention.  That  the  SDLP,  in  fact,  on  the  nationalist 
side  of  this  community,  is  the  establishment  party,  representing  a 
majority  voice  has  a  lot  of  goodwill  going  for  it  among  the  media,  that 
was  a  slight  culture  shock  for  me  (interview,  Belfast  August  1990). 
This  type  of  coverage  is  enhanced  by  John  Hume's  good  personal 
relationships  with  journalists: 
He  will  arrange  for  journalists  to  come  and  see  him  in  Donegal.  Hekind 
of  summons  them  to  his  cottage  in  Donegal.  In  fact  I  don't  think  that's  a 
bad  strategy  at  all.  It  puts  them  fjournalists]  at  an  instant  disadvantage. 
He  gives  them  a  good  time,  mixes  them  a  lethal  cocktail,  and  they  come 
back  happy  and  Hume  gets  an  extremely  good  press.  A.  because  he's 
very  good  and  B.  because  he  does  take  time  to  develop  good  relations 
with  individual  journalists  (Interview,  Belfast  August  1990). 
There  is  also  widespread  agreement  that  the  Unionist  parties  have  a  poor 
media  image.  According  to  Sinn  F6in  the  unionist  protest  campaign  against  the 
Anglo-Irish  Agreement'cost  them  dearly  in  PR  terms  and  to  the  British  public  it 
has  only  emphasised  the  differences  between  the  Six  Counties  and  Britain' 
(Sinn  F6in  1987:  4).  Unionists  too  have  acknowledged  that  they  have  a  poor 
public  image.  According  to  Sammy  Wilson,  the  image  of  the  DUP  is: 
fairly  bad  as  far  as  the  general  populace  is  concerned.  I  don't  think  it 
really  matters  too  much  with  the  people  who  support  us.  In  fact  I  think 
that  they'll  come  to  expect  that  that  should  be  the  reaction  and  if  the 
media  are  praising  us  you  know  they're  going  to  wonder.  I've  had  this  all 
the  time  'what're  you  people  at?  '  because  there's  something 
complementary  said  about  you  (Interview,  Belfast  June  1993). 
There  is  a  perception  here  that  the  unionist  parties  are  bound  by  their 
constituencies  to  repeating  a  message  which  may  not  be  popular  outside  the 
confines  of  the  Unionist  community.  The  cause  of  this  poor  image  has  been 
diagnosed  by  a  wide  range  of  unionist  politicians  and  writers  and  there  is 
considerable  agreement  across  the  spectrum  of  unionism  that  at  least  part  of 
the  problem  is  a  failure  of  unionist  public  relations.  Thus  according  to  Jeffrey Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  159 
Donaldson,  the  Hon.  Treasurer  of  the  Ulster  Unionist  Party: 
I  think  at  times  there  is  an  attempt  by  those  within  the  media  to 
misrepresent  some  of  the  things  that  unionism  does  [but]  I'm  quite  happy 
for  unionism  to  share  the  blame  with  the  media  in  terms  of  how  our 
image  is  presented.  It  is  not  sufficient  just  to  say  it's  all  the  fault  of  the 
media.  That  is  not  the  case.  Some  of  it's  the  fault  of  the  media  but  a 
lot  of  it's  also  our  own  fault  in  the  way  that  we  have  presented  our  case 
(Interview,  Belfast  June  1993) 
For  Alan  Wright  of  the  Ulster  Clubs  the  Anglo-Irish  agreement  was  one  result  of 
the  failure.  The  agreement  was: 
the  culmination  of  50  years  work  by  nationalists,  not  two  years  work  in 
Dublin.  Fifty  years  of  lobbying  right  across  the  world.  A  50-year  PR  job. 
We  haven't  been  doing  that  and  we  have  to  learn  that  lesson  (interview 
in  Fortnight  No.  233,10  February  1986  cited  in  O'Dowd  1991:  168). 
But  the  problem  is  that  even  now  unionism  has  failed  to  mount  a  coherent  PR 
campaign.  In  the  words  of  John  Oliver,  former  Permanent  Secretary  at 
Stormont: 
The  unionist  philosophy  has  become  disastrously  stuck  in  -a  setting 
appropriate  no  doubt  to  earlier  times,  when  intransigence  was  the 
response  to  continuing  threat  and  exclusiveness  justified  by  smouldering 
rebellion.  It  is  largely  for  that  reason  that  legitimate  unionist 
governments  from  1921  till  1972  remained  tongue  tied  in  so  many 
important  ways  and  that  their  energetic  and  expensive  campaigns  in 
Great  Britain  and  North  America  were  less  than  convincing.  Spokesman 
were  hesitant,  unsure  and  reticent  because  deep  down  they  had  no 
assurance  that  they  could  speak  frankly  for  unionism.  In  so  far  as 
unionism  had  become  in  practice  a  defensive  stance  and  in  so  far  as  it 
was  buttressed  by  attitudes  of  Protestant  ascendancy,  unworthy 
electoral  practices  and  unfair  discrimination,  then  its  spokesmen  were 
unable  to  do  justice  to  the  real  merits  of  their  case  and  to  the  undoubted 
achievements  of  their  regime,  both  central  and  local,  in  bringing 
prosperity  and  progress  to  the  people  (Oliver  1978:  68). 
'Typically'  as  Liam  O'Dowd  has  written,  'Oliver  does  not  elaborate  the  positive Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  160 
philosophy  of  Unionism  any  fufther'(O'Dowd  1991:  169).  The  consequences  of 
this  fundamental  identity  crisis  is  that  the  Unionists  have  few  friends  in  the 
media  or  internationally.  In  international  terms  they  are  a  blot  on  the  landscape 
because  of  their  inability  to  modemise  and  present  themselves  in  terms 
acceptable  to  liberal  democratic  norms. 
Conclusions 
The  NIO  and  other  official  sources  cannot  always  dominate,  but  official  sources 
have  been  remarkably  effective  in  influencing  media  coverage.  Alternative 
sources  can  and  do  make  an  impact,  but  they  tend  to  be  limited  by  resourcing 
and  credibility  problems  as  well  as  official  attempts  at  censorship  and 
intimidation  of  the  media. 
The  success  of  a  particular  media  strategy  may  not  mean,  and  in  fact,  tends 
not  to  mean  the  domination  of  news  agendas  or  the  reproduction  of  frameworks 
of  understanding.  In  general,  media  strategies  focus  on  more  limited  goals. 
Some  of  the  major  successes  in  the  media  strategies  of  non-official  sources 
have  been  successful  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  media  agendas  have  still 
operated  within  parameters  set  by  official  sources.  It  does  not  always  require 
that  the  media  become  oppositional  for  non  official  sources  to  succeed. 
The  next  chapter  examines  the  content  of  news  reports  and  shows  that  the 
potential  of  the  press  to  criticise  or  oppose  official  views  depends  on  the 
interaction  of  a  number  of  identifiable  factors,  such  as,  format,  the  policing  of 
the  media,  and  source  strategies.  It  also  shows  that  coverage  of  Northern 
Ireland  in  the  US  is  considerably  more  open  to  critical  views  than  that  in  Britain. 
Even  so  US  media  coverage  still  operates  predominantly  within  the  official 
framework.  This  is  the  case  even  in  those  cases  where  the  British  government 
has  felt  itself  to  be  losing  and  the  republican  movement  winning  the 
propaganda  war. 
FOoTNOTES 
1  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  security  considerations  can  hamper  the  efforts  of  the  information 
manager.  In  the  view  of  one  Director  of  the  Northern  Ireland  Information  Service: 
if  you  had  a  totally  free  hand  obviously  you  would  be  dragging  it  out  for  weeks  and  days  in 
advance,  sending  out  invitations  and  all  that  sort  of  thing.  Stimulating  people  to  be  there, 
especially  if  it  was  a  good  story  of  a  factory  opening  or  jobs  or  something  like  that  (interview, Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  161 
Belfast  July  1990). 
2  COI,  1989:  23. 
3  Information  from  the  Northern  Ireland  Information  Service  August  1989. 
4  Although  it  is  paid  for  by  the  Information  Dept  of  the  FCO,  OVIS  was,  until  1990,  part  of  the 
COI  with  a  staff  complement  of  forty-three  in  London  (Col  1990b)  plus  a  Visits  Officer  in  each 
of  the  regional  Offices  In  Newcastle,  Leeds  and  Bristol  as  well  as  one  at  the  Welsh  Office, 
three  at  the  Scottish  Office  and  two  at  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  (COI  1  990c:  32-34).  In  the 
year  1988-89  OVIS  organised  a  total  of  900  programmes  for  2,500  visitors  from  132  countries. 
(Col  1989:  23)  In  1989-90  there  were  926  visits  for  2,600  people.  (COI  1  990a:  24).  In  addition 
there  is  the  London  Correspondents  Service  with  a  staff  of  six  (COI  1990b)  which  organises 
visits  forjournalists  resident  in  Britain.  Figure  4.1  gives  available  data  on  trips  organised  by 
the  Tourist  Board  and  the  Industrial  Development  Board. 
Figure  3.1 
Number  of  visits  byjoumaiists  to  Northem 
Ireland  paid  for  by  the  NITB  and  IDB 
IVITA3  IDR 
1982/83  130  N/A 
1983/84  >140  N/A 
1984/85  200  N/A 
1985/86  140  N/A 
1986/87  200  47 
1987/88  300  60 
1988/89  400  96 
1989/90  300  83 
1990/91  >300  61 
1991/92  300  108 
1992/93  250  70 
Key:  N/A  =not  available 
Sources:  NI  Tourist  Board  Annual  Report  and  Accounts,  Vol. 
39,1986/87:  11;  Vol.  40,1987/88:  8;  Vol.  41,1988/89:  9;  Vol.  41, 
1989/90:  9;  IDB,  Annual  Report  and  Accounts  1990191:  89; 
1991192:  27,1992193:  33 
5  These  papers,  all  produced  by  the  Information  Department  of  the  Foreign  Office,  come  in 
two  main  series:  Background  briefs  about  all  aspects  of  government  and  foreign  policy  and 
Greyband  briefs  (after  1988,  titled  Northern  Ireland  Briefs)  which  are  specifically  about  Northern 
Ireland.  Each  of  the  briefs  bears  the  legend  'this  paper  has  been  prepared  for  general  briefing 
purposes'.  On  the  Background  briefs  are  the  additional  words  'it  is  not  and  should  not  be 
construed  or  quoted  as  an  expression  of  government  policy.  The  first  Greyband  brief  I  have 
been  able  to  trace  appeared  in  October  1980  and  dealt  with  the  ongoing  prison  protests 
(Foreign  &  Commonwealth  Office  1980).  The  Background  Briefs  go  back  as  far  as  1978. Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  162 
Significantly,  this  is  the  year  the  Information  Research  Department  in  the  Foreign  Office  was 
disbanded  and  replaced  by  the  Overseas  Information  Department.  This  in  turn  was  replaced 
by  the  Information  Department  in  the  early  1980's.  IRD  was  a  covert  propaganda  department 
of  the  Foreign  Office  with  close  links  to  the  intelligence  community  (Bloch  and  Fitzgerald  1983; 
Fletcher  1982;  Dorril  and  Ramsay  1990  and  Smith  1979).  IRD  officials  were  also  seconded  to 
the  Information  Policy  Unit  In  Lisburn  in  the  early  70's  to  help  with  this  information  work  (Foot 
1990).  During  that  period,  IRD  produced  several  'briefing  documents'  on  Northern  Ireland  such 
as  The  IRA:  Alms,  Policy,  Tactics.  Briefings  produced  by  the  Information  Department  during 
the  1980's  are  the  direct  descendants  of  such  material. 
6  An  updated  version  of  Northern  Ireland  Chronicle  was  made  after  the  signing  of  the  Anglo- 
Irish  Agreement  in  1985  and  is  still  (in  1993)  on  the  catalogue  of  the  London  Television  Service 
at  the  COI  which  produces  films  for  the  FCO  to  distribute  overseas. 
7  These  figures  are  calculated  from  a  compilation  of  published  information  to  be  found  in 
Appendix  1.  The  total  does  not  include  any  of  the  staff  in  the  Central  Office  of  Information  or 
the  Ministry  of  Defence  in  London  or  the  home  and  overseas  branches  of  the  diplomatic 
service,  especially  In  the  US  who  spend  large  proportions  of  their  time  on  information  work  on 
Northern  Ireland.  Nor  does  it  include  the  personnel  of  advertising  agencies  and  public  relations 
consultants  working  on  NIO  advertising  or,  writing  'good  news'  about  Northern  Ireland. 
8  This  was  Trevor  Hanna  who  went  on  to  become  the  Belfast  correspondent  for  the  Sun. 
9  Information  from  conversation  with  senior  former  member  of  the  SOLP,  June  1993 
10  On  harassment  of  journalists  by  republicans,  loyalists  and  British  forces  see  Bolton 
1990:  219-220;  Campbell  1985;  Curtis  1984:  251-253;  'The  Mirror  and  the  IRA',  Daily  Mirror23 
November  1974;  Journalist  July/August  1991:  6-7;  Conway  1989;  Hanvey  1990;  Index  on 
Censorship,  February  1993a,,  1993b. 
II  The  question  is  when  is  a  mistake  not  a  mistake?  I  have  tried  to  give  as  accurate  an 
account  of  this  incident  as  possible,  however,  this  is  not  to  say  that  all  'mistaken'  disclosures  of 
information  are  actual  mistakes,  nor  should  it  be  assumed  that  genuine  mistakes  do  not  on 
occasion  have  some  beneficial  pay  offs. 
12  See  Foot  1990,  for  some  examples.  See  also  'Black  Propaganda  in  Ulster  admitted'  The 
Times,  31  January  1990. 
13  See,  for  example,  Chris  Ryder,  Neil  Darbyshire  and  Ben  Fenton,  'Yard  Minutes  on  the  IRA 
are  leaked',  Daily  Telegraph,  22  April  1992,  Duncan  Campbell,  Richard  Norton-Taylor  and 
Owen  Bowcott,  'Yard  plays  down  IRA  leaW,  The  Guardian  23  April  1992,  Richard  Norton. 
Taylor,  'M15  and  Met  in  anti-terror  showdown,  7he  Guardian,  23  April  1992,  Richard  Norton- 
Taylor  and  Duncan  Campbell,  'MI5  wins  fight  to  take  on  IRA',  7he  Guardian,  9  May  1992, 
David  Rose,  W15  will  take  over  more  police  work',  7he  Observer,  21  June  1992 
14  In  the  event  the  DPP  recommended  against  prosecution. 
Is  As  opposed  to  those  civilians  who  are  by  implicit  contrast  labelled  as  culpable.  In  particular Public  Relations  as  a  Propaganda  Tactic  163 
these  include  members  of  the  nationalist  community  who  are  shot  by  the  'security  forces'.  In 
the  official  view  the  notion  of  a  guilty  civilian  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  members  of 
illegal  paramilitary  groups  are  deemed  to  be  civilians  for  the  purposes  of  official  statistics,  but 
when  they  are  shot  dead  by  British  forces,  they  are  'terrodsts'. 
16  It  is  this  point  that  has  so  often  exercised  the  Ire  of  counter  insurgency  writers  and  Northern 
Ireland  ministers.  However  they  tend  to  conveniently  ignore  the  other  factors  outlined  here 
(See,  for  example,  Clutterbuck  1981;  Rees  1985:  338-345;  Wilkinson  1977) Chapter  Four 
From  'Terrorists"  to  'Freedom  fighters.  - 
International  Coverage  of  Northern  Ireland 
A  cursory  glance  at  European  or  North  American  newspapers  reveals  coverage 
of  the  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  which  is  markedly  different  from  that  found  in 
Britain.  British  mainstream  news  programmes  tend  to  be  relatively  closed 
around  the  official  perspective.  'Terrorism'  is  the  ubiquitous  description  of  the 
activities  of  the  Irish  Republican  Army.  Outside  Britain,  other,  more 
legitimating,  descriptions  start  to  appear.  However,  this  doesn't  mean  that 
international  coverage  tends  to  favour  the  'terrorists'.  Comparative  analysis  of 
international  coverage  shows  that  the  way  Northern  Ireland  is  reported  in 
Britain  is  neither  'natural'  or  immutable,  nor  is  it  the  only  way  to  cover  the 
conflict  in  Northern  Ireland.  Alternative  models,  even  within  Western  countries 
do  exist. 
Method 
In  order  to  examine  the  ways  in  which  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland  varies 
between  different  national  media  systems  (even  in  an  age  of  increasing 
internationalisation),  media  types  and  presentational  formats,  I  will  compare 
British  and  US  press  and  TV  coverage  of  the  killings  in  Gibraltar  in  March  1988 
and  their  aftermath.  I  have  chosen  the  US  because  it  is  an  ally  of  Britain  and, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  regarded  as  the  most  important  arena  of  propaganda 
warfare  by  both  the  British  and  the  republicans.  The  events  surrounding  the 
Gibraltar  killings  are  particularly  appropriate  because  they  were  regarded  by 
the  US  media  as  a  major  story  and  were  one  of  the  increasingly  few  stories 
which  brought  US  camera  crews  to  Belfast.  Additionally  the  killings  were  the 
subject  of  an  hour  long  documentary  on  US  television,  which  is  something  of  a 
rarity. 
In  Britain  I  have  included  all  national  newspapers  as  well  as'main  news 
programmes',  current  affairs  and  documentary  coverage.  In  the  US  the  three 
major  TV  networks,  ABC,  NBC  and  CBS  as  well  as  a  range  of  the  US  press  - 
The  New  York  Times,  Chicago  Tribune,  Atlanta  Constitution,  Boston  Globe, 
Christian  Science  Monitor,  Washington  Post  and  the  Los  Angeles  71meS.  2 
Before  we  engage  in  detailed  comparisons  of  the  British  and  US  press,  I  will 
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survey  some  of  the  differing  ways  in  which  Northern  Ireland  has  been  reported 
around  the  world. 
From  'The  freedom  loving  forces  of  Northern  Ireland'to  'terrorist 
atrocities' 
The  reporting  of  Northern  Ireland  varies  in  relation  to  political  distance  from  the 
conflict,  the  relationship  between  the  particular  media  system  and  the  state, 
and  the  political  complexion  of  the  government.  Because  all  three  of  these 
criteria  can  vary  over  time  and  in  relation  to  each  other,  coverage  can  evolve 
and  change  or  even  be  subject  to  contradictory  pressures  or  struggles  which 
relate  to  the  exigencies  of  political  power  or  interest. 
The  political  culture  in  which  journalists  operate  can  heavily  influence  the  way 
they  look  at  the  conflict  in  Ireland.  In  the  countries  of  the  former  Eastern  Bloc, 
the  political  culture  was  highly  critical  of  British  policy  in  the  six  counties  and 
this  informed  reporting  by  the  state  controlled  media.  But  not  all  of  the  Eastern 
European  countries  covered  Northern  Ireland  in  the  same  way. 
At  one  end  of  the  spectrum  of  coverage  were  resolutely  oppositional  accounts 
of  the  conflict.  Albania,  for  example,  was  one  of  the  most  authoritarian  of  the 
Eastern  European  communist  countries.  In  1984  the  Albanian  news  a-  gency 
ATA  gave  its  view  of  the  conflict  in  Ireland: 
The  freedom-loving  forces  of  Northern  Ireland  are  responding  to  the 
savage  violence  of  the  British  police  and  occupying  forces  with  a 
resolute  struggle.  (ATA  17  August  1984,  cited  in  BBC  Summary  of  World 
Broadcasts) 
The  official  British  view  is  categorically  rejected  as  Britain  is  seen  as  the  cause 
of  the  conflict  to  which  the  'freedom  loving  forces'  only  respond.  But  this  report 
is  not  straightforwardly  supportive  of  the  IRA.  For  one  thing  the  language  and 
style  reflect  the  official  ideology  of  'Marxism-Leninism'  more  than  they  do  Irish 
Republicanism.  Indeed  we  can  see  this  report  as  reflecting  the  priorities  and 
rationale  of  the  Albanian  State  in  its  opposition  to  the  West,  rather  than  simple 
support  of  the  IRA.  The  above  report  goes  on  to  explain  that  the  'savagery'  of 
British  policy  in  Ireland  is  not  simply  random  but  should  be  seen  in  the  context 
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By  implementing  its  policy  towards  Northern  Ireland,  London  enjoys  the 
support  of  American  imperialism.  During  his  visit  to  the  Republic  of 
Ireland  and  Britain  this  year,  Reagan  himself  condemned  the  struggle  of 
the  people  of  Northern  Ireland,  calling  it  a  'brutal  and  terrorist  violence'... 
The  support  they  give  each  other  for  their  policy  of  establishing  and 
preserving  the  hegemonist  domination  over  other  peoples  is  in  the 
interest  of  both  London  and  Washington.  (ATA  17  August  1984,  cited  in 
BBC  Summary  of  World  Broadcasts) 
Soviet  reporting  was  also  consistently  critical  of  British  policy.  McNair  argues 
that  until  the  end  of  1987  Northern  Ireland  was  reported  'almost  exclusively  in 
terms  of  "the  troubles"'  (McNair  1991:  174)  and  the  coverage  was  predominantly 
organised  within  a  'human  rights  framework'  (1991:  176).  Soviet  journalists 
routinely  and  explicitly  rejected  the  British  view  that  the  blame  for  the  troubles 
lies  with  the  'terrorists'.  In  1983,  for  example,  Young  Communist  paper 
Komsomolskaya  Pravda  reported: 
The  main  cause  of  the  persistent  conflict  in  Ulster,  which  has  already 
claimed  over  2,600  lives  is  the  human  rights  situation  in  the  province. 
To  this  day  London  rules  Ulster  by  emergency  legislation  which  quite 
candidly  rides  roughshod  over  the  principles  and  purposes  of  the  UN 
charter.  (Komsomolskaya  Pravda  25  August  1983,  cited  in  BBC 
Summary  of  World  Broadcasts  29  August  1983) 
This  allowed  journalists  to  describe  protest  actions  in  Northern  Ireland  as 
responding  to  British  'repression'.  On  St  Patricks  day  1988,  for  example,  Tass 
reported  that  Northern  Ireland: 
again  became  a  scene  of  spontaneous  protest  actions  against  a  course 
of  police  and  military  repression  imposed  upon  Ulster  by  the  London 
Government.  (Tass  17  March  1988,  cited  in  BBC  Summary  of  World 
Broadcasts) 
McNair  argues  that  this  tended  to  result  in  coverage  which  was  sympathetic  to 
and  supportive  of  republican  activists,  including  members  of  paramilitary 
organisations'(176).  This  seems  to  be  going  too  far.  While  much  reporting 
was  critical  of  the  British  role  in  Ireland  and  referred  to  republican  paramilitaries 
as  'guerrillas'  or  even  'patriots'  there  was  a  coherent  strand  in  the  reporting 
which  condemned  the  activities  of  'terrorists'  or  the  killing  of  non-combatants  as From  Terrodsts  'to  'Freedom  fighters,  167 
counterproductive.  In  May  1987  Tass  reported: 
The  progressive  forces  of  Ulster,  among  them  communists,  condemn 
terror  as  a  method  of  political  struggle.  Such  actions  only  complicate  the 
situation  and  offer  imperialist  circles  a  pretext  for  interfering  in  internal 
Irish  affairs.  Indeed,  as  the  press  reports,  London,  taking  advantage  of 
another  outbreak  of  terrorism,  intends  to  beef  up  police  forces  in  Ulster. 
It  sent  additional  army  units  there,  including  units  of  the  SAS  which 
became  notorious  for  their  brutality  as  punitive  forces.  (Tass  12  May 
1987,  cited  in  BBC  Summary  of  World  Broadcasts  14  May  1987) 
Following  the  bombing  in  Enniskillen  in  November  1987  the  IRA  were  again 
condemned.  During  a  long  interview  the  radio  announcer  asks  if  'the  latest 
terrorist  act  by  the  IRA  has  played  into  the  hands  of  London?  '  The  London 
Correspondent  replies: 
'Yes,  I  think  this  action  was  deplorable,  both  from  the  standpoint  of  its 
political  effect  and  in  terms  simply  of  the  human  tragedies  it  has  caused.  ' 
(Moscow  Foreign  Service,  2000  GMT,  10  November  1987,  cited  in  BBC 
Summaty  of  World  Broadcasts  17  November  1987) 
Furthermore,  the  political  and  institutional  context  in  which  different  media 
operate  may  influence  the  sources  which  journalists  use.  Hence  it  is  very  rare 
for  British  or  US  journalists  to  quote  British  or  Irish  Communist  Party 
representatives  in  their  reports.  In  the  Soviet  media  however,  such  sources 
seem  to  have  been  used  regularly.  Following  the  Assembly  elections  in  1982 
the  Moscow  Home  Service  interviewed  Moscow  Radio's  London  Correspondent 
who  commented  that  the  elections  were  a  'cosmetic  operation'.  This  was 
contrasted  with  the  'constructive'  programme  that  had  been  put  forward  by  the 
Communist  Party  of  Ireland: 
The  election  programme  of  the  Communists  pointed  out  the  need  for  a 
realistic  approach  to  solving  Ulster's  main  problem  -  guaranteeing  real 
equality  between  the  Roman  Catholic  population  and  the  Protestants 
and  improving  the  economy.  (Moscow  Home  Service,  1802  GMT,  23 
October  1982) 
Following  the  Brighton  Bombing  which  targeted  Mrs  Thatcher  and  her  cabinet, 
Izvestiya  cited  the  Communist  Party  of  Great  Britain  (CPGB): From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  168 
Democratic  circles  have  resolutely  condemned  the  act  of  terrorism.  As 
G  McLennan,  General  Secretary  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Great 
Britain,  pointed  out,  this  act  will  do  nothing  to  help  the  Irish  people's 
cause.  The  bomb  and  the  threat  of  new  attacks  play  into  the  hands  of 
those  who  seek  to  tie  Ireland's  just  cause  and  terrorism  together  in  a 
single  knot.  (14  October  1984,  cited  in  BBC  Summary  of  World 
Broadcasts  16  October  1984) 
In  fact  while  the  Soviet  media  was  strongly  critical  of  British  policy  in  Ireland, 
they  were  also  critical  of  the  actions  of  the  IRA  and  keen  to  promote  the  British 
and  Irish  Communist  parties.  A  1982  Soviet  TV  documentary  thus  reviewed 
events  in  the  North  and  featured  interviews  with  the  IRA3,  politicians,  human 
rights  activists  and  the  British  Army  before  giving  this  (somewhat  immodest) 
picture  of  the  CPI: 
Threatened  from  all  sides  and  made  up  of  only  the  bravest  and  most 
stalwart,  the  Irish  CP  supports  reunification.  (The  Flames  of  Ulster', 
Soviet  Television  12  February  1982,  cited  in  BBC  Summary  of  World 
Broadcasts  15  February  1982) 
Soviet  media  coverage  was  more  complex  than  McNair's  suggestion  that  it 
simply  supported  the  IRA.  The  approach  of  the  Soviets  in  questioning  the 
legitimacy  of  the  British  presence  should  not  be  confused  with  support  for  what 
the  Soviets  themselves  regarded  as'terrorism'.  The  Soviet  approach  seems  to 
have  been  echoed  by  reporting  in  the  newspaper  of  the  French  Communist 
Party  LHumaniK  which  during  the  1981  Hunger  strikes,  'stressed 
systematically  the  Republican  calls  for  peaceful  demonstrations  and 
condemned  the  military  aspect  of  their  fight.  The  blame  for  physical  violence  is 
put  on  the  British  troops  and  the  Protestant  paramilitary  groups'  (Brennan  et  al 
1990:  111). 
Western  news 
Reporting  Northern  Ireland  in  Western  countries  such  as  France  or  the  US  is 
different  from  that  found  in  both  British  and  Eastern  European  media.  This  is 
not  simply  because  of  the  geographical  proximity  of  France  or  the  US  to  Britain, 
it  is  more  closely  related  to  ideological  criteria.  The  way  that  terrorism  is 
described  is  related  to  who  the  'terrorists'  are  attacking.  and  how  'politically, From  'Terrorists'  to  'Freedom  fighters'  169 
proximate  they  are.  Li  Causi  notes  that  when  Italian  television  covers  political 
violence  outside  Italy  it  tends  to  provide  rational  explanation  for  opposition  to 
the  state: 
Foreign  terrorism  isn't  some  kind  of  aberrant  spectacle  coming  from 
nowhere  or  out  of  the  heads  of  third  rate  ideologists.  It  has  roots, 
causes,  objectives.  Its  actions  can  be  understood  by  the  television 
audience,  even  if  not  justified.  (Li  Causi  1982:  231  cited  in  Schlesinger  et 
al  1983:  57) 
Li  Causi  has  noted  that  coverage  of  organisations  such  as  the  IRA  and  UIDA  on 
Italian  TV  are: 
explained  in  terms  of  the  troubled  history  of  that  country,  by  the 
centuries-old  subjection  of  Ulster  to  British  rule,  and  so  far  as 
Republican  irredentism  is  concerned,  by  the  economic  and  cultural 
oppression  of  the  Catholics  by  the  Protestants,  and  finally  by  the 
presence  of  the  British  army.  (Li  Causi  1982:  226,  cited  in  Schlesinger  et 
al  1983:  175) 
In  the  French  Press,  a  similar  pattern  is  found  with  a  'pro-Catholic  and  anti- 
Protestant,  pro-Irish  and  anti-British'  attitude  informing  the  coverageýof  the  right 
wing  Le  Figaro.  After  1975  this  was  overlaid  by  a  view  of  the  IRA  as  'a  terrorist 
organisation,  which  was  fully  integrated  into  the  international  terrorist  plot' 
(Brennan  et  al  1990:  106-107).  Meanwhile,  at  Le  Monde,  'The  IRA  and  later,  -- 
UDA,  activities  were  not  approved.  Even  if  Le  Monde  leaned  towards  the  Irish 
nationalists,  backing  the  idea  of  a  united  Ireland  as  the  best  solution  in  the  long 
term,  it  never  found  any  good  reason  to  support  violence'  (Brennan  et  al 
1990:  118). 
As  we  have  seen  the  major  international  target  for  the  public  relations  activities 
of  both  the  British  state  and  Irish  nationalists  is  the  USA.  It  seems  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  the  US  is  the  most  pressured  space  for  coverage  of  Ireland 
outside  of  Britain  and  Ireland.  This  is  because  of  the  media  and  policy 
objectives  of  British,  Irish  and  US  organisations  (both  Irish-  American  and 
governmental).  It  seems  clear  that  successive  US  Presidents  have  been 
interested  in  shoring  up  the  border  whatever  their  professed  views  on  the 
campaign  trail  to  the  White  House  (Cronin  1987).  The  US  is  a  very  close  ally 
of  the  UK  and  so  it  might  be  thought  that  US  coverage  would  be  fairly  close  to From  'Terrofists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  170 
British  reporting. 
British  guidelines 
In  Chapter  One  we  saw  how  British  broadcasters  had  progressively  tightened 
their  internal  rules  for  covering  Northern  Ireland,  partly  as  a  result  of 
government  pressure.  The  language  used  to  describe  the  conflict  is  also 
subject  to  close  policing.  BBC  guidelines  distinguish  between  'terrorists'  and 
'guerrillas'  as  follows: 
Members  of  illegal  organisations  who  bomb  and  shoot  civilians  are 
unquestionably  terrorists  -  they  use  terror  to  achieve  their  objectives.  if 
there  are  occasions  when  the  term  is  not  appropriate  there  are  always 
other  words  available  -  IRA  men,  UVF  men,  killers,  murderers,  bombers, 
gunmen'  (BBC  1993:  15). 
Similarly,  in  the  style  book  at  the  Independent,  on  the  sparsely  populated 
liberal  end  of  the  spectrum  of  the  British  press,  the  advice  to  journalists  is  to  be 
cautious  about  the  use  of  'terrorist'.  But  the  definition  of  a  'terrorist'  shares  key 
elements  with  that  of  the  BBC: 
Terrorist  is  a  much  abused  word  that  still  has  a  precise  meaning. 
Terrorism  is  violent  action  intended  to  create  terror  among  a  civilian 
population  so  as  to  destabilise  a  government.  Thus  an  IRA  man  who 
plants  a  bomb  in  a  public  house  is  acting  as  a  terrorist;  one  who  shoots 
a  British  soldier  is  not...  Resist  the  unthinking  habit  of  always  calling  the 
IRA  terrorists  (Keleny  1992:  60-61). 
In  any  case  the  distinction  between  a'guerrilla'  and  a'terrorist'  is  not  applied 
uniformly,  since  the  IRA  are  almost  uniformly  described  as  'terrorists'  whatever 
their  targets.  There  is  a  much  more  fundamental  sense  in  which  the  term 
terrorist  is  literally  'one-sided'.  In  the  definitions  quoted  above  the  'terrorist';  is 
described  not  just  in  terms  of  targets  but  also  in  terms  of  their  relationship  to 
the  current  political  system.  Thus  for  the  Independent,  it  is  groups  trying  to 
'destabilise'  a  government  and  for  the  BBC  simply'illegal'  groups  which  are 
defined  as  'terrorist'.  The  concept  of  'state  terrorism'  is  effectively  ruled  out. 
However,  some  guidelines  do  not  make  an  explicit  distinction  between  legal 
and  illegal  groups  or  between  states  or  non  state  groups.  At  the  Times: From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  171 
'Essentially,  the  difference  should  derive  from  the  choice  of  target  or  the 
tactics  of  that  particular  violence.  Terrorism,  in  our  view,  is  any  act  of 
violence  perpetrated  willingly  or  inadvertently  against  non-military 
targets.  Guerrillas  may  be  guerrillas,  but  they  are  terrorists  when  they 
attack  buses  full  of  civilians'  (cited  in  Taylor  1986:  215). 
It  is  of  course  equally  clear  that  reference  to  the  state  as  'terrorist'  is  not  meant 
to  be  within  the  ambit  of  such  coverage.  When  the  British  Army  kills  civilians  in 
Northern  Ireland,  the  British  media  don't  refer  to  those  incidents  as  'terrorism'. 
Similarly  words  such  as  'gunman',  'killer'  or'murderer'  are  not  used  to  describe 
government  forces.  We  don't  often  hear  of  British  'gunmen'  patrolling  the 
streets  of  Northern  Ireland. 
BBC  guidelines  state  that  journalists  should:  'Avoid  anything  which  would 
glamorise  the  terrorist,  or  give  an  impression  of  legitimacy.  In  particular,  try  not 
to  use  terms  by  which  terrorist  groups  try  to  portray  themselves  as  legitimate  - 
terms  like'execute",  "court-martial",  "brigade",  "active  service  unit"'  (BBC 
1989c:  80). 
Journalists'  are  even  given  instructions  on  the  language  they  can  use  to 
describe  the  relevant  territories  in  Britain  and  Ireland: 
The  United  Kingdom  is  made  up  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland. 
Northern  Ireland  is  the  only  correct  name  for  that  part.  But'Ulster'  (really 
the  name  for  nine  Irish  counties  of  which  six  are  in  Northern  Ireland)  is 
so  widely  used  as  a  synonym  that  it  is  acceptable.  (BBC  1989c:  39) 
This  is  contrasted  with  the  term  the'Six  Counties'which  is  not  acceptable 
because  it'has  no  legal  or  constitutional  basis,  and  expresses  a  political 
viewpoint'  (BBC  1989c:  39).  It  is  clear  that  terms  such  as'Northern  Ireland', 
'United  Kingdom'and  especially  'Ulster'  are  no  more  neutral  than'Six  counties' 
or'North  of  Ireland'.  To  use  the  term  UK  implies  an  acceptance  of  current 
constitutional  arrangements,  which  are  of  course  precisely  what  are  under 
dispute.  Nevertheless  the  BBC  has  simply  adopted  the  terminology  used  by 
the  government  as  if  it  were  neutral. 
BBC  World  Service 
The  restrictions  on  BBC  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland  meant  for  consumption  in From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  172 
Britain  do  not  apply  to  the  World  Service.  Operating  in  a  world  which  does  not 
automatically  share  the  British  view  of  the  conflict  in  Ireland,  the  World  Service 
tries  to  protect  its  credibility  by  reporting  more  dispassionately.  Their 
reputation  is  seen  as  being  premised  on  how  they  report  events  in  Britain  in 
general  and  in  Northern  Ireland  in  particular. 
In  reporting  Britain,  we  follow  the  same  editorial  principles  as  in 
reporting  the  world.  A  British  story  must  earn  its  place  in  our  bulletins 
and  current  affairs  coverage;  it  must  be  judged  by  its  news  value,  not  by 
its  effect  on  Britain's  reputation...  We  conceal  neither  the  unpleasant 
nor  the  positive;  we  explore  both.  Indeed,  many  listeners  regard  our 
coverage  of  the  complex  and  often  distressing  events  in  Northern  Ireland 
as  a  litmus  test  of  our  credibility  (BBC  World  Service  1990). 
The  problems  of  covering  political  violence  have  resulted  in  a  special  appendix 
in  the  World  Service  Style  Book.  It  describes  at  length  the  reasoning  which 
has  led  the  World  Service  to  rule  against  the  use  of  the  word  'terrorist'  in  it's 
reporting.  This  'self-denying  ordinance'  is  justified  on  the  following  grounds  by 
World  Service  news  editor  David  Spaull: 
We  too  would  often  like  to  relieve  our  feeling  of  revulsion  by  using  the 
broadcastable  equivalents  of'murdering  bastards'.  We  don't,  because 
we  feel  that  something  far  more  important  than  our  feelings,  or  the 
feelings  of  some  of  our  listeners  is  at  stake.  (Spaull  1988:  50) 
The  debate  in  the  World  Service  in  part  revolves  around  the  notion  that  it  is  the 
job  of  the  journalist  to  'fight  terrorism'.  Editorial  staff  have  'no  doubt'  that  not 
using  the  'T'  word  enhances  their  credibility  and  therefore  the  fight  against 
, terrorism': 
If  we  were  to  depart  from  it,  our  credibility  and  reputation  for  impartiality 
would  be  badly  damaged  in  the  minds  of  our  listeners.  Nowhere  is  this 
more  true  than  in  our  reporting  of  the  IRA...  When  things  do  go  wrong  in 
the  fight  against  the  IRA,  as  from  time  to  time  inevitably  they  must,  there 
is  no  better  damage  limitation  in  terms  of  world  opinion  than  the  BBC 
telling  the  facts  without  embellishment  and  without  emotive  language 
(Spaull  1988:  52). 
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cautioned  that  only  the  acronym  will  do  when  referring  to  the  IRA.  "The  IRA  is 
always  the  IRA  -  Irish  Republican  Army  is  misleading.  '  (Brown-  1988  p33).  The 
thought  that  the  IRA  might  be  referred  to  as  an  Army  is  beyond  the  limits  of 
objectivity  of  even  the  World  Service. 
Language  in  the  press 
Let  us  now  examine  the  way  guidelines  such  as  these  are  put  into  practice  in 
news  coverage  of  the  main  armed  oppositional  force  in  Northern  Ireland,  the 
Irish  Republican  Army.  The  most  common  description  in  both  the  US  and 
British  Press  was  the  simple  abbreviation  IRA.  (Figure  4.1  gives  a  summarised 
table  of  the  most  common  terms).  After  this  though  the  descriptions  diverge 
markedly.  In  the  British  press  the  ubiquity  of  the  term  'terrorist'  is  apparent.  It 
was  much  more  commonly  used  than  any  other  term.  In  the  US  press,  by 
contrast,  the  political  distance  between  the  US  and  Britain  manifested  itself  in 
terms  like  'member(s)''guerrilla(s)'  and  'Rebel(s)which  were  used  more  often 
than  the  term  'terrorist'. 
Figure  4.1 
Descriptions  of  Irish  Republicans  in  the  Press 
US  press  British  press 
IRA  399  IRA  163 
members  80  terrorists  69 
guerrillas  61  members  27 
Irish  Republican  Army  57  bomb  squad/gang  26 
Sinn  Fein,  political  wing  of  Provisionals/  Provos  22 
the  IRA  38 
rebels  31  paramilitary  display  18 
trappings 
terrorists  28  gang  17 
gunman/men  19  suspected  terrorists  15 
outlawed  16 
suspects  15 
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By  way  of  comparison  some  of  the  more  favoured  and  legitimising  terminology 
found  in  the  US  press  can  very  occasionally  be  found  in  the  British  media. 
There  was  for  example  one  reference  to  'suspected  guerrillas'  in  the  Times  of 
March  7. 
The  main  descriptions  of  Loyalist  groups,  by  contrast  were  less  prejudicial  (see 
figure  5.2).  'Gunman'was  the  most  common  description  in  both  countries  and 
other  words  describing  actions  such  as  'attacker'  and  'assailant'  were  relatively 
common  in  the  US.  Harder  terms  for  actions,  such  as,  'assassin',  'bomber'  and 
Ikiller'were  used  in  the  British  press. 
Figure  4.2 
Descriptions  of  Ulster  Loyalists  in  the  press 
US  press  British  press 
gunman/gunmen  22  gunman  77 
Protestant  paramilitaries  17  UDA  40 
attacker  12  assassin  23 
Protestant  9  bomber  22 
Protestant  gunman  8  terrorists  16 
Protestant  extremist  7  UVF  15 
(Protestant)  terrorist  7  paramilitary  14 
UDA  7  killer  14 
assailant  6  Ulster  Defence  Association  10 
LIDA,  Loyalist  paramilitary  6  Fanatic/  lunatic  /  crazed/  12 
group  kamikaze/  psychopathic 
terrorist  acts  5 
Loyalist  paramilitaries  were  much  more  often  identified  as  'Protestant'  in  the 
US  than  they  were  in  Britain,  while  the  British  (tabloid)  press  more  often 
resorted  to  the  language  of  irrationality  and  madness.  The  main  descriptions 
which  transcended  the  identification  of  organisations  simply  with  their  actions 
were  either  the  names  of  the  organisations  or  the  term  'paramilitaries'.  By, 
comparison  this  term  was  very  rarely  used  to  describe  republican  groups. 
Descriptions  of  British  forces  showed  the  least  variation  between  the  US  and From  'Terrotists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  175 
British  press.  Routine  terminology  included  'British  Army',  'troops',  'soldiers', 
'military'etc.  'Police'  or'police  officers'were  the  second  most  common  followed 
by  'security  forces'  in  both  nations.  (Figure  4.3). 
It  was  rare  for  the  British  press  to  include  routine  negative  evaluative 
information  about  the  RUC,  but  in  the  US  there  were  occasional  references  in 
the  US  press  to  the  sectarian  makeup  of  the  RUC.  There  were  three 
references  to  the  RUC  as,  for  example,  a  'Mainly  Protestant  police  force' 
(Chicago  Tribune  7  March  1988)  or  as'widely  perceived  not  as  a  traditional 
police  force  but  as  a  paramilitary  arm  of  suppression'  (New  York  Times  10  July 
1988). 
Figure  4.3 
Descriptions  of  British  forces  in  the  press 
US  press 
British  soldiers/  military/ 
army/  troops  etc. 
Police  /  detectives  /  officers 
etc 
Security  forces/  chiefs/ 
services  etc 
Royal  Ulster  Constabulary 
etc 
British  agents/  undercover 
British  press 
376  British  soldiers/  military/  army  192 
troops 
251  Police  88 
52  RUC  officers/  men  83 
52  Security  forces/  services/  46 
personnel 
33  SAS  25 
agents 
Commandos  19  Royal  Ulster  Constabulary  19 
SAS  and  descriptions  16  Special  Branch/  detectives  18 
RUC  15 
Comparing  the  terminology  for  republicans  and  British  forces  in  the  British 
Press,  there  are  few  occasions  when  the  British  Army  is  described  in  the  same 
terminology  as  the  IRA.  In  the  American  press  it  was  possible  to  find  the  same 
article  referring  to  British  and  IRA  agents.  This  recognition  in  a  news  account 
that  the  IRA  and  the  British  Army  are  opposing  military  forces  is  very  rare  in 
British  reporting.  Indeed  there  were  no  references  in  the  British  sample  to 
republicans  as  'agents'  and  only  two  to  British  'personnel'.  On  both  occasions From  Terrorists'  to  'Freedom  fighters'  176 
the  term  was  prefixed  with  the  word  'undercover  and  one  of  these  was  a 
description  of  the  beliefs  of  'local  people' 
The  key  difference  between  the  descriptions  of  state  and  non  state  actors 
though  is  that  state  actors  are  rarely  described  by  their  actions.  In  my  sample 
there  were  no  occasions  on  which  British  Army  or  RUC  personnel  were 
described  as  'snipers'  or'killers',  though  it  is  clear  that  the  British  Army  has 
inflicted  a  substantial  proportion  of  all  casualties  in  the  confliCt.  4  It  is  also  rare 
to  find  state  personnel  described  with  evaluative  terms  such  as  'terrorist'.  The 
significant  exception  to  this  rule  is  the  use  of  positive  evaluative  terms  adopted 
by  the  state  groups  themselves.  In  my  sample  this  was  most  prominently 
shown  in  the  use  of  the  labels  'anti-terrorist'  and  'Security  Forces' 
Formats 
Many  analyses  assume  that  media  reporting  is  homogeneous  and  that  there 
are  few  noteworthy  differences  between  media  types  or  forms.  But,  as  Bruck 
has  argued,  ideological  reproduction  is  not  uniform  and'the  news  media  do 
their  work  in  differing  ways  at  different  times,  depending,  among  other  things, 
upon  the  topic,  political  circumstances  and...  the  alternative  social  and 
discursive  pressures  exerted  at  a  given  time'  (Bruck  1989:  113).  It  has  also 
been  suggested  that  formats  may,  in  an  important  sense  determine  the  content 
of  reporting  (Altheide  1985;  1987).  The  rest  of  this  chapter  compares  and 
contrasts  varying  formats  in  the  press  and  on  television  to  examine  such 
arguments  more  thoroughly. 
News  reports  -  the  press 
On  Monday  March  8  1988  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Geoffrey  Howe 
announced  to  the  commons  that  a  'dreadful  terrorist  act  has  been  prevented,  by 
the  actions  of  'military  personnel'  in  Gibraltar5.  He  also  acknowledged  that 
there  had  been  no  bomb  in  the  car  and  that  the  three  IRA  members  had  been 
unarmed.  This  marked  change  of  story  delivered  by  a  senior  government 
Minister  in  the  House  of  Commons,  became  the  main  news  angle  for  some 
journalists  the  next  day.  After  following  official  reports  on  the  killings  on  the 
night  of  March  6  and  then  finding  that  they  were  so  comprehensively  wrong,  it 
is  interesting  to  note  that  the  main  news  stories  in  the  British  press  continued  to 
follow  the  agenda  set  by  official  sources  rather  than  exercising  critical 
judgement  on  the  activities  of  the  government.  There  were  no  headlines  such From  'Terrofists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  177 
as  the  front  page  lead  in  the  Dublin  Irish  Press:  'Fury  as  no  bomb  found'. 
Instead,  the  British  Press  concentrated  on  other  matters,  such  as  the  hunt  for 
the  alleged  fourth  member  of  the  IRA  squad  with  front  page  headlines  such  as 
'Fourth  IRA  bomber  on  the  run'  (Guardian),  'Hunt  for  fourth  IRA  terrorist' 
(Times),  'Fourth  Terrorist  Still  at  Large',  (Daily  Telegraph),  'Search  Continues  in 
Gibraltar  for  car  bomb  and  IRA  terrorist',  (Financial  Times),  'Hunt  for  IRA 
Evelyn'  (Sun)  and  'Find  Evil  Evelyn'  (Daily  Mirror).  In  these  latter  tabloid 
reports,  Evelyn  Glenholmes  was  named  as  being  hunted  by  police  throughout 
Europe  over  her  alleged  involvement  in  the  'Gibraltar  Bomb  Plot'.  6 
These  accounts  shared  with  the  government  a  consensus  about  the  importance 
of  two  obviously  newsworthy  events  accepting  that  it  was  more  crucial  to  report 
the  alleged  fourth  IRA  member  than  question  the  activities  of  the  government. 
Some  news  stories  accepted  that  the  account  given  by  Howe  was  accurate  and 
that  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  car  bomb  was  genuine  if  mistaken.  Thus 
the  Star  had  'Find  the  Real  Bomb  Car'  and  the  Daily  Telegraph  'Dreadful  act  of 
Terror  averted  Howe  tells  MPs'. 
In  the  US  by  contrast  the  headlines  centred  on  the  change  in  the  British 
government  story: 
British  admit  killing  3  unarmed  members  of  IRA  (Atlanta  Constitution) 
British  say  no  bomb  found  in  3  killings  (Chicago  Tribune) 
Britain,  in  an  about-face,  says  3  slain  in  Gibraltar  hadn't  planted  bomb 
(Boston  Globe) 
British  Amend  Account  of  Killing  of  3  in  Gibraltar  (New  York  Times) 
The  more  routine  line  in  Britain  was  assigned  minority  status  in  the  Los 
Angeles  Times: 
Gibraltar  Bomb  Sought  After  IRA  deaths  (Los  Angeles  Times) 
These  differences  in  reporting  between  US  and  British  newspapers  are 
important  because  they  show  that  front  page  stories  are  not  only  determined  by 
the  intrinsic  'news  value'  of  a  particular  event  or  angle.  Newspapers  in  America 
and  in  Dublin  thought  that  the  more  newsworthy  story  was  the  change  in  the From  7errorists'lo  'Freedom  fighters'  178 
British  account.  The  British  press  by  contrast  thought  that  the  most  important 
story  was  in  following  the  agenda  set  by  the  British  government  and 
concentrating  on  the  hunt  for  the  fourth  IRA  member  or  the  whereabouts  of  the 
explosives. 
Features 
Features  are  distinguished  by  a  number  of  formal  characteristics.  They  are 
longer  than  news  reports,  intended  to  set  events  in  context  and  are  defined  as 
'soft  news'  (Bruck  1989:  115).  Thus  the  reporter  can  more  readily  include 
accounts  from  sources  whose  credibility  is  not  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  their 
authority.  'Colour'  can  be  added  by  recording  anecdotal,  bizarre  or  incidental 
detail.  The'human',  angle  on  features  or  backgrounders  may  allow 
oppositional  perspectives  to  be  aired  or  alternative  information  to  be  presented. 
For  example,  the  lead  story  in  the  Daily  Mail  on  March  8  (in  common  with  the 
other  papers)  revealed'bomber  on  the  run  is  a  woman'with  a  strap  line'Police 
link  Evelyn  Glenholmes  with  Gibraltar  terror  raid'.  The  story  was  dominated  by 
official  statements,  from,  the  Spanish  police  and  Geoffrey  Howe.  Inside  the 
paper,  however,  a  centre  spread  started  off  with  the  individualised  'soft'  news 
treatment  of  an  eyewitness  to  the  shootings: 
A  young  mother-of-two,  watched  from  her  bedroom  as  the  finale  of  the 
IRA's  attempt  to  bring  mass  murder  to  Gibraltar  unfolded  before  in  the 
afternoon  sunshine.  (Daily  Mail  8  March  1988) 
This  is  a  classic  introduction  to  a  feature  piece.  Starting  off  by  personalising 
the  story,  it  makes  clear  the  vulnerability  of  the  innocent  witness  about  to  see 
an  alien  scene  played  out  in  front  of  her  eyes.  She  looked,  we  are  told,  'hardly 
believing  what  her  eyes  were  telling  her'.  The  witness  account  of  the  killings 
was  carried  in  an  almost  celebratory  way  under  the  headline  'Death  in  the 
Afternoon',  but  nevertheless  it  was  carried  at  length.  It  implicitly  contradicts  the 
official  account  given  in  the  House  of  Commons  and  on  the  front  page  of  the 
Daily  Mail  and  every  other  paper  that  day.  It  is  worth  remembering  that 
although  this  eyewitness  testimony  was  available  to  all  the  papers,  five  of  the 
eleven  national  dailies  did  not  report  it.  7 
it  is  possible  in  news  to  entirely  exclude  alternative  accounts  or  information, 
whereas  in  features  such  information  is  easier  to  include  even  if  the  'whole From  'Tarroriststo  'Freedom  fighters'  179 
structure'  of  the  piece  is  'designed  to  discredit  it  as  a  political  argument' 
(Schlesinger  et  al  1983:  91). 
In  American  papers  feature  and  background  pieces  on  Northern  Ireland  (an 
international  story)  are  particularly  appropriate  for  Sunday  newspaper  editions 
as  they  can  be  used  as  a  lens  through  which  to  view  and  contextualise  the 
weeks  events  (this  tendency  of  Sunday  newspapers  is  of  course  related  to  the 
political  rhythms  of  both  the  US  and  Britain  where  Sunday  is  'quiet'  in  'hard' 
news  terms).  In  fact  seven  out  of  the  fifteen  features  on  these  events  were 
published  on  a  Sunday. 
A  New  York  Times  colour  piece,  for  example,  concentrated  on  the  background 
of  Mairead  Farrell,  one  of  those  shot.  It  included  an  extensive  contribution  from 
Fr.  Raymond  Murray,  the  noted  human  rights  activist,  who  was  also  chaplain  of 
Armagh  women's  prison  when  Farrell  was  imprisoned  there.  Murray's 
contribution  allowed  some  of  the  complexities  of  the  debate  between  the  church 
and  the  IRA  to  be  aired.  The  report  opens  with  a  scene-setting  description  of 
Murray's  preparation  of  a  requiem  Mass  for  Farrell: 
it  was  late,  the  fire  was  fading  at  the  rectory  hearth  and  the  priest  had 
finished  writing  his  eulogy  for  Mairead  Farrell,  an  Irishwoman  slain  in  the 
time-worn  rebellion.  (New  York  Times  16  March  1988) 
The  reporter  then  goes  on  to  describe  Farrell  in  terms  unfamiliar  to  British 
audiences  more  used  to  simple  descriptions  of  IRA  members  as  mindless 
psychopaths: 
Far  from  being  a  romantic  enigma  Mairead  Farrell  was  a  plain  spoken 
adherent  of  the  Irish  Republican  Army  who  was  involved  in  a  total  of  two 
insurgent  operations.  These  were  interrupted  by  10  years  in  prison, 
where  Father  Murray  says  he  first  felt  the  sharpness  of  her  \vit  in  debate 
in  defending  the  violent  IRA  struggle  from  criticism,  particularly  the 
church's. 
The  report  continues  describing  Murray's  reaction  to  the  prison  protests  and  his 
very  definitely  alternative  view  of  the  people  involved  in  them: 
'it  destroyed  me',  he  said,  describing  the  death  and  political  struggle  of 
the  last  20  years  and  the  militant  women  he  visualises  as  peaceful From  Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  180 
leaders  in  some  other  time  and  place.  He  saw  Miss  Farrell  become  the 
instant  leader  of  scores  of  women  through  their  darkest  days  when  they 
held  their  year  long  'no  wash'  strike  in  1980  over  the  British  authorities' 
withdrawal  of  their  political  prisoner  status.  (16  March  1988) 
The  extensive  description  of  Farrell  as  a  human  being,  with  details  of  her  past 
and  testimony  from  those  who  knew  her  allow  for  a  more  rounded  picture  to 
emerge.  They  counteract  what  Jack  Holland  has  called  the'dehumanising 
machinery  of  propaganda'  (1988)  Such  portrayals  did  not  occur  in  news 
stories. 
The  feature  form  has  the  potential  to  allow  access  to  sources,  to  give  personal 
and  individual  reactions,  and  can  also  allow  critiques  of  official  positions  to  be 
advanced.  While  US  news  coverage  often  implicitly  deviated  from  official 
perspectives,  it  was  rare  for  news  to  explicitly  question  the  role  of  the  British 
government  which  was  predominantly  assumed  to  be  a  bystander  in  the 
conflict.  But  in  a  feature  one  journalist  could  observe  that: 
The  London  government  often  leaves  nationalistsý  livid  by  assuming  the 
role  of  the  sad,  bewildered  referee  among  these  unruly  Irishmen  (New 
York  Times  20  March  1988). 
Such  openness  can  often  leave  journalists  feeling  uneasy  and  attempting  to 
recoup  the  lost  ground  which  their  interviewees  have  staked  out.  The  Christian 
Science  Monitor  was  perhaps  the  closest  to  official  British  perspectives  of  the 
US  papers  in  this  sample.  In  a  background  feature  highlighting  the  problems  of 
the  police  in  battling  'deep  distrust'  amongst  Catholics  the  London 
Correspondent  visited  and  interviewed  residents  of  Springhill  in  West  Belfast. 
The  discussion  starts  with  the  expression  by  residents  of  their  distrust  of  the 
police.  One  woman  argues:  'They're  not  patrolling  to  protect  us...  They  just 
want  to  keep  an  eye  on  us'.  The  journalist  goes  on  to  frame  these  responses 
not  as  indicating  a  coherent  alternative  analysis  of  the'troubles'  but  as  a  lack  of 
trust  which  the  RUC  must  overcome  to'improve  its  reputation  as  an  impartial 
law  enforcement  agency'  in  order  that  life  might  'return  to  normal'.  The 
attempts  made  by  the  RUC  to  do  this  are  then  detailed.  Amongst  these  is  the 
attempt  to  recruit  more  Catholic  officers,  but  the  failure  to  do  this  is  put  down  by 
the  journalist  to  Catholic  distrust.  Another  resident  of  Springhill  is  quoted: 
in  all  my  life  in  this  countýy  there's  been  no  change  in  the  policies  of  the From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  181 
RUC...  What  they  say  in  the  papers  and  what  they  do  on  the  streets  are 
two  different  things. 
Although  the  local  people  are  quoted  and  their  words  give  an  insight  into 
another  way  of  looking  at  the  'problem',  this  perspective  is  not  developed  and 
the  journalist  has  to  fight  to  bring  the  discussion  back  onto  the  familiar  terrain  of 
the  official  perspective.  In  this  case  he  does  it  by  intervening  to  give  his  own 
assessment,  saying  that  the  residents  of  Springhill  'live  on  the  front-line  of 
communal  strife  and  may  not  have  noticed  the  changes'.  This  invalidating  of 
the  personal  experience  of  ordinary  citizens  of  West  Belfast  is  then  backed  up 
by  information  from  a  source  which  has  a  high  credibility  -  The  RUC: 
One  positive  measure  of  confidence  in  the  police  has  been  the 
increased  numbers  of  callers...  to  police'hot  lines'.  Police  say  the 
numbers  have  increased  by  50  percent  in  recent  months  (Christian 
Science  Monitor24  March  1988). 
While  the  reporter  tried  to  invalidate  the  alternative  analysis  it  is  significant  that 
the  views  of  the  residents  were  granted  some  space.  On  occasion  the 
'openness'  of  the  format  can  allow  the  reporter  simply  to  record  chunks  of 
dialogue  without  intervention,  beyond  the  selection  of  the  pieces.  Towards  the 
end  of  March  the  Boston  Globe  ran  three  features  on  Northern  Ireland.  One  of 
these  simply  recorded  extracts  of  conversation  between  the  reporter  and 
'ordinary'  people  mainly  from  West  Belfast.  There  were  exchanges  between 
the  reporter  and  school  children,  one  Protestant  and  one  catholic  woman,  a 
Protestant  student  and  a  Catholic  retired  building  worker  as  well  as  a 
republican  and  former  INLA  member.  There  were  no  interviews  with  official 
sources  or  with  spokespersons  for  any  political  party.  The  former  member  of 
the  INLA,  explained  how  he  got  'involved'  and  ended  up  in  prison.  He  went  on 
to  describe  his  involvement  in  the  shooting  of  a  UDR  soldier  and  then  his 
response  to  and  rationale  for  his  actions: 
Truthfully,  I  never  have  any  bad  dreams  about  it.  Of  course,  at  the  same 
time  I  don't  relish  it.  It's  a  sad  fact  of  life.  Either  they  kill  you  or  you  kill 
them.  They  are  legitimate  targets  in  this  country.  A  sectarian  force  all 
made  up  of  Protestants  who  kill  unarmed  civilians  simply  becausethey 
are  Catholic  (Boston  Globe  27  March  1988). 
In  this  version,  the  activities  of  republican  groups  are  a  response  to  the From  'Terrofists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  182 
activities  of  the  state.  These  perspectives  allowed  to  continue  for  five 
paragraphs  and  at  no  point  is  it  contradicted  or  commented  on  by  the  journalist. 
Instead  the  comments  of  other  interviewees  stand  simply  as  different  views. 
Such  access  to  the  press  to  explain  a  republican  analysis  is  uncommon  in 
Britain. 
Editorials 
Editorials  are  different  from  news  in  that  they  are  the  space  where  a  view  on 
the  events  of  the  day  is  taken.  On  the  other  hand  editorials  are  different  from 
columns  in  that  the  opinions  have  the  imprimatur  of  the  newspaper  rather  than 
that  of  a  named  columnist.  As  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter  editorial  writers  are 
one  of  the  key  targets  of  British  Information  efforts  in  the  US. 
All  of  the  editorials  in  the  US  press  on  the  events  in  March  1988  included 
critiques  of  the  the  official  view  on  Gibraltar: 
What  chance  do  reason  and  justice  have  to  end  this  mockery  of 
civilisation  when  even  the  British,  the  supposed,  peacekeepers,  shoot 
first  and  ask  questions  later  (Chicago  Tribune  21  March  1988). 
Similarly  at  the  Boston  Globe: 
Britain,  on  the  one  hand,  treats  the  IRA  as  a  criminal  rather  than  a 
political  organisation  and  strives  to  maintain  the  standards,  of 
investigation,  arrest  and  trial  that  are  normal  in  the  British  system  of 
justice.  'Even-handedness'  toward  the  IRA  and  the  Protestant  gangsters 
and  fanatics  is  the  watchword  of  the  police,  and  to  some  extent  this  ideal 
is  achieved.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  recurrent  practice  -  and 
perhaps  the  unstated  policy  -  of  treating  the  IRA  as  if  it  really  were  an 
army  and  as  if  wartime  rather  than  peacetime  standards  apply.  In  war, 
soldiers  do  not  stop  to  check  an  enemy's  papers  or  caution  him  against 
suspicious  moves.  They  shoot  and  they  shoot  to  kill  (Boston  Globe  16 
March  1988). 
The  underlying  model  against  which  all  British  actions  are  judged  is  that 
promoted  by  the  British  government.  Editorials  in  the  US  press  regularly 
criticised  the  British  position,  but  the  underlying  assumption  was  that  Britain  is 
neutral  in  the  conflict  albeit  with  a  tendency  to  'overreact'ý  or  behave  ineptly.  A From  'Terrodsts'to  'Freedom  fighters'  183 
study  of  US  press  editorials  on  Northern  Ireland  between  1971  and  1981  found 
a  broadly  similar  pattern:  'The  British  are  very  much  seen  as  the  "honest 
brokers"  in  the  dispute.  Almost  every  initiative  proposed  by  the  British  up  to 
1981  has  been  favourably  received  by  the  editorial  writers'  (Artherton 
1983a:  20) 
By  contrast  editorials  in  British  papers  mostly  supported  the  shootings  in 
Gibraltar.  The  Sun's  view  was  that: 
The  moral  for  the  IRA  is  a  simple  one.  If  they  do  not  want  to  be  killed, 
they  should  not  try  to  kill  others.  Three  criminals  are  dead.  Our  troops 
and  all  the  forces  on  the  side  of  law  and  order  are  safe.  For  us  that  is  a 
happy  ending  (Sun  8  March  1988). 
On  the  other  hand  there  was  criticism  in  the  Guardian,  the  Independent,  the 
Observer  and  the  Daily  Telegraph: 
It  is  very  rarely  that  we  find  ourselves  less  satisfied  with  the 
Government's  account  of  events  than  the  Labour  front  bench...  There  is 
no  doubt  of  the  malevolent  intentions  of  the  Irish  group  on  the  rock.  But 
the  authorities  handling  of  the  affair  poses  serious  questions...  Few 
British  people  will  mourn  the  deaths  of  members  of  the  IRA.  But  it  is  an 
essential  aspect  of  an  anti-terrorist  policy  to  maintain  the  principles  of 
civilised  restraint  which  obtain  in  a  democratic  society.  A  failure  to  do  so 
argues  that  terrorism  is  succeeding  in  one  of  it's  critical  aims,  the 
brutalisation  of  the  society  under  attack  (Daily  Telegraph  8  March  1988). 
Comment  and  Columns 
Writing  about  the  background  of  a  story  or  ruminating  on  future  possibilities 
allows  a  certain  lee  way.  Comment  pieces  and  columns  allow  access  to  non 
institutional  sources  or  personal  views.  The  majority  of  background  and 
analysis  pieces  in  Britain  came  from  firmly  within  official  or  populist 
perspectives.  Norman  Tebbit  made  a  trenchant  statement  of  the  populist 
perspective  arguing  for  the  subordination  of  the  rule  of  law  to  the  war  against 
terrorism: 
There  can  be  no  justification  for  violence  to  achieve  political  ends  in  a 
democratic  system.  Such  violence  or  threat  of  violence  must  be  resisted From  Terrotists  'to  'Freedom  fighters'  184 
at  all  times  at  all  costs...  The  fact  is  that  a  democratic  society  which 
concedes  at  the  point  of  a  gun  what  cannot  be  gained  through  the  ballot 
box,  sells  out  on  democracy  itself  (Sunday  Express  13  March  1988, 
Reprinted  in  the  Daily  Star  14  March  1988). 
The  irrationality  of  terrorism,  a  key  component  of  official  thinking,  means  that 
the  terrorists  must  simply  be  crushed.  In  the  symbolism  of  the  Vietnam  war  the 
village  of  democracy  may  have  to  be  destroyed  in  order  to  save  it: 
If  terrorism  is  to  be  crushed  there  must  be  a  twofold  commitment.  First 
that  no  demand  is  ever  conceded  under  threat...  Second,  a  commitment 
that  the  defeat  of  terrorism  has  absolute  supremacy  over  the  cause 
which  the  terrorists  claim  to  uphold  (Sunday  Express  13  March  1988, 
Reprinted  in  the  Daily  Star  14  March  1988). 
Paul  Johnson  set  out  to  recoup  the  ground  lost  at  the  Milltown  attack,  which  he 
saw  simply  as  a  'propaganda  victory'  for  the  republicans.  Inordertodothishe 
reminded  readers  of  who  to  blame  for  the  killings: 
The  origin  of  yesterday's  violence  is  the  IRA.  This  is  the  evil  force  which 
lies  at  the  root  of  all  the  trouble.  (Daily  Mail  17  March  1988) 
Here  the  British  are  seen  as  simply  reacting  to  the  'Irish  problem. 
By  contrast,  a  guest  article  by  an  American  academic  in  the  Los  Angeles  Times 
questioned  the  notion  that  violence  in  Northern  Ireland  is  senseless  and 
included  the  question  of  violence  by  the  state,  so  often  left  out  of  comparable 
discussions  in  Britain.  His  recommendations,  that  the  British  government  make 
clear  to  the  loyalists  that  their  'intransigence  in  the  face  of  genuine  efforts  of 
conciliation  jeopardises  Westminster's  willingness  to  maintain  the  Union'  and 
the  creation  of  a  joint  Anglo-Irish  peacekeeping  force,  lead  to  a  conclusion  that 
any  backlash  from  the  loyalists  would  be  'violence'  that  was:  'truly  senseless, 
which  it  has  not  been  in  political  terms  thus  far'  (Los  Angeles  Times  28  March 
1988). 
Columns  allow  more  potential  space  to  contest  official  formulations.  But  that 
potential  is  not  always  fulfilled.  One  difference  between  columnists  and  outside 
contributors  is  that  the  latter  gain  access  by  virtue  of  a  combination  of  their 
authoritative  status  and  credibility  as  an  expert  or  commentator  as  well  as  an From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  185 
assessment  of  what  they  are  likely  to  say.  Regular  columnists,  are  either 
senior  journalists  or  specifically  employed  writers  whose  brief  may  include 
offering  authoritative  analysis  or  polemical  views.  Either  way,  the  columnist 
has  more  latitude  to  proclaim  unpopular  or  minority  views  which  may  contrast 
with  other  parts  of  the  editorial  content  or  even  with  the  editorial  line  of  the 
paper.  Columnists  are,  often  used  as  part  of  a  marketing  strategy  to  advertise 
the  breadth  of  the  paper.  Thus  the  Mail  on  Sunday  has  run  advertising 
campaigns  claiming  that  it  has  both  left  and  right  wing  columnists  in  Julie 
Burchill  and  John  Junor,  respectively.  The  Sun  has  also  employed  this 
strategy  with  columnists  such  as  Garry  Bushell  and  Richard  Littlejohn  as  well 
as  Labour  MP  Ken  Livingstone  who  the  Sun  once  called  'the  most  odious  man 
in  Britain'for  his  views  on  Northern  Ireland  (The  Sun  13  October  1981). 
In  March  1988  columns  in  the  national  press  were  more  likely  to  question 
official  accounts  or  give  voice  to  alternative  views  than  they  were  to  promote 
official  or  populist  perspectives.  As  we  have  seen  this  is  in  contrast  to  the 
coverage  in  analysis  or  comment  sections  of  the  press.  However,  columnists  in 
the  Sun,  Daily  Express  and  News  of  the  World  did  promote  official  or  populist 
perspectives.  Woodrow  Wyatt,  for  example  argued  that: 
Last  Sunday  three  IRA  terrorists  were  shot  dead  in  Gibraltar  by  the 
British  Army.  Now  Labour  appeasers  moan.  They  claim  the  three  ought 
not  to  have  been  shot.  They  were  unarmed  so  it  wasn't  legal  they  say. 
Unarmed?  They  had  smuggled  in  a  car  loaded  with  explosives.  Enough 
to  kill  two  or  three  hundred  people...  The  assassins  should  have  been 
buried  in  Gibraltar.  Not  in  Ireland  for  the  IRA  to  use  the  funeral  for  a 
mass  demonstration.  It  doesn't  matter  that  the  individuals  weren't 
carrying  arms  (News  of  the  World  13  March  1988).  8 
But  there  was  a  sense  in  which  the  Gibraltar  killings  were  a  step  too  far  in  the 
'war  against  terrorism'for  some  traditionally  conservative  writers.  Thus  the 
deaths  did  excite  critical  comment  amongst  some  columnists  in  the 
conservative  press.  Thus  Auberon  Waugh  observed  that: 
What  surprised  me  was  the  number  of  saloon  bar  Britons  who  reckoned 
it  was  all  right  to  gun  down  the  suspected  terrorists,  even  if  they  were 
not  engaged  in  terrorists  activities  at  the  time.  If  a  majority  of  Britons 
feel  like  this  -  and  my  own  soundings  suggest  they  do  -  what  is  to  stop 
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(Sunday  Telegraph  13  March  1988). 
This  is  similar  in  tone  to  some  ofthe  editorials  in  the  US  press,  but  quite 
radically  different  to  the  editorial  written  by  Peregrine  Worsthorne  in  Waugh's 
own  paper  the  Sunday  Telegraph  the  same  day.  9  Following  the  killings  at 
Milltown  and  Andersonstown  Daily  Mail  columnist  Keith  Waterhouse 
questioned  the  rationale  for  the  British  presence  in  Ireland: 
To  observe,  as  one  newspaper  did  yesterday,  that'we  have  had  an 
horrific  foretaste  of  what  would  happen  if  Britain  were  to  pull  her  troops 
out  of  Northern  Ireland'  seems  not  quite  appropriate  to  the  occasion 
when  the  two  men  mob  lynched  on  Saturday  were  themselves  British 
soldiers,  and  the  whole  bloody  week  was  precipitated  by  the  SAS  action 
in  Gibraltar.  For  myself,  I've  always  believed  that  the  Army  presence 
tends  to  aggravate  rather  than  mitigate  the  situation.  That's  easy  to  say 
and  difficult  to  prove,  of  course,  and  those  of  us  who  subscribe  to  this 
view  would  feel  pretty  sick  to  be  proved  wrong  by  hindsight.  But  it 
seems  to  me  that  recent  events  are  as  much  an  argument  of  the  Army 
going  as  for  the  Army  staying  (21  March  1988). 
We  can  note  that  such  perspectives  get  some  space  in  the  British  press,  albeit 
in  the  margins  of  the  paper.  This  is  potentially  important  in  providing 
alternative  information  and  perspectives  to  the  British  public.  some 
consequences  of  this  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  Five.  However  we  should 
remember  that  such  views  are  a  minority  even  amongst  columnists  and  are  not 
regularly  expressed.  Indeed  even  columnists  who  are  explicitly  employed  to 
have  'views'  about  contemporary  political  issues  are  vulnerable  if  they  express 
views  on  Northern  Ireland  which  are  too  critical  of  the  orthodoxy.  Thus  former 
editor  of  Ptivate  Eye,  Richard  Ingrams  seems  to  have  been  sacked  as  a 
columnist  by  the  Sunday  Telegraph  becauseW  his  writings  and  Labour  MP  Ken 
Livingstone  was  a  short  lived  columnist  at  Robert  Maxwell's  London  Daily 
News,  because  of  his  views  on  Northern  Ireland.  '() 
If  editorials  in  the  US  press  could  be  uniformly  critical  of  the  official  position  of 
the  British  government  and  open  to  the  assumptions  of  alternative 
perspectives,  then  the  space  given  to  columnists  could  begin  to  contest  even 
some  of  those  assumptions.  This  is  not  to  argue  that  aff  columns  are  like  this, 
but  there  is  a  different  range  of  information  and  views  available.  In  the  sample 
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British  Government.  In  news  reports  there  were  many  descriptions  of  Mairead 
Farrell,  but  it  was  only  in  a  guest  column  that  Sally  Belfrage"  could  simply 
record  that  for  many  people  in  Andersonstown  Farrell  was  'a  much  beloved 
local  heroine'  (Los  Angeles  Times  1  May  1988). 
She  also  referred  to  the  possibility  of  interpreting  British  views  as  racist.  Her 
analysis  assumes  that  Britain  is  intimately  involved  in  the  conflict: 
Over  in  London,  the  people  in  charge  of  this  mess  -  whose  attitude 
toward  all  the  Irish,  Catholic  and  Protestant,  can  be  regarded  as  racist  - 
were  searching  for  expletives  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Having  just 
spoken  after  the  Milltown  massacre  of  the  Irish  'plumbing  new  depths'  of 
savagery  and  bestiality,  the  politicians  were  hard  put  to  come  up  with 
new  hyperbole  when  the  soldiers  were  murdered.  So  they  spoke  of  still 
newer  depths  of  the  same  being  plumbed.  Of  no  concern  to  Parliament 
was  what  had  amounted  to  an  execution  without  trial  in  Gibraltar:  on  the 
contrary,  Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher  was  incensed  at  Amnesty 
International  for  pointing  this  out  (Los  Angeles  Times  1  May  1988). 
It  was  also  possible  to  find  the  killings  labelled  as  murder.  The  Boston  Globe's 
Mike  Barnacle  was  direct  and  to  the  point: 
Marvellousl  The  British  celebrated  St  Patrick's  day  a  bit  prematurely  last 
week  by  killing  three  unarmed  Irish  citizens  on  a  street  in  Gibraltar  and 
you  would  need  a  seeing-eye  dog  to  locate  an  American  politician  here 
with  even  the  slightest  drop  of  Celtic  blood  who  dare  to  label  the  deed 
for  what  it  was:  simple  murder  (Boston  Globe  17  March  1988). 
The  nearest  the  British  media  got  to  such  a  statement  was  six  weeks  after  the 
killings  in  a  guest  column  in  the  Independent  where  Enoch  Powell  raised  the 
'possibility'  that  it  was  murder  in  an  article  itself  criticising  British  media 
reporting  of  the  Gibraltar  incident.  Headed  'The  questions  our  muzzled  press 
should  be  asking  on  Gibraltar'  he  argued  that  after  the  killings: 
a  massive  self-congratulation  intoned  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  engulfed 
the  media:  it  echoed  back  and  forth  in  Parliament  and  the  papers. 
Maybe  what  happened  in  Gibraltar  was  perfectly  lawful  and  defensible... 
Maybe;  but  there  is  another  possibility.  The  possibility  that  it  was 
deliberate,  cold  blooded,  premeditated  murder  (Independent  1  April From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters' 
1988). 
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Such  sentiments  are  confined  to  the  margins  of  the  US  and  British  press  and  in 
the  latter  are  extremely  rare.  The  endorsement  of  British  disengagement  is 
very  rare  anywhere  in  the  British  media.  Only  the  Daily  Mirror  has  endorsed 
British  withdrawal  at  editorial  level  and  has  been  attacked  by  other  newspapers 
for  doing  do.  In  twenty  five  years  there  has  only  been  one  television 
documentary  devoted  to  explaining  the  case  for  British  withdrawal.  12 
Cartoons 
The  space  afforded  by  cartoons  is  bounded  by  the  conventions  of  satire  and 
humour.  These  are  considerably  looser  than  the  constraints  on  factual 
reporting.  Satire  allows  a  huge  leeway  for  comment.  The  liberalising  of  British 
television  in  the  1960s  is  regularly  symbolised  by  the  satirical  'That  Was  The 
Week  That  Was'  and,  in  the  1980's,  television's  Spitting  Image,  has  regularly 
got  away  with  comment  and  humour  which  would  be  unacceptable  in  other 
types  of  programming.  The  newspaper  cartoonist  is  thought  of  as  being 
'creative'  and  in  similar  vein  to  an  artist  or  playwrite  is  given  a  certain  measure 
of  licence  not  available  in  other  parts  of  the  paper. 
Indeed  it  has  been  suggested  that  some  of  the  humour  in  Spitting  Image 
broadcast  on  ITV  has  been  beyond  the  pale  even  for  comedy.  On  election 
night  1987  the  programme,  screened  just  after  the  polls  closed,  ended  with  a 
young  blue  eyed  boy  singing  the  song  'Tomorrow  belongs  to  me'  in  a  beer 
garden  in  a  replica  of  the  scene  from  the  film  Cabaret.  In  this  case  though  the 
beer  garden  was  populated  by  puppet  members  of  the  Cabinet,  beer  glasses  in 
hand,  who  joined  in  with  gusto  as  the  young  boy  raised  his  arm  in  a  Nazi 
salute.  This  edition  of  Spitting  Image  shocked  the  BBC.  According  to  the  then 
Deputy  Director  General,  Alan  Protheroe:  'There  was  no  way  the  BBC  could 
have  put  that  kind  of  programme  out  at  that  time.  As  one  of  my  colleagues 
said,  Mrs  Thatcher  would  have  ringed  Broadcasting  House  with  tanks'  (World  in 
Action  1988). 
Nevertheless,  satire  does  give  a  licence  for  material  that  would  be 
unacceptable  elsewhere.  This  does  not,  however,  only  mean  material  which  is 
critical  of  official  perspectives,  but  also  material  which  celebrates  official  and 
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Here  we  might  also  recall  the  popularity  of  anti-Irish  racism  in  cartoons  in 
some,  (especially  tabloid)  papers.  Here,  Irish  people  are  drawn  as  sub-human 
and  ape-like.  Explaining  this,  Michael  Cummings,  who  draws  for  the  Daily 
Express,  has  said  that  his  cartoons  are  simply  giving  expression  to  a  view  of 
Irish  people  as  'extremely  violent,  bloodyminded,  always  fighting,  drinking 
enormous  amounts,  getting  roaring  drunk'.  Simian  caricatures  are  he  explained 
a  product  of  the  violence  of  the  IRA  which  makes'them  look  rather  like  apes  - 
though  that's  rather  hard  luck  on  the  apes'  (cited  in  Curtis  1984b:  83)  Kirkaldy 
has  argued  that  such  cartoons  have  been  able  to  express  'anti  -Irish  prejudice 
that  in  any  other  form  would  be  publicly  unacceptable,  even  in  England' 
(Kirkaldy  1981.42). 
On  the  other  hand  cartoons  can  provide  a  more  critical  space  in  papers  like  the 
Guardian,  the  Independent  or  the  Boston  Globe.  The  Independent's  Colin 
Wheeler,  for  example  published  a  number  of  cartoons  questioning  the 
government  line  on  the  killings  in  Gibraltar  including  one  after  the  screening  of 
'Death  on  the  Rock'which  implied  that  the  IRA  members  had  been  shot  after 
giving  themselves  up  (Figure  4.4).  The  satirical  magazine,  Private  Eye,  which 
was  one  of  the  strongest  critics  of  the  government  account  of  the  killings 
(Private  Eye  1989)  trod  a  similar  path,  devoting  one  of  its  covers  to  the  fact  that 
Sean  Savage  was  shot  with  a  large  number  of  bullets  (Figure  4.5). 
Figure  4.4'Just  don't  put  your  hands  up,  that's  all',  Colin  Wheeler  in  the 
Independent  30  April  1988. From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  190 
Figure  4.5  Private  Eye  during  the  Gibraltar  Inquest,  16  September  1988. 
Meanwhile  the  Boston  Globe  cartoonist  Wasserman  put  it  more  forcefully, 
featuring  Mrs  Thatcher  as  saying  'We  deplore  the  recent  violence  in  Northern 
Ireland  and  will  work  for  a  prompt  return  to  law  and  order.  We  cannot  tolerate 
the  vigilante  killing  of  unarmed  civilians.  That's  a  job  for  British  Commandos, 
(Figure  4.6).  Cartoons  as  direct  as  this  are  rare  in  the  British  press,  echoing 
differences  between  nations  in  news  coverage: 
Of  all  the  factors  accounting  for  the  different  images  of  the  conflict 
presented  in  cartoons,  the  nationality  of  the  cartoonist  is  the  most 
powerful.  The  all-party  agreement  on  Northern  Ireland,  for  example  has 
encouraged  a  high  level  of  consensus  among  British  cartoonists... 
Outside  the  British  Isles,  there  are  clear  differences  of  emphasis 
between  socialist  and  capitalist  countries,  but  general  agreement  among 
all  that  the  issue  is  essentially  to  be  viewed  as  a  British  problem...  Two 
main  explanations  for  the  strong  distinction  between  cartoonists  from 
different  settings  are  the  level  of  their  involvement  with  the  issue,  and 
the  way  in  which  they  perceive  their  constituencies  (Darby  1983:  115- 
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Figure  4.6  Wasserman  in  the  Boston  Globe  20  March  1988 
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British  cartoons  are  generally  more  limited  than  the  occasional  critiques  to  be 
found  in  the  Guardian  or  Independent.  In  the  early  part  of  the  troubles, 
according  to  Darby,  'there  was  little  dispute'  in  cartoons  that  Northern  Ireland 
was  'in  fact  a  religious  conflict': 
Far  from  becoming  more  sophisticated  as  time  passed,  this  view  of  the 
conflict  was  apparently  confirmed  by  the  persistence  and  intractability  of 
the  violence.  On  the  question  of  blame,  too,  there  was  considerable 
accord  among  British  cartoonists:  the  roots  were  firmly  planted  in  Irish 
bigotry  and  intransigence.  Even  when  there  was  a  suggestion,  as  in 
[Gerald]  Scarfe's  cartoons,  that  some  of  the  blame  was  shared  by 
Britain,  it  was  laid  firmly  at  the  door  of  earlier  British  administrations. 
The  present  governments  may  make  mistakes,  but  it  was  generally 
conceded  that  their  good  intentions  were  above  reasonable  suspicion. 
So,  although  it  was  uncommon  for  the  Irish  to  be  stereotyped  as  the 
subnormal  brutes  so  common  in  nineteenth  century  cartoons,  many  of From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  192 
the  analyses  were  implicitly  ethnic.  They  assumed  that  the  violence 
arose  from  qualities  inherent  in  the  Irish  character  -  aggression, 
superstition,  unreliability  and  a  kind  of  unthinking  death  wish  (Darby 
1983:  122-123). 
Television  News 
The  first  and  most  obvious  point  about  the  US  network  TV  news  on  Ireland  is 
the  sheer  lack  of  it.  The  networks  cover  Northern  Ireland  only  occasionally  and 
it  takes  many  deaths  to  spur  them  to  send  a  camera  crew  to  Belfast.  The  big 
events  of  19BB  and  1989  were  the  aftermath  of  the  Gibraltar  shootings  and  the 
twentieth  anniversary  of  the  redeployment  of  British  troops.  The  revolutions  in 
Eastern  Europe  of  1989/1990  forced  Northern  Ireland  off  the  news  pages,  with 
London  correspondents  either  relocated  to  other  parts  of  Europe  or  simply 
assigned  to  stories  in  the  East.  CBS  was  the  first  network  to  cover  the  story  on 
the  nightly  news  with  a  report  on  March  7.  The  first  ABC  report  was  on  March 
14  and  it  was  not  until  the  attack  on  the  funeral  at  Milltown  on  March  16  that 
NBC  introduced  the  story.  If  we  were  to  accept  the  arguments  of  some 
journalists  and  academics  (Altheide  1987)  we  might  expect  to  find  that  such 
lack  of  time  resulted  in  news  which  was  dominated  by  official  perspectives  to 
an  even  greater  extent  than  news  coverage  in  Britain.  But  this  is  not  the  case. 
The  stories  covered  on  TV  news  were  all  event  led  updates,  some  of  which 
were  then  used  as  a  hook  to  retell  the  story  of  the  events  of  recent  weeks.  In 
this  respect  they  were  similar  to  the  news  briefs  and  reports  in  the  press. 
It  is  often  argued  that  the  British  system  of  public  service  Broadcasting  is  better 
able  to  be  independent  of  the  state  than  a  commercial  system,  such  as  that  in 
the  US.  However  it  is  clear  that,  as  with  the  press,  US  television  is  - 
considerably  more  open  than  British  television.  We  might  recall  that  under 
British  Public  Service  provisions,  the  BBC  and  ITN  are  required  by  law  to 
produce  news  which  is'objective',  'unbiased'  or  'balanced'.  Such  legal 
conventions  are  routinely  violated  by  British  broadcasters. 
On  US  television  the  IRA  has'members',  'activists'  and  'guerrillas'.  In  contrast, 
British  television  used  only  the  term  'members'  (Figure  4.7).  A  similar  pattern  to 
the  press  reporting  emerges  with  perhaps  more  of  an  emphasis  on  the  term 
'terrorist'  on  ABC  which  accounted  for  both  uses  of  the  term.  CBSaccounted 
for  all  uses  of  the  terms  'guerrilla'  and  'activist'  while  NBC  preferred  simply From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  193 
using  'IRA',  which  it  did  fifteen  times. 
Figure  4.7 
Descriptions  of  Irish  Republicans  on  television 
US  TV  British  TV 
IRA  26  IRA  39 
members  12  terrorists  17 
Sinn  Fein,  political  wing  of  4  bombers  9 
the  IRA 
Irish  Republican  Army  3  members  8 
guerrillas  3  gang  4 
mob  3  group  4 
activists  2  unit  4 
leaders  2  Provos  4 
sniper  2  squad  3 
terrorists  2  what  it  [the  IRA]  called/  so  2 
called  Active  service  Unit 
suspe  cted  terrorists  2  paramilitary  2 
gunman/men  2 
On  British  television  news  there  was  one  mention  of  an'IRA  Commando  Unit', 
significantly  on  Channel  Four.  The  word  commando  is  not  acceptable  on  the 
BBC  even  on  the  World  Service  because  according  to  the  BBC's  1979  News 
Guide,  'in  the  1939-45  war,  the  word  had  heroic  connotations,  and  it  is  still  the 
name  of  units  of  the  Royal  Marines'  (cited  in  Curtis  1984b:  135)  The  military 
terminology  preferred  and  used  by  the  IRA  such  as  'unit'  does  occasionally  get 
used.  The  term  'squad'  also  has  military  connotations  but  is  not  used  by  the 
IRA.  it  is  used  by  the  broadcasters.  Probably  on  both  accounts  because  it  links 
so  well  with  the  termdeath'with  its  connotations  of  South  America.  'Personnel' 
is  occasionally  used  to  describe  IRA  members  as  is  the  legitimising 
'volunteers'.  But  more  often  than  not  British  journalists  make  it  clear  just  how 
legitimate  they  think  such  labels  are,  as  in  the  references  to  'so-called 
volunteers'.  For  the  BBC  there  is  also  an  issue  about  using  the  term'Provos'. 
In  the  sample  period  it  was  used  four  times  all  of  which  were  on  ITN.  BBC 
news  guidelines  explicitly  state  that  journalists  should  'nevef'  (their  emphasis) 
use  the  term  'Provos'  because  'we  should  not  give  pet  names  to  terrorists' From  'Terrotists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  194 
(BBC  1989c:  39.4).  Similarly  BBC  journalists  are  advised  not  to  give  the  IRA 
'spurious  respectability'  by  speaking  of  IRA'volunteers'  because'we  don't 
know  why  they  joined'  (BBC  1989c:  39.9). 
The  use  of  less  pejorative  terms  such  as  'guerrilla'  is  only  part  of  the  story.  In 
the  (British)  official  perspective  the  IRA  are  a  criminal  conspiracy,  without 
political  motivation.  Their  campaign  is  simply  one  of  terrorism.  While  there  is 
some  room  in  British  broadcasting  to  contest  this  proposition,  most  notably  in 
documentaries,  and  some  fictional  output,  television  news  remains  relatively 
closed.  However  even  in  the  most  closed  formats  of  television  network  news  in 
the  US  there  is  a  good  deal  more  space  to  contest  key  propositions  of  the 
official  (British)  perspective. 
Non  News  Actuality  coverage 
In  Britain  news  coverage  of  the  events  of  March  1988  was  not  the  only  source 
of  television  information  for  viewers.  A  number  of  current  affairs  and 
documentary  programmes  covered  the  killings  in  Gibraltar  and  their  aftermath. 
The  most  critical  of  these  and  the  one  which  caused  the  most 
, 
controversy,  was 
an  edition  of  Thames  Television's  This  Week,  titled'Death  on  the  Rock',  which 
investigated  the  killings  in  Gibraltar  and  suggested  that  government  accounts 
of  the  shootings  had,  at  best,  been  misleading.  In  the  US,  the  killings  and  their 
aftermath  led  to  the  making  of  a  special  documentary  for  the  PBS  public 
television  network  on  the  life  of  Mairead  Farrell,  one  of  the  IRA  members  killed 
in  Gibraltar.  It  has  been  suggested  that  documentaries  are  amongst  the  most 
potentially  open  of  programme  formats  in  both  the  US  and  Britain  (Schlesinger 
et  al  1983;  Altheide  1987).  It  is  instructive  to  compare  these  two  programmes 
and  the  reactions  to  them,  as  they  illustrate  the  limits  of  openness  in  factual 
television  in  Britain  and  the  US. 
As  we  saw  in  Chapter  One,  the  account  given  by'Death  on  the  Rock'  directly 
contradicted  the  official  version.  Eye-witnesses  interviewed  for'Death  on  the 
Rock'  alleged  that  there  had  been  no  challenge  and  that  the  IRA  members  had 
made  no  movements,  simply  putting  their  hands  up,  as  if  in  surrender. 
Essentially  the  programme  challenged  the  factual  accuracy  of  the  official 
account,  implying  rather  than  actually  elaborating  an  alternative  way  of 
understanding  the  conflict.  The  latter  approach  is  very  difficult  in  prime  time 
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The  'Death  on  the  Rock'  programme  makers  themselves  were  very  much  aware 
of  the  limits  of  covering  Northern  Ireland.  They  were  conscious  that  in  order  to 
get  their  programme  on  to  television  they  would  have  to  include  sequences 
which  showed  that  they  were  no  supporters  of  'terrorism'.  13  Indeed  the  editor, 
Roger  Bolton,  who  has  a  long  history  of  involvement  in  critical  programmes  on 
Ireland,  made  a  special  request  that  the  programme  slot  be  extended  partly  so 
that  this  material,  which  'underlined  the  hostile  editorial  stance  of  the 
programme  towards  the  IRA  and  its  methods',  could  be  accommodated 
(Windelsham  and  Rampton  1989:  22-24).  Bolton,  (1990:  224)  has  described 
this  insurance  policy  as  putting  the  investigation  'in  context'.  The  Chairman  of 
the  IBA,  Lord  Thomson  was  later  to  write  that  he  saw  no  reason  to  prevent  the 
broadcast  of  the  programme  'provided  the  criminal  record  of  the  terrorists  and 
the  enormity  of  the  outrage  they  planned  was  made  clear'  (cited  in  Bolton 
1990:  232,  my  emphasis).  Such  precautions  are  not  required  in  the  US. 
In  America  the  networks  are  able  to  show  documentary  programmes  which 
simply  could  not  be  shown  in  Britain.  In  1980,  for  example,  ABC  broadcast  a 
documentary  To  Die  for  Ireland  in  a  peak  time  slot.  According  to  press  reports 
British  diplomats  even  complained  that  it  was  being  shown  in  America 
(Glasgow  University  Media  Group  1982:  140-143).  14  The  1989  PBS  film  on  the 
life  of  Mairead  Farrell  -Death  of  a  Terrorist'-  (Cran  1989)  was  structured  as 
an  investigation  into  the  reasons  why  a  middle  class  Catholic  girl  from  Belfast 
would  join  the  IRA  (at  the  age  of  fourteen)  and  take  up  arms  against  the  British 
military.  The  Director  Bill  Cran  was  keen  to  show  some  of  the  complexities  of 
political  violence  and  organised  the  film  in  opposing  sections  allowing  Farrell 
and  her  family  and  comrades,  to  present  her  as  an  ordinary  person  and 
determined,  but  rational  activist.  15  Against  this  were  counter  views  which 
emphasised  the  official  view  of  the  conflict  and  the  suffering  caused  by  IRA 
actions.  As  Bill  Cran  explained: 
if  you  can  imagine  something  like-an  earthquake  meter  or  something 
measuring  a  heart  beat,  I  deliberately  plotted  it  so  your  sympathies  are 
switching  for  and  against  [Mairead  Farrell]  like  she's  almost  driven  into 
joining  the  IRA  and  I  sympathise  with  her  but  then  you  know  you're 
confronted  with  the  fact  that  they're  letting  off  bombs  and  innocent 
people  get  killed.  Then  she  goes  to  jail  where  she's  very  very  brave  and 
then  she  comes  out  and  she  rejoins.  At  the  end  where  we  reran  the 
news  footage  of  the  Gibraltar  killings,  the  funeral,  the  attack  on  the 
corporals  and  so  on  we  were  literally  deliberately  planning  it  so  that From  Terrorists'  to  'Freedom  fighters'  196 
toward  the  end  of  the  film  the  oscillations  of  sympathy  start  to  go  off  the 
scale.  All  the  way  through  the  film  you're  doing  small  sort  of  ups  and 
downs  until  they're  absolutely  going  off  the  meter  at  the  end.  That  was 
deliberately  planned  (Interview,  London  May  1990). 
The  film  featured  extensive  interviews  with  Farrell,  conducted  following  her 
release  from  jail  in  1986,  as  well as  with  former  cell  mates  and  other  members 
of  the  republican  movement.  By  comparison  'Death  on  the  Rock'  did  not 
feature  any  interviews  with  either  Sinn  F6in  or  the  IRA.  16  In  sum  the  US 
programme  was  able  to  interrogate  critically  the  official  picture  of  Northern 
Ireland  and  to  show  that  it  is  not  universally  shared.  The  programme 
concluded  by  emphasising  the  contested  nature  of  definitions  of  'terrorism,  and 
leaving  to  the  viewer  to  decide  which  version  they  favoured.  'To  some  people  of 
the  Falls  Road  she  [Mairead  Farrell]  was  a  patriot.  To  the  British  she  was  a 
terrorist.  To  her  family  she  was  a  victim  of  Irish  history.  '  'Death  of  a  Terrorist' 
was  much  more  open  to  alternative  views  than  'Death  on  the  Rock.  The 
controversy  caused  by  'Death  on  the  Rock'  compared  with  the  lack  of 
controversy  over'Death  of  a  Terrorist'  is  indicative  of  just  how  close  to  the 
limits  of  British  broadcasting  the  former  pushed  and  of  how  much  looser  the 
limits  of  US  broadcasting  are. 
In  Britain  the  broadcast  of  This  Week's'Death  on  the  Rock'was  subject  to  an 
attempt  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  have  the  programme  withdrawn.  His 
request  to  the  Independent  broadcasting  Authority  (IBA)  was  rejected  and  the 
'Death  on  the  Rock'was  broadcast  as  planned.  There  followed  a  concerted 
government  attempt  to  cast  (unattributable)  doubt  on  the  credibility  of  the 
witnesses  interviewed  and  government  ministers,  including  Prime  Minister 
Margaret  Thatcher,  publicly  attacked  the  programme  (Miller  1991).  Finally  after 
a  long  running  campaign  by  the  government  supported  especially  by  Murdoch 
owned  papers,  The  Sun  and  The  Sunday  Times,  Thames  Television  were 
pressured  into  instituting  an  independent  inquiry  into  the  programme 
(Windelsham  and  Rampton  1989).  In  the  US  the  PBS  documentary  'Death  of  a 
Terrorist'was  notsubject  to  any  similar  pressures. 
The  front-line  for  alternative  perspectives  on  the  Gibraltar  killings  in'  Britain  was 
the  raising  of  questions  about  the  legitimacy  of  state  actions,  measured  against 
the  standards  of  democratic  government  and  the  rule  of  law.  In  America, 
television  was  able  to  go  further  and  consider  the  reasons  why  an  Irish  woman 
might  take  up  arms  against  the  British  state.  In  other  words,  questions  could From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  197 
be  asked  about  whether  the  actions  of  the  Irish  Republican  Army  could  be  seen 
as  legitimate. 
US  coverage:  some  strengths  and  limits 
As  the  political  distance  between  the  media  of  any  country  and  the  political 
violence  on  which  they  are  reporting  increases,  so  more  open  and 
dispassionate  coverage  becomes  more  common.  Some  have  argued  that  this 
indicates  that  such  coverage  is  favourable  to  'terrorism'.  Weimann,  for 
example,  argues  that  the  use  of  'positive'  labels  may  aI  low  'terrorists,  to  gain 
'international  recognition  and  even  sympathy'  (Wei  mann  1985:  443).  We  have 
seen  that  the  US  press  is  more  likely  to  use  more  dispassionate  terminology  in 
describing  non-state  actors  in  Northern  Ireland,  but  this  should  not  be  confused 
with  coverage  which  justifies  the'armed  struggle'.  On  the  contrary,  while  the 
US  coverage  from  March  1988  tended  to  be  more  open  than  British  coverage,  it 
was  rare  for  it  to  allow  unchallenged  oppositional  views.  Moreover,  as  many 
researchers  have  shown  (Holland  1989;  Artherton  1983a;  1983b;  O'Maolchatha 
1990;  Tan  1987;  1988;  1989;  Paletz  et  al  1982a;  1982b)  US  press  and 
television  reporting  (especially  news  forms)  tends  to  accept  a  key  element  of 
the  'official'  view  of  the  conflict  -  that  the  British  state  is  somehow,  above,  the 
fray  and  holding  the  ring. 
This  was  certainly  the  case  in  the  coverage  of  Gibraltar.  The  unusual  features 
of  the  killings  (in  broad  daylight  on  a  public  street,  outside  Northern  Ireland 
where  the  credibility  of  witnesses  was  not  automatically  suspect)  along  with  the 
build  up  of  controversial  events  of  early  1988,17  prompted  particularly  hostile 
coverage  of  British  policy  in  Northern  Ireland  which  on  other  occasions  and 
other  stories  is  likely  to  be  more  muted.  18  Yet  even  in  this  period  the  conflict  is 
predominantly  conceived  of  within  the  parameters  of  the  official  perspective. 
There  is  criticism  of  British  policy  for  not  matching  up  to  its  stated  ideals,  there 
are  acknowledgements  of  repressive  parts  of  British  policy,  there  is  discussion 
of  the  demands  and  aims  of  the  IRA  and  there  is  even  some  treatment  of  the 
IRA  and  the  British  Army  as  opposing  military  forces.  But  when  it  comes  to 
characterising  the  conflict  and  its  causes  official  explanations  predominate. 
News  from  Northern  Ireland  was  predominantly  reported  in  terms  of 
inexplicable  acts  of  continuing  violence  (cf.  Elliot  1977).  Where  explanations 
were  given  or  alluded  to,  irrationality  was  emphasised.  The  conflict  was 
sometimes  seen  as  rooted  in  obscure  historical/sectarian/religious  passions 
and  sometimes  with  the  'terrorism',  'guerrilla  warfare'  or  even  'armed  struggle' From  Terrorists'  to  'Freedom  fighters'  198 
of  the  IRA.  In  this  period  there  were  19  occasions  on  which  the  conflict  was 
characterised  as  'sectarian'  or  'religious'  and  six  where  the  cause  was  given  as 
the  violence  of  the  IRA.  As  a  corollary  loyalist  violence  was  seen  as  occurring 
as  a  response  to  the  IRA.  (For  example,  'Protestant  paramilitary  groups  have 
grown  up  to  fight  it  [the  IRA]',  Atlanta  Constitution  17  March  1988). 
Characterisations  of  the  conflict  on  US  television  news  also  tended  to  leave  the 
role  of  the  British  out  of  the  reckoning.  Journalists  talked  of  'The  conflict 
between  Catholics  and  Protestants  in  Northern  Ireland'  (NBC  16  March  1988), 
or  'a  further  escalation  of  violence  between  the  two  communities'  (NBC  19 
March  1988),  or  of  the  IRA's'war  against  the  Protestants  of  the  North'  (ABC  23 
March  1988).  When  the  Christian  Science  Monitor  discusses  the'extremists  on 
both  sides'  (24  March  1988)  it  is  not  referring  to  the  British  Army.  As  Ward 
concluded  in  his  analysis  of  US  network  television  news  coverage  of  Northern 
Ireland  between  1968  and  1979,  the  major  element  missing  was  an 
examination  of  the  role  of  the  British  government.  'The  rationale  for  the  British 
presence  had  been  discussed  in  1969  and  was  never  subsequently 
contradicted  or  examined  in  depth'  (Ward  1984:  210). 
By  contrast  there  were  only  three  references.  in  the  press  which  characterised 
Northern  Ireland  as  a'British-Irish  conflict',  19  and  a  further  three  which  used 
the  single  word  'resistance'  to  refer  to  IRA  actions.  20  On  only  one  occasion  was 
the  promotion  of  the  'sectarian  conflict'  view  recognised  as  a  view  rather  than 
an  accepted  fact.  London  Correspondent  Karen  DeYoung  wrote  'Prime 
minister  Margaret  Thatcher  has  seemed  particularly  prone  to  the  belief  that  the 
Irish  conflict  is intractable  and  that  the  citizens  of  the  province,  Protestant  and 
Catholic  alike,  are  some  sort  of  alien  species  locked  in  arcane  warfare  and 
impermeable  to  civilised  reason'  (Washington  Post  21  March  1988). 
This  short  fragment  was  the  nearest  the  US  press  got  to  referring  to  the  British 
government  as  promoting  a  particular  view  of  Northern  Ireland.  '  This  compared 
to  the  regular  references  to  the  value  that  events  would  have  in  'propaganda' 
terms  for  the  republicans  (cf.  Holland  1989;  Thomas  1991).  Journalists  talked 
of  and  endorsed  the  view  that  IRA  or  Sinn  176in  actions  could  be  measured  in 
terms  of  th  ei  r  'propaganda'  value.  Thus  the  Chicago  Tfibune  reported  that'The 
IRA,  dubbing  the  dead  guerrillas  "The  Gibraltar  Martyrs",  has  launched  a  major 
propaganda  campaign'(16  March  1988.  Reporting  on  the  killing  of  three 
mourners  at  Milltown  Cemetery  the  Washington  Post  reported  the  'today's 
events...  are  sure  to  be  seen  as  a  major  propaganda  coup  by  the  IRA'  (17 From  'Tefforists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  199 
March  1988)  while  the  Christian  Science  Monitor  reported  that'some  analysts 
contend'  that  the  IRA  and  Sinn  176in  'have  attempted  to  turn  the  Gibraltar 
setback  into  a  propaganda  victory.  The  elaborate  funeral  arrangements,  they 
say,  aimed  to  make  martyrs  of  the  dead'(17  March  1988).  These  propaganda 
gains  were  then  considered  to  have  suffered  a  setback  following  the  killings  of 
the  two  British  soldiers  in  Andersonstown  three  days  later.  The  New  York 
Times  reported  that  the  IRA'was  seen  to  have  suffered  another  blow  to  the 
image  it  cultivates  of  the  dedicated  defender  of  the  hard-pressed  Catholic 
minority'  (23  March  1988).  In  the  only  two  counter  examples  the  Chicago 
Tribune  (18  March  1988)  referred  to'the  movement's  traditional  salute  to  it's 
dead',  and  the  Washington  Post  (18  March  1988)  reported  'the  military  display 
which  is,  traditional  at  funerals'.  CBS  echoed  this  view  when  it  reported  that 
'IRA  men  in  West  Belfast  gathered  to  fire  a  traditional  but  illegal  honour  guard 
salute'  (15  March  1988).  In  contrast  ABC  reported  that  'The  IRA  uses  funerals 
as  a  propaganda  instrument'  (ABC  23  March  1988) 
On  British  television  news,  however,  to  accept  that  the  IRA  has  traditions  and 
perhaps  even  rules,  regulations  or  a  coherent  political  ideology  is  beyond  the 
pale  of  mainstream  reporting.  The  killings  in  Gibraltar,  the  return  of  the  bodies, 
the  funeral  and  the  attack  on  it,  the  lack  of  police  presence,  and  finally  the 
killing  of  the  soldiers  in  Andersonstown  were  all  evaluated  in  terms  of  their 
propaganda  value  for  the  republican  movement.  Thus  the  Daily  Telegraph 
reported  'Sinn  Fein  to  turn  IRA  burials  into  publicity  stunt'  (16  March  1988).  21 
Television  news  also  followed  this  agenda. 
It  should  not  be  imagined  that  there  are  no  external  limits  on  US  reporting. 
When  as  journalists  become  too  critical  they  risk  being  frozen  out  by  British 
sources.  In  a  critical  commentary  on  US  press  coverage,  Jack  Holland 
specifically  singles  out  reporting  by  New  York  Times  correspondent  Jo  Thomas 
in  the  mid  1980's  as  a  significant  and  hopeful  exception  to  the  lack  of  US 
investigative  reporting  on  Northern  Ireland  (Holland  1989:  235).  Yet  Thomas 
quickly  ran  into  problems  with  the  British  government  for  her  revelations  about 
police  and  army  killings: 
A  senior  editor  who  kept  a  home  in  London  as  well  as  in  New  York  and 
who  had  been  enthusiastic  about  my  initial  dispatches  from  Belfast, 
began  telling  me  to  stay  out  of  Northern  Ireland.  A  high-ranking  British 
official,  who  in  the  past  has  had  close  ties  with  the  intelligence 
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my  investigation  in  exchange  for  a  lot  of  access  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  Northern  Ireland  as  well  as  an  exclusive  first  look  at  the  Anglo-Irish 
pact  then  being  negotiated  between  London  and  Dublin.  I  refused. 
Several  American  colleagues  in  London  suggested  I  leave  the  difficult 
investigations  to  the  local  press:  if  there  really  were  a  story,  British  and 
Irish  reporters  would  be  on  top  of  it.  In  fact,  they  were  not  -  but  some  of 
them  began  treating  me  as  if  I  were  a  member  of  the  IRA.  Then.  too.  the 
mail  at  my  house  in  London  started  to  arrive  opened.  In  Northern 
Ireland  I  was  refused  access  to  all  official  records,  even  transcripts  of 
inquests  and  trials  that  had  been  open  to  the  public..  -.  Then  in  February 
1986  1  was  abruptly  ordered  home...  In  light  of  constant  complaints  that  I 
had  been  paying  too  much  attention  to  Northern  Ireland,  I  suspected  this 
was  the  cause,  and  one  senior  editor  confirmed  that  this  was  so 
(Thomas  1991:  123-124). 
Clearly,  American  reporting  lis  vulnerable  to  pressure. 
Conciusions 
The  contrast  between  the  controversy  caused  by'Death  on  the  Rock'  and  the 
lack  of  response  to  'Death  of  a  Terrorist'  seems  not  to  relate  to  the  difference  in 
content  of  the  programmes,  but  to  factors  such  as  the  pressure  which  British 
sources  can  apply  and  the  political  closeness  of  the  conflict  in  Ireland  to  the 
British  state.  22  As  the  Head  of  BBC  television  news  Peter  Woon  and  his 
Deputy  Robin  Walsh  told  Peter  Taylor'Beirut  is  a  long  way  away...  We  do, 
work  slightly  differently  when  it  affects  us.  Whether  subconsciously  or 
consciously  we  differentiate'  (Taylor  1986:  219). 
There  are  clear  differences  between  different  forms  of  actuality  coverage  in 
both  the  US  and  UK.  The  further  you  move  from  the  centre  stage  of  news 
towards  the  margins  of  comment  and  satire,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  editorial 
controls  will  loosen.  This  means  that  there  is  increased  space  to  contest 
official  perspectives  on  'terrorism'  but  also  increased  licence  to  promote  the 
populism  which  favours  order  regardless  of  the  law.  ý  There  are  also  systematic 
variations  between  the  US  and  British  media  systems.  These  can  be 
characterised  as  differences  of  range  and  gravity.  There  is  a  greater  range  of 
coverage  in  the  US,  but  the  centre  of  gravity  has  shifted  so  that  more 
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It  is  true  that  news  coverage,  and  especially  television  news,  is  the  most  limited 
form  of  news,  but  this  is  less  to  do  with  the  shorter  length  of  time  news  has  or 
with  'natural'formal  factors,  than  it  does  with  the  close  policing  of  news  in 
Britain.  News  is  not  inherently  limited  to  relaying  the  definitions  of  the  powerful 
by  its  format  or  other  constraints  such  as  time.  The  limits  of  the  acceptable  for 
different  media  formats  are  not  simply  given  or  determined  by  the  'Accessibility, 
visual  quality,  drama  and  action'  or  the  'thematic  unity'  of  any  event  (Altheide 
1985:  346-347).  Rather,  decisions  made  about  stories  to  cover  reflect  the 
interests  and  priorities  of  contemporary  news  values  and  the  constraints 
exerted  by  source  organisations.  The  comparison  of  US  and  British  news 
showed  clear  differences,  not  of  form  or  style,  but  of  substantive  content,  - 
there  were  a  wider  range  of  interviewees  and  official  nostrums  could  more 
easily  be  questioned. 
But  does  this  make  any  difference?  What  is  the  relationship  between  the 
media  and  public  opinion  and  belief?  It  is  to  this  question  that  the  next  two 
chapters  are  devoted. 
BBC1,2100,  ITN,  2200,  C4  News  and  BBC2's  Newsnight 
2  These  papers  were  chosen  largely  for  ease  of  access.  The  Los  Angeles  Times  is  now  the 
biggest  selling  paper  in  the  US  (UK  Press  Gazette  14  May  1990)  and  it  should  be  understood 
that  the  tabloid/broadsheet  split  is  not  nearly  so  marked  in  political  terms  in  the  US  as  it  is  in 
Britain. 
3  This  is  significant  because,  as  we  have  noted,  the  IRA  have  not  been  interviewed  on  British 
television  since  1974. 
4  Between  1969  and  30  June  1989  British  forces  inflicted  11  .  8%  of  total  casualties  (Irish 
information  Partnership  1990). 
5  See  Chapter  One  for  a  summary  of  the  events  in  Gibraltar. 
6  Glenholmes  was  Fleet  Street's  "most  wanted  terrorist"  for  several  years  in  the  1  980s.  She 
was  first  named  by  Scotland  Yard  in  1984,  appearing  in  the  papers  as  the  "Terror  Blonde  in 
jeans"  (Daily  Mail  13  November  1984)  and  the  "Blonde  Bomber"  (Evening  standard  12 
November  1984).  After  an  unsuccessful  extradition  attempt  in  Dublin  in  1986  the  papers 
obtained  several  photographs  of  'Evil  Evelyn'which  replaced  the  artist's  impression  released  by 
the  police  two  years  earlier.  They  showed,  among  other  things,  that  Glenholmes  was  not,  in 
fact,  blonde.  These  photographs  have  been  appearing  periodically  ever  since,  for  example, 
with  the  caption  'Angel  of  Death'  in  the  Star  of  11  January,  1988.  They  resurfaced  on  8  March, 
1988.  Their  significance  was  illustrated  when  Irish  Press  columnist  John  McEntee  reported 
Witnessing  the  'creation  of  a  little  bit  of  history'in  Gibraltar's  Holiday  Inn,  Ihe  invention  of From  'Terrorists'to  'Freedom  fighters'  202 
Evelyn  Glenholmes  as  the  missing  fourth  IRA  member  in  Gibraltar'.  McEntee  asked  a  'colourful 
colleague  if  he  believed  the  theory  of  the  fourth  man.  "Oh,  it's  a  woman  and  we  are  saying  it's 
Evelyn  Glenholmes",  this  craggy  veteran  explained.  Why  on  earth,  I  wondered  aloud,  was  he 
saying  it  was  Glenholmes.  "Because",  he  replied,  "we  have  a  nice  picture  of  her  and  she  won't 
sue...  (Irish  Press  16  March  1988). 
7  We  can  contrast  this  with  the  feature  pieces  carried  in  the  Mail  during  the  Gibraltar  inquest. 
All  of  these,  written  by'Special  feature  writer'  Geoffrey  Levy,  were  polemical  accounts  of  the 
inquest  or  attacks  on  the  merest  whiff  of  alternative  evidence  or  perspective.  This  suggests 
that  analysing  media  content  to  locate  variation  rather  that  domination  needs  to  be  tempered 
by  a  very  sensitive  attention  to  what  is  at  stake  for  dominant  explanations  in  the  appearance  of 
alternative  views  or  information.  The  extent  to  which  official  sources  are  briefing  hard  and  are 
able  to  anticipate  developments  may  have  a  decisive  impact  on  the  actual  visibility  of 
alternative  sources  or  explanations  even  within  more  open  formats. 
8  Incidentally  Wyatt  seems  to  have  got  a  bit  confused  here.  The  explosives  were  not  of  course 
smuggled  into  Gibraltar 
.9  Under  the  heading  'Liberals  cry  wolf  over  Gibraltar  shootings',  Worsthome  wrote: 
When  it  comes  to  the  issue  of  terrorism,  particularly  of  IRA  terrorism,,  there  seems  to  be  little 
doubt  that  reason  and  morality  are  both  on  the  side  of  the  reactionaries  rather  than  the  liberals  - 
unless,  that  is,  one  starts  from  the  premise  that  the  IRA  ought  to  be  allowed  to  win,  which  most 
of  the  disapprovers;  claim  not  to  do.  In  fact,  they  almost  all  start  off  by  decladng  that  they 
detest  the  IRA,  before  going  on  to  condemn  the  use  of  the  only  methods  that  are  proving  at  all 
effective  in  defeating  the  IRA,  thereby  demonstrating  themselves  toýbe  humbugs  of  liars. 
fighting  terrorism  is  not  like  fighting  any  other  type  of  crime.  Terrorists  are  the  enemies  of  the 
state,  just  as  the  Germans  were  during  the  World  War  11.  The  primary  aim,  therefore,  is  to 
defeat  them  (Sunday  Telegraph  13  March  1988). 
10  Ingrams  'wrote  a  column  for  the  Sunday  Telegraph,  but  was  soon  sacked  for  his  un-tory 
views  on  Northern  Ireland'  (Lynn  Barber'Lord  Gnome's  Mid-Life  Crisis'  Independent  on  Sunday 
Review,  16  February  1992:  9).  Ingrams  himself  had  earlier  written  'I  felt  certain  that  the  reason 
was  some  remarks  of  mine  about  the  IRA  and  the  late  Airey  Neave  that  were  considered 
undiplomatic'  (Observer,  13  March  1988).  Robert  Maxwell  terminated  Livingstone's  contract 
following  the  MPs  maiden  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  which  dealt  with  intelligence 
activities  in  Northern  Ireland.  Maxwell  was  reportedly  'appalled'  by  the  speech  and  said  that 
was  no  place  in  any  paper  of  his  for  such  'reckless'  material:  'Your  engagement  to  write  for  the 
London  Daily  News  is  terminated  forthwith'  he  wrote  ('People  Diary',  The  Guardian,  16  July 
1987). 
11  Author  of  The  Crack:  A  Belfast  Year  1988 
12  'Pack  up  the  Troubles',  Critical  Eye  Channel  Four,  24  October  1991 
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as  these  are  not  confined  to  news  programmes.  Although  the  use  of  language  can  be 
somewhat  relaxed  in  a  documentary  or  current  affairs  programme,  Broadcast  institutions  do 
police  language  closely.  For  example  Peter  Taylor  recalls  arguing  with  BBC  Deputy  Director 
General  Alan  Protheroe,  about  how  to  describe  the  killing  of  Airey  Neave: 
The  film  showed  two  men  walking  in  Phoenix  Park,  Dublin,  where  a  century  earlier 
some  forerunners  of  the  IRA...  had  assassinated  Lord  Frederick  Cavendish,  the  new 
Chief  Secretary  for  Ireland.  The  point  of  comparison  was  that  the  men  now  seen  in 
the  Park  were  former  members  of  the  INLA  which  had  'assassinated'  Airey  Neave. 
Alan  Protheroe...  saw  the  film  prior  to  transmission  and  said  that  the  word  should  be 
'murder'  not  'assassination'.  I  said  I  had  used  the  word  deliberately  to  draw  the  parall 
, 
el 
between  that  and  the  incident  which  had  happened  one  hundred  years  before  at  the 
samespot.  Mr  Protheroe  took  the  point  but  insisted  that  'murder'  was  'the  more  precise 
and  accurate  word'.  So'murder'  was  used  (Taylor,  1986:  219). 
14  Such  films  are  quite  rare.  According  to  the  Vanderbilt  Television  News  Archive  at  Vanderbilt 
University,  Nashville,  Tennessee,  there  were  a  total  of  six  documentary  reports  on  Northern 
Ireland  between  1980  and  1989  on  the  ABC  and  PBS  networks.  These  included  a  showing  of 
an  edition  of  the  BBC  Real  Lives  programme,  'At  the  Edge  of  the  Union'which  is  discussed  in 
Chapter  One. 
15  According  to  Cran,  the  use  of  the  word  Terrorist'  in  the  title  of  the  film  was  intended  to  be  a 
question  (interview  with  the  author,  May  1990). 
16  Interviewing  members  of  the  republican  movement  is  difficult  on  British  television.  This 
Week  did  Interview  Gerry  Adams  of  Sinn  F6in  for'Death  on  the  Rock'  but  decided  not  to  use 
the  interview  because  it  Would  give  the  IRA  a  propaganda  platform  that  could  not  be  justified, 
(Windelsharn  and  Rampton:  20).  The  programme  did  feature  a  short  audio  taped  clip  of 
Mairead  Farrell's  voice. 
17  The  rejection  of  the  Birmingham  Six  appeal,  the  shooting,  in  suspicious  circumstances,  by 
the  British  Army  of  a  civilian,  Aldan  McAnespie,  the  release  and  return  to  service  of  Private  Ian 
Thain  after  serving  only  two  years  of  the  first  murder  sentence  ever  imposed  on  a  member  of 
the  British  Army  in  Ireland  since  1969 
18  A  British  Information  Services  (BIS)  Press  Officer  told  Paul  Artherton  that  'any  sort  of 
initiative  we  suggest  is  pretty  well  assured  of  favourable  coverage'  (Artherion  1983a:  20). 
1-9  All  the  examples  of  this  short  phrase  were  found  in  the  New  York  Times,  13  March  1988,17 
March  1988  and  20  March  1988. 
20  These  references  were  all  on  March  20  from  the  pen  of  a  New  York  Times  journalist  whose 
copy  was  used  by  both  the  Atlanta  Constitution  and  the  Chicago  Ttibune. 
21  One  correspondent  for  a  British  tabloid,  related  how  a  republican  funeral  in  the  early  1980s 
was  viewed  by  his  paper 
I  was  told  by  my  people  to  see  what  it  was  like  and  if  it  was  a  stunt  to  write  it  as  a  stunt. From  'Ftv*d=  t;  Mers'  04 
So  Isaid  "Mal  do  you  mean?  '  And  they  replied:  Well,  If  the  IRA  turn  up  and  fire 
gunshots  over  the  coffin,  we  want  all  that,  we  must  have  how  the  IRA  hijacked  the 
funcrar...  I  wa:,  told  to  write  a  story  saying  that  this  was  the  IRA  turning  a  man's  funeral 
into  a  propaganda  stunt  (cited  in  Hamilton-Tweedale,  1987:  390). 
2'-  1  am  not  arguing  that  Us  television  generally  takes  a  line  critical  of  Western  governments  on 
Issues  of  political  violence  or  that  It  Is  the  fourth  estate  watchdog  that  some  commentators 
maintain.  There  Ii  abundant  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  role  of  the  US  media  In  reporting 
political  violence,  cartied  out  by  governments  or  sub  state  groups  opposing  US  foreign  policy 
Imperatives.  Is  in  many  respects  quite  similar  to  the  role  of  British  broadcasting  in  reporting 
Northern  Ireland.  (See  Anderz;  cn  195a:  Chomsky  1989:  Hallin  1987  and  Herman  and  Chomsky 
1988  for  contrasting  critical  views).  Just  as  British  television  could,  in  the  1  980s.  report 
relatively  dispassionalely  on  El  Salvador  or  Nicaragua,  compared  to  the  US  media,  so  the  US 
media  can  hame  the  conflict  In  Northern  Ireland  in  looser  terms  than  In  Britain.  This  relates 
largely  to  Ilia  political  distance  of  the  conflict  In  Ireland  from  the  Immediate  exigencies  of  US 
foreign  policy. Chapter  Five 
Misinformation  and  Public  Belief: 
The  Case  of  Gibraltar 
Until  one  mild  March  afternoon, 
As  balmy  as  an  English  June, 
A  Sunday,  full  of  peaceful  sounds 
And  strolling  tourists  on  their  rounds, 
There  came  a  change  of  quality. 
The  game  became  reality. 
At  sometime  after  three  o'clock 
The  Thing  they  harboured  in  their  Rock 
Descended  on  them;  out  of  the  blue  - 
Slaughter  in  Winston  Churchill  Avenue 
Panic  among  the  passers-by 
As  three  young  Irish  people  die, 
Mown  down  by  men  with  automatics. 
The  story  goes  they  were  fanatics, 
Dangerous  terrorists,  they  said. 
Who,  the  assassins?  No  -  the  dead. 
But  how  do  we  know  the  intentions  was 
To  shoot  to  kill?  we  know  because 
The  SAS.  to  put  it  straight, 
Is  that  intention  incarnate 
Jack  Mitchell  GiB:  A  Modest  Exposure,  1990. 
Introduction 
The  debate  on  media  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland  has  continued  periodically 
since  the  beginning  of  the  current  period  of  troubles.  Most  commentary  has 
focused  on  the  'propaganda  war',  the  conduct  of  journalists  or  the  content  of 
what  they  write  or  say.  Yet,  Implicit  in  almost  all  that  is  said  are  assumptions 
about  the  impact  of  the  media  on  public  belief  and  society  more  widely.  For 
some  the  media  function  as  the  ally  of  the  'terrorists',  increasing  the  support 
and  morale  of  the  insurgents,  spreading  fear  among  their  potential  victims, 
gaining  the  insurgents  unwarranted  public  attention,  making  it  harder  for  the 
state  to  gain  support  for  'counter-terrorist'  measures,  and  sapping  the  national 
will  to  stay  in  Ireland.  For  others,  the  media  are  the  instrument  of  the  state, 
demoralising  the  Insurgents,  marginalising  them  to  the  edges  of  the  public 
sphere  or  beyond  it,  assuring  the  public  that  they  will  be  protected,  make  it 
easier  for  the  government  to  bring  in  repressive  measures  and  ensuring  that 
the  public  is  kept  in  ignorance  of  what  is  happening  in  Ireland. 
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In  all  this  debate,  which  Is  replicated  throughout  the  extensive  literature  on 
'terrorism'  and  the  media,  there  is  very  little  direct  investigation  of  public  belief 
(although  see  Hewitt  1992)  and  even  less  on  the  influence  of  the  media.  There 
is  a  large  and  Inconclusive  body  of  research  on  links  between  violence  in  the 
media  and  violence  In  society,  but  this  has  rarely  touched  on  questions  of 
political  violence  (Cumberbatch  and  Howitt  1989). 
DesIgn,  Method  and  Sample 
This  study  attempts  to  examine  the  processes  by  which  people  come  to'make 
up  their  minds'about  the  conflict  in  Ireland.  It  seeks  to  establish  what  people 
'know'  and  then  to  trace  the  sources  of  this  knowledge  and  belief.  This  is  a 
quite  different  approach  to  that  adopted  by  the  bulk  of  researchers  who  have 
examined  the  reception  of  media  messages.  Such  approaches  have  generally 
Involved  showing  specific  programmes  to  people  and  then  gauging  their 
response  or  have  simply  asked  what  people'bring  to'  the  reception  process 
(Morley  1992).  In  some  cases  this  has  meant  attempting  to  measure  changes 
in  attitude  or  knowledge  and  in  others  it  has  been  more  concerned  with 
examining  specific  genres  of  programming  rather  than  specific  issues,  as  in  the 
preponderance  of  studies  of  soap  opera  (Ang  1985;  Hobson  1982;  1984;  Katz 
and  Liebes  19135;  Liebes  and  Katz  1993). 
In  contrast  this  study  asked  groups  of  people  to  write  their  own  news  bulletins 
using  photographic  stills  taken  from  actual  television  programmes.  This  was  to 
show  whether  they  could  recall  and  reproduce  news  programmes.  The 
bulletins  were  then  compared  with  what  the  groups  actually  believed  to  be  true 
and  the  reasons  for  their  acceptance  or rejection  of  the  television  message 
examined  by  the  administration  of  a  small  number  of  questions  and  then  a 
period  of  group  discussion. 
The  study  was  begun  In  November  1988  and  finished  in  February  1990.  At  first 
the  research  concentrated  simply  on  perceptions  of  the  Northern  Ireland 
conflict  In  general  and  a  total  of  19  groups  including  144  people  took  part.  Two 
types  of  group  were  selected.  Firstly,  groups  of  people  who  might  be  expected 
to  have  some  special  knowledge  about  the  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland.  These 
included  Nationalist  and  Unionist  groups  living  in  the  North  as  well  as  serving 
British  soldiers.  The  other  groups  were  selected  because  they  were  not 
necessarily  expected  to  have  any  special  knowledge  of  the  conflict.  All  the Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  207 
discussions  were  conducted  with  pre-existing  groups  of  people  who  work,  live 
or  socialise  together,  chosen  to  reflect  different  sociodemographic  factors  such 
as  age,  region,  nationality,  class  and  gender.  Most  of  the  groups  selected  were 
from  Scotland.  But  it  was  important  to  include  some  groups  in  the  South  of 
England  for  comparative  purposes.  Accordingly  three  groups  containing  29 
people  took  part  in  the  general  sample.  In  addition,  29  American  students  took 
part  in  the  research.  (See  Appendix  four  for  a  full  list  of  groups). 
However,  it  also  appeared  from  comments  in  some  of  these  groups  that  it  was 
important  to  try  and  investigate  beliefs  about  specific  incidents  in  more  depth. 
An  obvious  candidate  for  investigation  was  the  Gibraltar  shootings  which  had 
occurred  in  March  1988.  They  had  received  a  great  deal  of  publicity  and  I  had 
already  done  some  research  on  the  media  coverage  of  the  events  and  the 
propaganda  conflict  surrounding  them  (Miller  1991).  This  made  it  easier  to 
compare  accounts  and  to  trace  sources  of  media  information  from  those  given 
in  the  groups.  So,  from  mid  September  1989  (19  months  after  the  killings) 
groups  were  asked  to  write  a  news  story  about  Northern  Ireland  using 
photographs  from  the  Gibraltar  shootings.  Eleven  further  groups  including  143 
people  took  part  in  this  second  phase  of  the  study  making  a  total  of  313  people 
(A  full  list  is  included  in  Appendix  Five).  This  chapter  mainly  deals  with  public 
belief  in  relation  to  the  Gibraltar  killings.  ' 
The  photos 
Each  group  was  divided  into  up  to  six  news  teams  and  given  identical  sets  of 
photographic  stills,  taken  from  actual  news  bulletins,  representing  different 
aspects  of  routine  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland.  The  photographs  included  a 
series  of  talking  heads  representing  different  perspectives  on  Northern  Ireland 
(British  Prime  Minister,  Margaret  Thatcher,  Labour  Party  leader,  Neil  Kinnock,  a 
British  Army  spokesperson,  Rev.  Ian  Paisley,  MP  for  North  Antrim  and  leader  of 
the  Democratic  Unionist  Party  and  Gerry  Adams,  (then)  MP  for  West  Belfast 
and  President  of  Sinn  176in)  as  well  as  other  routine  news  images  from 
coverage  of  Northern  Ireland  (a  'riot  scene',  a  Republican  funeral  procession, 
a  helicopter,  a  fire,  RUC  personnel  (Figure  5.1),  an'Orange  [Protestant]  walk' 
(Figure  5.2),  a  crowd  scene  (Figure  5.3)  and  a  march  preceded  by  British  Army 
personnel  carriers).  Finally,  the  groups  were  also  given  a  photograph  showing 
a  scene  of  folk  music  being  played  in  a  pub  (Figure  5.4).  This  image  was 
included  because  it  was  atypical  of  news  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland.  Indeed 
it  came  from  a  programme  which  explicitly  attempted  to  show  the  'other  side'  of Misinformation  and  Public  Befief 
life  in  Northern  Ireland. 
Figure  5.1  Photo  of  RUC  personnel. 
Figure  5.2  Photo  of  orange  walk. 
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Figure  5.3  Photo  of  crowd. 
Figure  5.4  Photo  of  folk  music  in  pub. 
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The  groups  which  took  part  in  the  research  on  the  Gibraltar  killings  were  given 
eight  pictures  specifically  about  the  Gibraltar  killings.  These  were  in  addition  to 
the  'talking  heads',  the  'riot'  and  the  funeral  the  other  groups  used  but  they 
replaced  the  other  seven  scenes  detailed  above.  The  Gibraltar  shots  included 
an  aerial  shot  of  Gibraltar,  a  TV  graphic  on  which  the  airport  and  Government 
House  were  marked,  a  shot  of  explosives  recovered  by  the  Spanish  Police,  a 
Military  base  on  the  Rock,  and  a  shot  of  a  military  band  parading  before 
government  house  in  Gibraltar  (Figure  5.5).  There  was  also  a  shot  of  a  dead 
body  lying  on  the  ground  covered  in  a  blanket  and  a  shot  of  two  further  bodies 
covered  with  blankets  and  surrounded  by  police  officers(Figure  5.6).  Finally 
each  groups  was  also  given  an  uncaptioned  picture  of  Carmen  Proetta  (Figure 
5.7)2  one  of  the  key  eye  witnesses  to  the  shootings,  as  she  appeared  on  Death 
on  the  Rock  and  various  TV  news  programmes. 
Figure  5.5  Photo  of  military  parade. 
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Fioure  5.6  Photo  of  dead  bodies  outside  petrol  station. 
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Figure  5.7  Photo  of  eyewitness  Carmen  Proetta. Misinformation  and  Public  Belief 
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The  questions  were  asked  immediately  following  the  'presentation'  of  the  news 
bulletin.  All  were  open  ended  and  respondents  were  free  to  reply  as  they 
wanted.  The  first  two  questions  were  about  general  perceptions  of  television 
news: 
1.  Does  the  BBC  news  have  a  point  of  view?  Does  it,  for  example,  favour  one 
political  party  over  another,  or  is  it  neutral?  Is  it  biased,  unbiased,  pro- 
establishment,  anti-establishment,  accurate,  inaccurate,  partial  or  impartial? 
How  would  you  describe  it? 
2.  Does  ITN  operate  from  a  point  of  view?  do  you  think  it  is  the  same  as  BBC 
news  or  is  it  different  in  some  way? 
These  questions  were  intended  to  be  a  general  indication  of  the  groups 
perceptions  of  TV  news  and  indicated  whether  television  was  thought  to  be 
biased  to  the  left  or  right.  They  were  especially  useful  in  providing  a  tool  for 
investigating  the  extent  to  which  people  believed  the  news  bulletin  they  had 
written  or  whether  it  was  written  consciously  from  a  'television'  perspective  with 
which  the  authors  disagreed. 
3.  How  would  you  feel  about  going  to  Northern  Ireland? 
4.  Is  life  in  Northern  Ireland  mostly  violent  or  mostly  peaceful 
5.  Does  TV  news  tell  you  that  life  in  Northern  Ireland  is  mostly  peaceful  or 
mostly  violent 
6.  What  is  your  source  of  information  for  questions  3  and  4 
These  questions  were  central  to  the  study.  Past  academic  research  and  the 
evidence  of  this  book  has  shown  that  the  predominant  reason  for  covering 
Northern  Ireland  on  television  news  in  Britain  is  violence.  I  wanted  to  find  out 
whether  people  believed  this  to  be  the  case  and  whether  they  also  thought  that 
this  was  a  true  picture  of  life  in  Northern  Ireland.  Questions  4  and  5  are  very 
similar  to  the  questions  asked  by  Philo  in  his  study  of  the  Coal  Dispute  of 
1984/5  (Philo  1990).  But  there  is  one  key  difference.  Philo  asked  whether 
picketing  in  the  strike  had  been  mostly  violent  of  mostly  peaceful.,  In  the 
present  case  the  question  is  much  wider  since  it  asks  about  life  in  Northern 
Ireland  in  general.  Question  3  was  asked  as  an  additional  way  of  asking  about 
perceptions  of  life  in  Northern  Ireland.  It  was  anticipated  that  some  people Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  213 
might  see  the  picture  of  Northern  Ireland  given  on  television  as  accurate  but  I 
was  also  interested  in  the  extent  to  which  people  might  reject  what  they  saw  as 
the  television  message.  Did  they  reject  television  at  an  intellectual  level,  but 
still  find  the  idea  of  actually  visiting  Northern  Ireland  frightening?  In  the  event 
answers  to  this  question  did  show  marked  variations  from  answers  to  question 
five.  It  was  important  to  try  and  find  out  why  people  believed  or  disbelieved 
television  messages  about  the  conflict.  Was  this  because  they  read  other 
media  which  gave  a  different  view?  Or  were  there  other  factors  which  might 
cause  people  to  judge  that  television's  account  was  accurate  or  inaccurate? 
7.  Of  all  the  Irish  issues  that  are  covered  on  television  what  do  you  think  is  on 
TV  the  most? 
8.  Of  all  the  things  you  have  seen  over  the  last  few  years  what  has  stuck  in 
your  mind  the  most?  If  I  say  the  words  'Northern  Ireland'  what  image  or  event 
comes  most  clearly  to  mind? 
These  questions  were  intended  to  reveal  something  of  peoples  perceptions  of 
news  coverage  and  also  their  own  perceptions  of  the  images  or  experiences 
which  had  stuck  in  their  minds  in  relation  to  the  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland.  In 
practice  these  questions  tended  to  be  answered  in  relation  to  the 
preoccupation's  and  understandings  of  the  groups  involved. 
9  Which  newspaper(s)  do  you  normally  read/prefer? 
This  question  was  intended  partly  as  an  indication  of  political  cultural  views,  but 
was  also  useful  in  tracing  information  sources.  It  was  especially  useful  in  the 
part  of  the  study  which  focused  on  the  killings  in  Gibraltar,  -because  of  the  very 
different  coverage  available  in  different  part  of  the  press. 
An  additional  question  was  asked  of  the  groups  taking  part  in  the  latter  part  of 
the  study  on  Gibraltar.  This  involved  holding  up  the  still  picture  of  eyewitness 
Carmen  Proetta  which  included  a  caption  with  her  name  on  it  and  asking  the 
groups'what  is  her  occupation?  '  News  bulletins  written  by  the  groups  on 
Gibraltar  tended  to  deal  with  the  actual  events  and  it  was  then  possible  to 
ascertain  whether  they  reflected  the  groups  beliefs  about  what  had  actually 
happened.  I  was  also  interested  in  the  extent  to  which  people  were  aware  of 
the  controversy  in  the  media  surrounding  Proetta's  'character'  and  reliability  as 
well  as  whether  they  believed  the  stories  printed  in  the  press  about  her. Misinformation  and  Public  Belief 
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We  have  already  discussed  media  coverage  of  the  Gibraltar  killings  and  looked 
at  the  furore  around  the  Thames  Television  Programme  'Death  on  the  Rock'.  it 
is,  however,  probably  worthwhile  to  briefly  recall  some  of  the  key  issues  in  the 
public  debate  around  the  killings  before  we  proceed,  as  these  in  practice  were 
the  raw  material  with  which  people  were  working  in  their  reconstruction's  of 
television  coverage. 
The  killings  took  place  on  March  6  1988,  they  were  carried  out  by  the  SAS  in 
disputed  circumstances.  First  stories  from  (unattributable)  official  sources 
claimed  that  the  IRA  members  had  planted  a  car  bomb  and  were  armed.  This 
quite  false  story  dominated  the  media  or  nearly  twenty  four  hours.  The  story 
about  the  bomb  was  reported  as  fact  by  all  British  national  newspapers  and 
broadcast  outlets.  It  wasn't  until  the  next  afternoon  that  the  Foreign  Secretary, 
Sir  Geoffrey  Howe,  revised  this  version  saying  in  the  House  of  Commons  that: 
Near  the  border  they  were  challenged  by  the  security  forces.  When 
challenged  they  made  movements,  which  lead  the  military  personnel, 
operating  in  support  of  the  Gibraltar  police,  to  conclude  that  their  own 
lives  and  the  lives  of  others  were  under  threat.  In  the  light  of  this 
response  they  were  shot.  Those  killed  were  subsequently  found  not  to 
have  been  carrying  arms...  The  parked  car  was  subsequently  dealt  with 
by  a  military  bomb  disposal  team.  It  has  now  been  established  that  it  did 
not  contain  an  explosive  device.  (7  March  1988) 
It  was  later  added3  that  the  SAS  believed  that  the  IRA  team  could  be  armed  or 
in  control  of  a  radio  controlled  detonating  device  orbutton  job'.  This  was  the 
version  which  the  British  government  depended  on  throughout  the  next  year. 
The  alternative  case,  constructed  largely  from  eyewitness  accounts  and 
briefings  from  Spanish  government  and  police  sources,  was  largely  to  be  found 
in  certain  broadsheet  papers,  television  documentaries  and  more  marginal 
publications  such  as  New  Statesman  and  Society.  It  suggested  that  there  was 
no  challenge  to  the  three  IRA  members  and  that  they  did  not  make'movements' 
which  could  have  been  interpreted  as  reaching  for  weapons  or  a  'button  job'. 
Instead,  in  the  words  of  key  witness  Carmen  Proetta,  'They  didn't  make  any 
movements  -  they  put  their  hands  up.  I  believe  I've  said  it  before.  Yes,  they 
just  put  their  hands  up'.  Witnesses  also  saw  all  three  of  the  IRA  members Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  215 
being  finished  off  on  the  ground. 
Writing  the  news  on  Gibraltar 
When  asked  to  write  a  news  bulletin  groups  often  protested  that  they  didn't 
remember  anything  about  Gibraltar  or  that  they  knew  nothing  about  the  conflict 
in  Northern  Ireland.  But  by  using  the  photographs  and  working  in  groups  they 
tended  to  produce  very  rapidly  a  wealth  of  impressions,  half-remembered  facts, 
opinions  and  views.  As  one  women  in  Saltcoats  put  it'It  comes  back  to  you, 
mind  you,  when  you  think  about  it.  You  take  in  more  than  you  think.  ' 
Interpreting  the  photographs 
In  some  cases  people  found  it  difficult  to  write  a  text  which  reproduced  a  news 
account  of  the  shootings.  In  general  this  was  because  they  disagreed  with  the 
news  version  and  preferred  to  give  their  own  analysis  of  the  news  coverage 
and  of  what  had  happened  in  Gibraltar.  But  in  most  cases  people  did  produce 
competent  news  reports.  Sometimes  it  was  evident  that  these  reflected  their 
own  views  on  events  in  Gibraltar  and  in  other  cases  bulletins  were  produced 
which  gave  accounts  with  which  the  groups  vehemently  disagreed.  Amongst 
the  groups  there  was  a  range  of  levels  of  sophistication  with  which  this 
distancing  of  the  news  bulletin  from  the  views  of  the  group  was  carried  out.  In 
some  groups  there  was  extremely  sophisticated  discussion  about  deadlines, 
terminology,  the  state  of  knowledge  at  the  time  they  had  decided  to  set  the 
news  bulletin,  questions  about  what  information  would  have  been  released  by 
official  and  non  official  sources  and  so  on.  Such  discussions  were  especially 
apparent  among  groups  from  Northern  Ireland.  Discussions  included  whether  it 
was  possible  to  include  the  names  of  the  three  IRA  members  who  had  been 
killed: 
1.  Should  we  put  the  names  in? 
2.  The  names  haven't  been  released  yet,  sure. 
(Suffolk  Community  Services  Group,  Belfast) 
This  group  also  discussed  how  they  should  describe  the  British  personnel  who 
carried  out  the  killings: 
2.  'They  were  believed  to  be  members  of  the  SAS'. 
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2.  Sure,  but  they  wouldn't  say  by  then. 
The  question  of  deadlines  was  also  important  for  the  group  of  serving  British 
Soldiers.  Three  out  of  the  four  bulletins  they  produced  were  described  as  news 
flashes  immediately  after  the  shootings.  These  reports  used  the  speculative 
language  of  early  reports  including  phrases  such  as'it  is  thought'  and'it  is  also 
believed'.  They  also  reported  that  the  IRA  members  were  shot  as  they 
'returned  towards  the  border  after  parking  a  suspect  car  bomb'.  It  emerged  that 
the  reason  the  three  groups  had  done  this  was  in  order  to  avoid  the 
complications  of  writing  a  bulletin  from  the  next  day.  One  group  concluded 
their  report  with  a  trailer  for  a  later  bulletin  'There  will  be  an  in-depth  report  on 
this  during  the  6  O'Clock  News'.  (compare:  'More  on  that  later  in  our  main  news 
on  BBC1  tonight  at  Nine  O'clock(BBC1,1825  6  March  1988)  They  were  quite 
aware  that  as  one  of  them  put  it'a  lot  of  things  didn't  come  to  light  until  3  or  4 
days  after'.  This  would  have  made  the  story  a  lot  less  straightforward  from  an 
Army  perspective,  but  they  did  not  want  to  have  to  deal  with  that  as  an  issue. 
They  therefore  decided  to  produce  a  bulletin  which  fudged  the  issue  of  whether 
the  IRA  members  were  challenged  or  tried  to  surrender. 
The  way  in  which  the  photographs  and  group  discussion  triggered  memories 
and  associations  resulted  in  the  production  of  'news  bulletinswhich  recalled  in 
great  detail  the  key  issues  in  the  controversy  surrounding  the  events  in 
Gibraltar.  Figure  5.8  compares  news  bulletins  written  by  the  groups  with  actual 
television  news  programmes. 
All  these  news  bulletins  were  written  by  groups  between  18  months  and  two 
years  after  the  shootings.  They  showed  remarkable  similarities  of  language 
and  tone  with  actual  television  news.  The  specificity  of  the  details  which  were 
remembered  is  remarkable.  All  that  the  groups  were  asked  to  do  was  write  a 
news  bulletin  about  the  killings  of  three  members  of  the  IRA  by  the  SAS  in 
Gibraltar  using  the  photos  provided.  The  groups  talked  of  surveillance,  of 
challenges,  of  attempts  to  evade  capture,  of  the  IRA  members  carrying  guns 
and  of  car  bombs.  Of  course,  as  we  have  seen,  these  were  all  key  themes  in 
media  coverage  about  the  killings. 
The  US  groups  were  also  able  to  reproduce  journalistic  terminology  and 
(especially  US)  news  conventions  (See  Miller  1994).  However  in  5  out  of  6 
cases  they  were  unable  to  produce  news  bulletins  specifically  about  the 
Gibraltar  killingS.  4  Three  groups  did  general  Northern  Ireland  stories  and  the Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  217 
other  two  compiled  joke  stories  which  featured  drug  running  and  sex  scandals 
Figure  5.8 
Bulletins  written  by  respondents 
The  three  dead,  two  men  and  a  woman  were  IRA 
suspects.  A  car  bomb  was  found  and  it  is 
believed  that  the  military  parade  was  the 
intended  target.  (Saitcoats  WEA  group) 
Reports  are  reaching  us  of  a  shooting  incident  on 
the  Rock  of  Gibraltar  regarding  the  deaths  of 
three  suspected  IRA  terrorists.  It  Is  believed  they 
were  involved  In  planting  a  bomb  which  was 
concealed  In  a  car  and  planned  to  go  off  during  a 
military  parade.  It  is  understood  that  the  victims 
had  been  under  observation  for  some  time  by  the 
Spanish  Police  prior  to  their  entry  into  Gibraltar. 
(Ardrossan  Senior  Citizens). 
Today  in  Gibraltar  three  civilians  were  shot  dead 
by  SAS  soldiers.  Witnesses  say  they  were 
unarmed.  (SaItcoats  WEA  group) 
Today  in  Gibraltar  three  well  known  members  of 
the  IRA  were  shot  dead  by  the  SAS,  while  under 
suspicion  of  planning  a  terrorist  attack.  They  had 
been  under  surveillance  by  both  Spanish  and 
British  authorities  since  entering  Spain  and  were 
shot  while  attempting  to  open  fire  on  British 
soldiers.  It  was  however  later  discovered  that  at 
that  point  they  were  not  armed  and  an  eyewitness 
claims  they  were  running  away  from  the  soldiers 
rather  than  towards  [them].  (Glasgow  School  of 
Art  1989) 
One  of  the  [IRA]  men  reached  into  his  jacket  and 
the  SAS  thought  he  was  reaching  for  a  gun,  so 
they  opened  fire  killing  all  three  of  them  in  a  hall 
of  bullets.  (SACRO  19  September  1989) 
Actual  television  news  bulletins 
British  Soldiers  in  Gibraltar  have  shot  dead  three 
suspected  IRA  terrorists.  It's  believed  the  two 
men  and  a  woman  were  on  a  bombing  mission  in 
the  British  colony.  Later  a  car  bomb  was  found 
near  the  Governors  residence.  It's  thought  the 
target  was  a  British  Army  parade.  The  bomb  was 
destroyed  with  a  controlled  explosion  (ITN  2115, 
6  March  1988) 
The  target  for  the  IRA  bombers  were  soldiers 
from  the  Royal  Anglian  Regiment  on  Gibraltar 
guard  duty...  The  three  Irish  terrorists  were  shot 
dead  on  the  road  back  to  the  Spanish  frontier  by 
plainclothed  soldiers  believed  to  be  from  the 
SAS.  The  terrorists  had  been  under  surveillance 
from  Spanish  police  in  Malaga  for  several  weeks. 
They  crossed  into  Gibraltar  and  planted  their 
bomb  in  the  town  centre  (ITN  1230  7  March 
1988) 
Witnesses  say  they  were  not  armed  and  were 
shot  at  close  range  (ITN  1230,7  March  1988). 
The  three  people  who  were  shot  dead  in  Gibraltar 
were  well-known  to  the  intelligence  services  in 
Belfast,  London  and  Dublin  (BBC1  1800,7  March 
1988). 
Three  people  were  apparently  walking  along  this 
road  called  Winston  Churchill  Avenue.  They 
were  challenged  by,  it  appears  plain  clothed 
policemen  from  the  Met.  Then  the  shoot-out 
happened.  Two  died  outside  a  petrol  station,  the 
third  one  died  about  200  yards  further  into  the 
town  (BBC1  2100,6  March  1988) 
After  being  challenged  they  tried  to  escape.  The 
woman  and  one  of  the  men  were  shot  dead 
Immediately.  The  second  man  was  killed  a  few 
hundred  yards  away  (BBC1,0900  7  March  1988) 
between  Irish  and  British  government  officials  with  which  the  IRA  were 
connected.  None  of  these  groups  raised  issues  about  whether  there  was  a 
bomb,  about  surveillance,  challenges,  attempted  surrender  or  any  of  the  other 
debating  points  found  in  British  and  Irish  bulletins. 
Individual  facts 
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happened,  which  almost  invariably  related  to  the  key  terms  of  the  public 
debate/dispute  over  Gibraltar.  This  is  interesting  because  it  does  show  how 
much  people  absorb  of  media  information. 
There  is  another  issue  which  is  that  all  the  information  about  what  happened  in 
Gibraltar  had  come  via  the  mass  media.  Even  in  Northern  Ireland  the  only 
available  sources  of  information  in  addition  to  the  mainstream  media  are  the 
alternative  and  radical  papers  of  each  community.  in  the  case  of  Gibraltar  the 
pre-  eminent  alternative  sources  were  An  PhoblachtlRepubfican  News  the 
weekly  paper  of  the  republican  movement  and  the  nationalist  weekly 
Andersonstown  News.  The  only  people  who  knew  what  had  happened  in 
Gibraltar  first  hand,  were  those  that  were  killed,  their  killers,  the  eyewitnesses 
and  (possibly)  the  other  member(s)  of  the  IRA  unit.  However,  the  IRA  has 
never  publicly  acknowledged  how  many  (if  any)  of  it's  members  escaped 
Gibraltar,  nor  have  their  accounts  been  published.  The  only  option,  then  was 
discussion  and  evaluation  of  publicly  available  information  from  the  mass 
media. 
To  be  sure,  there  was  a  range  of  information  available,  with  a  quite  clear 
division  in  the  press  between  those  papers  which  supported  and  actively 
propagandised  on  behalf  of  the  official  view  (Sunday  Times,  The  Sun,  Sunday 
Telegraph,  Daily  Express,  Daily  Mail,  Daily  Star  and  Daily  Mirror)  and  those 
papers  and  television  current  affairs  journalists  (Observer,  Independent,  The 
Guardian,  This  Week,  BBC  Northern  Ireland's  Spotlight,  Private  Eye)  which 
attempted  to  investigate  the  discrepancies  in  the  official  line  and  attempted  to 
come  to  a  judgement  about  what  had  happened  in  Gibraltar.  In  television  news 
some  questions  were  asked,  but  the  emphasis  was  on  the  official  version.  The 
question  is  which  version  did  viewers  and  readers  believe? 
The  day  after  every  single  British  national  newspaper  and  television  news 
programme  had  given  their  readers  and  viewers  a  false  account  of  what  had 
happened  in  Gibraltar,  there  were  no  apologies  and  no  headlines  on 
government  misinformation.  It  was  almost  as  if  journalists  could  not  quite 
believe  that  they  had  been  so  comprehensively  misled.  Indeed,  some 
journalists  found  it  hard  to  accept  that  there  was  no  bomb  and  continued  to 
produce  reports  which  assumed  there  was.  The  Independent  stated  that'Army 
experts  then  defused  the  white  Renault  5'  (8  March  1988).  The  BBC  report 
following  Geoffrey  Howe's  announcement  of  the  lack  of  the  bomb  stated'They 
had  planted  what  was  thought  to  be  a  car  bomb'  (BBC,  1554  7  March  1988).  It Misinfonnation  and  Public  Belief  219 
is  of  course  impossible  to  plant  or  defuse  a  non-  existent  bomb.  This  is  not 
because  news  values  intrinsically  inhibit  newspaper's  from  accusing  the 
government  of  lying.  ý  Indeed  one  newspaper  led  its  front  page  on  March  8  with 
the  headlineFury  as  no  bomb  found',  but  this  was  the  Ifish  Press  published  in 
Dublin.  In  the  US  the  Boston  globe  headlined  'Britain,  in  an  about-face,  says  3 
slain  in  Gibraltar  hadn't  planted  bomb'  (Boston  Globe  8  March  1988) 
In  Britain  the  hunt  for  the  fourth  bomber  dominated  the  front  pages  of  most  of 
the  newspapers  (Miller  1991).  Sir  Geoffrey's  statement  to  the  Commons  was 
also  prominently  reported,  but  no  front  page  headlines  focused  on  the  false 
stories  from  the  day  before.  Instead  the  Daily  Telegraph  led  with  'Dreadful  act 
of  terror  averted  Howe  tells  MPs'  (8  March  1988). 
Television  news  also  emphasised  the  alleged  fourth  member  and  the  search  for 
the  explosives,  without  explicitly  headlining  the  fact  that  they  had  been  mislead. 
ITN  had  'A  fourth  terrorist  is  hunted  in  Gibraltar  as  search  fails  to  find  IRA's 
bomb'  (ITN,  1745  7  March  1988),  Channel  Four  had'In  Gibraltar,  after  the 
killing  of  the  IRA  bombers  the  search  for  the  car  with  their  bomb'  (Channel  Four 
News,  1900  7  March  1988).  The  BBC  reported'The  Gibraltar  shootings.  On 
the  rock  police  hunt  a  fourth  IRA  man  and  a  hundred  and  forty  pounds  of 
explosives'  (BBC1,2100  7  March  1988).  As  Enoch  Powell  later  argued: 
A  massive  self-congratulation,  intoned  by  the  Foreign  Secretary,  " 
engulfed  the  media;  it  echoed  back  and  forth  in  Parliament  and  in  the 
papers  (Powell  1988). 
The  official  version  as  given  to  journalists  by  official  sources,  immediately  after 
the  shootings,  by  Sir  Geoffrey  Howe  in  the  House  of  Commons  and  all  the  way 
up  to  the  inquest  in  September  was  that  the  IRA  members  were  challenged.  It 
was  evident  that  the  challenge  was  a  key  element  for  the  government  case, 
but,  during  the  Summer  official  sources  started  to  brief  journalists  that  the 
shouting  of  a  challenge  was  of  secondary  importance  (Campbell  1988).  , 
Preparing  the  ground  in  this  way  was  of  key  importance  for  managing  public 
perceptions  of  the  inquest  in  September.  The  Crown  had  the  advantage  here 
because  they  were  the  only  ones  in  full  possession  of  the  facts  (the  solicitor  for 
the  family  was  not  given  all  the  witness  statements)  and  they  were  able  to 
determine  the  order  in  which  the  witnesses  would  appear.  When  the  soldiers 
who  actually  shot  Farrell  and  McCann  appeared,  they  were  preceded  into  the 
witness  box  by  their  commanding  officer,  'Soldier  Ewho  had  not  actually  been Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  220 
present  at  the  shootings.  He  nevertheless  felt  able  to  say  that:  'In  both  cases 
the  challenge  was  started...  How  far  they  got  in  that  challenge,  I  don't  know, 
because  I  wasn't  there...  but  I  know  they  started  the  challenge'  (Transcript  of 
the  Gibraltar  Inquest,  Day  Six,  Tuesday  13  September  1988:  34). 
The  SAS  man  who  started  the  shooting  was  not  so  clear  as  his  superior  officer 
saying  'I  wanted  to  shout:  "Stop".  I  actually  don't  know  if  it  actually  came  out.  I 
honestly  don't  know'.  Nevertheless  the  press  then  felt  able  to  report  that  the 
IRA  members  had  been  challenged  by  emphasising  the  words  of  the  senior 
SAS  officer: 
SAS  men  'shouted  warning'  before  shooting  IRA  team  (independent  14 
September  1988) 
'SAS  men  tell  inquest  of  warnings'  (Guardian  14  September  1988) 
SAS  'shouted  warnings'before  they  opened  fire'  (Times  14  September 
1988) 
Beliefs 
My  interest  is in  exploring  the  beliefs  of  the  groups  and  individuals  within  them 
about  the  specific  facts  of  the  case  and  then  looking  at  the  way  in  which 
particular  'facts'  were  put  together  and  interpreted  against  previous  knowledge, 
experience  and  cultural  and  political  perspectives.  I  will  to  take  each  contested 
detail  about  the  shootings  separately  and  then  look  in  depth  at  perceptions  of 
the  witness  Carmen  Proetta  and  her  credibility. 
Accepting  the  Message:  the  factual  construction  of  Gibraltar 
All  'factual'  information  on  what  had  happened  in  Gibraltar  was  of  necessity 
gleaned  from  the  mass  media  (including  alternative/radical  media). 
Respondents  varied  in  their  beliefs  about  many  of  thefacts'  of  the  case  and 
there  were  sometimes  disagreements  in  the  groups  about  what  had  happened. 
But  a  substantial  proportion  of  respondents  did  believe  the'factual  details' 
released  by  official  sources  which  turned  out  to  be  false,  such  as  reports  that 
the  IRA  members  had  planted  a  bomb  or  that  they  were  armed.  Some  also 
believed  key  details  of  the  official  case  which  were  contested  in  parts  of  the 
media  and  turned  out  to  have  less  factual  foundation  than  the  media  coverage 
of  them  would  warrant,  such  as  whether  the  IRA  members  were  challenged  or 
made  movements  after  such  a  challenge. Misinformation  and  Public  Belief 
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Most  of  the  serving  British  soldiers  were  convinced  that  there  actually  was  a 
bomb  in  the  car  in  Gibraltar  when  the  IRA  members  were  shot.  In  writing  their 
news  bulletin  they  discussed  the  weight  of  the  bomb. 
Soldier  1.  'What  shall  we  say,  how  many  pounds  was  there,  Semtex? 
Soldier  2.  'Couple  of  hundred  wasn't  it?  ' 
Soldier  3.  'you  don't  need  all  that  Semtex' 
Soldier  2.  'Well,  put  it  this  way,  the  car  was  packed  with  it,  that's  for 
sure' 
(British  Soldiers) 
it  is  perhaps  unsurprising  that  many  of  the  Soldiers  apparently  believed,  almost 
two  years  after  the  shooting,  that  there  was  a  bomb,  since  this  was  the  original 
story  which  emerged  from  official  (military)  sources  on  March  6.  Although  the 
story  was  changed  the  next  day  by  the  Foreign  Secretary,  Government 
information  Officers  in  the  Ministry  of  Defence  were  still  able  to  write  that  a 
bomb  had  been  found.  Two  weeks  later  in  the  government  produced 
'magazine  of  the  British  Army',  Soldier,  the  false  story  about  the  bomb  was 
repeated: 
An  IRA  bomb  gang  died  when  plans  to  explode  a  device  during  a 
military  parade  on  Gibraltar  were  foiled  by  security  forces.,  Soldiers  shot 
dead  two  men  and  a  woman  after  they  had  parked  a  car  containing  the 
bomb  next  to  a  petrol  station  not  far  from  the  Governor's  residence 
(Soldier  21  March  1988:  9,  my  emphasis).  5.  I 
But  it  wasn't  only  soldiers  that  were  convinced.  One  group  wrote  in  their-news 
bulletin'The  three  dead,  two  men  and  a  woman  were,  IRA  suspects.  A  car 
bomb  was  found  and  it  is  believed  that  a  military  parade  was  the  intended 
target'.  (SaItcoats  September  1989).  One  of  the  two  women  who  wrote  this 
bulletin,  believed  that  a  car  bomb  was  found,  while  the  other  thought  there  was 
but  couldn't'really  remember'.  Both  said  they  had  gained  their  impression  from 
television  news. 
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Often  members  of  the  groups  disagreed*on  what  they  thought  had  actually 
happened  but  were  nevertheless  able  to  agree  on  how  the  news  would  present 
it.  One  bulletin  described  how  the  IRA  members'were  thought  to  be  carrying 
arms'  (SACRO).  It  then  reported  eyewitness  Carmen  Proetta  who  saw  the 
incident  from  her  window',  as  saying  the  IRA'were  shot  in  cold  blood'.  Then, 
as  'balance'  it  continued:  'But  the  SAS  say  the  IRA  started  to  shoot  first'.  One 
group  member  thought  that  in  reality  the  members  of  the  IRA  had  been  carrying 
arms  but  he  was  unsure  whether  they  shot  first.  He  thought  that  BBC  news 
was  one  of  the'better  news  programmes.  Another  member  of  the  group, 
however  disagreed.  He  thought  that  both  BBC  and  ITN  were  biased,  saying 
'ITV  or  BBC  never  tell  you  when  a  British  soldier  has  killed  babies  or  children'. 
His  view  was  that  the  IRA  members  had  been  unarmed  and  he  said  that  he  had 
managed  to  glean  this  information  from  television  news.  But  they  had 
presented  the  bulletin  in  this  'balanced'  manner  because  this  was  how  they 
thought  the  news  would  do  it. 
One  young  man,  a  member  of  another  SACRO  team,  did  believe  that  the  IRA 
members  were  armed,  but  that  the  SAS  had  shot  first.  His  belief  seemed  to  be 
innocent  of  any  attempt  to  justify  the  actions  of  the  SAS,  since  he  illustrated  his 
answer  sheet  with  a  shamrock  with  the  letters  IRA,  one  on  each  leaf  and  with 
the  phrase'up  the  RX 
Did  the  SAS  think  they  were  armed1had  planted  a  bomb? 
The  motivations  of  the  SAS  in  shooting  McCann,  Savage  and  Farrell,  were 
hardly  questioned  by  the  groups.  Of  those  who  did  not  believe  the  IRA 
members  were  armed  there  was  wide  agreement  that  the  SAS  men  believed 
that  Farrell,  McCann  and  Savage  had  planted  a  bomb  and  were  able  to  set  it 
off,  or  were  armed.  For  one  of  the  SACRO  groups'the  fact  that  the  terrorists 
proved  to  be  unarmed  created  an  international  incident.  But  the  shooting  had 
taken  place  in  the  belief  that  these  people  had  been  armed'. 
Another  group  wrote  that  the  fact  that  there  was  no  bomb  had  only  been 
discovered  after  the  shooting: 
Three  members  of  the  IRA  were  shot  dead  in  Gibraltar,  suspected  of 
placing  a  bomb  in  a  car.  When  the  bomb  disposal  unit  set  off  a 
controlled  explosion  there  was  no  bomb  (Paisley). Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  223 
Even  groups  which  were  otherwise  very  critical  of  the  shootings  appeared  to 
believe  that  the  lack  of  a  bomb  was  only  discovered  after  the  shooting: 
After  the  bomb  disposal  team  were  called  in  to  search  the  car  in  which 
the  three  had  parked  it  was  discovered  that  there  were  no  explosives  in 
the  car  (Nationalist  group,  West  Belfast). 
This  particular  group  also  believed  that  the  explosives  found  two  days  later  in 
Spain  had  been  planted  there  by  the  British  Army  to  cover  up  what  the  group 
termed  'their  mistake'.  This  is  a  distinctly  alternative  view  of  the  actions  of 
British  Army  personnel.  It  should  be  noted  that  neither  the  British  media,  the 
British  government,  or  the  IRA  has  ever  suggested  that  this  was  the  case. 
Were  they  challengedldid  they  make  movements? 
There  was  less  unanimity  on  the  question  of  whether  the  IRA  members  were 
challenged  or  made  movements  which  might  be  interpreted  as  reaching  for 
concealed  weapons  or  attempting  to  detonate  a  bomb  (a  'button-job'  as  the 
SAS  dubbed  it).  One  of  the  SACRO  teams  believed  that  the  IRA  members  had 
made  movements: 
One  of  the  (IRA]  men  reached  into  his  jacket  and  the  SAS  thought  he 
was  reaching  for  a  gun,  so  they  opened  fire  killing  all  three  of  them  in  a 
hail  of  bullets  (SACRO). 
Some  groups  produced  apparently  contradictory  reports  which  echoed  the 
assumptions  of  some  news  programmes: 
Were  shot  while  attempting  to  open  fire  on  British  soldiers.  It  was 
however  later  discovered  that  at  that  point  they  were  not  armed  (Art 
School  Students). 
The  IRA  members  could  not,  of  course,  have  attempted  to  open  fire  on  the  SAS 
because  they  were  unarmed.  One  of  the  Soldiers  had  a  very  detailed  memory 
of  how  the  shooting  had  started: 
In  fact,  what  started  [it]  off  was  one  of  them  had  been  like  compromised 
as  such  that  they  were  following  them,  the  guy  turned  round,  spotted 
them  being  followed  and  then  they  started  to  leg  it  and  that's  what  made Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  224 
them  open  fire,  that's  what  started  it;  and  then  they  thought  well  right 
now  their  aims  obviously  changed  there  but  they  had  to  stop  them  before 
they  detonated  it  so  really  their  options  ran  out  at  that  point...  that  came 
up  in  court  in  the  end  when  the  soldiers  were  being  cross  examined 
(Soldiers). 
This  account  is  strikingly  similar  to  that  given  at  the  inquest  by  the  SAS  men  as 
well  as  to  that  pioneered  by  the  Sunday  Times  following  official  briefings: 
As  the  terrorists  approached  the  junction,  and  crossed  the  road,  the  SAS 
men,  still  following  on  foot,  saw  Savage  peel  off..  and  head  back  to 
town.  Farrell  and  McCann  continued  walking  North.  Just  why  Savage 
backtracked  is  not  known...  Then,  it  is  believed,  Farrell  and  McCann 
somehow  realised  that  they  were  being  followed.  The  SAS  men  had 
closed  up  in  the  busy  street  so  that  they  could  keep  the  terrorists  in  sight 
and,  if  anything  went  wrong,  have  a  clear  line  of  fire.  They  believed  they 
had  been  rumbled  and,  shouting  a  challenge,  one  SAS  man  reached 
behind  him  and  pulled  a  Browning  9mm  automatic  pistol  from  the 
waistband  of  his  jeans  (Sunday  Times  8  May  1988). 
Rejecting  the  official  version  of  the  shootings 
Although  it  was  more  common  for  respondents  to  believe  key  elements  of  the 
official  case,  than  details  associated  with  alternative  explanations,  some 
respondents  did  reject  official  'facts'  and  believed  instead  in  alternative 
versions.  In  general  these  'alternative  facts'  had  also  been  gleaned  from  the 
mass  media.  Two  key  areas  included  reading  alternative  information  in  the 
press  and  culling  details  and  fragments  from  television  news  accounts.  We 
have  already  seen  that  some  official  'facts'  were  rejected  in  favour  of  others.  In 
particular,  this  related  to  a  rejection  of  the  initial  discredited  story  about  a  bomb 
having  been  planted  and  the  IRA  members  being  armed.  This  was  often 
replaced  with  subsequent  official  'facts'  about  the  IRA  members  making 
movements  and  the  Army  'discovering'  that  there  was  no  bomb  and  that  they 
were  not  armed. 
However,  it  should  not  be  thought  that  government  impression  management 
was  altogether  successful  in  building  up  an  empirical  picture  of  what  had 
happened  in  Gibraltar.  There  were  two  particular  areas  in  which  alternative 
understandings  gained  some  hold.  Firstly,  the  question  of  surveillance  and Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  225 
secondly  the  testimony  of  eyewitnesses  were  areas  in  which  people  were  more 
likely  to  hold  critical  views. 
Were  they  under  surveillance? 
There  was  almost  unanimous  agreement  among  the  groups  in  both  their  news 
bulletins  and  spoken  comments  that  the  IRA  members  had  been  under 
surveillance.  None  of  the  groups  questioned  this'detail.  Indeed  from  the  time 
of  the  shootings  until  mid  summer  1988  this  was  common  ground  between 
Ministry  of  Defence  briefers,  the  Spanish  police  and  Interior  Ministry  and  critical 
journalists  and  was  routinely  reported  in  the  mainstream  media.  By  the  time  of 
the  inquest  the  Official  version  had  changed  (cf.  Private  Eye  1989).  Now  it  was 
said  that  the  Spanish  police  had'lost'  McCann,  Farrell  and  Savage  soon  after 
they  arrived  on  the  Costa  Del  Sol  on  March  4.  This  change  in  story  had  the 
advantage  that  it  allowed  British  sources  to  claim  that  they  did  not  know  when 
the  three  would  arrive  on  the  Rock  so  it  was  not  possible  to  arrest  them  at  the 
border.  6 
The  assertion  that  the  three  had  been  'lost'  was  reported  as  the  truth  in  those 
papers  which  supported  the  official  version,  but  it  did  not  gain  the  prominence 
of  the  headlines  on  the  bomb,  the  question  of  eyewitness  testimony  or  the 
character  of  one  of  those  witnesses.  It  appears  that  this  detail  had  entirely 
passed  the  groups  by,  although  it  was  crucial  for  the  government  case  at  the 
inquest.  It  seems  that  this  was  a  key  area  in  which  official  attempts  at 
impression  management  conspicuously  failed.  It  was  not  only  information 
managers  at  the  Ministry  of  Defence  who  noticed  that  accepting  the  - 
surveillance  story  potentially  damaged  their  case.  Some  of  the  respondents  in 
the  groups  noticed  too. 
The  question  I  as  a  Welsh  guardsman  would  like  to  ask  is  why  were  the 
IRA  permitted  to  cross  into  Gib.  There  are  police  and  customs  at  the 
barrier  to  prevent  the  entry  of  such  people  (Ardrossan). 
This  evaluation  of  the  actions  of  the  SAS  came  from  a  person  who  read  the 
Daily  Express,  thought  BBC  news  had  a  'leftish  tinge'  and  that  Carmen  Proetta 
was  a  'part  time  hostess',  yet  he  had  evaluated  the  information  available  to  him 
and  seen  the  potential  contradiction  in  the  government  case. Misinformation  and  Public  Belief 
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A  few  of  the  groups  reproduced  the  tenor  of  Eyewitness  accounts  featured  in 
parts  of  the  press  and  most  notably  on  'Death  on  the  Rock'.  The  central 
allegations  were  that  there  had  been  no  challenge,  that  Farrell  and  McCann  put 
their  hands  up  as  if  in  surrender,  and  that  all  three  were  shot  again  on  the 
ground. 
An  eye  witness  says  that  one  woman  and  two  men  were  gunned  down  in 
the  street  directly  below  her  flat  window  for  no  apparent  reason.  She 
went  on  to  say  that  one  of  them  raised  his  hands  as  if  to  surrender  but 
was  still  shot  four  times  in  the  stomach  (Art  School  Students).  , 
In  this  account,  which  expressed  the  reservations  of  members  of  the  group 
about  the  actions  of  the  SAS,  the  accounts  of  eyewitnesses  are  emphasised. 
There  were  also  a  handful  of  other  discussions  and  presentations  which  cited 
witnesses  as  saying  no  warning  was  given.  In  such  cases  people  were  often 
unsure  about  which  version  to  believe.  There  is  a  further  key  factor  which 
affected  how  people  judged  the  killings  and  especially  the  eyewitness 
testimony.  This  is  the  assault  on  the  credibility  of  key  witness  Carmen  Proetta. 
Carmen  Proetta 
Perhaps  the  most  bitter  of  the  information  battles  fought  out  over  the  Gibraltar 
killings  was  that  for  the  reputation  and  credibility  of  key  eye  witness  Carmen 
Proetta.  Following  Proetta's  appearance  on'Death  on  the  Rock',  official 
sources  in  Gibraltar  and  one  government  minister7  provided  journalists  with 
information  which  resulted  in  a  series  of  defamatory  stories  about  Proetta. 
The  headlines  included:  'Shamed!  Drug  and  sex  secrets  of  wife  in  SAS  telly 
storm'  (Daily  Mirror),  'Trial  by  TV  Carmen  is  Escort  Girl  boss'  (Daily  Express) 
and  the'The  Tart  of  Gib'  in  the  Sun  (30.4.88).  The  Sun  alleged  that  Proetta 
'used  to  be  a  prostitute'.  The  Daily  Mail  claimed  that  she  was  'a  director  of  a 
Spanish  escort  agency'.  The  Daily  Mirror  alleged  of  the  supposed  escort 
agency  that  'police  say  it  is  just  a  cover  for  vice'.  The  Star  went  so  far  as  to 
claim  that  Carmen  Proetta  'campaigns  for  Spanish  rule  in  Gibraltar'.  The  Daily 
Telegraph  alleged  that'several  residents  of  the  colony,  who  would  not  be 
named,  had  claimed  she  was  one  of  only  44  Gibraltarians  to  vote  to  end  British 
Rule  in  the  1967  referendum'.  8  All  these  allegations  were  untrue.  Carmen Misinfonnation  and  Public  Belief  227 
Proetta  issued  writs  against  seven  national  newspapers  all  of  which  ended  with 
apologies  and  substantial  damages  to  Carmen  Proetta.  9  The  first  to  settle  was 
the  Sun,  which: 
agreed  to  pay  damages  to  Mrs  Carmen  Proetta  and  apologised  to  her  for 
... 
highly  defamatory  and  unfounded  allegations  ...  It  accepted  that  Mrs 
Proetta  had  given  an  honest  account  of  what  she  remembers  seeing  and 
that  she  neither  hated  the  British  nor  was  she  guilty  or  involved  in  the 
other  misconduct  described  (The  Sun  17  December  1988). 
All  the  apologies  were  of  much  less  prominence  than  the  original  stories, 
appearing  on  inside  pages  and  taking  up  no  more  than  a  few  sentences  in  a 
single  column.  10 
Prostitute? 
As  we  have  already  seen  from  extracts  from  news  bulletins  produced  by  the 
groups  there  were  many  references  to  an  eyewitness  or  eyewitnesses.  It  was 
comparatively  rare  for  the  groups  to  actually  refer  to  the  allegations  against 
Proetta  in  their-news  bulletins.  Only  in  one  bulletin  did  a  group  describe 
Proetta  straightforwardly  as  a'prostitute'  in  their  news  bulletin  (SACRO), 
although  several  others  referred  to  allegations  about-  Proetta  being  of  'doubtful 
character.  However,  it  was  clear  that  people  were  actually  discussing  the 
allegations  within  the  groups.  During  the  writing  of  the  news  bulletins  there 
was  often  laughter  and  joking  about  the  allegations  when  the  picture  of  her  was 
being  discussed.  It  seemed  that  part  of  the  reason  for  this  was  that  the  groups 
did  not  believe  the  television  news  would  repeat  such  allegations.  But,  there 
was  also  a  sense  in  which  many  participants  were  reluctant  to  openly  discuss 
the  topic  of  prostitution  although  many  of  them  knew  or  remembered  that  it  was 
a  factor  in  the  story.  This  behaviour  made  it  especially  important  for  me  to  ask 
directly  about  their  views  on  Carmen  Proetta's  occupation.  Sometimes  when  I 
did  this  there  was  literally  a  roar  of  embarrassed  laughter,  especially  among 
older  participants  (for  example,  the  pensioners  group  in  Ardrossan).  None  of 
them  had  mentioned  in  their  bulletins  that  the  'character  of  the  eyewitness' 
might  be  an  issue,  but  when  I  asked  directly  about  Proetta's  occupation,  the 
vast  majority  were  clear  that  it  had  been  raised  in  the  media.  Even  then  the 
answers  they  gave  to  the  question  were  couched  in  ambiguous  and  evasive 
language  such  asentertainer  in  a  night  club',  'flamenco  dancer,  'part  time 
hostess',  'night  club  hostess',  'a  lady  of  leisure',  'a  lady  of  easy  virtue  -  It's  a Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  228 
national  pastime',  'naughty  girl',  'model',  'model  with  side  line,,  'she  had  a  fancy 
man',  'perhaps  a  street  walker'.  Not  one  of  the  respondents  in  this  group  used 
the  word  'prostitute'.  Indeed  some  were  reluctant  to  even  hint  that  they 
believed  that  Proetta  was  a  prostitute.  One  put  down  that  Proetta  was  a'house 
agent'.  On  asking  what  this  meant  the  respondent  said  that  she  believed 
Proetta  was  a  prostitute  but  that'l  didn't  like  putting  it  down'.  It  is  likely  then  that 
the  number  of  people  who  were  prepared  to  state  that  they  believed  Proetta  to 
be  a  prostitute  is  an  underestimate. 
In  fact,  30%  of  the  general  Gibraltar  sample  did  feel  able  to  say  they  believed 
Proetta  to  be  a  prostitute  or  similar  and  a  further  15%  put  that  she  was  possibly 
a  prostitute.  "  This  is  in  itself  a  remarkable  finding,  given  that  the  stories 
discrediting  Proetta  appeared  almost  exclusively  in  the  press,  mainly  in  the 
English  tabloids  and  were  wholly  false.  There  were  similar  stories  discrediting 
Proetta  in  the  Sunday  77mes,  Daily  Telegraph  and  Sunday  Telegraph,  but  by  - 
and  large  television  news  stayed  clear  of  recycling  damaging  information  about 
Proetta.  The  majority  (27  out  of  38)  of  those  who  thought  Proetta  was  or  was 
possibly  a  prostitute  read  English  or  Scottish  tabloids  (Sun,  Mirror,  Daily 
Express,  Daily  Record12)  but  the  remainder  were  readers  of  broadsheet  papers 
(only  one  of  which  listed  a  paper  which  had  repeated  the  allegations  against 
Proetta  -  The  Sunday  Times).  This  suggests  that  there  can  be  an  additional 
circulation  of  salacious  stories  which  become  big  enough  to  be  known, 
repeated  and  circulated  among  a  wider  population  than  those  who  read  (or 
admit  to  reading)  popular  papers. 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  people  monitor  what  is  the  correct  thing  to  say,  but  it 
also  seems  that  doubts  and  alternative  explanations,  interesting  details  or 
salacious  gossip  lurk  below  the  'acceptable'  responses.  An  interest  in  such 
gossip  is  one  of  the  strong  selling  points  of  newspapers  such  as  the  Sun. 
There  was  a  striking  example  of  this  in  the  nationalist  group  from  West  Belfast. 
Five  out  of  the  eight  participants  said  that  they  read  English  tabloids, 
predominantly  the  Sun.  But  the  majority  of  the  group  (6  out  of  8)  also  listed 
other  papers  such  as  the  nationalist  Irish  News,  Andersonstown  News  and  Sinn 
Fdin's  An  PhoblachtlRepublican  News.  All  eight  members  of  this  group  thought 
that  television  news  was'pro-British',  'anti-Irish'  or'tells  lies  about  the  Irish'.  In 
all  the  other  groups  in  the  Gibraltar  study  people  tended  to  answer  the  question 
about  Carmen  Proetta  by  either  giving  an  occupation  (or  a  possible  occupation) 
or  saying  that  they  did  not  know.  The  West  Belfast  group  went  further,  many  of 
them  indicating  that  they  were  aware  of  media  stories  about  Proetta,  but  that Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  229 
they  did  not  believe  them.  Five  of  the  eight  included  comments  such  as  'She 
got  the  blame  for  being  a  prostitute.  I  don't  believe  it',  'we  were  told  by  the 
British  news  and  papers  that  she  was  a  prostitute,  which  I  do  not  believe'. 
Their  awareness  of  the  stories  about  Proetta  had  been  discussed  during  the 
news  writing  exercise  accompanied  by  laughter  and  jokes.  This  resulted  in  one 
woman  believing  that  other  members  of  the  group  thought  that  Proetta  was  a 
prostitute.  In  fact  one  other  member  of  this  four  person  team  did  believe  that 
Proetta  was  a  prostitute.  He  had  listed  the  papers  he  read  as  the  Sun,  the  Star 
and  the  Ifish  News.  However,  the  other  two  members  of  the  team  rejected  the 
idea  that  she  was  a  prostitute  although  they  had  taken  part  in  the  joking  during 
the  writing  of  the  bulletin.  It  could  be  argued  that  this  is  an  illustration  of  the 
way  in  which  a  strong  sense  of  political  identity  can  over-ride  an  otherwise 
keen  interest  in  sex  scandals.  It  seems  likely  that  there  was  also  an  element  of 
giving  the  'correct'  answer  of  people  from  nationalist  West  Belfast  as  their  part 
in  the  propaganda  war.  The  rejection  by  the  bulk  of  this  group  of  the  Proetta 
'story'  is  testament  to  the  power  of  political  ideology  in  withstanding 
propaganda  assaults.  But  it  is  also  clear  that  even  when  political  identity  is  a 
strong  part  of  everyday  life  it  is  possible  for  elements  of  propaganda  messages 
to  be  accepted.  One  of  the  group  did  believe  that  Proetta  was  a  prostitute  even 
though  he  also  stated  that'we  want  the  British  soldiers  off  our  streets  and  we 
want  our  nationality  back'. 
Rejecting  the  message 
A  large  number  of  respondents  said  that  they  did  not  know  Proetta's  occupation 
(45%).  A  much  smaller  number  volunteered  that  they  were  aware  of  attempts 
to  discredit  her.  On  asking  what  her  occupation  was  one  simply  wrote  that  she 
was'a  victim  of  pressure  to  change  her  evidence'while  another  put  that'lies 
were  told  about  her'.  Proetta  was  in  fact  a  bi-lingual  legal  secretary.  Only  two 
people  out  of  the  entire  Gibraltar  sample  came  anywhere  near  this,  saying  she 
was  a  'bi-lingual  secretary'  or  'interpreter'.  Both  of  these  women  were  in  the 
SaItcoats  group.  One  had  heard  the  other  say  it,  while  the  latter  had 
remembered  it  from  watching'Death  on  the  Rock'.  This  woman  had  Irish 
(Catholic)  parents  and  had  watched'Death  on  the  Rockwith  interest.  The  fact 
that  her  sister  also  did  the  same  job  as  Proetta  had  acted  as  an  aide  memoire. 
These  two  participants  were  also  aware  of  the  story  about  prostitution  but  did 
not  believe  it.  As  one  of  them  put  itA  couple  overheard  the  shooting.  The 
press  and  media  called  them  liars  and  the  woman  was  later  called  a  prostitute' Misinfonnation  and  Public  Belief  230 
The  belief  that  Carmen  Proetta  was  a  prostitute  or  was  possibly  a  prostitute 
was  widespread  among  the  groups  between  sixteen  to  twenty-two  months  after 
the  stories  had  been  printed.  The  success  of  the  story  about  Carmen  Proetta 
was  probably  boosted  by  the  way  it  tapped  into  popular  images  and  - 
conceptions  of  femininity.  The  fact  that  Proetta  was  a  woman  and  also  that  she 
was  Spanish  may  have  increased  the  believability  of  the  stories  about  her. 
Good  propaganda  has  to'fit'with  public  preconceptions.  This  was  particularly 
evident  in  the  assumption  that  some  of  the  American  students  made  about  the 
photograph  of  Carmen  Proetta.  They  had  not  actually  seen  any  of  the 
coverage  of  the  Gibraltar  shootings,  since  they  had  only  arrived  in  Britain  a 
couple  of  months  before  the  session  took  place  in  February  1990.  They  were 
unable  to  reconstruct  Proetta's  allegations  and  did  not  know  that  she  was  an 
eyewitness.  Nevertheless  it  emerged  in  their  answers  that  a  small  number  of 
them  (4  out  of  24)  thought  that  Proetta's  sexual  reputation  might  in  some  way 
be  in  question.  13  1  was  surprised  at  this  response,  since  the  only  evidence 
they  had  been  given  was  the  photographic  still  of  Proetta  (Figure  5.7).  It 
emerged  that  they  had  made  this  assumption  because  of  her  physical 
appearance  (she  appeared  to  be  wearing  make  up)  and  because  of  their 
familiarity  with  US  media  coverage  of  sex  scandals.  Women  wearing  make  up, 
they  reasoned  only  get  on  the  news  in  relation  to  their  (alleged)  sexual 
behaviour. 
DM.  You  said  something  about  her  being  made  up? 
Female  1.  Yes,  she  was  very  harsh  looking  I  thought,  very  glamorised 
Female  2.  I'd  say  not  a  prostitute  but  a  woman  who  was  sleeping  with 
one  of  the  men  involved  in  the  scandal.  That's  what  came  to  my  mind,  a 
mistress. 
DM.  (to  Female  1.  )  You  thought  she  was  a  prostitute  because  she  was 
made  up? 
Female  1.  Yeah. 
Male  1.  That's  an  American  impression.  I'll  back  you  up  on  that  point 
[---1 
Male  1.  You  look  at  all  the  people  who  were  supposedly...  mistresses 
Female  2.  Fawn  Hall  and  Tammy  Baker...  Who  was  the  chick  that  was  in 
the  news,  the  large  chest  in  the  video 
Male  2.  Jessica  Hahns...  She's  like  Miss  Made  Up.  But  I  don't  think  it's 
justified  just  because  somebody's  made  up  to  think  they're  a  prostitute 
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,  Female  1.1  would  confirm  that  -  it  was  just  a  first  impression.  She  could 
be  a  nice  lady.  (US  Students,  Manchester) 
But  whether  Proetta  was  a  'nice  lady'  or  not,  many  of  the  participants  in  this 
study  were  also  convinced  that  she  was  or  was  possibly  of  dubious  reputation 
and  therefore  credibility. 
Liar?  Changed  evidence? 
In  addition  to  perceptions  of  Proetta  as  a  prostitute  there  was  a  wider  current  of 
opinion  within  the  groups  about  her  credibility  which  seemed  in  part  to  be 
related  to  the  stories  about  her  in  the  press  which  we  have  already  discussed. 
Although  perceiving  Proetta  as  a  prostitute  did  not  necessarily  lead  to 
scepticism  about  her  evidence  or  truthfulness,  such  perceptions  did  have  their 
role  to  play.  It  is  plausible  to  argue  that  the  stories  about  prostitution  set  the 
context  for  further  attempts  to  undermine  her  credibility.  Many  of  those  who 
thought  that  Proetta  was  a  prostitute  also  believed  that  she  had  withdrawn,  her 
account  or  given  a  different  version  at  the  inquest'. 
For  example  news  teams  in  the  Ardrossan  pensioners  group  believed  both  that 
Proetta  was  a  prostitute  and  that  she  had  changed  her  evidence.  As  one 
member  of  a  team  said: 
There  were  no  members  of  the  press  present  when  it  happened  so  any 
reports  must  of  necessity  be  based  on  hearsay  and  conjecture, 
especially  as  an  eye  witness's  testimony  vastly  varied  on  the  first  and 
subsequent  occasions  when  she  was  interviewed  (Ardrossan). 
In  another  team  the  picture  of  Proetta  was  held  up  by  one  participant  who 
asked  the  rest  of  the  team  'is  she  the  witness?  ',  to  which  another  replied  to 
general  assent'yes,  she  retracted  her  evidence'.  Some  of  the  ex-offenders  at 
SACRO  were  also  convinced  that  Proetta  had  retracted.  One  news  team 
wrote: 
An  eye  witness  saw  the  whole  view  of  what  happened  and  said  the  SAS 
just  pulled  guns  out  and  shot  them  without  warning.  But  later  on  when 
she  was  being  interviewed  by  police  she  denied  all  knowledge  (SACRO 
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The  other  team  echoed  this:  'She  said  the  SAS  shot  them  down  in  cold  blood, 
but  later  on  in  the  inquiry  she  said  that  she  made  it  up'  (SACRO  19  September 
1989). 
These  groups  had  mostly  believed  that  Proetta  was  a  prostitute  but  were 
otherwise  very  critical  of  the  actions  of  the  SAS  in  the  killings.  In  one  of  the 
SaItcoats  teams  there  was  some  dispute  about  whether  Proetta  was  telling  the 
truth  and  about  whether  she  had  retracted.  14  This  resulted  in  a  long  argument 
about  whether  Proetta  could  have  heard  or  seen  the  shootings  since  she  was 
$quite  far  away'. 
In  all  these  examples  the  people  who  believed  Proetta  had  retracted  also 
believed  that  she  was  a  prostitute.  But  there  were  also  some  groups  who 
believed  she  had  retracted  even  though  they  did  not  believe  that  she  was  a 
prostitute.  The  retired  women  in  the  Paisley  group  were  critical  of  the 
shootings  and  did  not  believe  that  Proetta  was  a  prostitute.  They  were, 
however,  confused  about  what  had  happened  in  Gibraltar  primarily  because 
they  had  become  doubtful  about  Proetta's  testimony.  As  one  of  the  woman  in 
the  group  put  it'can  we  believe  in  the  integrity  of  the  eye-witnesses?  Through 
the  newspapers  we  were  led  to  believe  that  at  least  one  was  of  doubtful 
character  and  not  always  truthful'.  Perhaps  more  surprisingly,  some  of  the 
participants  in  the  nationalist  group  in  West  Belfast  accepted  that  Proetta  had 
changed  her  evidence.  They  had  explicitly  rejected  the  story  about  prostitution, 
but  they  believed  as  one  put  it  that'she  said  one  story,  then  she  said  another'. 
But  not  all  those  who  thought  that  Proetta  had  changed  her  story  believed  that 
what  she  had  originally  said  was  false.  One  news  bulletin  done  by  three  clients 
of  SACRO  reported  that  Proetta  had  changed  her  evidence.  The  groups 
believed  this  to  be  true  but  also  believed  that  she  had  changed  her  evidence 
'because  she  was  scared'  of  the  police  and  the  SAS. 
Media  Coverage  of  Proetta  at  the  inquest 
How  are  we  to  explain  the  fact  that  some  people  did  not  believe  Proetta  to  be  a 
prostitute,  yet  thought  that  she  had  changed  her  evidence  at  the  inquest  or  that 
she  had  retracted  her  story?  In  addition  to  the  allegations  of  prostitution, 
official  sources  briefed  journalists  that  her  evidence  was  'wrong'  from 
immediately  after  the  broadcast  of  'Death  on  the  Rock'  until  the  inquest. 
Reports  also  emerged  from  official  sources  that  Proetta  would  refuse  to  attend Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  233 
theýinquest.  16  Proetta  commented  that  this'looked  like  another  attempt  to 
smear  her  by  implying  that  she  was  hesitant  about  her  evidence.  '  (Independent 
30  May  1988) 
When  Proetta  gave  evidence  she  held  firmly  on  to  her  testimony  under  cross 
examination  by  lawyers  for  the  crown  and  the  SAS.  The  crown  case  was  that 
Proetta  had  either  not  seen  the  shooting  at  all  or  had  only  seen  its  aftermath. 
There  were  two  key  areas  on  which  the  lawyers  for  the  crown  and  the  SAS  tried 
to  shift  Proetta,  firstly  the  question  of  whether  Farrell  and  McCann  were 
surrendering  and  secondly  whether  she  could  actually  be  sure  that  the  shots 
she  heard  were  coming  from  the  guns  pointed  at  the  IRA  members.  Asked  if 
Farrell  and  McCann  were  giving  themselves  up  she  said'That's  the  impression 
I  got,  but  they  weren't  given  a  chance'  to  which  the  Crown  lawyer  responded 
'Were  they  surrendering  yes  or  no?  '  and  Proetta  replied  'For  me,  the  signal  of 
hands  up  can  mean  surrendering,  it  can  mean  shock,  or  it  can  mean  something 
else.  '  We  can  note  that  Proetta  continued  to  maintain  that  Farrell  and  McCann 
had  their  hands  up  when  they  were  shot. 
Pressed  on  the  question  of  whether  she  had  seen  the  shots  she  said'  If  you  see 
people  with  guns,  you  presume  it's  coming  from  them.  You  don't  get  guns  in 
people's  hands  every  day  in  Gibraltar...  I  didn't  see  the  smoke,  I  didn't  see  the 
fire.  I  gathered  the  shooting  was  done  through  those  guns  that  these  men  were 
carrying'  (Transcript  of  the  Gibraltar  Inquest,  23  September  1988:  87+89). 
This  was  reported  in  most  of  the  press  as  indicating  a  major  revision  of 
evidence  or  a  total  retraction.  Týe  Daily  Mirror  headlined,  'I  could  have  got  it 
wrong,  says  Carmen'  (24.9.88),  the  Sun  front  page  lead  had  'Carmen  admits 
doubts  on  SAS'(24  September  1988)  and  the  Daily  Record  reported'her  story 
fell  apart'  (24  September  1988).  Today  reported  that  Proetta  had  'agreed  that 
the  shots  she  heard  while  they  [Farrell  and  McCann]  were  lying  on  the  ground 
could  have  been  those  which  killed  the  third  gang  member,  Sean  Savage,  at 
the  back  of  her  flat'  (24  September  1988).  The  Sunday  Times  added  a  bit  more 
detail:  'In  court  she  said,  "I  didn't  notice  where  the  shots,  came  from.  I  have  no 
idea  where  they  came  from.  I  didn't  see  any  trace  of  smoke  and  firing"'  (25  ý 
September  1988).  The  press  reporting  of  Proetta's  appearance  at  the  inquest 
followed  much  the  same  pattern  as  previous  reporting  about  her  credibility.  A 
different  view  was  given  in  papers  such  as  the  Guardian,  which  had  'Carmen 
sticks  to  story  on  Gibraltar  shootings'  (24  September  1988).  Whatwas 
different  about  the  coverage  was  that  television  news  also  reported  that  Proetta Misinformation  and  Public  Belief 
had  significantly  changed  her  evidence: 
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The  inquest  has  also  heard  from  a  woman  who  appeared  in  Death  on 
the  Rock.  Carmen  Proetta  indicated  that  she  no  longer  was  sure  that 
the  terrorists  had  tried  to  surrender.  (BBC1,1800  23  September  1988)17 
A  few  days  later  it  became  clear  that  Proetta  could  not  have  seen  flashes  or 
smoke  as  the  SAS  member  fired  their  guns.  A  Scotland  Yard  forensic  expert, 
David  Prior,  gave  evidence  that 
the  bullets  used  by  the  four  soldiers  who  shot  the  three  IRA  members 
were  of  the  new  smokeless  propellant  variety.  He  [Prior]  agreed  with  ... 
Mr  McGrory  that  on  a  clear  March  day  it  was  quite  possible  for  someone 
to  see  the  shooting  but  miss  both  the  flash  and  the  smoke  (Irish  Times 
28  September  1988). 
But  this  fragment  of  information  was  not  reported  in  any  of  the  tabloid  papers. 
Indeed  it  was  very  hard  to  find  anywhere  in  the  British  press,  with  only  the  Daily 
Telegraph  printing  it  as  a  fragment  of  an  extensive  report  on  inside  pages  of 
the  paper.  Interestingly  the  Sunday  Times  journalists  who  wrote  the  book 
Ambush  also  fail  to  mention  that  the  SAS  men  were  using  smokeless  bullets. 
They  also  reported  Proetta  as'not  so  sure'  (Adams  et  al  1988:  182).  Although 
Adams,  Morgan  and  Bambridge  were  not  in  Gibraltar  for  the  Inquest,  it  was  not 
lack  of  information  which  resulted  in  their  interpretation  of  Proetta's  evidence. 
The  Sunday  Times  had  their  journalists  at  the  Inquest  filing  verbatim  transcripts 
of  the  proceedings  back  to  Wapping. 
There  is  an  additional  factor  whichmight  explain  the  large  number  of  people 
who  believed  that  Proetta  had  retracted  her  evidence.  This  is  that  Proetta  gave 
evidence  on  the  Same  day  as  another  eyewitness,  Kenneth  Asquez,  who  had 
told'Death  on  the  Rockthat  he  had  seen  Sean  Savage'finished  off  on  the 
ground.  He  appeared  to  retract  what  he  had  told  the  television  programme 
although  as  Roger  Bolton  has  said  'A  close  reading  of  the  court  transcript  , 
makes  it  clear  that  by  the  end  of  his  two  sessions  in  the  Gibraltar  witness  box, 
the  coroner  was  not  sure  if  what  Mr  Asquez  now  said  in  court  was  the  truth' 
(Late  Show,  BBC2  25  January  1989).  18  Nevertheless  most  papers  and 
television  news  programmes  accepted  at  face  value  that  Asquez's  original 
account  was  false.  The  BBC  reported'The  headlines  tonight.  A  witness  at  the 
Gibraltar  inquest,  Kenneth  Asquez,  has  admitted  he  was  lying'  (BBC1,1800  23 Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  235 
September  1988).  The  relevance  of  this  is  that  many  of  the  papers  the  next 
day  had  front  page  headlines  which  referred  to  a  witness  'lying'  without 
specifying  which  one: 
'Death  on  the  Rock'witness  lied  for  TV  (Times  24  September  1988) 
Lies  on  the  Rock  (Daily  Mail  24  September  1988) 
Death  on  Rock'witness'  admits  he  was  lying  (Daily  Telegraph  24  September 
1988) 
Why  I  lied  by  TV  trial  witness  (Daily  Express  24  September  1988) 
it  was  lies  says  Provo  shootings  witness  (Daily  Record  24  September  1988) 
The  most  prominent  picture  used  by  both  the  Daily  Express  and  the  Daily 
Record  to  accompany  their  headlines  was  one  showing  Carmen  Proetta.  It  is 
perhaps  less  surprising  then  that  so  many  people  in  the  groups  were 
apparently  convinced  that  Proetta  had  changed  her  story  even  though  some 
did  not  believe  that  she  was  a  prostitute. 
Rejecting  the  messagel  Legitimating  the  Killings 
It  was  not  necessary  to  disbelieve  each  and  every  official  fact  in  order  to 
believe  that  the  action  of  the  SAS  was  illegitimate.  In  fact  various  members  of 
the  SACRO  groups  believed  that  the  IRA  members  had  been  armed,  hadmade 
movements'  as  though  going  for  a  gun,  that  Carmen  Proetta  was  a  prostitute 
and  that  she  had  changed  her  evidence.  Given  this  one  team  still  felt  able  to 
title  their  news  bulletin  in  a  reflection  of  their  own  sentiments:  -'3  murdered  in 
cold  blood  by  the  SAS'. 
One  of  the  nationalist  teams  from  West  Belfast  produced  what  they  called  a 
'Falls  News'19.  This  gave  a  radically  different  view  to  that  found  on  British 
television: 
Three  volunteers  of  the  Provisional  Irish  Republican  Army  were  shot 
dead  in  Gibraltar  early  today  by  the  SAS  as  they  were  holidaying  on  the 
rock.  The  British  government  claimed  they  were  attempting  to  blow  up 
the  bandsmen.  Eyewitnesses  claimed  that  two  were  shot  in  the  back  as 
they  passed  the  garage  as  two  of  the  volunteers  were  riddled  with 
bullets.  The  third  volunteer  named  Sean  Savage  who  was  40  yards 
behind  tried  to  make  his  escape  and  was  wounded.  Then  eyewitnesses 
said  they  saw  an  SAS  man  putting  his  foot  on  the  volunteers  back  and Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  236 
shot  him  in  the  head.  After  the  bomb  disposal  team  were  called  in  to 
search  the  car,  in  which  the  three  had  parked,  it  was  discovered  that 
there  were  no  explosives  in  the  car.  The  explosives  were  found  two 
days  later  after  the  British  Army  had  planted  them  in  a  car  to  cover  their 
mistake.  20 
Here,  in  contrast  to  British  news  the  IRA  are  the'Provisional  Irish  Republican 
Army',  their  members  are'volunteers'  not  'terrorists'.  While  this  bulletin  clearly 
expressed  a  point  of  view,  the  group  also  attempted  to  insert  some  tones  of 
'balance'  by  using  the  term  'claimed'  for  both  the  British  version  and  that  of  the 
eyewitnesses.  In  that  respect  this  news  bulletin  can  be  seen  as  a  mirror  image 
of  actual  television  news,  delivered  from  a  different  perspective. 
It  was  evident  that  the  political  culture,  background  and  experience  of  these 
respondents  had  made  them  very  critical  of  the  news.  They  had  (with  one  or 
two  exceptions)  rejected  most  of  the'facts'  promoted  by  British  sources  and 
elaborated  a  consistently  oppositional  perspective.  In  many  respects  they  had 
very  successfully  resisted  the  message.  This  finding  supports  other  research 
which  has  found  that  people  in  Northern  Ireland  are  more  resistant  to  media 
coverage  about  Northern  Ireland  than  people  who  live  in  Britain  (Nolan  1993; 
Wober  1981) 
On  occasion  the  background  and  experience  of  some  of  the  groups  proved  to 
overwhelm  not  only  news  coverage  but  also  their  memories.  Some  groups 
seemed  to  indulge  in  a  little  wishful  thinking.  For  example,  one  of  the  teams  of 
soldiers  included  a  Sinn  Rin  comment  in  their  news  bulletin  to  the  effect  that 
the  three  IRA  members  were  tourists.  This  reflected  their  view  of  republican 
propaganda  and  their  desire  to  discredit  the  republican  movement.  In  another 
example  one  of  the  woman  in  the  SaItcoats  group  had  referred  to  the  three  as 
'holidaymakers'  in  a  bid  to  further  delegitimise  the  shootings.  In  fact  the  IRA 
acknowledged  on  the  evening  of  the  shootings  that  the  three  were'Volunteers 
attached  to  a  special  'General  Headquarters  Unit'  and  that  they  were  on  active 
service. 
In  groups  where  people  did  not  have  strong  political  views  on  Northern  Ireland 
or  alternative  political  identities,  official  information  could  structure  how  people 
thought  about  the  killings.  But  alternative  information  could  also  make  people 
uneasy  in  their  acceptance  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  actions  of  the  SAS.  Thus 
one  of  the  teams  of  Pensioners  in  Ardrossan  had  become  worried  about  the Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  237 
actions  of  the  SAS.  They  read  the  Daily  Record  or  the  Daily  Express,  four  out 
of  five  thought  that  television  news  was  unbiased  or  objective  with  one  thinking 
the  BBC  news  biased  towardsEire'.  Four  of  the  five  thought  Carmen  Proetta 
was  a  prostitute  and  yet  they  sounded  a  note  of  caution  at  the  end  of  their  news 
bulletin: 
Was  the  army  right  to  shoot?  We  must  leave  that  for  future  generations 
to  decide.  Nobody  has  sympathy  for  the  IRA  but  in  the  shooting  at 
Gibraltar  had  we  taken  a  leaf  from  their  book? 
This  questioning  and  uncertainty  was  echoed  in  a  large  number  of  groups,  in 
particular  amongst  participants  who  were  very  critical  of  the  government  on 
other  political  topics.  For  them  the  chief  effect  of  the  assault  on  the  credibility 
of  Carmen  Proetta  was  to  make  them  unsure  of  what  had  happened  in 
Gibraltar.  .1 
Confusion  and  Conclusion 
The  groups  showed  a  great  deal  of  familiarity  with  the  details  of  the  killings  in 
Gibraltar.  But  it  was  striking  that  the  original  (false)  story  about  armed  IRA 
members  and  a  car  bomb  seemed  to  have  such  an  impact  on  peoples  beliefs. 
Ministry  of  Defence  public  relations  specialists  have  long  recognised  the 
importance  of  getting  the  story  out  first.  Royal  Marines  Officer  Alan  Hooper  has 
written  that  journalists  'are  prisoners  of  current  events  -a  weakness  which  is 
exploited  by  the  skilful  propagandist  -  hence  the  impact  of  the  initial  "story  III 
(Hooper  1982:  139).  Colin  Wallace  the  ex  Army  press  officer  who  specialised  in 
disinformation  in  the  1970s  has  also  commented  on  the  ability  of  official  public 
relations  attempts  to  set  the  agenda  of  public  understanding: 
The  important  thing  is  to  get  saturation  coverage  for  your  story  as  soon 
after  the  controversial  event  as  possible.  Once  the  papers  have  printed  it 
the  damage  is  done.  Even  when  the  facts  come  out,  the  original  image  is 
the  one  that  sticks.  21 
It  was  also  clear,  however,  that  a  number  of  people  had  picked  up  the  revised 
version  as  set  out  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  Sir  Geoffrey  Howe  and 
subsequently  developed  by  official  sources  in  briefings  to  sympathetic 
journalists.  The  believability  of  this  version  of  the  shootings  was  seriously 
weakened  by  the  eyewitness  accounts  given  in  'Death  on  the  Rock',  but  it Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  238 
seems  to  have  been  bolstered  by  the  smear  campaign  against  the  credibility  of 
key  witness  Carmen  Proetta.  This  story  was  widely  believed  among  the  groups 
in  the  study  even  amongst  some  people  who  didn't  read  the  papers  in  which 
the  allegations  were  carried.  There  were,  however,  some  cracks  in  the  edifice 
of  the  official  propaganda  campaign,  such  as  over  the  question  of  surveillance 
and  the  question  of  whether  the  IRA  members  were  challenged  or  tried  to 
surrender. 
Beliefs  about  media  portrayals  of  vIo/ence22 
British  news  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland  has  often  been  criticised  for 
reporting  violence  at  the  expense  of  context,  background  and  explanation 
(Curtis  1984a;  Elliot  1977;  1980;  1982;  Schlesinger  et  al  1983).  But  does  it 
matter?  For  some,  the  constant  flow  of  television  images  'goes  in  one  ear  and 
out  the  other',  leaving  people  with  little  memory  or  knowledge  about  the  events 
covered  each  night.  For  others,  such  coverage  is  worth  little  note  since  people 
'actively'  make  sense  of  television  and  other  media. 
So  do  people  know  what  television  news  covers  or  do  they  (more  or  less) 
randomly  decide  what  they  have  seen?  In  my  own  research  there  was  a  very 
high  degree  of  agreement  that  television  news  mostly  showed  violence. 
Overall  a  total  of  96.9%  (222  people  out  of  229)23  thought  that  television 
showed  Northern  Ireland  as  mostly  violent.  24  Five  people  (2.2%)  referred  to 
reporting  asjust  news'.  25  One  person  (0.4%)  didn't  know  and  one  (0.4%) 
thought  that  the  news  was  not'all  violent'.  Not  a  single  person  in  this  study 
thought  that  television  news  showed  Northern  Ireland  as  'mostly  peaceful'. 
There  was  then,  remarkable  unanimity  about  the  question  of  violence  in 
television  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland.  This  compares  with  other  opinion  poll 
data  such  as  that  carried  out  by  BARB  in  1990.  Using  a  sample  of  3,217  they 
found  that  80%  and  81  %  agreed  or  strongly  agreed  that  television  portrayed 
Northern  Ireland  as  'An  extremely  difficult  place  to  live  a'normal  life'  and  'A 
dangerous  place  to  live'  respectively  (BARB  1990). 
Beliefs  about  violence  in  Northern  Ireland 
While  perceptions,  of  television  coverage  of  violence  were  quite  uniform,  beliefs 
about  real  life  in  Northern  Ireland  were  more  complex.  Many  people  had 
rejected  the  media  picture  as  inaccurate,  at  least  at  an  intellectual  level.  in  the 
General  British  sample  a  total  of  77  people  (53.8%)  believed  that  life  in Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  239 
Northern  Ireland  was  mostly  peaceful,  21  people  (14.7%)  believed  that  the 
violence  tended  to  be  confined  to  particular  areas  (Belfast,  Derry  and  the 
Border  were  all  mentioned  here),  or  particular  times  of  the  year,  and  a  further  6 
(4.2%)  that  Northern  Ireland  was  more  violent  than  other  places. 
Twenty  two  people  (15.4%)  believed  that  life  in  Northern  Ireland  was  mostly 
violent  with  a  further  17  (11.9%)  hazarding  that  it  was  'probably'  mostly 
peaceful.  This  latter  category  were  all  very  doubtful  about  it  being  mostly 
peaceful. 
Among  the  groups  who  either  lived  in  Northern  Ireland  or  were  in  the  British 
Army  there  were  marked  difference  in  perceptions  of  violence.  Amongst  the 
Army  group  27  (69.2%)  believed  that  life  in  Northern  Ireland  was  mostly 
peaceful,  4  (10.3%)  thought  it  was  mostly  violent  and  a  further  8  (20.5%)  that  it 
depended  where  you  were.  Amongst  groups  living  in  Northern  Ireland  -75% 
thought  that  life  in  Northern  Ireland  was  mostly  peaceful,  one  thought  it  was 
mostly  peaceful  with  the  constant  threat  of  violence,  two  said  that  it  'depends 
what  you  want'  or'life  is  as  you  make  it'  and  six  (12.5%)  put  that  it  depended 
where  you  lived.  There  were  three  people  (6.25%)  who  thought  that  life  where 
they  lived  was  mostly  violent. 
These  findings  are  broadly  similar  to  other  research  in  the  area.  In  1981 
Wober  found  that  viewers  in  Yorkshire  were  less  likely  than-viewers  in  Northern 
Ireland  to  agree  with  the  statement'In  real  life  Northern  Ireland  is  not  as  violent 
as  TV  suggests'.  62%  of  Northern  Ireland  viewers  agreed  but  only  29%  of 
Yorkshire  viewers  did  so.  Thirty  one  per  cent  of  Yorkshire  viewers  disagreed 
compared  with  17%  of  Northern  Ireland  viewers  (Wober  1981)26 
would  they  go? 
The  high  number  of  people  who  wrote  that  Northern  Ireland  was  mostly 
peaceful  appeared  to  reject  the  what  they  saw  as  television's  message,  at  least 
at  an  intellectual  level.  However,  when  asked  how  they  would  feel  about  going 
to  Northern  Ireland  a  much  more  even  split  occurred.  Fifty  people  (35%) 
indicated  that  they  would  have  no  problem  going  to  Northern  Ireland,  14  (9.8%) 
said  they  would  be  wary  but  would  go  and  12  (8.4%)  said  they  would  go  but 
only  to  certain  places,  or  at  certain  times.  In  some  cases  people  said  that  they 
would  go  but  as  one  wrote'only  if  I  had  reassurance  about  my  welfare'.  By 
contrast  60  (42%)  people  said  that  they  would  not  go.  Many  of  the  people  who Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  240 
said  that  they  would  not  go  were  quite  emphatic  that  they  would  not  set  foot  in 
Northern  Ireland  writing  comments  such  as  'no  way',  'Not  B.  likely'  and  'Never,. 
Their  lack  of  desire  to  visit  seemed  not  to  stem  from  lack  of  interest27,  but  from 
a  quite  palpable  fear.  Comments  ranged  from  'terrified',  'scared',  'frightened',  'I 
wouldn't  go  to  Ireland  as  a  visitor  because  you  would  be  a  British  target  for 
terrorists'  (SACRO),  'No  thank  you  -  why  tempt  fate?,  to'Very  wary  because  of 
the  news  coverage'  (Bruntsfield  Hospital).  A  small  number  of  respondents  who 
said  they  would  not  go  related  this  not  to  a  wariness  of  being  shot  by  'terrorists' 
or  to  fear  instilled  by  the  media,  but  to  their  own  political  perspective.  One 
respondent  seemed  to  be  operating  his  own  cultural  boycott  in  the  style  of  the 
Anti-Apartheid  Movement.  He  said  that  he  would  not  go  to  Northern  Ireland 
because  to  do  so  would  condone  the  British  view  that  Northern  Ireland  was 
part  of  the'UK. 
There  was  a  very  high  degree  of  consensus  that  television  showed  life  in 
Northern  Ireland  as  mostly  violent,  but  more  than  half  of  the  respondents 
rejected  this  as  a  factual  picture  of  life  in  Northern  Ireland.  However  a  large 
proportion  of  respondents  (42%)  were  unwilling  to  visit  Northern  Ireland,  almost 
all  because  they  were  scared  of  the  threat  of  violence.  It  seemed  that,  at  a 
deeper  level,  many  respondents  critique  of  the  news  was  quite  insecure.,  Two 
questions  arise  from  these  quantitative  findings.  Firstly,  why  do  so  many 
people  believe  that  Northern  Ireland  is  mostly  violent  or  are  scared  to  visit, 
secondly,  what  were  the  reasons  for  the  rejection  of  the  television  message 
evident  among  a  high  proportion  of  respondents? 
Sources  of  information 
Of  those  who  thought  it  was  mostly  violent,  the  majority  (17  out  of  22),  cited 
television,  the  press  or  the  media  in  general  as  their  only  source  of  information, 
five  others  also  cited  evidence  from  friends,  acquaintances  or  family.  Of  the 
sixty  people  who  would  not  go  to  Northern  Ireland  31  gave  the  media  as  their 
only  source  of  information  with  a  further  fifteen  citing  the  media  and  another 
source.  Two  gave  non-news  media,  six  had  some  critique  of  the  news,  three 
had  compared  the  TV  with  other  accounts,  sixteen  listed  friends  and 
acquaintances  and  two  the  personal  experience  of  visiting  Northern  Ireland.  28 
Of  the  seventy-seven  people  who  believed  it  was  peaceful  there  was  a  less 
heavy  dependence  on  the  media  as  the  only  source  of  information  (11  gave 
only  the  media  as  a  source  and  a  further  22  gave  the  media  and  another Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  241 
source).  8  gave  alternative  media  information,  12  a  critique  of  the  news,  6  said 
they  had  compared  NI  with  other  parts  of  the  world  or  that  their  view  was  based 
on  assessments  of  people  in  Northern  Ireland.  The  biggest  category  (58)  by 
far  was  direct  and  indirect  experience.  Seven  gave  family,  thirty  four,  people 
from  NI  or  acquaintances  who  had  visited  NI  and  seventeen  cited  the  direct 
experience  of  living  in  or  visiting  Northern  Ireland  as  their  reason  for  rejecting 
what  they  saw  as  the  television  message. 
Media  influence 
The  clearest  reason  why  people  accepted  life  in  Northern  Ireland  was  mostly 
violent  was  because  of  media  (especially  television)  coverage  of  the  conflict. 
Such  imagery  had  evidently  informed  what  respondents  said  about  life  in 
Northern  Ireland.  Some  commented  explicitly  that'Because  of  what  I  hear  on 
TV  I  believe  it  to  be  very  violent'  (Harrow),  while  others  regarded  media 
coverage  as  a  transparent  reflection  of  life  in  Northern  Ireland  (cf.  Richardson 
and  Corner  1986)  as  in'TV  news  seems  to  be  merely  reporting  the  facts' 
(Harrow) 
Such  coverage  seemed  also  to  have  had  a  greater  impact  on  the  willingness  or 
desire  of  respondents  to  visit  Northern  Ireland  as  in  the  comment  from  one 
State  Enrolled  Nurse  who  thought  that  life  in  Northern  Ireland  was  'very  violent': 
11  would  feel  very  wary  because  of  the  news  coverage  it  gets.  I  would  feel  very 
unsafe'. 
The  two  most  obvious  factors  which  resulted  in  their  rejection  of  the  media 
account  of  violence  in  Northern  Ireland  were  firstly  contact  (through  family, 
friends  or  acquaintances  with  people  who  had  been  to  Northern  Ireland  or  had 
lived  there)  and  secondly,  direct  experience  of  personally  visiting  Northern 
Ireland. 
Memories  and  beliefs 
If  there  was  a  high  level  of  agreement  about  the  meanings  of  news  coverage  of 
violence,  there  was  also  an  obvious  spread  in  the  memories  given  by 
respondents  as  having  had  the'most  impact  on  them.  The  responses  to  this 
question  were  highly  socially  patterned.  The  first  and  most  striking  difference 
was  the  recollection  of  personal  experiences  as  being  the  most  important. 
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memories  they  gave  had  mostly  been  experienced  through  the  media. 
The  most  commonly  mentioned,  key  memories  of  the  British  groups  were 
related  either  to  general  descriptions  of  violence:  'funerals',  'bombings, 
'killings',  'deaths'  etc.  were  mentioned  37  times.  Particular  atrocities  were  also 
mentioned.  The  bombing  at  Enniskillen  in  November  1987  was  cited  most 
often  by  27  people.  The  killings  of  'innocents'  or'children'  or  of  people  in  front 
of  their  families  were  cited  by  ten  people  and  the  killings  of  two  British  soldiers 
who  drove  into  an  IRA  funeral  cortege  was  mentioned  specifically  by  three 
people.  Such  references  tended  to  reflect  the  respondents  political  identity  and 
there  were  a  few  references  from  respondents  who  were  critical  of  government 
policy  on  Ireland  or  who  came  from  a  Catholic  background  or  Irish  extraction. 
'Bloody  Sunday,  'British  oppression'  and'that  the  British  don't  call  it  a  war' 
were  all  mentioned  once,  as  were'integrated  education'and  the'ecumenical 
movement'from  people  who  had  religious  convictions.  Scottish  respondents 
tended  to  mention  events  in  Ireland  as  key  memories  rather  than  bombings  in 
Britain.  This  was  not  the  case  for  respondents  in  the  South  East  of  England 
who  referred  to  the  bombing  of  the  horseguards  parade  and  the'deaths  of 
English  soldiers'  as  having  a  strong  impact.  ,- 
It  is  clear  that  these  responses  are  socially  patterned  and  that  in  the,  case  of 
the  British  groups  the  responses  are  mainly  sourced  with  the-media.  Such 
responses  are  often  seen  as  negotiations  of  the  meaning  of  media  messages, 
but  it  seems  clear  that  the  comments  relate  to  events  (mediated  or  not)  which 
have  had  the  most  impact  (or  been  the  most  poignant)  for  them.  These  - 
responses  are  related  in  part  to  what  people  'bring  to'  the  media  in  the  form  of 
prior  political  perspectives,  identities  and  ideological  baggage.  But  there  is  a 
difference  between  reactions  to  a  programme  and  perceptions  of  it.  The 
content  of  media  coverage  has  a  clear  empirical  content  which  was  not 
negotiated  by  my  respondents. 
Rejecting  the  message 
The  clearest  reason  for  rejecting  the  message  of  television  was  the  actual 
experience  of  going  to  Northern  Ireland  Of  the  19  people  in  the  general  sample 
who  had  direct  experience  of  Northern  Ireland  none  believed  life  there  was 
mostly  violent.  The  Northern  Ireland  groups  were  the  most  emphatic  in 
rejecting  the  message.  This  finding  supports  other  research  which  has  found 
that  people  in  Northern  Ireland  tend  to  be  very  critical  of  the  way  in  which  the Misinformation  and  Public  Belief 
media  cover  the  conflict. 
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In  a  study  of  responses  among  people  living  in  Northern  Ireland  to  a  BBC 
Northern  Ireland  programme  sponsored  by  the  Community  Relations  Council2g, 
Nolan  found  that  judgements  on  the  programme  were  closely  linked  with 
nationalist  or  unionist  perspectives  or  with  other  political  identities.  However, 
groups  from  both  communities  did  share  some  evaluations  of  the  content  of  the 
programme: 
While,  in  an  obvious  sense,  the  readings  made  from  a  nationalist  and  a 
unionist  perspective  oppose  each  other,  the  alienation  described  by  both 
communities  seems  to  stem  from  a  common  source,  or  at  least  to 
converge  to  a  common  point.  This  might  best  be  described  as  a 
vexation  with  the  tendency  of  television  to  exclude  the  more  authentic 
voices  of  Belfast's  communities  in  order  to  promote  a  safe  and 
reassuring  view  of  the  city's  sectarian  divisions...  The  broadcasters  are 
seen  to  be  instrumental  in  promoting  an  establishment  view  - 
dissembling,  complacent,  and  unwilling  to  make  space  for  dissident 
voices.  For  the  Catholics  and  Protestants  from  the  troubled  parts  of  the 
city  interviewed  in  this  study,  the  mirror  that  is  held  up  by  television 
succeeds  in  rendering  them  invisible.  It  is  ironic  that  a  programme  which 
set  out  to  explore  the  reality  of  a  divided  city  only  served  to  confirm  them 
in  that  belief  (Nolan  1993:  unpaged).  ý 
In  a  series  of  research  projects  (Cairns  1983;  1984;  1987;  1990;  Cairns  et  al 
1980;  1981  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter)  examining  the  impact 
of  televised  coverage  of  the  Northern  Ireland  conflict  on  children's  conceptions 
of  life  in  Northern  Ireland  Cairns  concludes,  in  apparent  surprise,  that: 
Despite  all  this  exposure  to  violence...  the  evidence  is  that  children  in 
Northern  Ireland  have  not  become  totally  overwhelmed  by  the  troubles. 
That  is  they  have  not  absorbed  Northern  Ireland's  media  image  to  the 
extent  where  the  very  names  'Northern  Ireland'  or'Belfast'  conjure  up 
nothing  but  thoughts  of  death  and  destruction.  Indeed,  despite  the 
media  concentration  on  violent  death  in  Northern  Ireland  children  have 
apparently  been  able  to  retain  a  perspective  which  allows  them  to 
understand  that  in  most  years  since  1970  more  people  in  Northern 
Ireland  have  died  in  road  accidents  than  have  died  as  a  result  of  the 
'troubles'!  (Cairns  1987:  43) Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  244 
The  same  cannot  be  said  for  many  of  those  people  in  Britain  whose  only 
source  of  information  is  television.  We  will  consider  some  of  the  theoretical 
issues  raised  by  these  findings  in  the  next  chapter. 
I  Other  parts  of  the  study  are  reported  in  Miller  1994. 
2  In  fact  I  took  captioned  photos  of  Proetta,  Ian  Paisley  and  Gerry  Adams  to  all  groups  in  case 
people  could  not  Identify  them.  I  gave  them  uncaptioned  photos  in  the  first  instance  as  I  was 
interested  In  whether  they  would  be  recognised  and  assigned  to  the  correct  party  and 
political/religious  allegiance.  If  there  was  real  uncertainty  as  to  who  the  people  were,  this  was 
noted  and  then  the  captioned  photos  were  introduced.  In  practice  this  was  done  very  rarely 
since  most  of  the  groups  (with  the  significant  exception  of  some  of  the  American  students)  were 
able  to  recognise  both  Adams  and  Paisley.  With  Proetta,  the  identification  of  her  name  was  not 
important,  but  it  was  interesting  to  see  how  many  groups  would  recognise  or  use  her  as  an 
eyewitness. 
3  primadly  in  briefings  to  the  Sunday  rimes. 
4  The  one  group  that  was  able  to  produce  a  bulletin  on  the  Gibraltar  shootings  included  one 
person  who  had  seen  the  American  documentary  'Death  of  a  Terrorist'  on  the  life  and  death  of 
Mairead  Farrell  and  was  able  to  construct  the  bulletin  from  his  memory  of  that  programme  (See 
Chapter  Five;  Miller,  1994). 
5  Soldier  is  published  by  the  Ministry  of  Defence. 
6  The  original  of  the  statement  made  by  a  Spanish  police  officer  allegedly  to  the  effect  that  the 
three  had  been  lost  has  never  been  disclosed  to  the  press  or  to  the  lawyers  for  the  families. 
There  are  however  at  least  seven  separate  statements  from  various  Spanish  police  and 
governmental  sources  which  all  agree  that  the  IRA  members  were  followed  to  the  Gibraltar 
frontier.  See  John  Hooper  and  Peter  Murtagh,  'Questions  linger  over  Rock  shooting',  (the 
Guardian,  25  March  1989:  2). 
7  According  to  Michael  Cockerel[  one  government  minister'rang  the  political  correspondents  of 
three  different  newspapers  with  defamatory  allegations'  against  Proetta  (Cockerell,  1989:  341). 
8  This  was  repeated  by  the  Sun,  Today  and  the  Sunday  Telegraph  (1  May  1988). 
9  The  papers  were  the  Sun,  Star,  Daily  Express,  Daily  Mail,  Mail  on  Sunday,  Daily  Mirror  and 
the  Sunday  rimes. 
10  Two  sentences  in  the  Daily  Mail  (1  February  1989)  and  the  Daily  Express  (27  February 
1989). 
11  The  group  of  soldiers  were  if  anything  slightly  less  convinced  that  the  general  population. 
groups.  A  total  of  7  respondents  (35%)  believed  Proetta  was  or  was  possibly  a  prostitute.  The 
numbers  involved  here  are  too  small  to  compare  properly. 
12  The  Daily  Record  is  the  sister  paper  of  the  Daily  Miffor  in  Scotland.  Throughout  the Misintormation  and  Public  Beliet  245 
coverage  of  the  events  in  Gibraltar  news  coverage  in  the  Record  was  mostly  simply  selected 
from  copy  used  by  the  Miffor. 
13  They  wrote  'night  club  singer',  'I  have  no  ideal  Perhaps  a  prostitutel',  'prostitute  (I  don't 
know)'  and  'secretary/M  ! stress' 
14  Both  members  of  the  other  team  believed  that  she  had  retracted  her  evidence. 
15  See  for  example,  John  Keegan,  Army  questions  TV  version  of  Gibraltar  deaths',  Daily 
Telegraph,  Saturday  30  April  1988. 
16  See  for  example,  Mail  on  Sunday,  29  May  1988.  As  the  Inquest  approached  the  Sunday 
Telegraph  reported  'it  is  still  not  clear  whether  Mrs  Carmen  Proetta  will  be  among  the 
witnesses'  (4  September  1988). 
17  The  reports  from  Gibraltar  went  on: 
She  told  the  Documentary  that  from  her  window  ovedooking  the  scene  she  saw  four 
men  get  out  of  a  police  car,  jump  over  a  barrier  and  shoot  McCann  and  Farrell.  They 
had  their  hands  raised.  They  were  giving  themselves  up.  But  in  court  today  she  said 
she  didn't  see  men  firing  guns.  She  heard  the  shots  and  presumed  they  came  from 
them.  Michael  Hucker  'Were  McCann  and  Farrell  really  surrendering?  Yes  or  NoT 
Mrs  Proetta  'For  me,  having  your  hands  up  can  mean  surrender  or  shock  or  something 
else'.  'I'm  suggesting  you  were  totally  mistaken.  You  didn't  see  these  people  shot'. 
'That's  your  opinion,  not  mine'..  (BBC1  1800,23  September  1988). 
18  Auberon  Waugh,  not  normally  noted  for  his  defence  of  investigative  journalism  wrote  that 
Asquez: 
claimed  that  the  lie  was  told  In  response  to  pressure  from  Thames  Television.  It  is 
normal  practice  when  a  witness  admits  to  having  lied,  to  ask  what  reason  there  is  to 
believe  his  revised  version  -  whether  he  might  not  now  be  giving  false  evidence  in 
response  to  pressure  from  another  source.  At  very  least,  his  evidence  tends  to  be  taken 
with  a  pinch  of  salt.  But  not,  it  would  appear,  by  the  poodles  (Waugh  1988). 
The  Falls  Road  is  the  main  thoroughfare  through  West  Belfast. 
20  They  went  on  to  write  that  'Gibraltar  Airlines  have  refused  to  take  bodies  back  to  Belfast  for 
their  burial  as  a  protest  against  the  freedom  fighters  of  Ireland.  This  was  interesting  because  it 
showed  a  very  detailed  level  of  memory  which  seemed  to  be  related  to  their  own  experience 
and  concerns.  This  fact  seemed  to  have'stuck  because  they  regarded  it  with  disdain.  No  other 
group  remembered  this  detail. 
21  Quoted  in  What  the  Papers  Say,  Channel  Four,  11  March  1988. 
22  The  data  upon  which  this  chapter  draws  are  the  groups  taking  part  in  the  general  study  as 
well  as  those  taking  part  in  the  Gibraltar  study. 
23  Not  including  the  American  Students. 
24  A  total  of  95.9%  of  the  general  British  sample. 
25  For  three  of  the  five  this  was  related  to  a  recognition  that  news  values  meant  that  violence Misinformation  and  Public  Belief  246 
was  newsworthy.  They  did  not,  however,  believe  that  Northern  Ireland  was  mostly  violent  in 
reality.  The  other  two  did  believe  that  Northern  Ireland  was  mostly  violent  and  that  this  was 
faithfully  reflected  on  television. 
26  40%  of  Yorkshire  and  20%  of  Northern  Ireland  viewers  replied  that  they'didn't  know'.  The 
sample  size  was  three  hundred  In  each  area. 
27  in  fact  only  five  people  said  they  would  not  go  because  they  were  'not  interested'  or  had  'no 
inclination'. 
28  One  had  been  as  a  soldier  and  didn't  want  to  go  back  and  the  other  didn't  want  to  return 
because  she  had  been  there  with  her  father  when  he  was  in  the  army. 
29  The  Community  Relations  Council  is  a  government  funded  body  which  is  charged  with 
helping  to  improve  'Community  Relations'and  in  the  long  term  ease  the  conflict.  See  Miller, 
1993  for  a  discussion  of  this  project  as  a  government  strategy. Chapter  Six 
Conclusion: 
Winning  the  Information  Battle 
It  is  evident  that  the  media  are  regarded  as  a  very  important  element  in  the 
struggle  for  power  and  resources  in  Northern  Ireland  by  most  if  not  all  of  the 
participants  in  the  conflict.  That  is  why  public  relations  are  central  parts  of  the 
campaigning  and  legitimating  strategies  of  those  organisations.  But  there 
remains  a  profound  dispute  about  the  precise  role  played  by  the  media  in  the 
Northern  Ireland  conflict.  In  part  this  is  in  itself  an  intimate  part  of  the 
propaganda  war.  For  some  the  media  are  all  powerful  and  act  on  behalf  of 
either  the  state  or  the  insurgents,  while  for  others  the  media  are  less  important 
and  have  minimal  impacts  on,  for  example,  public  opinion  or  public  policy.  This 
chapter  reviews  some  contemporary  debates  about  the  power  of  the  media  and 
concludes  by  making  an  assessment  of  that  power. 
The  Powerful  media:  Ally  of  the  insurgent 
For  many  of  the  counterinsurgency  theorists  and  'terror  experts'  the  media  are 
guilty  of  hampering  the  'fight  against  terrorism'.  Sometimes  it  is  argued  that 
because  the  'terrorists'  want  publicity  it  must  be  in  their  interests  and  for  that 
reason  alone  media  personnel  should  not  allow  themselves  to  be'hijacked'  by 
'terrorists'.  For  Walter  Laque  'The  media  are  the  terrorist's  best  friend.  The 
terrorist  act  by  itself  is  nothing,  publicity  is  all'  (Laquer  1976:  104;  see  also 
Clutterbuck  1981;  Wright  1990).  Yet  such  theorists  implicitly  accept  that 
gaining  media  coverage  is  not  the  only  goal  of  any  insurgent  organisation.  The 
point  of  publicity  is  not  only  publicity,  it  is  the  impact  which  it  is  feared/hoped 
will  flow  from  media  coverage  that  is  what  concerns  the  'anti-terrorism' 
theorists.  We  might  think  of  such  impacts  as  being  directly  on  the  government 
or  indirectly  via'public  opinion'.  Leading  US  Ideologue  Norman  Podhoretz  has 
put  it  as  follows: 
The  publicity  that  has  been  accorded  the  terrorist  groups  has  had  the 
effect  of  habituating  the  public  mind  to  the  kind  of  action  -  the  murders, 
the  kidnappings,  the  hijackings  -  that  once  seemed  so  horrible  as  to  be 
virtually  unthinkable...  We  become  habituated,  we  lose  the  sharpness  of 
our  sense  of  outrage,  we  lose  the  clarity  of  our  moral  judgement.  This  is 
the  first  way  in  which  the  publicity  that  terrorism  has  received  helps  to 
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further  the  aims  of  the  terrorist  (Podhoretz  1980:  85). 
Alternatively,  there  is  a  fear  that  publicity  may  boost  the  morale  of  the 
'terrorists'  or  that  media  coverage  may  result  in  the  contagion  of  'terrorism'. 
Some  writers  have  held  that  the  imitative  effect  applies  specifically  to  tactics 
and  know-how  as  well  as,  or  instead  of,  providing  the  impetus  to  violence  in  the 
first  place.  We  have  seen  that  counter-insurgency  theorists  tend  not  to 
examine  media  coverage  or  the  process  by  which  it  emerges,  directly  and 
empirically,  but  when  we  turn  to  the  impact  of  media  coverage  of  political 
violence  there  is  almost  no  published  research  on  the  impact  of  media 
coverage  of  terrorism  on  public  opinion  or  of  the  impact  of  public  opinion,  on 
government.  The  literature  on  contagion  is  not  based  on  the  direct 
investigation  of  public  belief  or  on  the  beliefs  and  motivations  of  the  'terrorists', 
but  on  a  host  of  other  approaches  or'methods. 
The  Contagiousness  of  International  Terrorism? 
In  counterinsurgency  doctrine  the  media  encourage  terrorism.  For  Norman 
Podhoretz'one  of  the  main  reasons  and  possibly  the  most  important  reason,  for 
the  use  of  these  terrorist  tactics  in  advancing  the  political  aims  of  the  - 
organisations  involved  is  treatment  by  the  media'  (Podhoretz  1980:  85).  In  a 
similar  vein,  leading'terror  expert'Yonah  Alexander  has  written  that,  terrorism, 
however  local,  is  by  its  very  nature  a  world-wide  theatrical  attractiorl,  it  tends  to 
encourage  angry  and  frustrated  groups  beyond  a  particular  country  to 
undertake  similar  acts  as  a  way  out  of  their  helplessness  and  alienation' 
(Alexander  1978:  47).  British  terrorologist  Paul  Wilkinson  has  stated  that:  'the 
recent  history  of  terrorism  in  many  democratic  countries  vividly  demonstrates 
that  terrorists  thrive  on  the  oxygen  of  publicity'  (Wilkinson  1990:  30).  But  the 
evidence  given  for  such  hypotheses  is  remarkably  slight,  being  based  almost 
entirely  on  anecdotes  and  comparisons  between  the  use  of  apparently  similar 
tactics  by  differing  groups  (Dobkin  1992).  As  Schlesinger  et  al  have  put  it: 
It  is  characteristic  of  this  argument  and  of  the  way  it  is  mobilised  in 
official  thinking,  that  it  constantly  detaches  events  from  their  specific 
historical  and  political  contexts  and  regroups  them  as  part  of  the  same 
general  phenomenon  because  they  look  the  same,  employ  the  same 
techniques,  or  occur  together  in  time.  In  doing  so  it  glasses  over  crucial 
differences  between  them  and  the  situations  from  which  they  spring 
(Schlesinger  et  al  1983:  141) Winning  the  Infonnation  Battle  249 
In  fact  there  are  remarkably  few  studies  which  have  attempted  to  examine  the 
relationship  between  non-state  political  violence  and  the  media  by  empirical 
rather  then  rhetorical  means,  as  Picard  has  noted: 
As  one  reviews  the  literature  it  becomes  shockingly  clear  that  not  a 
single  study  based  on  accepted  social  science  methods  has  established 
a  cause-effect  relationship  between  media  coverage  and  the  spread  of 
terrorism.  Yet  public  officials,  scholars,  editors,  reporters,  and 
columnists  continually  link  the  two  elements  and  present  their 
relationship  as  proven.  The  dearth  of  evidence  associating  the  two 
variables  is  not  the  result  of  conflicting  studies  or  arguments  over 
interpretation  of  evidence,  but  rather  the  absence  of  research  on  the 
subject.  At  times  some  scholars  have  attempted  to  overcome  that 
problem  or  to  place  the  pallor  of  respectability  over  their  opinions  by 
'borrowing'  conclusions  from  the  literature  on  the  effects  of  televised 
violence  and  crime  on  viewers  and  then  projecting  similar  effects  to 
coverage  of  terrorism  (Picard  1986:  387) 
The  'evidence'  which  has  been  presented  (Berkowitz  1973;  Heyman  and 
Mickolus  1981;  Holden  1986;  Mazur  1982;  Midlarsky  1970;  1978;  Midlarsky  et 
al  1980;  Stoil  and  Brownell  1981;  Weimann  and  Brosius  1989)  is  entirely  at  the 
level  of  correlation,  which  is  then  mistaken  for  causation.  In  one  of  the  more 
recent  studies,  Robert  Holden,  claims  to  have  developed  a'mathematical 
model'  of  contagion  which  he  applies  to  aircraft  hijackings  in  the  United  States 
between  1968  and  1972.  He  argues  that'analyses  show  that  successful 
hijackings  in  the  United  States  did  generate  additional  hijacking  attempts  of  the 
same  type'  (Holden  1986:  874).  He  goes  on  to  say  that'Even  though  it  was  not 
possible  to  show  statistically  that  media  coverage  was  responsible  for  the 
stimulating  effects,  the  results  tend  to  support  the  common  belief  that  hijacking 
had  stimulating  effects  is  consistent  with  previous  studies  showing  that  violent 
acts  are  more  likely  to  be  imitated  if  they  are  seen  to  be  rewarded  (Holden 
1986:  902). 
Although  Holden  goes  on  to  note  that'The  finding  is  more  consistent  with  the 
assumption  that  most  hijackers  were  rational  than  that  they  were  irrational' 
(Holden  1986:  902),  it  is  hard  to  resist  the  temptation  to  view  the  'terrorists,  as 
pathological.  This  is  because,  as  with  all  the  other  research  in  this  tradition, 
'terrorist'  acts  are  wrenched  out  of  their  social,  political  and  historical  context. Winning  the  Information  Battle  250 
'Terrorists'  are  pictured  as  being  provoked  into  hijacking  by  virtue  simply  of 
watching  television.  But  Holden  then  comes  close  to  acknowledging  the 
weakness  of  his  case  by  stating  that  the  contagion  effects  he  had  observed 
might  be  more  consistent  with  spurious  contagion  than  with  causal 
connections  between  events.  That  is,  exogenous  factors  may  have 
raised  the  hijacking  rate  over  certain  long  periods,  yielding  dependence 
between  counts  of  events  at  time  points  within  those  periods.  Of  course, 
contagion  and  exogenous  causation  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  and  it  is 
possible  that  both  types  of  effects  occurred.  The  findings  of  the  present 
research  should  not  be  dismissed  because  of  the  mere  logical  possibility 
that  a  completely  exogenous  rate  process  exists  (Holden  1986:  901-902). 
If  it  is  the  case  that  other  factors  may  be  at  work  and  that  'contagion'  is  not 
necessarily  the  only  or  most  important  factor,  the  entire  case  for'contagion,  as 
direct  and  powerful  media  effects  collapses.  ' 
Terrorism'and  the  'effectsof  the  media 
There  is  one  partial  exception  to  the  failure  amongstterroe  writers  to 
investigate  the  impact  of  the  media  on  public  beliefs  about  terrorism.  Gabriel 
Weimann,  alone  among  'terror'  experts  (as  far  as  I  am  aware),  has  attempted  to 
study  media  effects  in  this  area.  Like  other'terror  experts',  Weimann  has 
argued  that 
Press  attention  appears  to  be  sufficient  to  enhance  the  status  of  the 
people,  problem,  or  cause  behind  a  terrorist  event.  Terrorists'  success 
in  attracting  media  attention  may  then  guarantee  world-wide  awareness 
and  recognition  of  the  political,  racial,  or,  religious  problem  that  caused 
the  event  (Weimann  1983:  44) 
In  a  later  study  he  concluded  that  his  results  'provide  abundant  evidence  to  the 
agenda-setting  and  status  conferral  functions  of  media  coverage'  (Weimann 
1990:  23).  According  to  Weimann'what  is  surprising'  is  the'image  improving 
effect'of  media  coverage.  Weimann  talks  of  theworld-wide  recognition'of  the 
problems  which  cause  'terrorism'  and  the  improvement  of  image  which  results 
from  media  exposure,  yet  his  research  singularly  fails  to  provide  support  for 
such  statements  This  is  largely  because  of  his  slippery  use  of  concepts  such  as 
'image'  and  'recognition'  and  inadequate  conceptual  isation  of  the  field  of  study. Winning  the  Infonnation  Battle  251 
Weimann  carried  out  two  separate  studies  with  80  undergraduates  from  the 
University  of  Haifa,  and'a  random  sample  of  200  Israelis,  all  Adult  Jews' 
(Weimann,  1983;  1990).  He  asked  both  sets  to  complete  a  questionnaire  on 
attitudes  to'terrorism',  then  in  the  case  of  the  undergraduates  split  them  into 
'matched  groups'  (1983:  40).  One  was  designated  the  control  group  for  the  first 
of  two  case  studies  and  the  other  control  for  the  second.  The  events  used 
were  the  hijacking  of  a  Dutch  train  by  south  Moluccans  in  1975  and  the 
hijacking  of  a  TWA  plane  by  Croatians  in  1976.  The  research  groups  were 
given  a  selection  of  press  cuttings  from  an  Israeli  daily  newspaper,  which 
'paralleled  everyday  coverage  by  providing  the  full  account  of  the  sequence  of 
events'  (1983:  40).  The  two  case  study  'terrorist'  events  were  selected  to  be 
'remote  in  time,  location  and  socio-political  distance'from  the  respondents 
(Weimann  1983:  40).  The  second  study  was  largely  similar  except  that  it  also 
exposed  respondents  to  television  reporting  of  the  two'terrorist'  events  and 
asked  the  research  and  control  groups  additional  questions  about  perceptions 
of  the  incidents. 
As  Edward  Herman  has  pointed  out,  the  clippings  given  to  the  groups  were  not 
a  random  set  and  were  from  only  one  newspaper:  'Weimann  does  not  even 
claim  that  they  were  either  complete  or  randomly  selected.  They  seem  to  have 
been  selected  for  information  coverage.  But  many  media  comments  are 
emotional  rather  than  factual.  Without  a  random  set,  the  method  is  biased  and 
without  scientific  value'  (Herman  1988:  63) 
Weimann  assumes  that  the  media  promote  the  cause  of  the  terrorists  by 
explaining  it  in  news  reporting.  He  writes  that'media  coverage  of  terrorist 
events  must  explain  the  motive'of  the'terrorists'  (Weimann  1990:  27).  In  fact 
this  is  simply  wishful  thinking  for  which  he  has  no  evidence.  It  is  clear  that 
television  news  does  not  regularly  explain  the  causes  of  those  groups  which  it 
defines  as  terrorist.  Indeed  the  major  critique  of  television  news  and  press 
coverage  of  political  violence  has  been  that  it  tends  to  concentrate  on  violence 
at  the  expense  of  background  and  context.  In  a  study  of  the  New  York  Times 
and  the  London  Times,  Kelly  and  Mitchell  conclude,  in  a  far  from  unique 
statement,  that  news  reports  were'sapping  terrorism  of  it's  political  content'  and 
that'less  than  10  percent  of  the  coverage  in  either  newspaper  dealt  in  even  the 
most  superficial  way  with  the  grievances  of  the  terrorists'  (Kelly  and  Mitchell 
1981:  287;  See  also  Dobkin  1992;  Elliot  1977;  Knight  and  Dean  1982;  Paletz  et 
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Following  exposure  to  the  press  cuttings  and  TV  reports  the  experimental 
groups  were  consistently  more  likely  than  the  control  groups  to  agree  with 
statements  such  as  'the  problem  which  caused  the  terrorist  act  is important'; 
'the  problem  should  have  been  covered  by  the  mass  media':  'the  problem 
should  be  solved  by  international  institutions';  'people  should  know  about  this 
event  and  its  causes';  'I  would  like  to  know  more  about  this  subject'  from  this 
Weimann  concludes  that'the  observed  difference  between  the  (experimental 
and  control]  groups  provide  abundant  evidence  to  the  agenda-setting  and 
status  conferral  functions  of  media  coverage'  (Weimann  1990:  23).  Later  he 
refers  to  the'image-improving  effect'which  his  studies  reveal  (1990:  26).  This 
is  a  radical  overstatement  of  his  findings. 
Weimann's  use  of  terms  such  as  'image'  and  'recognition',  'enhance  the  status' 
is  problematic.  To'recognise'the  name  of  a'terrorist'  group  such  as  the  IRA  is 
not  the  same  thing  as  granting  them  'recognition'  as  legitimate  entities.  The 
recognition  of  the  PLO  at  the  United  Nations  as  the'sole  legitimate  , 
representative'  of  the  Palestinians  which  so  exercises  Weimann,  as  an  Israeli 
academic,  is  quite  simply  not  the  same  as  recognising  that  the  people  who  took 
over  a  Dutch  train  are  from  South  Molucca.  As  Herman  has  put  itWeimann 
confuses  status  conferral  and  initial  recognition...  An  image  must  be  changed  if 
one  never  heard  of  a  group  previously  and  now  reads  of  it's  existence  and 
actions.  The  image  is  reorganised  from  a  blank  to  a  something,  even  if  that 
something  is  negative'  (Herman  1988:  63).  It  is  perfectly  clear  that  regarding 
the  'problem  which  caused  the  event'  as  important  is  not'at  all  the  same  thing 
as  being  in  sympathy  or  support  of  the  organisation  which  carried  out  the 
hijacking.  Nor  is  recognising  the  existence  of  a  group  or  believing  that  the 
problem  which  caused  its  existence  should  be  solved  the  same  as  supporting 
that  group  or  of  iunderstanding  the  ideology  and  objectives  of  the  organisation 
in  the  way  that  the  group,  itself,  would  wish  (Schlesinger  1981).  Such  slippery 
thinking  is  common  amongst  counterinsurgency  thinkers  in  Britain  and  the  US 
(cf.  Alexander  1979).  It  also  appears  to  exist  within  the  ranks  of  liberal  Israeli 
social  scientists.  2 
The  most  fundamental  question  is,  if  the  media  have  an  image  improving  effect 
on  'terrorists',  why  is  it  thatWestern  public  opinion  appears  to  be 
overwhelmingly  opposed  to  organisations  defined  in  the  media  as'terrarist' 
(Hewitt  1992)3  Moreover,  Weimann's  respondents  were'very  homogenous'  in 
their  views  on  'terrorism'  and  they  mostly  'objected'  to  'terrorism'  (Weimann Winning  the  Information  Battle  253 
1983:  42)  both  before  and  after  the  experiment.  The  question  which  then  arises 
is,  if  the  media  have  such  a  strong  improving  effect  on  the  image  of  'terrorists', 
why  do  his  respondents  have  such  a  negative  view  of  them  in  the  first  place? 
Unless  they  can  come  up  with  better  evidence  and  clearer  thinking  such  writers 
ought  to  desist  from  making  statements  about  media  influence  and  cease  their 
lobbying  for  repression  of  the  media.  4 
Terrorism  as  communication 
Underlying  much  of  this  debate  is  a  key  conceptual  problem.  The  use  of 
violence  is  held  to  be  a  'communicative  strategy'.  In  this  view  the  function  of 
terrorism  is  to  communicate  through  the  media  of  mass  communications.  This 
leads  some  to  the  radical  position  that,  without  the  media,  terrorism  would 
cease  to  exist.  This  is  part  of  the  underlying  assumption  of  the  concept  of  the 
$oxygen  of  publicity'  advanced  by  Margaret  Thatcher.  Lord  Chalfont  terror 
expert,  and  now  chair  of  the  Radio  Authority  in  Britain,  has  put  this  view'the 
first  point  to  be  grasped  is  that  terrorism  would  be  impotent  without  publicity.  It 
depends  for  its  effect  upon  dramatic  impact  in  order  to  compel  and  hold  public 
attention.  (Chalfont  1990:  18)5 
But  not  all  adherents  of  the  oxygen  of  publicity  thesis  would  accept  this.  Paul 
Wilkinson  for  example,  has  rejected  such  an  explanation  as  simplistic:  'the 
media  are  often  held  up  to  be  in  some  sense  "responsible"  for  terrorism.  If 
these  acts  were  not  publicised  it  is  argued,  how  could  the  terrorist  achieve  his 
purposes?  Superficially  this  is  a  plausible  theory  and,  not  surprisingly,  has 
been  readily  taken  up  by  those  who  find  it  convenient  to  blame  the  media  for 
every  social  evil.  However,  close  analysis  of  the  links  between  terrorism  and 
the  media  suggests  that  the  relationships  are  in  reality  a  far  greater  complexity' 
(Wilkinson  1978:  2).  Nevertheless  the  idea  that'terrorism'  depends  on  or  is 
mainly  oriented  towards  the  media  is  widespread  amongst  counterinsurgency 
theorists.  For  example,  Brian  Jenkins  has  argued  that 
terrorist  attacks  are  often  carefully  choreographed  to  attract  the  attention 
of  the  electronic  media  and  the  international  press.  Taking  and  holding 
hostages  increases  the  drama.  The  hostages  themselves  often  mean 
nothing  to  the  terrorists.  Terrorism  is  aimed  at  the  people  watching  not 
the  actual  victims.  Terrorism  is  a  theatre  (Jenkins  1975:  4). 
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maintained  by  liberal  and  critical  scholars.  The  most  notable  contribution  here 
is  that  of  Alex  Schmid  and  Janny  DeGraaf.  who  argue  thatterrorism  can  best 
be  understood  as  a  violent  communication  strategy....  violence  to  become 
terroristic  requires  witnesses'  (Schmid  and  DeGraf  1982:  15). 
Here  it  is  assumed  that  one  of  the  primary  aims  of  'terrorist'  organisations  is  to 
gain  media  coverage.  Therefore,  when  the  media  do  cover  acts  of  retail 
political  violence  they  are  in  effect  playing  the  terrorists  game.  Naturally  the 
solution  to  this  problem  is  for  the  media  to  stop  covering  terrorism. 
For  some  critics  the  impact  of  bombings  and  killings  on  real  people  is 
unimportant,  publicity  is  all.  Yet  is  it  true  to  say  that  the  armed  struggle  of  the 
IRA  has  had  no  material  impact  outside  of  publicity?  The  presence  of 
thousands  of  British  troops,  the  commitment  of  an  annual  subvention  of  around 
E2  billion  and  the  deleterious  effect  of  the  conflict  in  Ireland  on  civil  liberties  in 
Britain  argues  otherwise.  In  the  early  1970s  the  IRA  conducted  what  it  called 
an  economic  bombing  campaign  in  the  North  of  Ireland  and  in  the  early  90s  it 
has  tried  to  do  the  same  in  Britain.  The  effect  of  this  latter  campaign  prompted 
widespread  publicity  and,  it  is  true,  that  publicity  was  more  widespread  than  for 
similar  bombings  in  Ireland.  Yet  the  bombing  of  Bishopsgate  in  the  city  of 
London  in  1993  also  caused  billions  of  pounds  of  damage  and  resulted, 
amongst  other  things,  in  the  Government  stepping  in  to  pick  up  the  tab  for 
future  insurance  bills.  Whatever  the  symbolic  value  of  such  attacks,  which,  it 
can  not  be  doubted  is  huge,  they  also  have  real  material  consequences. 
Indeed  it  is  very  difficult  to  separate  the  symbolic  and  material  importance  of 
such  bombings.  They  are  intimately  related  as  indeed  are  the  symbolic  and 
material  aspects  of  government  action. 
Whether  the  material  effects  of  any  political  action  by  non-state  insurgents,  or 
by  governments,  are  noticed  by  the  media  or  the  public,  those  effects  are  real. 
However,  it  is  also  the  case  that  the  effects  of  any  action  on  public  opinion  and 
public  policy  can  be  substantially  affected  by  the  way  its  symbolic  dimensions 
are  characterised.  This  is  why  all  'terrorists',  pressure  groups  and 
governments  engage  in  public  relations. 
Consider  a  government  which  hosts  press  conferences  and  stage  manages 
appearances  by  its  personnel.  We  would  be  justified  in  thinking  that  the 
government  aim  to  get  publicity  and  possibly  good  publicity,  from  such 
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engage  in  press  conferences  is  simply  so  that  they  can  gain  media  coverage. 
The  object  of  a  press  conference  is  indeed  to  obtain  media  coverage  and  even 
favourable  coverage.  It  also  functions  to  help  the  government  carry  out  its 
political  objectives.  In  counterinsurgency  theory  it  is  forgotten  that  the  aim  of 
non  state  'terrorist'  groups  is  the  resolution  of  a  particular  grievance  (be  it  a 
ransom  demand,  the  release  of  prisoners,  a  change  in  government  policy  or 
state  power).  The  attempt  to  use  the  media  may  be  one  part  of  this  process, 
but  public  relations,  whether  used  by  government  or'terrorists'  (or  by  a 
government  which  practices  'terrorism'),  is  never  an  end  in  itself.  If  it  were  the 
case  that  all  the  IRA  wanted  was  favourable  coverage  in  the  media,  we  could 
have  peace  in  Ireland  simply  by  giving  the  airwaves  over  to  the  Republican 
Press  Centre  in  Belfast.  In  reality  though  the  aims  of  the  Republican 
Movement  are  much  more  substantial  than  the  regular  appearance  of  Gerry 
Adams  on  News  at  Ten. 
In  the  view  of  the  counter  insurgents,  the  irresponsibility  of  the  media  needs  to 
be  countered  by  increasing  controls  over  the  media.  In  the  1970s  the 
predominant  approach  was  to  emphasise  voluntary  agreements  between  the 
broadcasters  and  the  state  (see  Wilkinson  1978),  although  there  was  some 
advocacy  of  tightening  the  law  to  force  journalists  to  reveal  their  sources 
(Institute  for  the  Study  of  Conflict  1978;  Wilkinson  1980  cited  in  Schlesinger  et 
al  1983).  But  Wilkinson  was  an  early  advocate  of  the  approach  adopted  in  the 
south  of  Ireland  where  interviews  with  Sinn  Fein  and  the  IRA  were  banned  in 
the  1970's.  As  early  as  1977,  Wilkinson  was  advocating  this  as  a  response  to 
the  IRA  campaign  in  Britain  (Wilkinson  1977:  167)6.  He  repeated  this  view  at  a 
conference  in  1988: 
Experience  in  the  Republic  of  Ireland  certainly  shows  that  such  a  ban 
can  be  operated  smoothly  and  efficiently  for  many  years  without  in  any 
way  threatening  parliamentary  democracy.  Few  observers  pointed  out 
that  even  in  a  free  society,  no  freedom  of  expression  is  totally  unlimited. 
Most  of  us  believe  for  example  that  pornography  should  ý be  banned  from 
TV  and  radio.  Inviting  terrorists  on  TV  to  crow  about  their  latest  atrocity 
is  the  ultimate  pornography  of  violence.  Banning  them  will  prevent 
causing  real  distress  to  hundreds  of  relatives  bereaved  by  terrorist 
murderers.  It  will  also  help  to  protect  the  far  more  basic  democratic 
freedoms  of  life  and  liberty  by  helping  to  defeat  the  terrorist  murderers 
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This  was  eight  months  before  the  Home  Secretary  did  indeed  announce  the 
introduction  of  a  ban  which'was  discussed  in  Chapter  Two.  Such  calls  are 
issued  in  tandem  with  demands  that  the  broadcasters  abandon  impartiality  and 
declare  and  open  commitment  to  the  state  in  covering  political  violence.  For 
Lord  Chalfont,  the  tendency  of  the  media: 
is  to  search  for  some  kind  of  bogus  intellectual  objectivity  and  to  regard 
the  terrorist  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  police  officer  or  soldier,  on  the 
other,  as  two  sides  of  a  morally  symmetrical  confrontation.  In 
publications  of  otherwise  impeccable  respectability,  the  phrase'state  of 
violence'  is  used  to  describe  military  or  police  action  against  violent 
subversives  and  terrorists.  This  language,  often  results  from  the  sheer 
incapacity  to  distinguish  between  an  attack  by  a  violent  minority  on  the 
institutions  of  a  democratic  state  and  the  right  of  that  state  to  defend 
itself  against  such  an  attack.  This'absence  of  differentiation  is 
demonstrated  by  the  frequent  television  appearances  of  terrorists  and 
the  spokespeople  of  the  organisations  that  sponsor  them,  who  are 
allowed  to  disseminate  their  violent  propaganda  with  the  same  freedom 
as  a  candidate  for  parliament  addressing  his  or  her  constituency 
(Chalfont  1990:  19). 
This  tendency  to  interview  'terrorists'  is  of  course  entirely  fictional.  But  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  such  attacks  have  had  their  affect  on  the  broadcasting 
institutions. 
The  Powerful  Media:  Instrument  of  the  state 
In  contrast,  tighter  censorship  is  opposed  by  writers  from  a  variety  of  critical 
perspectives.  They  see  the  media  quite  differently  from  the  counter-insurgents, 
as  being  in  a  subordinate  relationship  with  the  state.  First,  there  is  the  body  of 
research  associated  with  George  Gerbner  and'Cultivation  Analysis'.  Secondly 
there  is  the  structuralist  conception  common  to  much  critical  media  studies  in 
the  1970s,  especially  the  Birmingham  Centre  for  Cultural  Studies  and  thirdly 
there  is  the'propaganda  model'advanced  by  Noam  Chomsky  and  Edward 
Herman.  In  all  three  cases  the  media  end  up  being  seen  as  instruments  of  the 
state.  For  Gerbner  and  his  colleagues  the  continual  flow  of  television  imagery 
cultivates  compliance  with  society  as  present  structured  and  can  even  win 
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My  argument  is  simply  that  symbolic  uses  of  violence  tend  to  benefit 
those  who  control  them,  usually  states  and  media  establishments. 
Isolated  acts  of  small  scale  insurgencies  or  bold  strikes  of  a  few 
individuals  may  force  media  attention  and  convey  a  public  message  of 
outrage  and  defiance.  But  in  the  last  analysis,  that  challenge  is  often 
made  to  seem  even  more  outrageous  and  serves  to  enhance  media 
credibility  ...  and  to  mobilise  support  for  repression,  often  on  a  higher 
scale  than  warranted  by  the  threat,  as  in  the  form  of  wholesale  state 
violence  and  terror  or  military  action,  which  is  presented  as  justified  by 
the  provocation  (Gerbner  1991:  3) 
The  cultivation  approach  has  been  criticised  for  ruling  out  the  possibility  of 
contradictory  messages  across  different  programme  types  and  within  particular 
programmes  (Schlesinger  et  al  1983:  161-162;  Wober  and  Gunter  1988:  2-14) 
and,  in  common  with  much  other  work  on  television  impacts,  for  neglecting  the 
specific  meanings  communicated  in  particular  programmes.  Cultivation 
analysis  assumes  that  compliance  is  cultivated  by  the  sheer  amount  of 
television  that  some  viewers  watch,  the  result  being  atelevision  bias'  in  public 
perceptions  of  the  world.  In  relation  to  violence  this  might  have  a  marked  effect 
on  assessments  of  risk  and  safety: 
In  the  portrayal  of  violence  there  is  a  relationship  between  the  roles  of 
the  violent  and  the  victim.  Both  roles  are  there  to  be  learned  by  the 
viewers.  In  generating  among  the  many  a  fear  of  the  power  of  the  few, 
television  violence  may  achieve  its  greatest  effect  (Gerbner  et  al 
1979:  180) 
In  Northern  Ireland  people  tend  to  watch  more  television  programmes  about 
Northern  Ireland  than  people  in  Britain  (Wober  1992)  and  yet  in  my  research 
(cf.  Wober  1981)  1  found  that  people  who  lived  in  Northern  Ireland  felt  a  greater 
sense  of  safety  in  walking  the  streets  of  Belfast  than  did  people  in  Britain.  This 
raises  another  criticism  of  'cultivation  analysis'  which  is  that  there  has  been 
little  attempt  to  investigate  the  sources  of  public  belief  about  vulnerability  to 
violence.  It  is  as  if  the  public  have  perceptions  about  violence  and  safety  which 
don't  interact  with  their  own  social  experience  of  the  world,  not  to  mention  other 
sources  of  information  and  experience.  Gerbner's  work  at  least  has  the  merit  of 
trying  to  engage  with  the  real  world  of  thinking,  acting  subjects.  The  other  two 
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In  the  structuralist  conception  most  often  associated  with  the  work  of  Stuart  Hall 
and  his  colleagues  (1978)  the  media-are  seen  as  subordinated  to  the'primary 
definers'  of  the  state.  I  have  already  argued  that  this  model  misconceives  the 
relationship  between  the  media  and  the  state  because  it  sees  the  output  of  the 
media  as  guaranteed  in  advance  by  the  structural  relationship  between  the 
media  and  official  sources  (cf.  Miller  1993b) 
In  the'propaganda  model'outlined  by  Chomsky  and  Herman,  the  media  are 
regarded  essentially  as'instruments'  of  the  state  and  media,  output  is 
constrained  by  five  major  filters.  The  model: 
traces  the  routes  by  which  money  and  power  are  able  to  filter  out  the 
news  fit  to  print,  marginalise  dissent,  and  allow  the  government  and 
dominant  private  interests  to  get  their  messages  across  to  the  public. 
The  essential  ingredients  of  our  propaganda  model,  or  set  of  news 
"filters",  fall  under  the  following  headings:  (1)  the  size,  concentrated 
ownership,  owner  wealth,  and  profit  orientation  of  the  dominant  mass- 
media  firms;  (2)  advertising  as  the  primary  income  source  of  the  mass 
media;  (3)  the  reliance  of  the  media  on  information  provided  by 
government,  business,  and  'experts'  funded  and  approved  by  these 
primary  sources  and  agents  of  power;  (4)  'flak'  as  a  means  of  disciplining 
the  media;  and  (5)'anti-communism'as  a  national  religion  and  control 
mechanism  (Herman  and  Chomsky  1988:  2) 
, 
The  model  is  based  on  the  operations  of  the  US  media  and  seems  to  be  less 
applicable  to  the  British  media  system.  For  example,  taking  each  filter  in  turn, 
the  continued  existence  of  a  Public  Service  Broadcasting  system  in  Britain 
does  make  a  substantial  difference  in  the  spaces  it  can  open  up  for  dissent. 
This  means  that  the  BBC,  for  example,  has  not  been  owned  by  private  capital, 
nor  has  it  relied  on  advertising  for  revenue.  Although  it  does  tend  to  rely  on 
'official'  sources,  it  is  also  expected  to  foster  a  consensual  national  identity, 
which  for  much  of  the  1980s  was  out  of  kilter  with  Thatcherism  and  this  means 
that  critical  voices  were  heard.  'Flak'  is  certainly  used  in  Britain  as  a  means  of 
disciplining  the  media  as  we  saw  in  Chapter  Two.  However,  the  extent  to  which 
ideology  is  simply  imposed  from  the  top  as  a  control  mechanism  is  open  to 
dispute.  If  this  were  the  case  in  Britain  it  would  be  hard  to  explain  the 
consistent  majority  which  favours  British  withdrawal  from  Northern  Ireland.  The 
idea  that  there  might  be  active  struggle  over  definitions  is  characterised  by 
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Yet  some  of  the  evidence  in  this  book  suggests  that  there  are  conflicts  between 
different  sources,  within  the  state  and  within  the  media  and  that  there  is  not  a 
straightforward  relationship  between  the  media  and  public  opinion.  This  does 
not  mean  that  the  media  are  independent  of  the  state,  or  that  they  are  not 
vulnerable  to  use  in  propaganda  campaigns,  but  it  does  mean  that  the  media 
are  not  simply  instruments  of  the  state. 
The  most  relevant  point  for  our  present  purposes  is  that  such  writers  have  not 
empirically  examined  the  relationship  between  public  belief  and  the  media. 
Instead  much  of  their  writing  has  assumed  the  media  have  powerful  and  direct 
effects  on  public  beliefs.  7  In  some  ways  the  public  are  therefore  seen  as 
victims  of  the  media.  Cohen,  for  example,  talks  of  'mass  delusions'  (Cohen 
1972)8.  But  there  is  little  acknowledgment  that  the  material  interests  which 
some  sections  of  the  population  in  western  countries  bring  to  the  media  are 
likely  to  mean  that  there  is  little  incentive  to  question  television  representations 
of  Nicaragua,  Panama  or  Iraq.  My  suggestion  is  that  there  is  perhaps  too  much 
emphasis  on  the  power  of  the  media,  which  almost  inevitably  results  in  an 
instrumentalist  perspective. 
Learning  from  Television 
There  are  a  variety  of  studies  which  have  examined  the  impact  of  television 
coverage  of  Northern  Ireland  (or  other  conflict  situations)  on  public  perceptions 
and  have  concluded  that  television  has  a  relatively  weak  impa  , ct  on  belief. 
Many  of  these  and  similar  studies  are  prompted  by  concerns  about  the 
deleterious  effects  of  televised  violence  on  the  perceptions,  particularly,  of 
'vulnerable'  groups,  such  as  children.  These  studies  tend  to  be  prompted  by 
concerns  about  the  strong  impact  of  television  and  researchers  are  often 
surprised  or  disappointed  that  their  research  shows  the  media  to  be  less 
powerful  than  they  had  anticipated  (Cairns  et  al  1980). 
Such  findings  have  inspired  a  variety  of  theories  with  scientific  sounding  names 
such  as'knowledge  gap  effect'  and  'information  processing'.  These  emerge 
from  psychological  traditions  of  research.  Information  processing  for  example 
is  closely  linked  with  the  study  of  memory  and  comprehension.  In  the  variety  of 
information  processing  studies  television  is  seen  as  a  relatively  ineffective 
means  of  communicating  information.  TV  news  information  is forgotten  or 
misunderstood  -  TV  news  is  as  Robinson  and  Levy  have  put  it'beyond 
comprehension'  (1986:  232).  In  their  survey  of  the  research  in  the  area Winning  the  Information  Battle 
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there  is  no  question  that  people  perceive  that  they  obtain  most  of  their 
information  from  TV.  However  these  perceptions  do  not  seem  to  match 
very  well  [with]  more  direct  studies,  (which]  examine  what  people 
actually  learn  from  the  news...,  But  our  results  and  those  of  others  ... 
clearly  suggest  that  whatever  televisions  impact,  it  may  be  short  lived. 
As  news  events  unfold  and  additional  contextual  information  becomes 
available  television  news  influence  pales  in  comparison  to  that  of  other 
news  media  (Robinson  and  Davis  1990:  117  their  emphasis). 
These  conclusions  are  drawn  from  a  series  of  studies,  many  funded  by  the 
broadcasters  themselves,  which  appear  to  indicate  that  people  either 
miscomprehend  much  of  the  news  (Robinson  and  Levy  1986),  or  forget  it 
(Collett  and  Lamb  1985;  Findahl  and  H6ijer  1985;  Gunter  1987).  The 
conventional  wisdom  is  that  television  news  is  an  ineffective  communicator  and 
that  news  information  goes  in  one  ear  and  out  the  other.  However,  in  my  own 
research  it  was  clear  that  people  had  retained  a  very  high  level  of  'knowledge' 
and  information  about  the  conflict  in  Ireland  and  especially  about  the  killings  in 
Gibraltar.  One  explanation  for  these  differences  is  that  in  my  research  I  was 
interested  not  in  how  much  of  the  total  content  of  news  bulletins  was  lost  but  on 
how  much  was  retained  about  a  specific  topic.  There  are,  however,  some 
similar  findings.  In  my  own  research  (as  with  Philo  1990)  1  did  find  that  there 
was  a  high  degree  of  forgetfulness  about  details  such  as  names,  dates  and 
places,  however  this  was  complimented  by  the  reproduction  of  key  explanatory 
news  themes.  What  is  being  measured  in  information  processing  research  is 
an  abstract  count  of  the  percentage  of  information  recalled.  It  does  seem 
unlikely  that  a  one  off  event  happening  in  another  country  would  have  the  same 
impact  as  the  prolonged  coverage  of  the  conflict  in  Ireland.  Yet  such  research 
makes  no  distinctions  between  different  events,  treating  all  news  as  discreet 
lumps  of  information.  In  measuring  retention,  'information  processing'  research 
assumes,  in  the  candid  acknowledgement  of  Robinson  and  Davis,  'that  the 
recall  of  certain  specific  information  can  provide  a  useful  initial  index  of  overall 
understanding'  (Robinson  and  Davis  1990:  113)  However,  as  Philo  has  argued: 
It  is  important  to  analyse  the  process  by  which  news  information  may  be 
located  within  the  political  perspectives  which  are  promoted  and 
contested  in  the  development  of  social  ideologies.  Methods  and 
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of  news  (events,  places,  causalities)  as  discrete  units,  irrespective  of  the 
processes  by  which  the  news  is  generated.  It  is  not  enough  simply  to 
assess  how  many  of  these  different  'units'  are  retained  in  the  memory 
(Philo  1990:  176) 
A  second  approach  from  within  the  'learning  from  television'  perspective  is  the 
'knowledge  gap  effect'.  First  hypothesised  by  Tichenor  and  colleagues 
(Tichenor  et  al  1970),  it  has  been  applied  to  many  topics  (Ettema  and  Kline 
1977;  Ettema  et  al  1983;  Shingi  and  Mody  1976).  The  hypothesis is  that'as 
the  infusion  of  mass  media  information  into  a  social  system  increases, 
segments  of  the  population  with  higher  socio-economic  status  tend  to  acquire 
this  information  at  a  faster  rate  than  the  lower  status  segments,  so  that  the  gap 
in  knowledge  between  these  segments  tends  to  increase  rather  than  decrease, 
(Tichenor  et  al  1970:  160).  , 
The  methods  used  are  rather  similar  to  those  employed  by  researchers  in  the 
information  processing  tradition,  in  that  they  attempt  to  assess  the  assimilation 
of  information  provided  by  television.  Two  pieces  of  research  which  examine 
television  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland-have  been  published  examining  the 
knowledge  gap  hypothesis.  The  first  one  with  respondents  in  Britain  and  the 
North  and  South  of  Ireland,  examined  learning  from  one  episode  of  'Ireland:  a 
Television  History'9  The  authors  concluded  that  their  evidence  supported  the 
knowledge  gap  hypothesis  (Rawcliffe-King  and  Dyer  1982).  The  author  of  the 
other  study,  however,  concluded  that  his  evidence  from  children  in  the  north 
and  south  of  Ireland,  provided  'virtually'  no  support  for  the  hypothesis  (Cairns 
1984:  36).  The  methodology  of  both  studies  involved  asking  a  set  of  questions 
about  aspects  of  Irish  history  of  politics  and  is  vulnerable  to  the  same  charge 
as  the  information  processing'theorists  of  confusing  memory  for  understanding. 
More  fundamentally  though,  the  evidence  from  my  own  research  suggests  the 
opposite  of  the  knowledge  gap  hypothesis.  Those  who  relied  on  television  as  a 
source  of  information  to  the  exclusion  of  other  sources  were  much  more  likely 
to  believe  the  picture  presented  by  the  news  than  were  respondents  who  had 
drawn  upon  other  sources  of  information.  Conversely  those  who  had  more 
complex  perceptions  about  the  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  were  those  who 
actually  lived  there.  Far  from  learning  the  most  from  TV  they  actively  rejected 
what  they  saw  on  television  as  untrue.  This  highlights  the  most  fundamental 
problem  with  the  psychological  approaches  reviewed  here,  which  is  that  the, 
concept  of  learning  from  television  tends  to  assume  that  television  gives  a 
truthful  account  of  social  conflict. Mnning  the  Information  Battle 
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There  is  a  further  and  somewhat  idiosyncratic  approach  which  has  emerged 
from  the  social  psychological  tradition  of  studying  the  effect  of  televised  , 
violence  on  children.  Ed  Cairns  and  his  colleagues  at  the  University  of  Ulster 
have  carried  out  a  number  of  projects  examining  the  perceptions,  particularly  of 
children,  in  Northern  Ireland.  In  their  earliest  and  most  interesting  work  the 
researchers  compared  groups  of  children  living  in  Northern  Ireland  with  groups 
in  Scotland.  Younger  children  (5-6)  were  shown  line  drawings  of  a  train  crash 
or  a  house  on  fire  and  asked  to  say  what  had  happened,  while  older  children 
(7-8)  were  asked  to  write  a  short  essay  to  begin  'Here  is  the  news...  ' 
Children  from  Northern  Ireland  were  much  more  likely  to  mention  bombs  or 
explosions  in  stories  than  children  in  Scotland  who'virtually  never'  mentioned 
such  things.  However  Cairns  and  his  colleagues  found  some  groups  of 
children  in  the  West  of  Scotland  who,  at  the  time  (1976-7),  could  only  receive 
television  from  Northern  Ireland.  These  children  mentioned  violence  more 
often  than  the  other  Scottish  groups  (Cairns  et  al  1980).  Cairns  concludes  from 
this  that: 
The  evidence  presented  here  thus  appears  to  confirm  the  conclusions 
reached  by  other  investigators  -  that  television  news  can  distort 
perceptions  of  reality  -  and  to  extend  this  finding  to  children  as  young  as 
5  years  (Cairns  et  al  1980:  6). 
Cairns  work  is  however  vulnerable  to  a  number  of  criticisms.  The  first  is  that 
there  is  a  failure  in  the  research  to  distinguish  between  children's  conceptions 
of  television  and  children's  conceptions  of  reality.  As  Wober  and  Gunter  have 
argued  'for  children  living  in  Northern  Ireland  the  necessary  analytic  and 
empirical  distinction  which  should  have  been  made  is  between  the  nature  of 
television  news  and  that  of  life  "outside";  for  children  in  Scotland  (when 
receiving  Northern  Ireland  television)  the  distinction  needed  is  three  fold 
between  the  nature  of  television  news,  that  of  life  in  Northern  Ireland  and  that 
of  life  in  Scotland  (Gunter  and  Wober  1981:  73).  It's  not  clear  whether  the 
responses  of  the  younger  children  to  the  drawings  reflect  their  view  of 
television  coverage,  their  view  of  life  in  Northern  Ireland  or  their  view  of  life  in 
theirownarea.  However,  Cairns'  use  of  essays  and  line  drawings  was 
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reproduce  the  themes  of  television  news  coverage.  The  news  bulletin 
produced  by  one  respondent  is  particularly  telling:  'a  bomb  has  just  gone  off  in 
Belfast  and  that  is  the  end  of  the  news'  (Cairns  et  al  1980:  5).  If  even  young 
children  are  able  to  reproduce  the  essential  themes  and  ways  of  understanding 
of  television  news,  the  next  questions  that  need  to  be  asked  relate  to  beliefs 
and  their  sources.  Do  children,,  or  indeed  adults,  believe  that  life  in  Northern 
Ireland  is  as  violent  in  reality  as  they  perceive  it  to  be  on  the  news;  and  what 
are  the  sources  of  belief  or  disbelief  about  the  predominance  of  violence? 
In  fact  Cairns  went  on  to  ask  about  perceptions  of  real  violence,  as  have  other 
researchers  (Cairns  1987:  41-43+64-70;  McWhirter  et  al  1983).  Cairns  found 
that  'despite  possible  exposure  to  a  daily  diet  of  Northern  Ireland  violence  in 
the  media  children,  happily,  have  the  violence  rather  more  in  perspective  than 
might  have  been  expected'  (Cairns  1987:  41-42).  McWhirterandher 
colleagues  concluded  that: 
The  present  data  indicate  a  heightened  awareness  of  the  phenomenon 
of  death  amongst  young  Belfast  children  but  there  is  no  evidence  of  a 
preoccupation  with  violent  death.  Overall,  death  was  attributed  more 
often  to  sickness  than  to  accidents  orviolence.  On  a  more  specific 
level,  just  as  many  children  cited  heart  disease  or  old  age  as  explosions 
or  shootings  and  more  children  ascribed  death  to  road  accidents  and 
cancer  than  to  violence  related  specifically  to  the  Northern  Ireland 
conflict.  In  short  the  children's  perceived  realities  quite  accurately 
reflect  the  objective  situation  (McWhirter  et  al  1983:  91,  emphasis  in 
original). 
As  we  have  seen,  these  results  with  children  in  Northern  Ireland  are  broadly  in 
line  with  the  findings  of  my  own  research  that  people  in  Northern  Ireland  are 
likely  not  to  believe  news  accounts  as  simple  descriptions  of  events  in  Northern 
Ireland.  But  Cairns  goes  on  to  make  a  seemingly  opposite  point,  arguing  that 
perceptions  of  violence  (described  by  McWhirter  as  'quite  accurate'  and  by 
Cairns  himself  as'happily...  in  perspective')  are  actually  a  manifestation  of  a 
psychological  process  of  'denial'.  Citing  a  study  of  3,000  schoolboys  carried 
out  in  1971/2  (Russell  1973)  together  with  his  own  research  on  children  (Cairns 
1982,  cited  in  Cairns  1987:  67)  and  adults  (Cairns  and  Wilson  1984)  he  argues 
that'obviously  there  are  various  ways  in  which  this  information  can  be 
interpreted,  but  one  is  that  at  least  some  of  the  children  questioned  in  both 
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(Cairns  1987:  68).  Turning  to  the  adults  views  he  concludes  that'the  majority... 
denied  there  had  been  a  lot  of  trouble  in  their  district  even  when  the  statistics 
on  violence  told  a  different  story'  (Cairns  1987:  68-69).  Cairns  concludes  that'it 
would  appear  that  a  convincing  case  may  be  building  up  that  denial  is indeed 
at  least  one  of  the  important  coping  mechanisms  being  used  by  both  children 
and  adults  in  Northern  Ireland'  (Cairns  1987:  69).  This  quite  clearly  contradicts 
his  earlier  conclusions,  but  he  appears  not  to  notice.  From  the  perspective  of 
media  reception  we  can  note  that  a  limitation  of  researching  perceptions  about 
the  real  world  and  perceptions  about  television  separately  is  a  difficulty  of 
linking  the  two  together  in  any  meaningful  way.  The  concern  in  my  own 
audience  research  was  to  assess  public  perceptions  about  news  portrayals  of 
reality  and  about  reality  itself,  and  then  to  ask  them  why  those  perceptions 
were  identical  or  why  there  was  a  disjunction  between  them.  As  we  saw  there 
was  a  very  high  degree  of  agreement  on  what  television  showed  together  with 
a  substantial  variation  in  perceptions  of  reality.  The  question  which  then  needs 
to  be  asked  is  what  are  the  sources  of  public  belief  in  this  area.  This  is  a 
particularly  relevant  point  when  we  consider  research  on  changes  in  perception 
of  students  from  outside  Northern  Ireland  between  their  arrival  and  a  period 
one  year  later.  After  the  students  had  been  in  Northern  Ireland  for  a  year  ý 
'mentions  of  violence  had  almost  disappeared  from  their  impressions.  Instead 
they  concentrated  on  the  more  normal  aspects  of  life'  (McIvor  1981:  8,  cited  in 
Cairns  1987:  66).  For  a  researcher  so  interested  in  the  impact  of  the  media,  it  is 
odd  that  Cairns  doesn't  think  to  ask  the  obvious  question  about  why  students 
from  outside  Northern  Ireland  perceived  it  as  being  so  violent. 
In  a  subsequent  study  with  520  children  in  various  'low',  'medium'  and  'high' 
violence  towns  in  the  north  and  south  of  Ireland,  Cairns  found  that  children's 
estimates  of  the  level  of  violence  in  their  areas  'corresponded  at  least  in  rank 
order  terms,  to  the  rank  order  of  the  areas  in  terms  of  actual  levels  of  violence' 
(Cairns  1990:  449).  Cairns  also  found  that  children  in  the  more  violent  towns 
reported  watching  the  news  more  often  than  others.  This  is  not  surprising, 
since  it  is  well  known  that  the  media  consumption  of  people  in  Northern  Ireland 
is  higher  than  in  Britain  (Wober  1992).  However,  it  is  necessary  to  do  more 
than  simply  demonstrate  correlation  between  media  consumption  and 
perceptions  of  everyday  reality. 
That  Cairns'  findings  suggest  that  television  is  less  powerful  than  had  been 
expected,  is  largely  a  function  of  inadequate  methodology  and 
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articles  that'one  possible  effect  is  that  overexposure  to  news  about  violence 
may  lead  to  the  perception  of  violence  as  more  usual  and  also  more 
acceptable'  (Cairns  et  al  1980:  6;  1983:  122).  While  this  maybe  'possible', 
Cairns  own  evidence  points  in  the  opposite  direction.  As  with  the  work  of 
Gerbner  referred  to  above,  one  of  the  key  problems  of  this  type  of  argument  is 
a  failure  to  attend  to  the  actual  meanings  conveyed  by  the  media.  Curiously 
enough,  many  of  the  problems  with  this  type  of  psychological  research  have 
been  replicated  by  much  recent  'critical'  analysis  of  media  reception. 
The  Weak  Media  and  The  'Active'audience:  Is  a  television  a  toaster? 
The  predominant  trend  in  recent  audience  research  in  media  and  cultural 
studies  has  been  a  move  away  from  the  power  of  the  media  and  towards 
demonstrating  the  power  of  the  audience.  At  the  methodological  level  such 
work  has  moved  away  from  analysing  the  content  of  television  programmes  or 
press  reporting  and  towards  the  analysis  of  audience  activity  and  resistance  to 
television  messages.  Such  resistance  is  held  to  invalidate  concerns  about  the 
power  of  television.  Indeed,  as  Corner  has  noted,  some  reception  analysts 
seem  to  regard  the  analysis  of  media  content  as  indicating  an  attachment  to 
'naive'  notions  of  media  power  (Corner  1991:  281).  10 
For  the  theorists  of  the  active  audience,  the  meaning  of  any  given  message  is 
not  determined  by  the  productive  ideological  labour  that  goes  into  construction, 
but  by  the  encounter  between  the  audience  and  the  text.  As  one  of  the  most 
influential  theorists,  John  Fiske,  puts  it: 
Meanings  are  determined  socially:  that  is,  they  are  constructed  out  of  the 
conjuncture  of  the  text  and  the  socially  situated  reader  (Fiske  1987:  80)" 
This  leads  on  to  a  conception  of  the  relation  between  television  and  it's 
audience  as  essentially  interactive:  'Television  and  its  programs  do  not  have  an 
'effect'  on  people.  Viewers  and  television  interact'  (Fiske  1987:  19,  cited  in 
Seaman  1992:  306).  This  is  more  than  saying  that  each  of  us  have  the  ability,  to 
interpret  what  we  see.  For  some  reception  analysts  people,  are  actively 
engaged  in  the  'creation'  of  meaning  as  if  there  was  an  almost  unlimited 
potential  for  people  toread'  any  meanings'  at  will  from  a  given'text'.  Such 
studies  have,  as  Corner  and  his  colleagues  have  pointed  out,  tended  to 
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The  investigation  of  meaning  in  reception  studies  needs  to  differentiate 
analytically  between  'understanding'  and'response',  however  interfused 
these  may  be  in  practice.  For  it  is  of  course  entirely  possible  for  viewers 
to  agree  as  to  how  to  understand  an  item  but  to  disagree  in  their 
responses  to  it  (Corner  et  al  1990:  50) 
In  the  research  reported  here  there  was  a  very  high  degree  of  agreement  that 
television  news  was  mostly  violent.  If  a  large  proportion  of  respondents  had 
said  that  they  thought  that  television  news  showed  mainly  scenes  of  beautiful 
countryside  in  its  coverage  of  Northern  Ireland,  we  would  not  speak  of  this  as  a 
'negotiated  reading'  of  television.  Instead  of  accepting  this  as  an  act  of 
resistance  to  be  celebrated,  we  would  more  straightforwardly  describe  this  as  a 
'misreading'.  In  a  critique  of  the  celebration  of  audience  'resistance',  Gitlin  has 
argued  that  the  active  audience  theorists  have  all  but  given  up  engaging  with 
the  world  of  actual  political  resistance: 
Resistance,  meaning  all  sorts  of  grumbling,  multiple  interpretation, 
semiological  inversion,  pleasure,  rage  friction,  numbness,  what  have  you 
-'resistance'  is  accorded  dignity,  even  glory,  by  stamping  these  not  so 
great  refusals  with  a  vocabulary  derived  from  life-threatening  work 
against  fascism  -  as  if  the  same  concept  should  serve  for  the  Chinese 
student  uprising  and  cable  TV  grazing  (Gitlin  1991:  336) 
Instead  of  engaging  with  the  conditions  under  which  real  political  resistance  is 
fostered  and  real  political  dominance  maintained,  some  cultural  theorists  have 
drifted  off  into  celebrations  of  consumer  culture.  This  is  the  politics  of  defeat. 
There  is  a  second  trend  in  contemporary  research  on  the'active  audience' 
which  seems  to  go  further  than  finding  that  audiences  are  able  to  exert  cultural 
power  over  television  messages.  This  is  the  study  of  the  use  of  television  (and 
other  communication  technologies).  One  of  the  first  was  David  Morley's  study 
Family  Television  (1986)  followed  by  his  work  with  Roger  Silverstone  (Morley 
and  Silverstone  1990;  1991;  Silverstone  1990)  and  the  writings  of  others  such 
as  James  Lull  (1990)  and  len  Ang  (1991).  Lull  takes  the  American  functionalist 
tradition  to  task  for  its  obsession  with  quantification  and  suggests  that  the  use 
of  ethnography  is  the  way  ahead  for  audience  research  on  'the  empirical  life- 
worlds  of  audience  members'(Lull  1990:  20).  Much  of  this  research  examines 
the  extent  to  which  the  use  of  television  technology  is  gendered.  Key  areas  of 
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watched.  Such  research  does  not  of  course  tell  us  very  much  about  the 
formation  of  public  belief,  but  it  is  conceivable  that  it  might  reveal  the  impact  of 
gender  roles  on  which  media  products  are  consumed  and  why.  However,  this 
would  only  be  the  first  stage  in  investigating  the  implications  of  consumption 
patterns  for  the  messages  to  which  people  are'  exposed  and  their  interaction 
with  the  beliefs  of  family  members.  Unfortunately  the  question  of  the 
consequences  of  viewing  is  routinely  ignored.  Silverstone  identifies  threekey 
issues'  for  anthropological  audience  research  to  tackle  amongst  which  he  does 
include  the  issue  of  'consequences'.  But  he  elaborates  on  this  by  referring 
firstly,  to  the,  impact  of  television  technology  on  the'boundary  around  the 
household  [and]  the  links  between  home  and  school;  home  and  work;  home 
and  leisure  opportunities'  (Silverstone  1990:  188);  and,  secondly  to  the  impact 
of  television  consumption  on  the  formation  in  the  home  of  'age  and  gender 
identities'  and  'it's  significance  as  an  ameliorator  or  prompter  of  conflict' 
(Silverstone  1990:  188)  The  question  of  the  content  of  television  messages  and 
whether  people  believe  them  is  plainly  not  part  of  the  agenda.  Such  lack  of 
interest  is  echoed  in  Morley's  most  recent  work  (1993)  and  in  the  work  of  len 
Ang.  Ang,  who  has  a  fondness  for  suggesting  that  active  audience  research 
opens  the  way  for'radical'  new  departures  in  ways  of  conceptualising  the 
audience,  argues  that  the  key  issue  is  not  the  analysis  of  the  meanings 
promoted  by  particular  types  of  programming.  Instead  it  is  the  uses  to  which 
television  technology  is  put  in  the  home: 
Morley's  research  enables  us  to  begin  to  conceive  of  'the  ideological 
operations  of  television'  in  a  much  more  radical  way  than  has  hitherto 
been  done.  The  relation  between  television  and  audiences  is  not  just  a 
matter  of  'negotiations'  between  texts  and  viewers.  The  process  of 
television  consumption,  and  the  cultural  positioning  of  television  as 
such,  -  have  created  new  areas  of  constraints  and  possibilities  for 
structuring  social  relationships,  identities  and  desires.  If  television  is  an 
'ideological  apparatus,  '  to  use  that  old-fashioned  sounding  term,  this  is 
not  so  much  because  its  texts  transmit  certain  'messages'  as  because  it 
is  a  cultural  form  through  which  those  constraints  are  negotiated  and 
those  possibilities  take  shape  (Ang  1991:  110) 
For  Lull,  Silverstone,  Morley,  Ang  and  others  there  is  a  reluctance  to  even  pose 
questions  about  the  impact  of  television  and  other  media  messages  on  public 
belief  as  if  this  would  in  some  way  be  elitist.  This  is  a  flight  from  not,  only  the 
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interpretation.  Such  theorists  don't  seem  interested  in  the  construction  of 
public  belief  and  the  success  (or  failure)  of  information  management  activities 
in  shaping  public  belief  and  facilitating  the  exercise  of  power  in  one  direction  or 
another.  The  view  of  the  'radical'  theorists  of  the  agenda  for  audience  research 
ends  up  being  more  or  less  the  same  as  the  old  Uses  and  Gratifications 
research.  Or,  as  Curran  has  put  Vold  pluralist  dishes  being  reheated  and 
presented  as  new  cuisine'  (Curran  1990:  151).  Some  researchers  have  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  rule  out  the  investigation  of  the  effects  of  the  media  and  thus 
rule  out  finding  any  effects.  In  a  straightforward  statement  of  that  position  Elihu 
Katz  has  argued  that'what  interests  us,  however,  is  not  what  people  take  from 
television  but  what  they  put  into  it'  (cited  in  Kubey  in  press:  14). 
In  the  end  the  supposedly  'radical'  approaches  of  the  new  audience  theorists  is 
largely  indistinguishable  from  the  study  of  the  consumption  of  any  other  item  of 
modern  household  technology.  There  is  very  little  senserin  any  of  this  work  of 
the  consequences  not  of  television  as  a  technology  but  precisely  as  a 
message  bearing  technology.  For  this  school  of  theorists  there  seems  to  be 
no  analytical  difference  between  a  television  and  a  toaster. 
The  Efficiency  of  British  State  Information  Management 
It  could  be  argued  that  the  success  of  government  information  management 
about  Northern  Ireland  is  limited  by  a  number  of  factors.  Firstly,  Ireland  is  very 
close  to  Britain.  It  is  not  only  the  access  of  the  media  to  Northern  ireland  which 
makes  it  different  to  the  insurgencies  in  Malaya,  Cyprus  or  Aden  or  to 
information  management  attempts  in  relation  to  the  Falklands  or  Gulf  Wars. 
There  are  a  very  large  number  of  people  living  in  Britain  who  are  of  Irish 
descent.  People  in  Britain  have  families  in  the  North  or  South  of  Ireland, 
people  go  to  Northern  Ireland  on  business  or  holiday.  There  are,  therefore, 
many  people  who  have  channels  of  communication  with  people  living  in  the 
North  of  Ireland  and  do  not  only  have  to  rely  on  the  media  for  information  about 
the  conflict.  Obviously  such  channels  will  be  more  or  less  frequently  used  or 
more  or  less  direct.  As  we  have  seen,  direct  communication  with  people  from 
Northern  Ireland  can  be  enough  to  undermine  media  based  perceptions,  but  it 
does  not  always  do  so.  Indeed  we  can  see  that  the  impact  of  personal 
channels  which  undermine  mainstream  media  messages  can  be  limited  by  the 
relatively  small  number  of  channels  and  the  cohesiveness  of  ex-patriate 
communities.  We  must  also  remember  that  the  content  of  the  information  and 
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not  only  between  nationalist  and  unionist  identifications  but  in  relation  to  class, 
gender  and  rural/urban  splits  etc. 
There  was  also  a  second  limit  to  official  public  relations  attempts  in  relation  to 
public  belief  on  the  Gibraltar  killings.  This  was  in  the  formation  of  overall 
judgements  on  whether  the  SAS  action  was  justified.  Judging  the  'facts'  of  what 
happened  in  Gibraltar  was  clearly  influenced  by  political  and  cultural  identities, 
personal  experience,  prior  knowledge  and  values  of  the  groups.  But  beliefs 
about  the  facts  were  not  endlessly  elastic.  Thus  participants  could 
acknowledge  the  weakness  of  their  case  in  a  particular  area.  For  example,  the 
soldiers  who  were  reluctant  to  acknowledge  that  there  had,  in  fact,  been  no 
bomb  in  Gibraltar,  had  avoided  the  difficulty  by  writing  a  news  flash  set  before 
the  facts  damaging  to  their  case  had  become  known.  People  do  mutually 
share  information  and  may  acknowledge  weaknesses  in  their  own  arguments 
by  trying  to  avoid  discussing  them.  There  is  an  extent  to  which  people  protect 
themselves  and  their  sense  of  identity  from  damaging  information,  be  it 
government  propaganda  or  uncomfortable  facts  about  the  state.  But  such 
identities  are  not  inviolate.  They  are  constantly  reconstructed  (sometimes  in 
the  same  way  or  sometimes  in  a  new  direction)  as  people  deal  with  new 
information  or  experience.  Sometimes  that  information  comes  from  the  media. 
In  some  ways  it  would  be  surprising  if  a  single  incident  such  as  the  Gibraltar 
killings  overturned  long  held  opinions  or  impressions,  since  there  are  many 
'incidents'  in  Northern  Ireland  every  year.  Gibraltar  was  exceptional  in  the 
amount  of  coverage  it  attracted  and  in  the  fact  that  the  case  against  the 
government  was  more  credible  for  the  media  and,  it  seems,  parts  of  the  public. 
it  is  interesting  to  find  that  people  might  not  reject  particular  beliefs  even 
though  they  are  key  parts  of  the  evidence  used  by  an  opposing  frame  of 
reference.  So  it  is  possible  to  find  people  of  republican  sympathies  who  have 
absorbed  key  elements  of  the  propaganda  of  thie  British  government.  My 
suggestion  is  that  people  do  not  exist  inside  sealed  ideologically  correct 
bubbles.  They  can  maintain  contradictory  or  seemingly  contradictory  beliefs 
simultaneously.  Pieces  of  information,  impressions,  tastes,  beliefs  and 
memories  may  never  be  evaluated  against  each  other,  or  may  be  different  for 
varying  situations.  But  it  also  means  that  they  can  on  occasion  very  effectively 
undermine  even  strongly  held  political  identifications. 
For  some  people  who  were  otherwise  quite  critical  of  the  government  the  most 
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confused  about  what  had  happened.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  conclude  that 
their  confusion  represented  a  considerable  victory  for  government  information 
management  attempts  to  muddy  the  waters. 
In  some  ways  the  Carmen  Proetta  Story  was  a  very  crude  form  of  propaganda. 
It  was  easy  for  liberal  broadsheet  papers  (such  as  the  Guardian  and  the 
Independent)  to  print  opposing  stories  pointing  out  the  propagandistic  coverage 
in  other  papers.  On  the  other  hand,  the  use  of  a  smear  does  not  require  that 
everyone  wholeheartedly  believes  it,  just  that  it  raises  doubts  about  past 
activities  or  motivations.  The  impression  management  which  British  official 
sources  engaged  in  after  the  allegations  of  prostitution  against  Carmen  Proetta 
can  be  seen  as  more  sophisticated  in  that  it  had  a  less  sensational  and  broader 
impact  on  the  press.  It  was  even  reported  as  fact  on  television,  in  marked 
contrast  to  the  allegation  of  prostitution.  The  fact  that  Proetta  had  not 
withdrawn  her  story  at  the  inquest  was  not  widely  pointed  out  in  the  media. 
This  together  with  the  question  mark  over  her'reputation'  made  it  more  difficult 
for  the  public  to  belief  alternative  information. 
Good  propaganda  has  to  fit  with  what  is  already  known  and  what  seems 
plausible.  The  assault  on  the  credibility  of  Carmen  Proetta  made  great  use  of 
popular  assumptions  and  prejudices  about  femininity.  It  is  often  said  that 
women  have  two  roles  in  public  life:  that  of  virgin  or  whore.  Discrediting 
Carmen  Proetta  by  labelling  her  as  a  prosititute  clearly  worked  with  many 
respondents,  although  it  did  not  always  over  rule  other  views  on  the  killings 
even  when  it  was  believed. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  extent  to  which  nationalist  and  unionist  groups 
rejected  the  'general  picture  of  life  in  NI  portrayed  by  the  news  was  much 
greater  than  that  with  which  they  rejected  specific  details  of  the  Gibraltar  story. 
it  seems  likely  that  this  has  something  to  do  with  the  very  specificity  of  the 
question  of  Gibraltar,  even  though  there  were  clearly  very  deep  and  detailed 
memories  about  what  had  happened.  My  argument  is,  however,  that  a  key 
reason  for  the  success  of  some  messages  about  Gibraltar  was  the  fact  that  all 
information  had  to  be  gleaned  from  the  mass  media  whereas  for  stories 
occurring  in  Northern  Ireland  other  channels  are  routinely  available.  This 
brings  us  to  another  point  which  is  that  the  killings  in  Gibraltar  gained  a  larger 
amount  of  coverage  than  any  of  the  other  controversial  special  forces  killings  in 
Northern  Ireland  which  have  occurred  throughout  the  troubles.  This  meant  that 
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available  in  Britain  than  in  most  of  the  other  cases.  Accordingly,  people  in 
Britain  are  more  likely  to  know  more  of  the  details  about  Gibraltar  than  about 
the  killings  on  the  Falls  Road  or  at  Cullyhanna  in  1990.  This  in  turn  means 
there  is  likely  to  be  less  British  public  concern  about  killings  in  Ireland.  Part  of 
the  reason  that  the  Gibraltar  killings  gained  such  prominence  was  the  fact  that 
they  did  not  occur  in  Ireland  and  that  the  official  cover  story  was  so  quickly 
changed  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  himself.  An  additional  factor  was  that  the 
witnesses  to  the  killings  were  not  so  easily  dismissable  by  journalists,  officials 
or  ministers  as  are  witnesses  in  Ireland.  The  witnesses  in  Gibraltar  were  not 
Irish  and  had  no  obvious  link  with  particular  perspectives  on  Northern  Ireland. 
Indeed  the  very  Britishness  of  Gibraltar  promoted  the  believability  of  such 
witnesses  (at  the  same  time  as  making  it  unlikely  that  more  would  come 
forward)  (see  Jack  1988).  This  does  point  to  the  importance  of  a  wide  range  of 
publicly  available  information  if  the  British  public  is  to  sensibly  make  up  its 
collective  mind  about  what  should  happen  in  the  North  of  Ireland. 
What  is  the  role  of  the  media  in  the  conflict  in  Ireland? 
The  ability  of  the  British  state  to  manage  opinion  is  potentially  limited  by  a 
number  of  factors  which  have  been  highlighted  throughout  this  book.  First  of 
all,  a  large  number  of  differing  interests  and  rivalries  exist  and  co-exist  within  a 
given  state  organisation  as  well  as  between  different  state  organisations.  Thus 
we  find  there  are  divisions  between  administrative  civil  servants  and 
Information  Officers  in  the  NIO,  between  the  police  and  the  civil  service, 
between  the  police  and  the  Army  and  between  the  various  branches  of  the 
intelligence  services.  Such  divisions  are  serious  and  ongoing  struggles  for 
resources  and  power:  such  divisions  are  not  always,  and  indeed  are  rarely, 
fundamental.  Even  then,  however,  this  does  not  divest  divisions  within  the 
state  of  importance,  for  they  can  have  material  effects  on  resourcing  pattern 
and  on  government  policy  (Miller  1993b). 
The  resources  available  to  the  institutions  of  the  state  cannot  be  matched  by 
any  of  the  other  participants  in  the  conflict.  The  financial  resources  available 
for  public  relations,  and  the  security  and  authority  of  the  institutions  of  the  state 
allow  them  huge  in  built  advantages  over  other  organisations.  The  use  of  the 
law  and  of  intimidation  are  perhaps  the  most  obvious  ways  in  which  such 
resources  can  be  mobilised.  We  saw  in  Chapter  Two  that  the  pre-eminent 
forms  of  intimidation  of  the  broadcast  media  often  involve  nothing  more  than 
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This  is  not  to  say  that  more  energetic  forms  of  intimidation  are  not  used. 
Journalists  and  photographers  have  been  shot  with  plastic  bullets,  hit  with 
truncheons,  beaten  up,  arrested  and  harassed  by  the  Army  and  police,  but  the 
more  authorised  forms  of  intimidation  are  much  more  likely  to  be  successful. 
Threatening  journalists  is  much  less  sophisticated  than  taking  them  to  lunch. 
Thus  Republican  PR  was  less  sophisticated  in  the  early  1970s. 
. 
In  1971  the 
IRA  blew  up  the  Daily  Mirror's  printing  plant  in  Belfast  and  in  November  1974 
two  Mirror  journalists  were  kidnapped  by  the  IRA  for  around  four  hours.  More 
recently,  in  1988  two  BBC  journalists  were  threatened  by  callers  claiming  to  be 
from  the  IRA  in  order  to  prevent  them  giving  evidence  in  court.  12  Thames 
television  researcher  Eamon  Hardy  was  also  threatened  in  1988  and  told  to 
leave  Belfast  (Bolton  1990).  In  general,  however,  it  is  unionists  who  have  more 
often  and  more  severely  attempted  to  intimidate  journalists  (Moloney  1988).  In 
1984  Jim  Campbell  of  the  Sunday  World  was  shot  by  loyalists  in  his  home  in 
Belfast  (Campbell  1985;  1991).  In  October  1992  a  bomb  was  planted  in  the 
offices  of  the  Sunday  World  by  the  UVF  and  in  November  of  that  year  death 
threats  were  made  to  Sunday  World  staff  by  the  UFF.  As  a  result  journalist 
Martin  O'Hagan  left  Northern  Ireland  and  Editor  Jim  Campbell  worked  for  a 
period  from  the  Republic  of  Ireland  (index  on  Censorship  1993a;  1993b). 
Official  organisations  have  superior  resources  but  necessarily  compete  with 
other  sources  for  media  space  and  are  not  always  successful  in  doing  so. 
Thus  the  attempt  by  the  British  government  to  criminalise  the  republican 
movement  in  the  1970s  foundered  when  the  republicans  response  of  hunger 
strikes  gained  public  sympathy  and  then  when  Sinn  Fdin  successfully  entered 
the  electoral  arena  in  the  early  1980s. 
A  further  major  limit  on  the  ability  of  official  sources  to  dominate  the  media  is 
the  disjunction  between  the  state  strategy  of  containing  the  troubles  and  the 
operational  imperatives  of  journalism.  The  drive  towards  maximising 
audiences,  whether  in  print  or  broadcast  media  together  with  the  legitimation,  of 
journalism  as  a'public  service'  or'fourth  estate'  means  that  the  priorities  of  the 
media  and  the  government  can  be  quite  distinct.  But  we  should  not  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  media  and  especially  television  are  therefore 
independent  of  the  state.  The  differing  motives,  ideologies  and  priorities  of  the 
media  often  overlap  or  coincide  with  those  of  the  state.  Similarly  the  priorities 
of  the  republicans,  the  unionists  and  others  may  also  on  occasion  overlap  with 
those  of  the  media.  But  such  coincidences  are  less  numerous  and  much  more 
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It  is  true  that  critical  voices  in  Ireland  have  been  pushed  progressively  to  the 
margins  of  the  media  over  the  last  twenty  years.  One  of  the  most  marked 
impacts  of  official  policing  in  the  late  1980s  on  the  forms  of  television  was  the 
turn  towards  the  drama-documentary  (Kerr  1990).,  As  the  ability  to  make 
factual  programmes  decreased  journalists  turned  to  dramatisations  where  there 
is  increased  space  for  dramatic  licence  and  it  is  easier  to  represent  events 
without  requiring  informants  to  appear  on  television. 
It  is  also  true  that  a  significant  public  service  ethos  remains  in  broadcasting  and 
the  ideology  of  the'fourth  estate'  remains  in  parts  of  the  press  although  there 
are  very  clear  limits  on  the  practice  of  a  watchdog  role.  In  addition  the 
operation  of  contemporary  news  values  cause  difficulties  for  the  government 
strategy  of  emphasising  'good  news'.  But  the  definition  of  good  news  is itself 
not  a  neutral  category.  If  the  state  has  tried  and  largely  succeeded  in 
dominating  'bad  news'  about  Northern  Ireland,  it  has  also  succeeded  in 
dominating  the  good  news  which  does  appear.  Nevertheless  news  values  have 
proved  fairly  resistant  to  good  news  as  have  some  individual  reporters  who 
perceive  the  campaign  for  good  news  as  a  propaganda  exercise.  13 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  the  role  of  the  media  is  contradictory.  On  the  one, 
hand,  the  media  are  vulnerable  to  the  propaganda  of  the  state  and  can  perform 
functionally  in  legitimating  the  activities  of  the  state.  On  the  other  hand  news 
values  and  the  remnants  of  Public  Service  ideology  can  be  at  least 
inconvenient  and  at  times  a  major  obstacle  to  official  actions. 
The  routine  repetition  of  official  misinformation  when  state  violence  occurs,  can 
enhance  the  capacity  of  the  RLIC  or  the  army  to  literally  get  away  with  murder. 
The  reporting  of  Northern  Ireland  in  terms  conducive  to  the  official  view  of  the 
conflict  dissipates  public  pressure  on  the  government  to  try  to  end  the  conflict 
and  legitimates  the  introduction  of  ever  more  repressive  legislation.  There  can 
be  little  doubt  that  the'field  dressing'  (Elliot  1976)  supplied  by  the  British  media 
following  the  Birmingham  and  Guildford  bombings  in  1974  eased  the  passage 
of  the  'draconian'  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  and  helped  to  convict  the 
Maguire  family,  the  Guildford  Four  and  the  Birmingham  Six  for  bombings  they 
did  not  commit.  These  events  conform  quite  well  to  an  instrumental  model 
which  emphasises  the  drift  to  a  strong  state  accomplished  by  the  mechanism  of 
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However,  it  explains  the  subsequent  release  of  the  Guildford  Four  and 
Birmingham  six  less  well.  In  the  Guildford  and  Birmingham  cases  it  is  clear  that 
television  played  a  role  in  forcing  an  acknowledgement  that  the  convictions 
were  unsafe,  by  helping  to'move  the  counter  discourses  enunciated  in 
Republican  and  Left  publications  from  the  periphery  to  the  centre  of  the  public 
sphere'  (Murdock  1991:  112).  Both  Granada's  World  in  Action  and  Yorkshire's 
First  Tuesday  made  a  series  of  documentaries  between  1984  and  -1987 
followed  by  Granada's  drama-documentary  'Who  Bombed  Birmingham'  (in 
1990)  which  ended  by  naming  the  men  allegedly  responsible  for  the  bombings. 
The  programmes  and  associated  books  (Kee  1986;  McKee  and  Franey  1988; 
Mullin  1987)  questioned  the  safety  of  the  convictions  and  eventually  led  to  the 
cases  being  sent  back  for  appeal  and  subsequently  to  the  release  of  all  the 
defendants.  Let  us  remember  that  this  was  in  the  teeth  of  opposition  from  the 
very  highest  officials  in  government  and  the  legal  system,  especially  the 
judiciary. 
The  media  cannot  simply  be  described  as  instruments  of  any  side  in  the 
conflict.  But  it  is  also  incorrect  to  see  media  institutions  as  the  equivalents  of 
an  individual  piece  of  technology.  Major  General  Richard  Clutterbuck,  for 
example,  has  written  that  the  television  camera  is  'a  weapon  lying  in  the  street 
available  for  either  side  to  pick  up  and  use'  (1  981:  xv).  Nor  are  the  media  the 
mythical  'fourth  estate'.  It  is  simply  fanciful  to  describe  the  release  of  the 
Guildford  Four  as  the  victory  of  a'free  media'  as  Abraham  Miller  has  done 
(Miller  1990).  The  media  operate  within  a  set  of  constraints  in  which  power  is 
clearly  skewed  towards  the  state.  The  major  constraints  on  the  media  are 
those  imposed  by  the  economic  context  of  media  production,  the  use  of  the  law, 
government  intimidation,  diriect  censorship  and  self  censorship.  Journalists 
continue  to  mistake  authority  and  status  for  credibility  and  are  oriented  towards 
the  state  in  their  work  practices  and  their  reportage.  However,  the  extent  to 
which  the  state  or  the  government  comes  in  for  criticism  from  the  media  is 
variable.  It  depends  among  other  things  on  the  balance  of  political  forces  at 
any  time.  If  the  government  is  weak  or  divided  then  it  will  be  easier  for 
journalists  to  criticise  and  for  the  broadcasters  to  resist  pressure  and 
intimidation.  The  media  provide  an  arena  in  which  battles  for  definition  are 
fought  out.  The  institutions  of  the  state  command  the  greatest  resources  in  this 
area,  and  this  means  that  media  institutions  are,  in  general,  oriented  towards 
the  state.  But  they  can,  on  occasion  be  harnessed  by  non  governmental 
organisations  especially  if  the  state  is  divided. Winning  the  Infonration  Battle  275 
In  traditional  democratic  models  the  media  are  supposed  to  oil  the  wheels  of 
democracy  by  supplying  the  population  with  enough  information  to  make  up  its 
collective  mind.  Yet  it  is  evident  from  the  research  presented  in  this  book  that 
many  people  in  Britain  have  a  quite  distorted  picture  about  violence  in  Northern 
Ireland  or  believed  false  propaganda  distributed  by  the  government. 
Nonetheless  it  is  apparent  that  the  bulk  of  the  British  public  do  not  draw  the 
same  conclusion  as  the  media  from  such  reporting  in  terms  of  what  should  be 
,  done'  about  Northern  Ireland. 
In  almost  every  poll  since  1971  a  majority  has  favoured  some  form  of  British 
withdrawal  from  Ireland.  However,  withdrawal  is  hardly  seriously  discussed  in 
the  mainstream  media.  It  seems  that  only  two  papers  have  advocated  British 
withdrawal.  Under  the  influence  of  leader  writer  Joe  Haines,  the  Daily  Mirror 
adopted  an  editorial  policy  of  advocating  British  Military  withdrawal  from  1978 
unti  I  Haines  departure  from  the  Mirror  after  the  death  of  proprietor  Robert 
Maxwell  in  1991.14  The  policy  was  not  matched  by  any  significant  difference  in 
the  news  reporting  of  Northern  Ireland,  which  remained  on  a  par  with  other 
mass  market  tabloids.  The  only  other  paper  to  advocate  a  British'withdrawal 
was  the  Sunday  Times.  15  In  the  ideology  of  consumer  sovereignty  adhered  to 
by  many  in  journalism,  the  content  of  the  media  only  reflects  the  wishes  of  the 
consumer,  since  if  it  didn't  sales  would  plummet.  If  this  were  so  we  might 
expect  to  see  at  least  half  of  the  British  press  adopting  a  policy  of  'troops  out'. 
In  reality,  however,  newspapers  give  their  readers  a  substantial  proportion  of 
what  the  newspaper  proprietor  or  editor  wants  them  to  hear. 
It  doesn't  seem  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the  decontextualised  coverage  of 
violence  which  so  predominates  British  news  coverage  should  lead  people  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  British  Army  can  perform  no  useful  role  there.  Such 
sentiments  appear  to  include  both  those  who  want  to  let  the  Irish  fight  it  out 
amongst  themselves  and  those  who  see  the  British  presence  as  part  of  the 
problem.  Opinion  polls  indicate  that  there  is  a  fairly  even  split  on  the  preferred 
constitutional  status  of  Northern  Ireland  and  on  the  role  of  the  British  Army  in 
the  conflict.  16 
According  to  counterinsurgency  theorists,  the  media  favour,  the  'terrorists'  by 
providing  the  oxygen  of  publicity,  yet  a  close  examination  of  opinion  polling 
data  together  with  the  audience  research  reported  in  Chapter  Six  indicates  that 
media  coverage  of  dramatic  republican  attacks  tends  to  push  public  opinion 
into  greater  support  for  government  poliCy.  17 Winning  the  Information  Battle  276 
First  of  all,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  very  small  number  of  people  in  Britain  are 
prepared  to  say  that  they  regard  the  IRA  as'freedom  fighters'  (3%  in  1977  and 
1983  -  De  Boer  1979;  Hewitt  1992).  This  is  hardly  consistent  with  unrelenting 
favourable  coverage  for  the  republican  movement.  The  most  important  finding 
here  is  that  media  coverage  of  republican  paramilitaries  can  shift  public  opinion 
in  the  government's  favour.  Although  most  polls  show  a  majority  in  favour  of 
British  withdrawal  there  are  a  few  significant  exceptions  to  the  pattern.  As  early 
as  September  1971  a  total  of  59%  said  they  favoured  withdrawal  (cited  in 
Curtis  1988),  this  seems  to  have  dropped  to  39%  by  October  following 
Owidespread  violence'  (Flackes  and  Elliot  1989:  2)  at  the  tail  end  of  September 
in  the  aftermath  of  internment  (Rose  et  al  1978).  The  next  clear  majority 
against  withdrawal  came  in  August  1972  when  a  record  low  of  34%  favoured 
withdrawal.  This  followed  hard  on  the  heels  of  the  26  bombs  exploded  in 
Belfast  by  the  IRA  on'Bloody  Friday'  as  a  result  of  which  11  people  died. 
Following  this  all  the  opinion  polls  I  have  been  able  to  trace  between  1974  and 
1986  showed  more  than  50%  of  the  British  population  in  favour  of  withdrawal. 
With  three  exceptions  this  also  applies  to  all  polls  since  1986.  These  three 
results  followed  closely  on  the  heels  of  two  major  IRA  attacks  in  which  civilians 
were  killed.  In  November  1987  the  percentage  favouring  British  withdrawal  fell 
under  50%  for  the  first  time  in  15  years.  The  poll  was  taken  between  20-24 
November,  only  11  -15  days  after  the  IRA  had  exploded  a  bomb  at  the 
Enniskillen  Remembrance  Day  ceremony  killing  11  civilians.  After  the 
bombing,  television  news  carried  a  moving  account  of  the  last  exchange  of 
words  between  one  of  the  injured,  Gordon  Wilson,  and  his  daughter,  as  her  life 
slipped  away  under  the  wreckage  caused  by  the  bomb.  It  seems  likely  that  the 
coverage  of  this  was  an  important  element  in  allowing  British  people  to  identify 
with  the  experiences  of  victims  of  violence.  Certainly,  Enniskillen  was  the  most 
prominent  memory  among  British  people  in  the  audience  research  reported  in 
Chapter  Six.  In  1987,  support  for  British  withdrawal  dropped  from  61  %  in 
January  of  that  year  to  40%  by  November.  Enniskillen  appears  to  have  had  a 
marked  impact  because  by  January  1988  the  proportion  favouring  withdrawal 
had  risen  only  to  44%.  However,  the  Birmingham  Six  appeal,  the 
announcement  of  no  prosecutions  in  the  Stalker/Sampson  inquiry,  the  killing  of 
civilian  Aidan  McAnespie  by  a  British  soldier  and  the  SAS  killings  in  Gibraltar 
were  amongst  the  events  between  that  poll  and  the  next  one  carried  out 
between  11  and  15  March  1988.  It  showed  50%  in  favour  of  withdrawal.  The 
only  other  occasion  when  support  fell  below  50%  was  in  March  1993  when  45% 
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week  after  the  Warrington  bombing  in  which  Jonathon  Ball  (3)  and  Tim  Parry 
(12)  died.  Because  it  happened  in  England,  the  coverage  of  this  bombing  was 
much  more  extensive  and  emotional  than  comparable  deaths  in  Ireland 
(Greenslade  1993a). 
This  suggests  that  media  coverage  can  function  to  decrease  the  number  of 
people  in  favour  of  a  British  withdrawal.  This  fits  with  evidence  from  BBC 
research  carried  out  at  the  time  of  the  interview  with  an  INLA  representative  in 
1979.  As  a  result  of  watching  the  programme  a  majority  of  respondents  felt  a 
little  or  a  lot  more  sympathetic  to  the  British  Army  (65%)  and  a  little  or  a  lot 
more  hostile  to  both  the  INLA  (74%)  and  the  IRA  (67%).  However  a  total  of 
80%  of  respondents  also  felt  it  was  right  to  show  the  programme  (BBC  1980a). 
If  the  strategy  of  the  IRA  is  to'sicken'  the  British  public  out  of1reland,  then  it 
seems  that  there  is  a  double  sense  in  which  it  has  been  mistaken.  Firstly,  IRA 
operations,  which  kill  civilians  seem  to  result  in  British  public  opinion  moving  in 
favour  of  the  British  military  presence.  Secondly,  the  British  government  has 
shown  itself  perfectly  able  to  ignore  the  wishes  of  the  electorate  when  it  comes 
to  Ireland. 
According  to  some  commentators  British  public  opinion  cares  little  for  what 
happens  in  Northern  Ireland.  This  is  credited  in  some  accounts  to  the  activities 
of  the  IRA  and  the  long  lasting  nature  of  the  conflict.  Mark  Urban  argues  that 
public  opinion  in  Britain  is,  'desensitized  by  years  of  terrorism'  and  therefore, 
'tends  to  care  little  for  the  lives  of  its  perpetrators'  (Urban  1992:  243).  But  if  it  is 
true  that  the  British  public  cares  little  for  what  happens  in  Ireland,  then  we 
ought  to  ask  how  they  came  to  care  so  little.  It  is  precisely  the  objective  of 
British  government  public  relations  to  contain  the  Northern  Ireland  conflict  and 
thus  isolate  it  from  mainstream  British  politics.  In  that  sense  the  desensitization 
of  the  British  public  owes  something  to  successful  official  information  - 
management.  But  it  seems  likely  that  the  partial  success  of  the  strategy  of 
containment  has  meant  that  the  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  has  never  been  a 
popular  war.  The  consistent  majorities  in  favour  of  British  withdrawal  contrast 
markedly  with  the  sizable,  though  not  majority,  support  for  the  British 
interventions  in  the  Falklands/Malvinas  (Glasgow  University  Media  Group 
1985)  and  the  Gulf.  What  is  different  about  those  conflicts  is  the  active 
construction  of  the  Argentine  government  and  Saddam  Hussein  as  popular 
hate  figures  to  legitimate  military  intervention  (Philo  and  McLaughlin  1992).  'By 
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recede  from  the  front  pages  and  sink  into  obscurity.  However,  no  British 
elections  were  won  with  the  aid  of  military  success  in  Northern  Ireland.  Despite 
consistent  public  opposition  to  the  policy  of  successive  British  governments,  it 
has  never  been  the  policy  of  any  mainstream  British  party  to  implement  the 
popular  will.  Although  the  media  do  tend  to  benefit  the  government  it  is  also 
true  that  they  have  some  beneficial  effects  for  the  'terrorists'.  The  media  do 
play  a  role  in  setting  the  political  agenda. 
However,  counterinsurgency  theorists  misconceptualise  the  power  of  the 
media.  The  media  in  Britain  do  not  and  have  not  supported  the  Provisional 
Republican  movement.  Indeed,  both  Sinn  Fdin  and  the  IRA  have  been 
consistently  excoriated  in  the  mainstream  media.  In  addition  British  public 
opinion  has  not,  as  a  result  of  media  coverage  of  'terrorism'  fallen  in  behind  the 
IRA.  As  we  have  seen  opinion  surveys  show  very  low  levels  even  of  expressed 
#sympathy'  for  the  insurgents.  It  is  evident  that  the  media  have  a  central  part  to 
play  in  the  process  by  which  some  problems  emerge  onto  the  political  agenda 
and  come  to  be  seen  as  important.  This  is  why  both  the  British  government 
and  the  Republican  movement  have  regarded  public  relations  as  a  central  part 
of  their  respective  strategies. 
There  is  a  political  and  practical  dilemma  at  the  root  of  the  arguments 
advanced  by  the  counterinsurgents.  This  concerns  how  a  political  system 
which  claims  to  be  democratic  reacts  to  challenges  to  its  democratic  credentials 
by  an  armed  attack  its  legitimacy.  In  practice,  it  would  be  possible  to  counter 
the  limited  use  that  the  insurgents  are  able  to  make  of  the  media.  Such  moves 
would  have  to  include  much  stricter  censorship,  including  banning  the  reporting 
of  Sinn  F6in  as  once  obtained  under  Section  31  in  the  Republic  of  Ireland.  It 
would  also  be  necessary  to  go  further  and  prohibit  all  reporting  of  the  actions  of 
both  Sinn  FC-in  and  the  IRA  and  indeed  all  mentions  of  their  existence  not  only 
in  broadcasting,  but  in  the  press  as  well.  An  attempt  to  do  this  was  made  in  the 
Irish  Republic  in  the  middle  years  of  the  twentieth  century,  but  it  failed  when  the 
term  'illegal  organisation'  became  known  as  a  synonym  for  the  IRA  (Horgan 
1984).  Paramilitary  actions  would  have  to  be  kept  secret  even  if  the  Northern 
Ireland  Secretary  or  the  entire  cabinet  were  taken  hostage  or  assassinated  by 
the  terrorists'.  In  fact,  such  an  approach  was  recommended  by  Labour 
Northern  Ireland  Secretary  Roy  Mason  in  the  1970s  (see  Curtis  1984a:  162), 
but  no  serious  attempts  were  ever  made  to  introduce  such  a  measure.  if  it 
were,  international  journalists  would  have  to  be  kept  out  of  Northern  -Ireland 
and  attempts  by  the  Republican  Press  Centre  to  communicate  with  the  outside Winning  the  Information  Battle 
world  would  have  to  be  checked. 
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These  measures  would,  however,  be  ineffective  without  introducing  legal 
changes  such  as  the  banning  of  Sinn  Fdin  (and  any  successor)  to  prevent  them 
taking  part  in  elections.  Such  a  move  has  in  fact  been  recommended  by  Paul 
Wilkinson  (1990). 
However,  even  these  measures  would  not  ensure  the  defeat  of  the  'terrorists'. 
The  'armed  struggle'  would  continue,  but  it  would  not  have  the  same  capacity  to 
put  the  Northern  Ireland  problem  on  the  political  agenda.  Sweeping  legal 
changes  such  as  these  would  also  give  the  government  a  much  freer  hand  to 
'root  out'  the  'terrorists'  away  from  the  spotlight  of  the  media  in  a  manner 
reminiscent  of  some  Central  American  states.  Such  a  course  of  action  might  be 
hampered  by  an  increased  human  rights  interest  in  Northern  Ireland,  and 
conflict  with  international  organisations,  which  might  lead  to  government  action 
to  curtail  the  activities  of  human  rights  activists  in  Northern  Ireland  and  Britain. 
Were  we  to  adopt  such  a  course,  the  democracy  which  such  measures  were 
alleged  to  defend  would  have  disappeared  in  the  effort  to  decouple  law  from 
order.  The  fundamental  value  question  which  remains  is  do  we  want  to  go  any 
further  down  that  road? 
There  is,  at  first  sight,  a  disjunction  between  media  coverage  and  public 
opinion.  The  editorial  position  of  almost  all  of  the  press  is in  favour  of  the 
British  presence,  yet  a  majority  of  the  British  public  favour  withdrawal.  On 
closer  inspection,  however,  it  is  apparent  that  it  it  is  only  very  rarely  that  papers 
spell  out  their  view  on  the  British  presence.  When  they  do,  they  are  usually  - 
found  in  editorials  or  columns.  There  has  in  fact  been  no  campaign  in,  the 
British  media  to  convince  the  public  specifically  that  the  British  presence  ý,  is 
necessary.  Instead  the  dominant  themes  in  British  news  coverage  have-  been 
the  portrayal  of  the  IRA  as  criminals  and  terrorists  and  the  British  Army  as 
peacekeepers.  The  main  rationale  for  coverage  has  been  violence  covered 
without  context  or  explanation.  Although  official  sources  would  prefer  that 
Northern  Ireland  drifted  into  obscurity,  it  is  clear  that  the  portrayal  of  'terrorists' 
and  'peacekeepers'  fits  well  with  official  media  management  strategies. 
Furthermore,  the  audience  research,  reported  in  this  book,  indicated  that  such 
themes  dominate  British  public  understandings.  Key  aspects  of  the  official 
story  on  the  Gibraltar  killings  were  also  believed  by  a  large  proportion  of  people 
in  my  sample.  What  this  suggests  is  that  public  opinion  can  be  vinerable  to Wnning  the  Infonnation  Battle  280 
propaganda  offensives  by  official  sources.  However,  it  is  clear  that  the  impact 
of  the  media  is  variable,  depending,  amongst  other  things,  on  other  sources  of 
information  available,  prior  beliefs,  views  and  experience.  Nevertheless,  the 
most  important  conclusion  of  this  book  is  that  the  media  can,  under  certain 
circumstances,  have  a  strong  influence  on  public  perceptions  of  contemporary 
political  issues  and  allow  the  powerful  to  legitimate  their  actions. 
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says  'there  is  a  call  for  guidelines  and  policies  -  all  created  and  adopted  by  the  media  on  a 
voluntary  basis  and  not  for  dictates,  censorship  and  repression'  (Weimann  1988b:  84).  As  we 
saw  in  Chapter  One  such  'voluntary  agreements'  have  indeed  resulted  in  censorship,  and 
guidelines,  or  the  threat  of  them,  are  enough  to  severely  constrain  the  media.  -, 
5  Former  Israeli  Foreign  Minister,  Benjamin  Netanyahu,  has  expressed  this  in  his 
characteristically  forthright  way.  He  has  argued  that  'today's  terrorists  in  fact,  frighten  not 
thousands  but  millions.  But  they  could  not  achieve  this  result  without,  the  free  press. 
Unreported,  terrorist  acts  would  be  like  the  proverbial  tree  failing  in  the  silent  forest.  Even  if 
passed  by  word  of  mouth,  news  about  terrorist  outrages  would  hardly  command  the  attention  of 
government  leaders,  the  public  at  large,  and  indeed,  as  often  happens,  the  centre  of  the 
international  stage.  The  press  has  become  the  unwilling  -  and  in  some  cases,  willing  -  amplifier 
of  the  terrorists  publicity  campaign  (Netanyahu  1986:  109).  It  is  of  course  the  case  that  if 
enough  of  the  proverbial  trees  fell  unobserved  in  the  rain  forests,  -  and  this  was  not  reported  by 
the  news  media,  the  first  thing  we  would  know  about  it  would  be  when  the  oxygen  started  to  run 
out. 
6AIthough  his  views  appear  to  have  softened  by  the  following  year  when  he  recommended 
voluntary  agreements  between  broadcasters  and  the  government  (1978). 
7  Ironically  this  is  one  of  the  Gustified)  criticisms  which  Herman  makes  Of  the  work  of  liberal 
American  media  academics:  'Gatekeeper  analyses  usually  do  not  provide  any  extended 
treatment  of  actual  media  performance  and  impact  on  ideology  and  opinion.  They  also  offer 
little  in  the  way  of  dynamics  that  would  show  how  the  media  mobilise  public  opinion,  or  are Winning  the  Information  Battle  281 
manipulated  (or  co-operate)  in  mobillsation  by  others'  (Herman  1986:  174) 
8  For  a  critique  of  Moral  panic  theory  see  Miller  and  Reilly  1994. 
9  This  was  the  BBC's  thirteen  part  documentary  on  the  history  of  Ireland,  first  broadcast  in 
1981. 
10  See  for  example  Brunt,  1992,  and  the  exchange  between  Brunt  and  Janice  Radway  after 
her  paper.  Here  there  is  a  recommendation  that  analysts  should  not  'return  to  the  text'  as  if  it  is 
possible  to  research  the  impact  of  media  messages  without  knowing  what  those  messages  are. 
11  See  also  Fiske,  1991.  Such  formulations  can  be  found  widely  in  the  literature.  Peter 
Dahlgren,  for  example  writes:  'By  "meaning"  I  refer  here  to  the  processes  of  making  sense  of 
the  world  around  us.  It  has  to  do  with  a  general  coherence  in  our  lives,  of  establishing  an  order 
in  which  to  anchor  our  existence...  Meaning  is  negotiated;  it  resides  in  the  forcefield  between 
the  givenness  of  the  programmes  and  the  sense-making  of  the  viewers'  (Dahigren 
1992:  203+205) 
12  Although,  Sinn  FdIn  said  they  could  find  no  evidence  that  the  calls  were  authorised  and  one 
of  the  journalists  subsequently  returned  to  work  in  Northern  Ireland. 
13  At  least  one  British  newspapers  correspondent  in  Belfast  has  refused  on  principle  to  write 
'good  news'stories  Crelephone  interview,  May  1990).  Similarly,  Kevin  Cullen  of  the  Boston 
Globe  has  reported  coming  under  pressure  to  do  'good  news'  pieces  about  Northern  Ireland, 
particularly  about  integrated  education,  following  reportage  of  his  which  the  British  Consul 
General  in  Boston  told  him  was  'extraordinarily  negative'  (Telephone  Interview  January  1991). 
14  Although  the  Miffor  had  called  for  a  withdrawal  as  early  as  1972  in  the  aftermath  of  Bloody 
Sunday  (Curtis  1984:  315). 
15  In  1981  it  suggested  that  such  a  move  might  be  a  prelude  to  the  establishment  of  an 
Independent  'Ulster.  This  position  changed  with  the  appointment  of  right  wing'editor  Andrew 
Neil  in  1983. 
16  A  1976  NOP  poll  found  that  32%  would  prefer  the  British  government  to  withdraw  and  leave 
the  Protestants  and  Catholics  to  their  own  fate  while  25%  thought  the  government  should 
encourage  the  North  and  South  to  unite  into  one  country.  These  findings  are  matched  by  the 
split  throughout  the  1980s  between  those  favouring  an  independent  Northern  Ireland  and  those 
who  preferred  a  united  Ireland.  Between  1980  and  1984  there  was  between  30  and  37% 
support  for  the  former  and  between  18-25%  for  the  latter.  By  1991  the  figures  for  these 
questions  were  at  level  pegging  at  25%  each  (MORI  1991).  In  1991  MORI  also  found  that  only 
17%  thought  the  British  presence  had  been  helpful  to,  the  political  situation  in  Northern  Ireland, 
with  37%  saying  it  made  no  difference.  By  contrast  36%  of  people  thought  that  British  troops 
had  made  the  political  situation  worse  (MORI  1991). 
17Unless  otherwise  stated,  opinion  poll  data  in  the  following  section  is  taken  from  Curtis  1988; 
MORI  1991;  Rose  et  al  1978;  Wilson  1988  and  successive  editions  of  the  Gallup  Political  Index 
1981-1992. Appendix  I 
Unattributable  briefing  documents  issued  by  the  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office 
1980-1993 
1980 
Hunger  Strikes  Greyband  Brief,  October 
Protest  Campaign  In  Northern  Ireland  Prisons  Greyband  Brief,  October  (revised) 
1981 
Protest  Campaign  In  Northern  Ireland  Prisons  Greyband  Brief,  February  (revised) 
Northern  Ireland  and  Anglo/ldsh  Relations  Greyband  Brief,  February 
Non-Jury  (Diplock)  Courts  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  May 
Comment  on  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  May 
overseas  Comment  on  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  July 
Northern  Ireland:  Intimidation  Greyband  Brief,  August 
Hunger  Strikes  Greyband  Brief,  August  (revised) 
Irish  Terrorism's  Overseas  Supporters  Greyband  Brief,  October 
Comment  on  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  October 
The  Provisional  IRA's  Support  in  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  November 
Noraid  and  the  financing  of  the  Provisional  IRA  Greyband  Brief,  December  (revised) 
1982 
Human  Rights  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  February  (revised) 
Irish  Terrorist  contacts  in  Europe  and  the  Third  World  Greyband  Brief,  May 
The  IRA:  Finance  and  Weapons  from  the  United  States  Greyband  Brief,  July 
Northern  Ireland:  A  New  Political  Initiative  Greyband  Brief,  September 
Northern  Ireland:  Constitutional  Proposals  1972-82  Greyband  Brief,  September, 
The  Extreme  Irish  Republican  Movement:  Aims  and  Ideology  Greyband  Brief,  October 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Extreme  Republican  Vote  Greyband  Brief,  November 
Comment  on  Northern  Ireland:  What  the  Churches  say  about  Terrorism  Greyband  Brief, 
November 
Comment  on  Northern  Ireland:  The  Ballykelly  Massacre  Greyband  Brief,  December 
Civil  Rights  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  December 
Comment  on  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  December 
1983 
Northern  Ireland:  Riot  Control  and  Baton  Rounds  Greyband  Brief,  January 
"Loyalist"  Paramilitary  Organisations  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  May  (revised) 
The  IRA  and  Noraid  Greyband  Brief,  June 
Irish  Terrorism  and  Overseas  Revolutionaires  Greyband  Brief,  August  (revised) 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Economy  and  Employment  Greyband  Brief,  August  (revised) 
Northern  Ireland:  Accountability  of  the  Security  Forces  to  the  Law  Greyband  Brief,  August 
Northern  Ireland:  Transfer  of  Prisoners  Greyband  Brief,  August 
Northern  Ireland:  The  work  of  the  Assembly  Greyband  Brief,  August 
Northern  Ireland:  Electoral  abuse  by  the  Provisionals  Greyband  Brief,  September 
Northern  Ireland:  Converted  Terrorists  Greyband  Brief,  November 
The  New  Sinn  Fein  Greyband  Brief,  November  1983 
The  Provisional  Republican  Movement  Greyband  Brief,  November 
1984 
The  Provisional  Republican  Movement:  Sinn  Fein  Greyband  Brief,  February 
Northern  Ireland:  Emergency  Legislation  Greyband  Brief,  May 
Libya  and  Irish  Terrorism  Background  Brief,  June 
Human  Rights  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  June 
The  Provisional  Republican  Movement:  The  IRA  Greyband  Brief,  July 
Libya's  Foreign  Relations  Background  Brief,  August 
Human  Rights  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  September  (revised) 
The  Provisional  IRA  and  Noraid  Greyband  Brief,  September 
1985 
The  Attitude  of  the  churches  to  Irish  terrorist  activities  Greyband  Brief,  ru  ry  . 
Feb  a 
Risk  Control  and  Baton  Rounds  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  May 
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Northern  Ireland:  The  Economy  and  Employment  Greyband  Brief,  July 
The  Provisional  IRA's  Punishment  Tactics  Greyband  Brief,  September 
The  Security  Forces  in  Northern  Ireland:  Controversial  Incidents  Greyband  Brief,  November 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Extreme  Republican  Vote  Greyband  Brief,  November 
Non-Jury  (Diplock)  Courts  In  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  December 
1986 
International  Reaction  to  Terrorism  Background  Brief,  January 
The  Anglo-Irish  Agreement,  1985  Greyband  Brief,  January 
Libya:  Second  International  Conference  against  Imperialism  Background  Brief,  April 
Libyan  State  Terrorism  Background  Brief,  April 
Gadaffl  and  Irish  Terrorism  Greyband  Brief,  April 
Unionist  reaction  to  the  Anglo-Irish  Agreement  Greyband  Brief,  May 
International  Terrorism:  The  European  Response  Background  Brief,  June 
The  Provisional  Movement  and  Noraid  Greyband  Brief,  October 
The  Anglo-Irish  Agreement:  One  Year  Later  Greyband  Brief,  November 
The  Provisional  Republican  Movement:  The  IRA  Greyband  Brief,  November 
1987 
Riot  Control  and  Baton  Rounds  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  January 
The  Security  Forces  In  Northern  Ireland:  Controversial  Incidents  Greyband  Brief,  January 
Northern  Ireland:  Accountability  of  the  Security  Forces  to  the  Law  Greyband  Brief,  February 
Northern  Ireland:  Transfer  of  prisoners  Greyband  Brief,  February 
Sinn  Fein:  Abstentionism  and  the  Irish  General  Election  Greyband  Brief,  March 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Economy  and  Employment  Greyband  Brief,  April 
Northern  Ireland:  Converted  Terrorists  Greyband  Brief,  May 
Northern  Ireland:  The  extreme  Republican  vote  Greyband  Brief,  June 
Northern  Ireland:  Accountability  of  the  Security  Forces  to  the  Law  Greyband  Brief,  June 
(revised) 
The  Irish  National  Liberation  Army  Greyband  Brief,  July 
Human  Rights  In  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  August 
The  Provisional  Republican  Movement:  Sinn  Fein  Greyband  Brief,  September 
Comment:  Enniskillen  Remembrance  Day  Atrocity  Greyband  Brief,  November 
Northern  Ireland:  Finance  for  Terrorism  Greyband  Brief,  December 
1988 
The  Provisional  IRA:  International  contacts  outside  the  United  States  Greyband  Brief, 
January 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Background  and  the  Facts  FCO  Briefing  January 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Economy  and  Employment  Greyband  Brief,  January 
Northern  Ireland  since  the  Anglo-Irish  Agreement  Greyband  Brief,  February 
Non-jury  (Diplock)  courts  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  May 
Recent  atrocities  by  the  Provisional  IRA  Greyband  Brief,  August 
Libya:  External  Relations  and  Activities  Background  Brief,  October 
Fair  Employment  in  Northern  Ireland  Greyband  Brief,  October 
The  Provisional  Republican  Movement:  Sinn  Fein  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  November  (revised) 
"Loyalist"  Paramilitary  Organisations  in  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  November 
Northern  Ireland:  Emergency  Legislation  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  December 
1989 
Northern  Ireland:  Accountability  of  the  Security  Forces  to  the  Law  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  June 
Recent  civilian  victims  of  the  Provisional  IRA  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  June 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Economy  and  Employment  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  August 
Riot  control  and  baton  rounds  in  Northern  Ireland  Northem  Ireland  Brief,  October  (revised) 
1990 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Background  and  the  Facts  FCO  Briefing,  January 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Economy  and  Employment  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  April 
Northern  Ireland:  Accountability  of  the  Security  Forces  to  the  Law  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  June 
(revised) 
Fair  Employment  in  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  October 284 
1991 
The  Provisional  IRA's  Campaign  of  Terror  Comment  and  selected  chronologies  Northern 
Ireland  Brief,  January 
Northern  Ireland  Prisons  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  February 
Education  In  Northern  Ireland:  A  new  direction  Northem  Ireland  Brief,  March 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Background  and  the  Facts  FCO  Briefing,  April 
Community  Relations  In  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  June 
Northern  Ireland:  Emergency  Legislation  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  September 
Fair  Employment  in  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  October  (revised) 
"Loyalist"  Paramilitary  Organisations  in  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  December 
IRA  and  Sinn  Fein  Propaganda  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  December 
1992 
The  Urban  Regeneration  of  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  January 
The  Tourist  Industry:  Northern  Ireland's  growing  asset  Background  Brief,  February 
The  Provisional  IRA's  Campaign  of  Terror  Comment  and  selected  chronologies  Northem 
Ireland  Brief,  April 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Protection  of  Human  Rights  Northem  Ireland  Brief,  May 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Economy  and  Employment  Background  Brief,  June 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Royal  Irish  Regiment  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  June 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Background  and  the  Facts  FCO  Bdefing,  June 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Sinn  Fein  vote  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  June 
Education  in  Northern  Ireland:  A  new  direction  Background  Brief,  July 
Northern  Ireland:  Opportunities  for  Investment  Background  Brief,  August 
Northern  Ireland  and  the  European  Community  Background  Brief,  October 
"Loyalist"  Paramilitary  Organisations  in  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  December 
1993 
Northern  Ireland:  Compensation  for  criminal  damage  and  criminal  injuries  Northern  Ireland 
Brief,  January 
Northern  Ireland:  The  MacBride  Principles  Campaign  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  January 
Fair  Employment  In  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  January  (revised) 
Non-jury  (Diplock)  courts  In  Northern  Ireland  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  February 
Northern  Ireland  Prisons  Northem  Ireland  Brief,  April 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Protection  of  Human  Rights  Northern  Ireland  Brief,  May 
The  Provisional  IRA's  Campaign  of  Terror  Comment  and  selected  chronologies  Northern 
Ireland  Brief,  August 
Northern  Ireland:  The  Background  and  the  Facts  FCO  Briefing,  September 285 
Appendix  2 
Cost  of  Press,  Public  Relations,  Advertising  and  Marketing  by  official  bodies  in  Northern 
Ireland 
NIO  Press 
and  PR 
NIO 
Advertising 
NIO  Total 
press,  PR  & 
Advertising 
Army 
Infonnation 
Services 
NI  Tourist 
Board 
Industrial 
Developme 
nt  Boardl 
1969/70  El  84,100  N/A 
1970/71  N/A  N/A 
_  1971/72  N/A  N/A 
_  1972f73  E432,638  N/A  N/A 
_  1973f74  El  11,000  E753,952  E864,952  N/A 
1974175  E833,543  N/A  N/A 
1  975/76  E343,4672  N/A  N/A 
_  1  976n7  E584,5653  N/A 
_  I  977/78  N/A  N/A 
_  I  978/79  N/A  N/A 
_  1979/80  E615.3974  E1,900.209  f-2,515,606  N/A 
1980/81  E715.502  E1.556,528  f-2,272,030  N/A 
1981/82  E883,079  E2,206.899  E3,089,978  N/A  E909,998 
1982/83  E1,027.492  E3,157,901  E4,185,393  N/A  E1,252,813  E782,000 
1983/84  E1.222.094  E5.765,690  E6.987,784  E216,000  E1,216,314  E3,145,000 
1984/85  E1,800,124  E5.405,516  E7,205,640  E230,000  El,  356,344  E2,924,000 
I  985/86  E2,300,482  E7.638,743  E9,939,225  f-240,000  _  E1,194,574  E3,785,000 
_  1986/87  f-2,714,909  E7,216,478  E9.931,387  E122,000  E1,471,509  E4,372,000 
1987/88  E5,675.209  E4,028,2594  E9,703,468  E130,000  E1,864,659  E4,455,00 
1  988/89  E9,184,086  E4.606,655 
- 
El  3,790,741  El  40,000  f-2,031,817  E5,071,000 
_  1989/90  El  1,464.663  E5,227,759  El  6,692,422  N/A  f-2,300,666  E5,234,000 
1990/91  E12.713.869  E5,886.796  El  8,600,665  N/A  f-2,761,955  E5,626,000 
1991/92  E5,701.719*  E7,387,167  El  3,088,886  N/A  E1,684,129  E5,481,000 
.  1992/93  E6.048.241'  E7.988.100  I  E14,036,341  N/A  E3,515,498  E4,490,000 
Note:  These  figures  are  compiled  in  the  main  from  Hansard  (and  for  1970M,  the  Stormont 
Hansard).  They  are  only  as  accurate  as  the  civil  service  makes  them.  In  particular,  the  figures 
given  for  NIO  spending  on  Press  and  PR  work  have  often  been  contradicted  by  data  given 
elsewherte  in  Hansard.  Figures  on  NIO  Press  and  PR  work  from  1979/80  to  1990/91  leave  out 
all  spending  at  the  London  Office  of  the  NIO  or  the  costs  of  Departmental  PR.  I  have  tried  to 
use  figures  which  are  most  consistent  with  each  other,  although  when  there  was  a  straight 
contradiction,  I  have  used  the  higher  figure.  Figures  for  RUC  spending  are  not  available. 
Footnotes 
1  The  Industrial  Development  was  formed  in  1982. 
2  This  figure  covers  1  January  1975  to  31  December  1976,  rather  than  the  financial  year 
(Hansard,  16  July  1976:  94) 
3  This  figure  Is  unlikely  to  be  accurate  since  it  is  less  then  the  total  spent  on  advertising  alone 
in  1974175, 
4  Figures  in  this  column  down  to  the  year  1990/91  are  obtained  by  adding  the  separate 
departmental  spends  given  in  Hansard,  2  April  1990:  451-452.  These  figures  are  plainly 
inaccurate  between  the  years  1979  and  1984  since  for  this  period  the  only  expenditure  given  is 
for  the  NI  departments.  Clearly  the  NIO  Information  Service  in  London  and  E3elfast  did  not  run 
on  nothing  in  this  period.  This  fact  also  means  that  the  figures  given  in  1986,  which  don't 
match  those  given  in  1990,  are  also  inaccurate,  since  they  are  only  slightly  different. 
#  Figures  in  this  column  from  1987/88  do  not  include  spending  by  Northern  Ireland 
Departments  on  advertising.  In  1986187  this  amounted  to:  E3,428,850  of  total  NIO  spending. 
*  Spending  on  Press  and  PR  in  the  Northern  Ireland  Departments  is  not  available. 286 
Appendix  3 
PR  staffing  levels  In  official  bodies  In  Northem  Ireland 
NIO 
Total 
Information 
Officers 
NIO 
Total 
Staff 
Army  RUC 
police  staff 
RUC  civilian 
staff 
1969  2  1  11 
1970  12 
1971  40 
1972  14 
1973 
1974  333 
1975  27  62 
1976  26  60  404 
1977  26  57  12  3 
1978  275  60 
1979  246  56 
1980  25  54 
1981  20 
' 
43  1  21  71 
1982  26  41  148 
609 
4 
1983  19  39 
1984  19  1  38  4 
1985  19  38  5  7 
1986  19  55(58)  7 
1987  19  37  58  7 
1988  63(58)  7 
1989  50(52)  3  61  (56)  7.5 
1990  54(61)  61  (56)  7.5 
1991  58(60)  4  51  (46)  13.5 
1992  58.5 
-J  -i 
i 
Footnotes 
I  Letter  from  Bill  McGookin,  RUC,  26  June  1991 
2  'at  least'  (Foot,  1990:  9) 
3  In  March,  during  the  power  sharing  Executive.  By  October,  after  its  fall,  there  were  25. 
4  In  February  (Curtis,  1984a:  253). 
5  On  1  January.  By  July  there  were  24. 
6  On  1  January.  By  1  May  there  were  25. 
7  Curtis  1984a. 
a  before  the  creation  of  FCIC  (Murtagh  1982). 
9  after  the  creation  of  FCIC  (Hamilton-Tweedale  1987). 
10  Figures  in  brackets  refer  to  authorised  posts.  They  are  included  only  where  there  is  a 
difference  between  authorised  and  filled  posts. 287 
Appendix4 
Groups  taking  part  In  the  General  Study 
No.  of 
groups 
No.  of 
participants 
General  Scottish  groups 
SACRO  1  8  Society  of  Telecom  Executives  1  4  Glasgow  School  of  Art,  2nd  Year  Students  1  5  Bruntsfield  Hospital  staff  1  14 
Total  4  31 
General  English  groups 
Harrow  Victims  Support  Group  1  10  Chislehurst  Nelghbourhood  Watch  1  7  Pensioners  Keep  FR.  Shepherds  Bush  1  12 
Total  3  29 
Soldiers 
Redford  Barracks  1  19 
Total  1  19 
Nationalist  groups  in  Northern  Ireland 
Cromac  Street  1  2  Lower  Ormeau  Road  Women  1  2  Turf  Lodge,  West  Belfast  1  5  Suffolk  Community  services  Group  1  4  Total  4  13 
Unionist  groups  In  Northern  Ireland 
Shankill  Womens  Group  1  8  Dee  Street  Community  Centre  1  6 
Total  2  14 
Mixed  group 
Farset  1  8 
Total  1  8 
American  Students  1  26 
Totals  - 
TO 
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Appendix  5 
Groups  taking  part  In  the  Gibraltar  study 
No.  of  No.  of 
Groups  Participants 
General  Scottish  group 
Sa  Itcoats  Workers  Educational  Association  1  7 
SACRO  I  is 
Glasgow  College  of  Technology 
2nd  Year  Communication  Studies  students  1  9 
Ardrossan  Senior  CltiZen3  1  32 
Paisley  Lunch-time  Forum  1  6 
Glasgow  School  of  Art  Second  year  students  1  14 
Total  6  83 
Soldiers 
Redford  Barracks,  Edinburgh  1  20 
Total  1  20 
Northern  Ireland  groups 
West  Belfast  Parent  Youth  Support  Project  I 
Suffolk  Community  Service  Group  1  4 
Total  2  12 
American  Students 
US  Students  at  Manchester  University  1  24 
us  Students  at  Glasgow  University  1  4 
Total  2  28 
Totals  iT  143 References 
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